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SUMMARY 
At independence in 1964, Malta's economy remained entirely dependent upon 
the revenue and employment provided by the British and NATO fortress on 
the Islands. The implications of this dependence were serious as, in 1957, 
the British Ministry of Oefence had announced its intention to run down, 
and eventually to terminate its military involvement in the Maltese Islands. 
faced with the imminent loss of a substantial proportion of the economy's 
revenue and employment, successive Maltese Governments (of both the major 
political parties) adopted vigorous economic diversification strategies. 
It was generally accepted that domestically generated economic development 
was impossible, and that economic diversification could only be achieved 
through the deliberate attraction of overseas enterprise. Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) were therefore invited to participate in, and develop 
the three crucial sectors of the Maltese eCQnomy - the dockyards, the new 
manufacturing sector, and tourism. 
Inevitably, the attraction of MNCs into the crucial sectors of the economy 
ensured that control of the economy was placed in the hands of overseas 
entrepreneurs, whose interests were not necessarily consistent with those 
of the Maltese Islands. The subsequent development of strongly dependent 
dual structures throughout key areas of the Maltese economy had by 1980 
induced extreme economic instability. 
Given this background, the intention of this thesis has been to evaluate 
Malta's post-independence development record. One of the best means of 
achieving this aim was seen as to be the adoption and adaption of a number 
of themes contained within 'dependency theory'. This avenue of enquiry 
has proved to be rewarding in two ways. first, the various concepts of 
xvi 
of dependence have helped to shed light upon the development experiences 
of Malta. Also important, however, is the fact that the Maltese case has 
itself raised many relevant questions concerning the application of 
dependency theory in empirical studies. 
The thesis itself can be divided into three distinct sections. Section 
One briefly discusses development, and then proceeds to examine the concept 
of dependenc~. Of particular interest is the degree to which dependency 
theory is applicable to small countries, and the role of MNCs in the 
generation of dependence. Section Two provides the essential historical 
background to Malta's current position, and Section Three sets about 
examining in some detail the development of the Maltese economy, with 
particular reference to the growth of manufacturing industry and tourism. 
The conclusions of the thesis again fall into two distinct groups. With 
respect to dependency theory, it seems that dependency themes can be of 
substantial use in the evaluation of a country's development process. 
With respect to Malta, it is apparent that Malta in the 1980s is facing 
a crisis of dependence that is rather more severe than that which faced 
the Islands at independence in 1964. The problem has clearly been that 
of excess dependence upon MNC subsidiaries. On the one hand, MNCs are 
seen as essential due to the inability of the domestic economy to generate 
its own industry. On the other hand, the dependent structures that have 
ensued have proved to be unstable and unreliable. Clearly, a compromise 
situation is desirable in which Government intervention ensures that 
foreign industries are attracted to the Islands, but that they are 
attracted selectively, and that their less desirable activities arB 
meticulously restricted by the Government. 
xvii 
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I NTRODUCTI ON 
INTRODUCTION 
Aims Of The Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate Malta's post-independence 
economic development. This involves an extensive study of the evolution 
of Malta's economic structure since political independence was achieved 
from Great Britain in 1964. This particular period of Maltese history 
is deeply significant as it represents a phase in which the country 
attempted to progress away from centuries of overseaS dominance. At 
independence in 1964, Malta's economic structure remained completely 
dominated by the British Fortress, which had sustained the Islands since 
the expulsion of the french in 1800. The imminent departure of the 
British forces, announced in a British defence White Paper (HMSO 1957), 
necessitated a rapid economic development programme designed to comp-
ensate for an inevitable and substantial loss of national income. The 
development programme that ensued conformed to the traditional diffusion-
ist pattern (see Chapter One), a~d placed faith in the pro~agation of 
a manufacturing sector from which it was hoped widespread prosperity 
would radiate. This thesis is, in effect, a study of the features and 
consequences of the adopted development strategy. 
BeCause of the very nature of the study, it is inevitable that it 
contains some criticism of the various development programmes embarked 
upon by the Maltese authorities. It is therefore important that it is 
recognised that the aim of this work is not to favour or attack either of 
the two political Parties that have competed for power in Malta since 
1964. The thesis is, in contrast, motivated by a strong affection for 
the Maltese people as a whole, whom the author has, during his visits to 
the Archipelago, grown to admire and respect deeply. 
1 
The major theme which emerges throughout the study is that of dependence 
a condition which may be used to describe Malta's inability to achieve 
self-sustained development since independence in 1964. During the 1960s, 
and possibly to a lesser extent during the 1970s, economic, political and 
strategic circumstances combined to foster Malta's dependence upon 
external states and institutions, most notably Great Britain. Signifi-
cantly, dependence has in many ways become a major bone of contention 
between ~alta's two warring political Parties, who are unable to agree 
both about the extent and desirability of dependence, especially upon 
Great Britain. One of the major aims of this study is therefore to 
examine the role of dependance in Malta's development strategy. In 
formal terms, the ultimate purpose of the thesis is to test the general 
hypothesis that, despite the provision of nominal independence, the 
Maltese Islands remain as dependent now as they were in 1964, just prior 
to the end of colonial rule. 
Specific Objectives 
The concept of dependence is most conveniently and completely contained 
within a body of so called 'Dependency Theory'. There are, 
however, problems associated with the use of Dependency Theory in the 
Maltese case. Cne of the major difficulties stems from the theory itself, 
which is neither unified (Siersteker 1979), nor always suited to applic-
ation in empirical studies (Seers 1981). furthermore, some branches of 
Dependency Theory are based upon the impossibility of dependent development 
frank0967), an assumption that is shown to dubious by the experiences of 
a number of newly industrialising countries throughout the world. Many of 
the problems associated with .the use of Dependency Theory in the Maltese 
case stem also from the exceptional characteristics of ~lalta , which defy 
many of the fundamental tenets of the dependency literature. One of the 
2 
first objectives of this thesis is therefore to adapt Dependency Theory, 
thereby producing a number of dependency themes (or vectors) through 
which Malta's development programmes may be evaluated. 
One of the few characteristics which the many manifestations of Depend-
ency Theory have in common is the adoption of an historical approach to 
dependence. All agree that the failure to account for historical factors, 
and a corresponding adoption of a static approach to develcpment studies, 
invalidates such studies. The historical component is in fact one of the 
most encouraging and redeeming features of Dependency Theory (~alma 1981), 
and it is for this reason that one of the major objectives of this study 
is to provide both a general account of recent Maltese history, and a 
synopsis of the evolution of Malta's post-independence economic structures. 
It should then be possible to apply the themes and ideas previously . 
extracted from the dependency literature to the Maltese case. finally, it 
will be possible to proceed from the above analysis to an assessment both 
of Malta's current position, and her short and long term prospects. 
Background 
One of the major reasons for this study's concern with the Maltese 
Islands is the fact that the funding which has sustained this research 
was an award linked to study in the Western Mediterranean, at the 
University of Glasgow. Given, therefore, that a topic within the 
Western Mediterranean region had to be chosen, there were a number of 
reasons for the choice of Malta as a study area. First, it appears that, 
on the surface at least, Malta has itself become a challenge to many of 
the conclusions that emerge from Dependency Theory. This is because, 
despite being heavily dependent upon Great Britain and the E.E.C. as a 
whole, she has, in conventional terms, achieved impressive levels of 
development. Second, and perhaps most important, is the fact that ~alta 
is a nation of manageable size. Under normal circumstances, a research 
project concerned with the development of an entire nation would encounter 
severe problems of scale that would in the long term only be soluble 
through undesirable generalisation. In the case of Malta, a more 
detailed national coverage is possible, and is exemplified by the fact 
that even a small industrial questionnaire can quite easily account for a 
comparatively large and representative portion of the Nation's manufact-
uring activity. 
Another of the major advantages of Malta as a study area is the widespread 
availability of official statistics. It seems that Maltese Government 
departments are highly efficient at producing large quantities of stat-
istics, and that the statistical volumes within which they ars published 
remain amongst the cheapest in Europet There are, however, doubts as to 
the reliability of some of the Government data, a problem which will be 
discussed later in this 'Introduction'. On a positive note, one of the 
most important advantages of the official statistics is that they are 
published in English. This particular bonus is especially important in a 
wider context as communication has never been a problem during studies in 
the Maltese Islands. In consequence, the translation difficulties and 
ambiguities associated with work in non-English speaking western Medi-
terranean field areas have been avoided. 
In summary, it must be recognised that, given the regional origins of its 
research, this thesis is primarily concerned with the development of the 
Maltese Islands. As a consequence of this emphasis, the study has become 
directly concerned with a number of important development themes, most 
obviously related to the practical value of Dependency Theory in develop-
ment studies, and equally important, the special conditions facing small 
countries when formulating development strategies. 
On a philosophical note, it is perhaps important at this stage to place 
this research in a suitable bracket within the Social Sciences. The 
author is, by training, a Geographer, and much of the motivation and 
thought behind the thesis has therefore been from a geographical pers-
pective. There is, nevertheless, a great deal of material contained _ 
within the study which is heavily economic, and consequently not necas-
sarily consistent with traditional definitions of Geography. It is, 
however, the author's belief that one of Human Geography's most important 
roles has been, and continues to be, as a coordinating force within the 
body of the Social Sciences. Human Geography (and Geography as a whole) 
is by its very nature multi-disciplinary, and one of its greatest strengths 
is therefore its ability to make use (and sense) of material from other 
Social Science disciplines such as Economics, Economic History, Politics 
and Sociology. Bearing the above in mind, it should be assumed that 
this is a Social Science Ph.D. thesis, and that as a consequence of (rather 
than in spite of) its multi-disci~linary nature, it is simultaneously a 
thesis in Geography. 
There are, meanwhile, other philosophical problems which must be resolved. 
for example, the study is, at the outset, critical of the current world 
economic system, and in particular, the manner in which it influences 
countries such as Malta. At the same time, the author was determined not 
to become trapped and governed by the scriptures of either the dominant 
(capitalist) or alternative (anti-capitalist) paradigms that mould so 
much of contemporary Human Geography. There have therefore been constant 
attempts throughout the thesis to retain at least some cegree of object-
ivity. It would, nevertheless, be foolish to suggest that a study of 
this nature could be genuinely objective. Thus, it is preferable to think 
of the contents of this thesis as conforming rather more with the 
characteristics of 'neo-positivism' as explained by Pocock and Hudson (1978). 
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Such an approach may be seen as one which attempts to make use of the 
objectivity of the pure sciences, whilst simultaneously attempting to 
remain conscious of the many sources of subjectivity that are endemic 
within social science research. 
In the case of this particular study, the attempted maintenance of some 
degree of balance is especially important as Malta's development strategy 
has since 1964 been moulded by both the major (and widely differing) 
political Parties in the Islands, as well as the previous British colonial 
administration. As has already been explained in this chapter, this 
thesis is deliberately designed not to favour either of the two political 
~arties, and given the high degree of political sensitivity in the 
Islands, is therefore obliged to maintain a' semblance of objectivity. 
Research Design 
The first section of the thesis contains five chapters, all of which are 
concerned with general development issues. Chapter One introduces a 
number of development themes which are extended within Chapter Two into 
a discussion of Dependency Theory. Although there are many problems 
associated with the use of Dependency Theory, the retrieval and adaption 
of a number of dependency ideas is shown to be possible. One of the most 
important themes to emerge from the discussion is the vital role of the 
Multinational Corporation (MNC) in dependency arguments, and ~oints to 
this effect are explained within Chapter Three. Dependency Theory's 
serious problems of empirical application are then considered, and Chapter 
four shows that the characteristics and experiences of small countries are 
particularly difficult to accommodate within most dependency analyses. 
Chapter five introduces Malta as a small country, and attempts to 
formulate a dependency based analytical framework through which ~altese 
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post-independence development may be evaluated. 
Section One is therefore designed to produce a theoretical base around 
which the remainder of the thesis can be structured. Because of the 
strong historical component of Dependency Theory, Section Two of the 
thesis is strongly historical. This has 2 advantages, which are that 
it provides vital background information, and that it also covers a 
large part of the existing available literature on modern Malta. 
Inevitably, it is impossible to ignore the important influence of the 
immediate pre-independence period upon events following independence in 
1964. The first chapter of Section Two (Chapter Six) is, as a result, 
devoted to relevant events occurring in colonial Malta before 1964. The 
remaining 2 chapters of the section are divided neatly between the 2 
distinct eras of post-independence government. Thus, Chapter Seven 
deals with the era of Nationalist Party administration between 1964 and 
1971, and Chapter Eight the era of labour Party administration that has 
extended from 1971 to the present day. 
Section Three constitutes the main body of the thesis, and on the basis 
of the material already discussed, involves a more detailed analysis of 
the Maltese economy and its evolution since 1964. The cultivation of 
manufacturing industry has formed the most important element in all post-
independence Maltese development strategies, and has in consequence been 
responsible for the development of some of the most significant dependent 
structures within the Maltese economy. for this reason, Chapters Nine, 
Ten and Eleven are devoted to an examination of manufacturing industry 
as a whole, and in turn, the important Textiles and Metals sectors. Most 
of the data used in these chapters is both aggregate in nature, and 
produced from official Government sources. The discussion at this stage 
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is therefore confined to the macro-level. In contrast, Chapter Twelve 
provides the results and interpretations of an industrial questionnaire 
carried out in Malta during Autumn 1980. This particular chapter is 
especially important because it provides more detailed information at 
the micro-level about Maltese manufacturing industry,which augments the 
material already provided at the macro-level. It is also important 
because it is, in some instances, able to test the validity of some of 
the statistics on which the analysis was forced to depend in earlier 
stages of the thesis. 
The final chapter of Section Three (Chapter Thirteen) is distinct from 
the others because it deals with the Tourist Industry in the Islands, and 
is thus not concerned directly with manufacturing activity. It was 
felt that the inclusion of a chapter on tourism was vital because of the 
central role played by tourism (alongside manufacturing activity) in 
Maltese post-independence development strategy. furthermore, the extra-
ordinary dependency links displayed by the tourist sector are ample 
evidence that the exclusion of the tourism material would be both foolish 
and illogical. However, perhaps the most important feature of the tourist 
industry in Malta is the fact that the dependent structures from which it 
suffers are remarkably similar to those of the manufacturing sector, and 
indeed, that they result from the same overseas oriented development 
strategies. 
Methods and Assumptions 
This thesis is an empirical study which attempts to utilize a body of 
theory that, by its very nature, is poorly suited to empirical application. 
There have, in fact, been few studies that have attempted to use 
Dependency Theory in such a manner (e.g. Jongkind 1979), and those that 
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have have often done so with the intention of discrediting the concept of 
dependence. This study is different in that it chooses to extract and 
adopt certain acceptable and practicable dependency themes,through which 
an evaluation of Malta's post-independence development is attempted. In 
the final analysis, therefore, both the integrity of Malta's development 
strategies and the validity of the adopted dependency ideas are under 
scrutiny. As will become clear from the early chapters, the most 
important assumption contained within the study is that the concept of 
dependence is itself viable in development studies. 
One of the most important features of the study is its dependence upon, 
and use of, large quantities of statistical data. Although there were 
startling omissions from certain Government statistical publications -
particularly where the data involved was politically sensitive - official 
publications yielded large quantities of information that have been used 
extensively, especially in Section Three of the thesis. There are, 
however, certain potential problems associated with the official data. 
One of the most obvious concerns the definition of industrial sectors, 
and subsequent inconsistencies resulting from the aggregation of data. 
The Maltese have not always grouped their statistics in internationally 
compatible categories, and indeed have not always grouped their statistics 
in the same waY1. furthermore, there is no doubt that in Malta, as in 
most other countries, the manipulation and presentation of official data 
occurs in the interests of the established power groups. The dependence 
of this study upon such statistics is, unfortunately, unavoidable, and 
it is therefore necessary to assume that the inaccuracies that result are 
not sufficiently serious to invalidate the analysis. 
The official statistics are, in any case, augmented by the use of some data 
1. This particular problem applies to almost every national and inter-
national institution that produces statistics of this type. 
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collected in the field. This not only serves to reinforce the findings 
based on the official data, but also helps to shed light upon the under-
lying structures within the Maltese economy. In the process, it is hoped 
that the micro-level data will reveal some of the anomalies created by the 
manipulation of official statistics. However, perhaps the most important 
contribution of the data provided by the questionnaire survey is the fact 
that, unlike the official macro-level statistics, it is not implicitly 
diffusionist in approach. As has already been stated, this study is 
intended to be critical of diffusionist development approaches, and a 
study completely dependent upon statistics produced by the diffusionist 
school (e.g. Keynesian aggregate measures such as G.D.P.) would therefore 
be unsound. 
In conclusion, the validity of this thesis is dependent upon the assump-
-tions that dependence is a valid yardstick in the evaluation of development 
strategy, and that the widespread use of official Maltese statistics does 
not impair the conclusions of the analysis. 
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SECTION ONE 
CHAPTER ONE: FERSPECTIVES ON 'DEVELO~~ENT' 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with an evaluation of ~laltese post-independence 
development, but before this can be achieved, some discussion of the 
meaning of the term 'development' is necessary. The need for some degree 
of discussion is enhanced by the fact that, throughout recent history, 
concepts of development have altered dramatically, contributing to the 
current diverse body of development theory. 
There is,in fact, no single concept of development, as it has through the 
years acquired different meanings and connotations. It is, however, 
possible in simple terms to describe development as both a process and a 
potential state of being. A state of development implies a situation in 
which a society has become autonomous and is entirely in control of its 
own destiny. Thus, a state of development ideally should permit man to 
make his own history under conditions of his own choosing. The process 
of development is the means by which such conditions of human existence 
may be aChieved. According to Lee (1981), such 'means' involve man in 
a productive crisis-free and non-exploitive set of relations with nature, 
and in a strugsle to remove oppression and exploitation from the relations 
between men. He goes on to argue that, by these Utopian standards, no 
society has yet achieved a state of development, and further, that it is 
likely that no society has yet engaged in a true development process. 
The implication, therefore, is that development in the real world is an 
imperfect process, and that as a condition, it does not yet exist. This 
explains the acceptance of the term development in many development 
studies as a process rather than a state. Significantly, the development 
process has traditionally be2n seen as being dependent upon economic 
11 
growth induced primarily by industrialisation. Stohr and Todtling (1977) 
have observed that development on both a regional and a national scale 
has in the past been governed by neo-classical economic theory. Traditional 
examples include the belief in sector theory, which advocates the 
implantation of a 'leading sector' from which other activity can develop, 
thereby helping to diffuse the benefits of development throughout a territ-
ory. Similarly, export base theory was based on the assumption that a 
territory's income is essentially a function of its export performance. 
Thus, the establishment of an export staple was seen as a vital engine of 
development. These, and other manifestations of neo-classical theory 
also tended to place great faith in the auto-corrective nature of the 
market system, which it was thought constituted the most satisfactory 
means through which the benefits accruing from the development process 
could be fairly distributed. 
In a historical context, the years of the Great Depression in the early 
decades of the 20th century represented a period in which there occurred 
a massive disequilibrium in the world econmic system that the neo-
classical economists were unable either to explain or counter. Although 
this era inspired the birth of Keynesian economics, it was not until after 
World War Two that the complexion of development theory altered signifi-
cantly. Because of the widespread damage and destruction resulting from 
the conflict (particularly in Western Europe), dramatic reconstruction 
policies were devised. In the case of Europe, the United States 
inspired and financed 'Marshall Plan' represented an enormous and 
unprecedented externally induced development programme. Such massive 
~ate intervention in the national and international economies was 
unprecedented, and indicates that the auto-corrective powers of the 
world economies were at last seen as being inadequate. 
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further changes in development philosophy were encouraged by the creation 
and expansion of the United Naticns Organisations, and other supra-
national institutions. Associated with these organisations was the 
accelerated decolonisation during the 1950s and 1960s, which gave birth 
to large families of poorly developed nations whose poverty, as a result 
of independence, was no longer concealed by the colonial powers. Global 
development issues therefore grew both in terms of academic interest and 
general urgency, and organisations such as the U.N.O. became concerned 
primarily with the many facets of world development. During this period, 
the major concern became one associated with the elimination of under-
development rather than the attainment of development. 
In recent decades, critics of the more traditional views of development 
have grown in number, particularly with the emergence of new school~ of 
thought in the less developed world. Simultaneously, it has become 
abundantly clear from empirical studies that conventional development prac--
tics has done very little for the majority of the so called less 
developed countries (LDCs), which account for the majority of the world's 
human population. Thus, using the KUhnian concept of scientific revol-
ution (KUhn 1970), it may be shown that the predominant paradigm of 
conventional development theory is being increasingly challenged by a new 
paradigm which, above all, is severely critical of the capitalist system 
(foster-Carter 1976). At the heart of the problem is the increasingly 
apparent fact that there is a difference between the development 
requirements and conditions in the developed countries and those within 
LDCs (Seers 1963). 
st~hr and T~dtling (1977) were especially critical of development theory 
based on neo-classical economics because of its failure to produce 
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sufficiently prescriptive analyses. Instead, they maintain, it seems to 
have been obsessed with the explanation of past patterns. Browett (1980) 
also comments that this type of theory has failed to produce valid 
prescriptive measures, and elaborates by observing that the theory became 
especially concerned with the explanation of the massively unequal 
patterns that had suddenly become apparent for all to see. St~hr and 
T6dtling (1977) referred to the body of conventional theory as one which 
placed implicit faith in 'Development from Above'. Browett (1980) 
described such an approach more generally under the umbrella of the 
'Diffusionist Paradigm of Development'. Unfortunately, despite the 
increasing hostility that has been shown towards the conventional theory, 
it continued to dominate throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and is 
still dear to the hearts of most Western governments and development 
planners. Thus, it is still widely beli~edthat the so-called free 
market mechanisms retain sufficient auto-corrective powers which will 
ensure the widespread diffusion of the fruits of development, even in the 
Less Developed World. 
1.2 The Dominant Diffusionist Paradigm 
There are apparently three branches of diFfusionist theory, the pro-
ponents of all three branches believing ' ••• that they adopt a non-
ideological a~~roach to development and so are able to provide objective 
and value-free scientific analyses of the transition from "traditionalism" 
to "modernity"' (Browett 1980, p.60). Thus, the first branch of the 
paradigm - that of spatial differentiation - chooses to concentrate on 
comparative analyses of patterns of development, and assumes development 
in less developed areas to be obtainable through the elimination of 
underdevelopment characteristics. The second branch concerns itself with 
single region or single nation stage models, the most famous of which i. 
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that of W. W. Rostow (1960). The third and final branch d3als with the 
spatial diffusion of development, the desired spread perceived as being 
obtainable through growth impulses generated from growth centres and 
sactors. 
One of the general criticisms of the diffusionist paradigm is the fact 
that development was seen entirely in economic terms (such as 'growth'), 
and that it was therefore assumed that it could be measured exclusively in 
terms of economic variables. As a result, many of the aggregate statist-
ical measures and indices devised by the Keynesian economists became 
exceptionally popular, and were used not only to reflect levels of devel-
opment, but also to act as causal explanations of those levels of develop-
ment. Major objections to arise from the ind~criminate use of such 
statistics include the observation that little attenticn is given to 
intra-area distributions,and the severe inequalities prevalent within ma~y 
national units. Also, it is clear that the measures and criteria adopted 
are derived almost exclusively from the Euro-American development 
experience. 'Hence, it is implied that what is "modern" or "western" is 
good, and what is "traditional" is bad' (foster-Carter 1976, p.172). 
Of the other major criticisms of the diffusionist paradigm as a whole are 
those that emphasise the frequent unjustified assumption that all 
societies begin from a common baseline of traditional 'underdevelopment'. 
Such a premise perceives today's less developed countries to be at earlier 
'natur~l stages of development, which are conceived in terms of a unilinear 
transformation along a development continuum, from traditional to modern. 
The most famous theories that fall into this category include Clark's 
(1951) sectoral theory, and Rostow's (1960 and 1971) sta~ed model of 
economic growth. The latter outlined five stages of economic growth through 
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which ~ countries had to pass before achieving conditions of 
development (see Figure 1.1). 
Implicit within Rostow's work, and indeed the work of many of his 
contemporaries, was a bias towards the concentration of capital for 
industrialisation. This may be attributed, in part at least, to the 
observation that developed countries were poor when they were agric-
ultural, and only seemed to generate wealth as a result of industrial-
isation. It is also important to recognise that Rostow's work was 
intended to be an anti-communist manifesto, and was thus keen to dis-
seminate anti-communist sentiments. It is therefore no coincidence that 
Rostow adapted a staged historical ap~roach similar to that of Marx, and 
similarly, concentrated as Marx had done upon industrialisation as the 
main agent of change in the struggle towards advancement. furthermore, 
the observation by ~rank (1967) that Rostow's theory is guilty of 
attributing history only to developed countries, thereby denying all 
history to underdeveloped countries, may also be applied to Marx, whose 
attitude towards traditional societies was far from generous (Palma 1981). 
Another of the diffusionist paradigm's most frequently cited faults is 
its assumption that the more developed and less developed nations and 
regions can be regarded as essentially separate systems of spatial 
organisation. The perceived lack of linkage between these two worlds 
allowed the proposition of the existence of isolated dual economies. The 
more developed areas were assumed to have experienced development through 
initial advantages at critical stages of change. In contrast, the less 
developed areas were seen as being trapped in vicious circles of poverty. 
It follows that the problems experienced by those living in less developed 
areas are largely of their own making (8rowett 1980). Clearly, such a 
viewpoint may now be discarded as a result of the large quantities of 
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--------------------------------------~Time 
Source: Rostow (1960) 
Figure 1.1 Rostow's Staged Development Model 
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empirical evidence, establishing beyond any doubt the true inter-dependent 
nature of the world economy. The view that economic prosperity, develo~-
ment and stability are more often than not heavily dependent upon external 
forces cannot be denied, and is, ironically, further reinforced by the 
observation that the world's capitalist and non-capitalist blocks remain 
substantially dependent upon each other for materials, markets and 
technology. 
Of central importance to the diffusionist paradigm is the dubious assump-
tion that there will be an automatic spread or filtering of growth 
impulses from more developed to less developed areas. This assumption in 
particular has been criticised by St6hr and Taylor (1981). With reference 
once again to 'development from above', they maintain that the diffusionist 
paradigm mistakenly seeks to achieve the reduction of inequalities by higher 
or more effective functional integration, both on a national and inter-
national scale. Once again, implicit in this type of approach is a belief 
in the benefits of the free market system advocated by the neo-classical 
economists, as well as a persistent faith in the macro-economics of demand 
and economic growth purveyed by the Keynesian school. 
Hansen (1981) states that, in the cases where theory concerning 'develop-
ment from above"' has been prescriptive in nature, it is best exemplified 
by the 'centre down paradigm', which advocates deliberately unbalanced 
growth. He cites the works of Perroux(1955), and Hirschmann 
(19SB) as classic cases. ~erroux (19SS) was particularly concerned with 
sectoral industrial concentrations (despite the spatial i~plications of 
his growth 'pole). He emphasised that growth rates vary from sector to 
sector, and therefore that even if a balanced approach to economic growth 
were desired, it would be impossible to achieve. Hirschmann's (1958) work 
also emphasised the need to concentrate resources in key sectors, which he 
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suggested should be chosen on the basis of potential forward and back-
ward linkages. It was hoped that growth would be communicated through 
leading sectors to other branches of the economy, and that the most 
important element of the 'trickle-down' effect would be investment by the 
boom sectors in the underdeveloped hinterland. 
In contrast, Hansen (1981) cites Myrdal's (1957) approach, which was 
inherently pessimistic, and concerned itself with the concept of cumul-
ative causation. Rather than spreading wealth into the periphery, the 
prosperous centre was perceived as cumulatively expanding its internal 
and external economies, and fortifying its growth at the expense of the 
periphery. Myrdal was therefore convinced that unbalanced growth 
strategies would serve only to worsen inequalities. 
Myrdal's (1957) contribution was important because of its suggestion that 
core areas are dependent upon the continuous drain of the periphery for 
their continued prosperity. Many subsequent works on develo~ment have 
adopted and adapted this standpoint. However, many of the diffusionists 
still believe that the diffusion of development at sub-national, national 
and international scales is possible. In particular, they believe that, 
through specialisation and the exploitation of comparative advantage, and 
through injections of planning and capital, it is possible to reproduce 
the success of the Marshall Plan in post-war Europe (8rowett 1990). Thus, 
the centre of their strategy is the establishment of bridgeheads or 
enclaves of modernisation from which external forces can be diffused into 
the more traditional economies and societies of the hinterland. Surpri-
singly, the resounding failure of this type of strategy does not seem to 
have deterred many of its proponents. 
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The diffusionist paradigm has been criticised in particular for its 
attitude towards the role of the state. Despite the often strong 
Keynesian influence, it has generally assumed that the State acts 
merely as a benevolent institution, or even as a neutral observer. It 
is often assumed that harmony exists between constituent nation-states, 
and that development is a non-contentious process, involving little 
conflict. Thus, state intervention, if necessary, is perceived as 
geing gradual and incremental , undertaken by established elites, and 
designed so as to produce a minimum threat to the status quo, and to 
avoid revolutionary change. Once again, empirical evidence would suggest 
that such beliefs are unrealistic. 
It is significant that, with comparatively few exceptions, less developed 
countries (LOCs) have adopted, consciously or otherwise, development 
strategies based upon many of the assumptions of the diffusionist para-
digm. This has usually resulted in manufacturing industry oriented and 
spatially concentrated development programmes. furthermore, it is clear 
that the davelopment strategies-of many LDCs have been conceived either 
in the more developed countries (often by consultancies), or by govern-
ments whose ministers and advisors have been educated in the more devel-
oped countries. It is for this reason that the development experiences 
of the metropolitan nations continue to be seen as fundamental guides, 
or implicit models in the development plans of LOCs. 
Throughout the world, the historical stage develo~ment theoriss, such 
as Rostow's (1960 and 1971) retain their popularity, as do their 
assumptions that lOCs are in a low equilibrium trap (Griffin 1969) and 
that the provision of vital absent factors of production will provide 
the necessary impetus for development (or Rostowts critical stage of 
'Take Off'). Brookfield (1975a) is extremely critical of much of 20th 
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century stage theory in general, and ~oints out that the conditions 
facing today's underdeveloped nations differ radically from those 
experienced by the already developed countries. Thus, he maintains 
that much development theory has, in relative terms at least, implicitly 
assumed the existence of an already dynamic and wealthy economy as a 
base for development. Referring directly to Rostow's works, Brookfield 
(1975a, p.37) adds that, 'Through its influence on a whole new generation 
of students of change, this publication is a major event in the pro-
longed obfuscation of the real issues contained in "davelopment".' 
Brookfield's (1975a) views may be reinforced by those expressed in 
earlier analyses, such as Seers (1963, p.S1) who observed that ' ••• the 
features of the private-enterprise industrial economy ••• make it of 
limited professional relevance for work in other economies.' Referring 
to contemporary factors of production in both more developed and less 
developed economies, he noted that the development opportunities of the 
latter were far more limited than was generally recognised. for example, 
labour in the metropolitan centres is comparatively literate, mobile 
and organised. Racial, religious and linguistic differences tend not to 
be sufficiently important to break up labour supply. Seers argued that 
this is far from being the case in LOCs. He also mentioned other import-
ant basic factors such as land tenure, land availability, capital and 
entrepreneurial activity, all of which he assessed to be lacking or 
obstructive in may LDCs. These assertions are sup~orted by Weaver (1981, 
p.78) who also concludas that 'Ideographic problems such as natural 
resource locations and political boundaries were largely assumed away 
leaving two primal economic forces - production and consumption - to be 
balanced off in locational terms.' 
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The continued widespread use of macro-economic aggresate indices has 
not enhanced the credibility of the diffusionist paradigm. Brookfield 
(1975a) has pointed out that the use of such indices as GNP, GOP and 
National Income merely provides a rough indication of economic growth, 
and entirely conceals the internal distribution of income and social 
welfare, both in terms of socio-economic and regional structures. He 
has also emphasised the fact that aggregate statistics of this nature 
frequently embody a large element of estimation, especially if large 
portions of producticn are not marketed in the legally recognised 
commercial system. Thus, it is inevitable that the use of such official 
aggregate measures often fails to account for substantial and significant 
production associated with the 'informal sector' activities prevalent 
in so many LDCs. 
Seers (1982) also notes that most development plans are highly aggreg-
ative, evading issues of distribution. Thus, there is often, for 
example, no distinction between foreign and domestic sectors. The 
statistical base for the plans are weak, and frequently politically 
doctored. Most aggregative indicators are in any case estimates, and 
are therefore ' ••• the products of hypothesis not fact'(Seers 1982, p.70). 
Brookfield (1975a) concludes that understanding the whole is subordinate 
to the elucidation of the process by which the parts become the whole. 
Thus, one of the diffusionist paradigm's most serious problems has been 
its inability to consider the complex internal structures of national and 
regional economies. 
Browett (1980) maintains that the diffusionist development paradigm has 
now been totally discredited, particularly in view of the fact that it 
has induced only very limited economic growth and very little development 
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in less developed areas. He also notes that this failure is made worse 
by the persistence of extreme poverty and material deprivation even in 
those areas where some aggregate growth has occurred. Furthermore, one 
of the most important consequences of the adoption of diffusionist 
development strategies - successful or not - is the increased dependence 
of the LDCs upon the developed metropoli, and just as important, increeased 
dependence upon overseas owned and controlled multinational corporations. 
Other critics of the diffusionist paradigm include Levitt (1970) who 
observed that in the so called 'Development Decade' of the 19605, there 
was in fact a sUDstantial transfer of income from the poor to the rich 
countries. This, and many other arguments are difficult to counter. 
However, one of the most common defensive postures adopted by the more 
entrenched proponents of the diffusionist development paradigm is that 
the paradigm has never been implemented properly. Thus, ' ••• investments 
have been too few, they have not been sufficiently concentrated, planners 
have worked with unrealistically short time horizons, and such strategies 
need to be embedded in more comprehensive development schemes. Thus one 
may say of the 'centre down paradigm'1 what Shaw said of Christianity: 
it is not necessarily wrong: it has simply never been tried' (Hansen 1961, 
p.35). If this is the case, then it would ap~ear that the diffusionist 
paradigm was untenable from the outset. 
1. The 'Centre Down Paradigm' may in this case be assumed to much the 
same as the Diffusionist Development Paradigm. 
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1.3 Alternative Development Paradigms? 
Although dissatisfaction with the diffusionist paradigm of development 
is widespread, there appears to be little evidence to suggest that there 
are many valid alternative paradigms. St8hrand T8dtling (1977) and 
St8hr and Taylor (1981), however, distinguished between 'develo~ment 
from above' and 'development from below'. In their scheme, development 
from above corresponds closely to the diffusionist paradigm. Development 
from below, on the other hand, is a far more recent conception, and is 
a reflection of changing ideas on the nature and purpose of development 
itself. In their own alternative approach, which they describe as being 
representative of development from below, St8hr and T8dtling (1977) 
perceived a need to increase the resilience of spatial systems by 
controlling the negative economic, social and political backwash effects 
first identified by Myrdal (1957). Development from below can therefore 
be seen as a strategy which attempts to reverse the current tendency 
towards functional and spatial integration which is acting increasingly 
in favour of the prosperous centres, and very much against the interests 
of the periphery. Development from below therefore aims to achieve 
even development. 
There are, meanwhile, preconditions that apply to any such attempts to 
achieve more even patterns of development. first, St8hrand T8dtling 
(1977) claim that the concept of spatial development needs to be 
broadened beyond economic to social and political processes. Second, 
distance friction shculd be regarded as a positive rather than a negative 
factor in decision-making. Third, greater attention needs to paid to 
non-market, non-institution based activities comprised in the informal 
sectors of countries. finally, there has to be a shift of decision-
making away from today's mainly vertical or functional scale to horizontal 
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or territorial units at various levels. Thus, develo~ment from below 
is designed to benefit the bulk of the population, most notably in the 
poor and disadvantaged regions. The mechanisms of the strategy require 
the creation of dynamic development im~ulses within less developed areas, 
and may, according to St~hr (1981) also require a degree of 'selective 
spatial closure' to inhibit undesirable transfers (particularly of 
capital) to and from the areas in question. Such strategies have yet to 
be applied within a world economy, althcugh the rural-cased development 
policies such as those of the Republic of China and Tanzania constitute 
brave efforts to break away from the traditional diffusionist mould. 
Although the concept of development from ~low is relatively recent, 
other alternatives to the dominant diffusionist paradigm have existed 
for some years. One of the most significant early challenges to the 
paradigm emerged from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (E.C.L.A. 1 ), and was most closely associated with the Commission's 
first general secretary, Dr. Raul ~rebisch. E.C.L.A. attempted a con-
scious policy of import substitution industrialisation, which it was hoped 
would propel the Latin American economies towards their elusive development 
goals. from a 'structuralist' standpoint, ' ••• it was argued that con-
ventional economic theory, with its emphasis on the theory of prices and 
general equilibrium, failed to recognise the existence of different 
structures ••• ' (O'Brien 1975, p.9). It followed,therefore, that isola-
tion from the damaging forces of world trade, dominated as it was (and is) 
by the metropolitan centres, would permit the sustained development of 
the Latin American economies. The intention was to promote import 
1. E.C.L.A. was established in 1948. 
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substitution industries to act as engines propelling a broader economic 
development, and to protect new enterprise from foreign competition 
through the erection of high protective tarrifs. 
Dos Santos (1973) summarised the intentions of the 'post-war' model of 
import substitution industrialisation as follows. The major aim was to 
reduce dependence upon foreign trade, and thus to gain more local control 
over the Latin American economies. This, in turn, involved a lessening 
of the powers of the traditional oligarchies, and a process of enhanced 
'political democratization.' A more equal income distribution was 
envisaged, and in particular, the integration of the rural masses into 
'modern society' was a major priority. There were also visions of the 
emergence of a Latin American consciousness, requiring supranational unity 
in the pursuit of national independence. 
Central to the E.C.l.A. stance was the concept of a highly dynamic core 
periphery system. The developed core was seen as being homogeneous but 
diversified, whilst the periphery was perceived as being heterogeneous 
and yet dangerously specialised. Thus, the periphery (of which Latin 
America was perceived as being a part) was identified as displaying 
backward structures of production, stifled technical progress, poor and 
stagnant productivity of labour, and dominant primacy in the ex~ort sector. 
Remedies for the conditions of the periphery were influenced by Keynesian 
concepts, exemplified by corrective state intervention in the economy, 
as well as the controlled manipulation of variables previously considered 
exogenous or irrational (Palma 1981). Clearly, however, despite certain 
significant departures from the conventional development paradigm, such 
policies continued to retain inherently diffusionist elements within their 
strategies, illustrated by the importance given to integrating their 
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1 , 
various populations into 'modern society' (Dos S3ntos 1973). 
Unfortunately, by the 1960s, it was more than apparent that the import 
substitution paradigm was in crisis. It had not lessened dependence, 
income distribution had grown considerably worse, and very large segments 
of populations, both rural and urban, were still marginal. Cultural 
alienation had become widespread as metropolitan values and patterns of 
consumption infiltrated Latin American SOCieties, which remained both 
divided and extremely unstable. The various national policies of 
autonomous industrialisation had been undermined by multi-naticnal corp-
orations, and industrialistaion in Latin America was primarily being 
undertaken by foreign investors. 
It was inevitable that disillusionment would lead to a body of theory 
-still more critical of the existing world order. According to Seers 
(1981, p.14), 'The realisation that import substitution created new, and 
possibly more dangerous forms of dependence converted E.C.L.A. "struct-
uralists" into "dependency theorists".' This was not so much an abandon-
ment of earlier beliefs as a major change of emphasis, which generated a 
much more significant conflict with the diffusionist development paradigm. 
As a result, development and underdevelopment were perceived as partial, 
independent structures of one global system (O'Brien 1975). The numerous 
forms of dependency theory that have emerged are, not surprisingly, mostly 
pessimistic in nature, not only suggesting that the structures binding the 
periphery to the core are interde~endent, but also maintaining that the 
dependence that ensues acts as an obstacle to development in the periphery. 
The demise of the import substitution industrialisation paradigm was 
inevitable. As a potential policy alternative, it ~roved to be implausible 
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for many Latin American countries, and remains so for most countries of 
the less developed world, whose internal structures remain unable to 
initiate and sup~ort endogenously generated industry. Unfortunately, 
the original E.C.L.A. strategies not only assumed development to be 
synonymous with industrialisation, but also failed to assess the implic-
ations of factors such as substantial foreign investment, and the 
activities of multinational enterprise in the peripheral economies. 
Such issues (and many more) are raised by the many manifestations of 
dependency theory. Because of its centrality in many contemporary devel-
opment analyses, and indeed its role in later chapters of this thesis, 
which ass~Maltese post-independence development, Dependency Theory will 
be examined in the next chapter (Chapter Two). 
1.4 Conclusions 
Traditional development theory, as represented by the diffusionist 
paradigm, clearly has been of little use to most LDCs. As Levitt (1970) 
has observed, during the great 'development decade', it seems that the 
core countries gained substantially at the expense of the periphery. In 
recent years, the plight of many LDCs has worsened still further. Unfort-
unately, it seems that the diffusionist paradigm's inability to produce 
viable prescriptive theory is matched by a similar failing on the part of 
the alternative paradigms. Thu~ import substitution proved to be a fail-
ure in Latin America, and development from below has yet to be seriously 
attempted. Dependency theory, as will be shown in Chapter Two, also 
suffers from an inability to produce practical answers to the problems 
which it discusses. Its major advantage is, however, that it does at 
least ask more relevant questions (Seers 1981). 
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Malta's position with respect to development achievements is exceptional, 
and totally inexplicable in terms of diffusionist theory. Thus, compared 
to the models of Rostow (196 a and 1971) and Clark (1951), r'lalta is 
developing backwards along the diffusionist development continuum, trying 
in the process to establish a secondary sector, thereby alleviating 
tertiary sector dominance. Furthermore, Malta's efforts are currently 
engaged in diversifying her economy, a policy in direct contradiction, 
for example, to the specialisation (based on comparative advantage)ideas 
of the diffusionist paradigm. 
Malta is, in fact, far from being an underdeveloped or Third World 
country, although she is a peripheral economy, located on the periphery 
of the Western European core. She is also a long way from becoming a 
developed country, and may therefore be placed within the diverse ranks 
of the less developed countries. Her current position is extremely pre-
carious, and is governed by the behaviour of the European core countries. 
Her dependence is extreme, but not necessarily always negative. Before 
delving more deeply into the Maltese case, it is therefore necessary to 
examine various aspects of dependency theory, from which it may be poss-
ible to extract a range of more useful and viable means of measuring 
Malta's progress. 
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CHAPTER T~O: DEPENDENCY THEORY 
2.1 Introduction 
The first of the original Latin American works on dependency theory 
appeared in the English language during the 19605, and by the 1970s, 
dependency had became a useful tool in the armoury of, in particular, 
left wing development economists (Lall 1975). However, it is suggested 
by several authors such as Seers (1981) and King (1982) that the 
dependency ideas did not receive, and ideed still have not receive~ 
adequate recognition in Europe and North America. Reasons for the slow 
adoption of dependency theory in the Western world include what Seers 
(1981) refers to as parochialism, which may itself be explained in terms 
of the diffusionist paradigm's inherent bias against non-western concepts 
and ideas. 
Another of the reasons for the apparent unpopularity of dependency theory 
is its ideological content, which is obviously in conflict with the 
political assumptions of the dominant diffusionist paradigm, which, as 
Browett (1980) has pointed out, is seen by its proponents as being value-
free. In addition, its interdisciplinary nature, and the fact that nearly 
all the early works were written in Spanish,further stunted its advance in 
Western academic circles. It is also significant that the Western social 
sciences were in the 1960s and 1970s strongly influenced by a wave of 
'positivism' which required a scientific and rigorous approach clearly 
lacking in dependency theory. 
Despite these obstacles, dependency theory has become popular in some 
recent development studies, to the extent that, in the wcrds of 
Brookfield (1975a, p.1), 'The whole contemporary world problem that we 
call variously that of "underdevelopment", "modernisation", or"economic 
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development of the Third World" is concerned at base with a dominance/ 
dependence relationship.' Other contemporary works adhering to the 
dependency viewpoint have, in turn, considered the multinational corp-
oration as the basis for a new type of technological industrial depend-
ence, replacing earlier more formal and often colonial manifestations 
of dependence (Siersteker 1978). 
Unfortunately, dependency theory is not (and never has been) a unified 
body of theory, as might have been hoped. In reality, 'Dependency is a 
label which encompasses such a diversity of arguments that any discussion 
of it must take care to distinguish between different usages if it is 
not to add further confusion to an already obscure debate'(Sienefeld 1981, 
p.79). In particular, because of the special connotation given to the 
word 'dependence', which is itself used frequently in normal parlance, 
some confusion has arisen over what it actually means in the development 
context. Greater world interdependence and increased dependence upon 
foreign trade and technology is not in itself bad or undesirable. But, 
to the Dependencia School, '"dependence" is meant to describe certain 
characteristics (economic as well as social and political) of an economy 
as a Whole, and is intended to trace certain processes which are causally 
linked to its underdevelopment and which are expected adversely to affect 
its development in the future' (Lall 1975,p.799). 
Quite how the dependency links are seen to affect the development process 
adversely seems to have depended very much upon the personal perceptions 
of the individual dependency theorists. Lall (1975, plaoo) explains that, 
'Even within the Dependencia School, ••• the word ~ependence) is given 
different meanings according to the users' beliefs about the particular 
historical processes which have caused underdevelopment and about the 
relative roles of the various factors which are at present governing the 
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future of development in the poorer countries.' Indeed, it has been 
observed that there are as many conceptions of dependency as there are 
dependency theorists (Biersteker 1978). 
Dependency theorists have, in consequence, ranged from the mildly 
socialistic nationalists such as furtado or Sunkel (often also referred 
to as structuralists - see Chapter One), via writers of increasing 
radicalism like Dos Santos, to explicit revolutionary neo~larxists like 
frank. Significantly, most review articles tend to produce a threefold 
classification of dependency theorists based on their political complexion, 
and their beliefs concerning the possibility of dependent development. 
first, there are those (such as frank 1967 and Baran 1957) who do not 
accept the possibility of development in the periphery within the pres-
ent capitalist system, and see only the further development of under-
development. Second, there are those who concentrate upon the obstacles 
which confront capitalist development in the periphery. finally, there 
are those who accept the possibility of capitalist development in the 
periphery, placing the emphasis of their analyses upon the subservient 
forms which it adopts. Although Palma(1981) is not entirely hap~y with 
this classification (and suggests his own alternative format), it does 
serve to show the heavily political nature of most dependency theory. 
Undoubtedly, the severest critics of dependency theory as a whole dislike 
it most of all for these strong political overtones. Thus, for example, 
' ••• to a social scientist brought up in the dominant positivist hypothet-
ical-deductive methodology, theories of dependency may seem at best 
trivial or irrelevant and at worst political slogans wrapped up as 
theory' (O'Brien 1975, p.11). furthermore, to the sceptics, dependency 
theory seems to display as many internal contradictions as the capitalist 
system that it chooses to criticise. Nevertheless, despite the many 
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ambiguities and inherent contradictions embodied within dependency theory, 
there is little doubt that it has provided a useful development perspect-
ive (Seers 1981). The political component is obviously a source of 
subjectivity, but it is also a valuable source of motivation which has 
injected much needed energy, urgency and relevance into development 
studies. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive how development studies 
could be entirely objective and apolitical in nature as, at the heart of 
most development issues are numerous political decisions that embody 
develo~ment strategy. Indeed, Bienefeld (1981, p.79) warns that, 'Care 
must be taken to avoid delusions of objectivity in the field of depend-
ency, and the indulgence in greater rigour which merely sweeps yet more 
reality under the ceteris paribus carpet.' 
2.2 Background to Dependency Theory 
Both the E.C.L.A. structuralists and the dependency theorists of the 
last three decades probably owe a great deal to the writings of Marx, and 
the subsequent literature that he has inspired. This is supported by the 
fact that more 'extreme' dependency theorists often refer to themselves as 
neo-marxists, and state the belief that development in peripheral coun-
tries is impossible under the conditions at present perpetuated by the 
capitalist system. It is, however, incorrect to associate such an attit-
ude directly to Marx and Engels, for as ~alma (1981) has pointed out, 
these beliefs go against the letter of Marx's writings and are more a 
reflection of those of writers such as Baran (1957). 
Marx was a major source of inspiration to dependency theorists in 
particular because he too condemned the brutalising and dehumanising 
nature of capitalist expansion. However, his opinions as to the role of 
capitalism differed markedly from those of many of the current neo-
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Marxists in that he perceived capitalism to be a necessary, if unpleasan~ 
means by which 'backward' societies could further develop. Thus, both 
Marx and Engels viewed less developed societies as being peopl~ by 
'barbarians', and therefore shared some of the pro-western modernisation 
views implicit within the diffusionist development paradigm. It was, in 
fact, within Lenin's work (on the development of capitalism in Russia) 
that there was the first systematic attempt to provide a concrete analysis 
of the development of capitalism in a backward nation,(Palma 1981). This 
point was also explained by Edel ~~. (1978, p.4) as follows, 
'Writings on imperialism introduced the first compelling analyses of 
of the geographically differentiated character of capitalist advance-
ment. Lenin, Trotsky, Luxembourgand others focused on the uneven 
penetration and impact of capitalism on countries, nationality groups 
and geographic areas.' 
Lenin was keen to show that in Russia,the development of capitalism was 
not an inevitable process (as had been predicted by Marx), but that it 
was retarded because of the weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie as an 
agent of capitalist development, the severe competition from Western 
Europe that undercut many home produced Russian goods, and the great and 
unexpected capacity for survival of the traditional structures of Russian 
society (Palma 1981). This led Lenin to write in 1923 ' ••• but the 
Western European countries are not completing this development (towards 
socialism) as we previously expected they would. They are completing it 
not through a steady "maturing"_of socialism, but through the exploit-
ation of some states by others' (quoted in roster-Carter 1974, p.67). 
According to Palma (1961), the works of Lenin, Bukharin and Luxembourg 
go on to provide further encouragement to dependency theorists by 
implying indirectly that capitalism leads to the domination and control 
of backward regions by the imperialist powers. In this way, the 
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integration of such backward countries into the world economy, inter-
national capital movements, and the international division of labour all 
resulted in the restriction of backward economies to mineral production 
and agricultural primacy. 
Despite these observations, there persisted the view that following 
independence, genuine unhindered capitalist development would occur. 
Independence and decolonisation have, however, not permitted this. Worse, 
it seems that the post-colonial period, especially in latin America, has 
advanced the obstructive tendencies of imperialism identified by the 
imperialist writers. Palma (1981) identified the 6th congress of the 
Communist International in 1928 as the turning point that finally linked 
imperialism to the various concepts of dependence. After the congress, 
emphasis was switched from the inevitability of the 'historical progress-
iveness thesis' to the obstacles which imperialism im~osed on indust-
rialisation during the colonial period, obstacles facing 'late industrial-
isation', and most important, the 'feudal-imperialist' alliance. The 
latter is particularly im~ortant as it established that links frequently 
exist between the (feudal) power structures controlling backward regions and 
the external imperialist powers. Again, this thesis is central to 
dependency theory. It is, however, interesting to note that the imper-
ialist writers, unlike the dependency theorists, continued to view 
development as being synonymous with industrialisation. Thus, the anti-
imperialist struggle was simultaneously the struggle for industrialisation. 
In contrast, one of the many advantages of dependency theory has been that, 
in general, its proponents have seen development in far more than simply 
economic and industrial terms. The contribution of the imperialist 
writers to dependency theory is nevertheless substantial. Dependency 
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theory, like the imperialist literature, concentrates on the develop-
ment of peripheral capitalism. More significantly, dependency theory 
follows up the fuedal-imperialist alliance premise of the imperialist 
writers, and attempts to analyse the development of peripheral capitalism, 
' ••• from the point of view of the intarplay between internal and external 
structures'{Palma 1981,p.42). But, as has been hinted earlier, opinions 
within the dependency school vary dramatically in terms of the means 
by which dependency links may be reduced. There are those in the revol-
utionary tradition, including frank (1967) and Amin (1974), who advocate 
semi-autarkic solutions. Those who see the state as being able to reduce 
dependence incrementally include Prebisch, Cardoso Sunkel and many others 
(Seers 1981). Quite which of these broad groupings is closest to the 
classical imperialist writings is difficult to judge, although the 
revolutionary zeal of Frank (1967), for example, encourages many to assume 
the radical alternative to be most in keeping with tradition. 
~alma (1981) prefers to use his own classification of dependency theory, 
suggesting that distinguishing between different branches of dependency 
theory on the simple basis of 'possibility of capitalist development in 
the periphery' is inadequate. His first two categories correspond 
broadly to the first 2 categories in the previous classification, and 
include the 'stagnationists grouping' and the 'obstacles to development' 
theorists. The third category, on the other hand,is very different, and 
conforms to Cardoso's (1972) view that dependency theory is most useful 
when used as a framework for the analysis of concrete situations of 
dependence. In other words, both Falma (1981) and Cardoso (1972) feel 
that dependency theory is at its best when used in empirical study. Such 
an ap~roach prevents excessive theorising in a vacuum by conf;ning itself 
to 'concrete situations', and drawing upon an empirical data base. This, 
claims Palma (1981, p.43) is a welcome change as 'The need at the moment 
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is for "analytic" rather than "synthetic" work.' 
2.3 A Typical Dependency Viewpoint 
Although it is extremely difficult to choose a suitably general and 
widely acceptable single description of the dependency viewpoint, Dos 
Santos (1973, p.76) provides a useful attempt at a summary. 
Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the economies of 
one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expan-
sion of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or 
more economies or between such economies and the world trading 
system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can 
expand through self impulsion while others, being in a dependent 
position, can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the 
dominant countries, which may have either positive or negative 
effects on their immediate development. 
Des~ite criticisms concerning the implicitly static nature of Dos Santos's 
conception of dependence1, Dos Santos (1970) had been careful to 
distinguish between various types, or phases of dependence. Colonial 
dependence (most frequently trade/export in nature), and financial and 
industrial dependence (especially in Latin America) were the traditional 
formeof overt dependence through which production was frequently geared 
to the demands of the metropolitan centres, often resulting in the rigid 
specialisation of production. However, 'In the post-war period, a new 
type of dependence has been consolidated, based on the multinational 
corporations which began to invest in industries geared to the internal 
market of underdeveloped countries. This form of dependence is basically 
technological industrial dependence. This situation is undoubtedly 
conditioned by the technological momopoly exercised by the "imperialist 
centres"' (Dos Santos 1970, p.234). 
1. These criticisms refer to the use of the term 'conditioning situation'. 
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The specific problems for which contemporary dependence is blamed are 
numerous. Cnce again, Dos Santos (1970) sees the unequal and combined 
character of capitalist development at the international level reprod-
uced internally in an acute form within less developed countries. Thus, 
the industrial and technological structures of such economies respond 
more closely to the needs and requirements of the multinational corpor-
ations than to the internal needs of the developing nations. Furthermore, 
the same industrial and financial systems of capitalism in LDCs gives 
rise to a highly unequal productive structure, a high concentration of 
incomes, the intensive exploitation of existing (particularly urban) 
markets, and a marked deterioration in an already serious rural-urban 
imbalance. 
other dependency theorists have developed similar, although not necess-
arily congruent specific ideas concerning dependence. There is general 
agreement that development is a global, structural process of change, 
and that underdeveloped countries are those countries which lack an 
autonomous capacity for change and growth. Indeed, writers such as 
Cardoso (1972) argue forcefully that development and underdevelopment are 
not different stages or states of a productive system, but rather are 
functions or positions that coexist within an international system of 
distribution and production. Sunkel (1971, cited in O'Brien 1975, p.26) 
reinforces this argument by stating that ' ••• development and under-
development are two faces of the same universal process.' ~redictably, 
frank's views are rather stronger. 'One and the same historical process 
of the expansion and development of capitalism throughout the world has 
simultaneously generated, and continues to generate both economic 
develo~ment and structural underdevelopment' (frank 1967, p.9). 
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One of the most common features of the majority of dependency theory's 
many manifestations is its chronological or historical ap~roach. Thus, 
much of the dependency literature tends towards an attempt to produce 
a chronology of the effects changes in capitalism have wrought, partic-
ularly within Latin America. There is little doubt that this may be 
attributed in part to the Marxist historical tradition. However, it is 
also clear that temporal comparisons and analyses in this field are both 
easier and more valid than, for example, ahistorical spatial or inter-
national comparative analyses. Palma(19S1) believes the historical 
nature of most dependency theory to be one of its major advantages, and 
severely criticises contributions that are inherently static in nature. 
The dynamic approach is thus seen as being particularly valuable as it 
sees that the so-called causes of underdevelopment are really the 
symptoms or results of the normal functioning of the total system, and 
that underdevelopment, with all its generally understood characteristics, 
is a normal part of the process of world capitalist development (O'Brien 
1975). 
2.4 The Problem of The Newly Industrialising Countries 
One of the major crises to face dependency theory in recent years has 
been the sudden apparently successful development of a selection of LOCs. 
Bienefeld (1981) has observed that the 1970s have produced highly contra-
dictory trends. Whilst the decade proved to be one of continued and 
predictable extreme difficulty for most LDCs 1,it also produced several 
'newly industrialising countries' (NICs) which mana~ed to generate 
periods of phenomenal sustained growth in their economies, based on 
manufactured exports. The development of these manufacturing bases was 
largely responsible for a rapid increase in the LOCs' share of world man-
ufacturing output since 1973. Such apparently dramatic progress in LOCs 
1. Difficulties include indebtedness and social and political polarisation. 
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represents a severe challenge to many segments of dependency theory, 
particularly those which denied the possibility of such development. 
Furthermore, it seems that Taiwan and South Korea, for example, show 
that if sustained for long enough, the benefits of such growth, 
'dependent' as it is, can be spread throughout society. 
The NIC phenomenon is therefore regarded by the proponents of the 
diffusionist development paradigm as proof of the validity of their 
approach. However, 'It is possible to show that the "fast developers" 
of Latin America, Southern Europe and South East Asia are still indeed 
"dependent" on the metropolitan countries in different ways and some-
times more markedly than a decade or two ago' (Lamb 1981, p.9?). 
Whilst it can be argued that populations in the so called 'trans-
nationalised enclaves' have an objective interest in the maintenance of 
dependent str~ctures, there is evidence to suggest that such heavy 
structural dependence can lead to long term instability within the 
economies in question, and may not perhaps be as beneficial to the the 
various populations as might have been expected. 
Amin (1974) strongly supports the view that NIC development is neither 
particularly beneficial nor inherently stable. In this context, he main-
tains that underdevelopment has three major features. First, underdevel-
oped countries display extreme unevenness of productivity between sectors 
of the economy. Second, they suffer from a complete disarticulation of 
their economic systems, the most obvious symptom of which is an extreme 
lack of linkages within their economies. Third, their economies suffer 
from outside domination, a problem that is highlighted by all the manif-
estations of dependency theory. Thus, Amin (1974, p.28) comes to the 
following conclusion concerning the purpose of development:-
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'The object of the art of development is to guide economic 
choices in a concrete situation - that of a given underdevelo~ed 
country with a structure and history, in the prospective setting 
of a systematic structural transformation, namely, the willed 
construction of a homogeneous national economy, with its center 
and driving force in the country itself. This art belongs 
therefore in the context of a struggle for national economic 
libera tion.' 
Amin (1974) therefore argues that unless the three previously stated 
manifestations of underdevelopment are eradicated, development cannot be 
judged to have occurred. A superficial examination of most NICs reveals 
a continued prevalence of all three of Amin's underdevelotJment character-
istics. Amin and others therefore claim that the NICs have not developed, 
and that dependency is not challenged by the experiences of the NICs. 
Indeed, they maintain that, if anything, the case ~ dependency theory 
is strengthened by the experiences of the NICs. In this respect, Malta 
is an interesting case, and will be discussed briefly in the latter part 
of this chapter. 
2.5 Dependence in Developed Countries? 
It is interesting to note that the concept of dependent development 
provides additional problems when applied to more developed core 
countries. It is abundantly clear that many developed countries (and 
regions) also suffer from conditions of dependence. For this reason, 
it seems that if dependency is going to contribute any further to stUdies 
of underdevelopment, it is important that it ex~lains why some dependent 
countries are rich, and others poor. Obviously, poverty and inequality 
are the major concerns of dependency theory, which has therefore confined 
itself to LOCs in most cases. However, there have been instances in which 
dependency analyses of more developed countries have been both interesting 
and revealing. Such works are often dominantly structuralist and 
nationalist in nature, Levitt's (1970) work on Canada being a good 
example. 
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Levitt began her work with the premise that ' ••• the re~atriation of 
economic decisionmaking is a precondition of a democratic social order' 
(Levitt 1970, p.xxi). Her major concern was the rapid expansion of 
American based MNCs in Canada. 'They are manifestations of a new 
mercantilism of corporate empires which cut across boundaries of 
national economies and undermine the national sovereignty of the 
hinterland countries in which their subsidiaries and branch plants are 
located' Levitt 1970,p3) 
Expanding on this theme, she introduced the concept of the 'branch 
plant economy', which,she suggested, not only leads to a lack of 
indigenous entrepreneurship, but also precipitates a situation in which 
an economy becomes dependent upon imported technology, and is therefore 
' ••• assured of a perpetual technological backwardness vis a vis the 
metropolis'(Lavitt 1970, p.105). This type of approach, assessing as it 
does the value and stability of ap~arently successful economic develop-
ment, appears to be a potentially fruitful line of analysis. Moreover, 
if conducted carefully, such an approach should have sufficient empirical 
power to qualify as one of the studies of 'concrete situations' of 
dependency favoured by Palma (1981). 
2.6 A reassessment of Dependency ThBory 
In his criticism of dependency theory, Lall (1975) maintains that any 
concept of dependence that is to serve a useful pur~ose must lay down 
certain characteristics of dependent economies which are not found in 
non-depend~nt ones. These characteristics must be shown to affect 
adversely the course and pattern of development of the dependent 
countries. Interestingly, empirical studies seem to suggest that there 
are cases, such as that of Malta, where dependence may be shown to have 
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assisted development. Some dependency theorists have in turn suggested 
that 'dominance' over the LDCs' economies by the metropoli is a crucial 
element of the dependence argument that ensures the validity of depend-
ency theory in development studies. Again, cases may be found in which 
a dominance dependence relationship between an LDC economy dnd a 
metropolitan power have not necessarily been to the detriment of the 
poorer country. ~ore significantly, many highly developed countries, 
such as Canada, are also dependent upon dominant foreign pcwers. 
On a positive note, dependency theory has without doubt aided the 
comprehension of many of the LDCs' problems. Seers (1981) states that 
the general feeling is that dependency theory, whilst not necessarily 
providing the answers, at least asks the right questions - questions 
which he says are much more relevant ones than those derived from neo-
classical economics. Indeed, it seems that one of the most welcome contrib-
utions of the dependency theorists has been to produce a body of theory from 
the point of view of the less developed economies. The dependency liter-
ature has therefore fulfilled very important psychological functions, 
whilst simultaneously representing attempts to understand why the economies 
of the less developed world remain weak. 
Unfortunately, whilst dependency theory has helped to identify and 
emphasise many of the problems facing less developed economies, it has 
been unable to show that these features of underdevelopment are caused 
directly by conditions of dependence. Thus, most dependency theory 
develops into an analysis and criticism of conditions of underdevelopment 
and the capitalist system as a whole, rather than the dependency links 
themselves. Ind3ed, there has been a tendency for dependency to be used 
to explain everything that is wrong with Latin America (and indeed every 
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underdeveloped country's) society (O'Brien 1975). But, worse still is 
the tendency for circular argument to creep into dependency analyses, 
which leads to the conclusion that dependent countries are those which 
lack the capacity for autonomous growth, and that they lack this because 
their structures are dependent ones (Lall 1975 and O'Brien 1975). 
One of dependency theory's greatest problems has been its failure to 
provide a solid measurement system for dependence. without some degree 
of measurement, this type of theory becomes prone to vague statements 
and unjustified value judgements. Indeed, the actual mechanisms of 
dependency are seldom spelt out in detail (O'Brien 1975). Thus, it 
becomes impossible to draw the line between dependence and non-dependence 
without falling into the basic error of defining underdevelopment to 
constitute dependence (Lall 1975, p.803). The measurement problem 
would be considerably alleviated if it were possible to identify-any 
country in the world that was totally non-dependent. Unfortunately, 
every country in the world is dependent upon external linkages to some 
extent. However, some attempts at measurement have been attempted. 
Jongkind (1979), for example, attempted to measure Venezuelan dependency 
by using several indicator variable~ ranging, from those describing 
Venezuelan industrial structure, to others investigating the education 
and perception of managerial personnel. This particular study's main 
purpose is to disprove the dependency hypothesis that autonomous national 
development is impossible within a dependent economy. Predictably, the 
study upholds its claim that traditional dependency theory is erroneous. 
This is unfortunate as there is without doubt great potential in the 
measurement of dependency. Indeed, one of the major intentions of this 
study is, after accepting that dependence exists throughout the Maltese 
economy, to measure it wherever possible, and to establish its negative 
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and positive effects. This should be possible, particularly with the 
assistance of time series data. 
Lall (1975) concludes his criticism of traditional dependency literature 
by demonstrating that it has, at least in part, led to a concentration 
on the wrong problems and on unrealistic solutions, a serious defect 
which must be rectified if it is not to end up as yet another branch of 
'grand theorising'. However, the study of concrete situations of 
dependency, as recommended by Palma (1981) holds far more promise. 
Further encouragement may be gained from Seers (1981 ) who suggests that 
dependency should be examined in terms of the potential consequences of 
'delinking'. Oelinking is only feasible on a partial scale, and may, 
for example, involve the raising of corporation tax rates, or the 
adoption of socialist pro-labour legislation. This may result in MNCs 
reducing output, exports, employment levels and technological inputs, 
all of which are measurable variables. It may also cause a considerable 
net outflow of capital. The penalties for such government initiatives 
have been known to be more dramatic. The events in Chile between 1970 
and 1973 provide the classic example of this. President Allende's advance 
to power was apparently at one stage threatened by the activities 
of the MNC 'ITT', who wished to prevent him from gaining office. The 
details of the demise which overtook him after he successfully gained 
office are well known. 
Delinking can have many other effects. It may lead to a crippling loss 
of confidence in the economy which may damage some sectors very badly 
indeed. This in turn can lead to losses of investment, the recall of 
loans, severe restrictions on new loans, the loss of tourists, the loss 
of emigrants' remittances, and inevitable currency crises. Such events 
frequently lead distressed governments to seek assistance from international 
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agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) and the 
World Bank. The powers of these institutions in the world is growing, 
and it is significant that they are perhaps amongst the most powerful 
proponents of conventional economic development strategies closely -
related to those of the diffusionist paradigm. Seers (1981 , p.139) 
summarises t~is point by observing that many countries are ' ••• partic-
ularly likely to turn to the Fund (I.M.f.) and be put under pressure to 
drop the delinking strategy and associated internal policies. Jamaica 
is another case in point. So are Peru and Tanzania. So is Britaint' 
Seers (1981 ,p.141) also em~hasis9s the role of cultural dependence in 
development, a factor which is frequently underestimated. He explains 
that cultural dependence is ' ••• of a different, higher order of import-
ance than economic dependence, just as ~ental illness is of a higher 
order of importance than physical disease: a mental patient may be 
incapable of recognising his symptoms, of willing himself to recover, 
or of monitoring his own progress.' Hence, national policy-making is 
rarely truly sovereign under any circumstances. Clearly, the study of 
cultural influences does present problems, especially given the abstract 
nature of many of the variables involved. However, Jongkind (1979) 
showed that some measurements of cultural dependence may-be attempted. 
One of the major criticisms of traditional dependency theory is the 
fact that, although dependency theorists introduced many factors 
ignored by mainstream economics into development studies, the theory 
ignores many vital and palpably obvious factors. Again, Seers (1981 ) 
lists many vitally important factors governing dependence, many of which 
are measurable. Of these, the most important include a country's size 
(se8 Chapter four), location, natural resources, linguistic and ethnic 
differenc3s, geostrategic and local military factors, and political 
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leadership. Adding such de~ographic and geographical factors ' ••• to 
those conventionally covered in dependency theory reinforces the point 
that no government is entirely free to shape its policy without regard 
to external influences' (Seers 1981 , p.143). It also illustrates the 
value of an approach to dependency which accepts that dependency can 
coexist with many types of development, and which, through the examin-
ation of 'concrete situations' can assess the success of development 
through the measurement of specific types of dependency link. 
It is clear that dependency theory is, or at least can be, a useful 
challenge to the diffusionist development paradigm. without doubt, the 
major conflict between dependency and the diffusionist viewpoints is 
over their differing attitudes to external linkages. The diffusionists 
believe that external linkages need to be encouraged to induce develop-
ment, whilst the dependency theorists suggest that it is exactly these 
linkages which obstruct development. However, to be of any use to 
this particular study, traditional dependency theory must be altered so 
that, in addition to external linkages, it takes into account the vital 
geographical, demographic and strategic factors highlighted by Seers 
(1981 ). 
2.7 Summary 
The discussion so far has shown that the numerous forms of conventional 
dependency theory are seriously deficient. In particular, they fail to 
provide meaningful answers, and similarly, are unable to generate viable 
solutions to the problems of dependence facing both underdeveloped and 
developed countries. Ferhaps more important is the fact that dependency 
theory has rarely attempted to measure the dependency links that it 
chooses to criticise. It has, as a result, been unable positively to 
distinguish between countries afflicted by sreater and lesser degrees of 
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dependence. Consequently, dependency theory has failed even to prove 
that dependence is an undesirable and debilitating condition. 
Also of importance is the fact that dependency theory has traditionally 
confined itself to the impoverished underdeveloped nations of the 
periphery. As has been explained, clear dependency linkages can be 
identified in all countries, underdeveloped or otherwise. Malta is 
extremely dependent upon external linkages, and yet she is far from 
being underdeveloped. Her dependence is both a consequence and a 
feature of her recent develo~ment. Thus, in the Maltese case, the 
priority is not a study of obstacles to development in the Islands so 
much as an examination of the quality and long term stability of the 
development. The adoption of dependency theory as it has traditionally 
been perceived is therefore not possible. 
In the case of this study, much of the use of dependency theory involves 
the adoption of a number of quantitative and qualitative measures. 
Examples of the specific facets of dependence to be measured include 
the extant of certain types of concentration occurring in Maltese indust-
rial production. It is therefore the intention to discover whether 
Malta is excessively dependent upon anyone industrial sector. This 
particular line of enquiry corresponds closely to Amints (1974) first 
criterion of underdevelopment - that of production concentration in an 
economy. 
other measures of dependence will include those of international trade 
or market concentration, and the predominance of overseas influence with-
in the economy, represented by direct overseas investment. Dependence 
upon a small range of export produce, a small number of markets and 
marketing organisations, and dependence upon overseas capital ( as well as 
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overseas entrepreneurial im~etus and technology) are all cantral themes 
deserving attention in development studies. Such indices also relate 
very closely to Amin's (1974) third feature of underdevelopment - that 
of overseas domination. 
It will also be possible to assess the extent to which the Maltese 
economy has become internally integrated. Amin's (1974) second feature 
of underdevelopment was that of isolated and fragmented production within 
an economy. Thus, the primary concern in this case is to identify the 
extent to which there are internal linkages within Malta. A preponder-
ance of external international economic linkages, and a corresponding 
lack of integration within Maltese productive capacity would, for example, 
suggest that the Maltase economy is structurally unsound. 
On a hypothetical level, it will also be possible to assess Malta's 
dependence - and its undesirable potential consequences - by predicting 
the likely consequences of a delinking strategy. As well as dealing with 
purely economic variables, this type of analysis introduces important 
political and strategic factors into the stUdy. These considerations 
are vital to the Maltese situation which, as the ensuing chapters will 
reveal, is, and always has been, governed by strategic and related 
political circumstances. For exactly this reason, the section of three 
historical chapters is vital to the comprehension of Malta's current 
situation. 
Finally, the introduction of basic geographical factors into the analysis 
is essential, and is amply demonstrated by the importance of the size of 
countries to dependency links. Malta's exceptionally small size has led 
to the need for two chapters dealing specifically with the influence of 
country size upon development and dependency issues (see this section, 
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Chapters Four and Five). 
Initially, however, it is necessary to assess the role of the MNC in 
the development process. The MNC is undoubtedly the single most import-
ant source of 3xternal linkages within most economies, and is therefore 
one of the most important sources of dependence. The role of the MNC 
has increased dramatically on a global scale during recent decades. For 
these reasons, the influence and activities of rlNCs are considered in 
the next chapter (Chapter Three). 
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CHAPTER THREE: hUL TINATHNAL CORPORATICNS 
3.1 Introduction 
Multinational corporations have, since the birth of ~alta's first 
development plan in 1959, played an increasing role in Maltese economic 
develo~ment. Predictably, their most important influence has been felt 
in the mar.ufacturing sector, which is now heavily dominated by overseas 
owned and c~ntrolled enterprise. There have, however, been significant 
developments elsewhere in the economy, and the vitally important tourist 
industry is now also heavily dominated by foreign businesses, some of 
which may be classified as MNCs. Malta is therefore strongly influenced 
by the activities of MNCs, which may be seen as one of the most import-
ant sources of dependence in the Islands. It is important to note, 
nevertheless, that Malta's experiences are not unique, and that the 
growth of MNCs since 1945 has been on a global scale. 
3.2 The Recent Growth of the Multinational Corporation 
Although his primary concern was with regional de~elopment in modern 
capitalist states, Holland's (1976a) observations concerning the recent 
development of large and powerful MNCs is particularly relevant at 
national and international. scales. 
' ••• changes in the modern capitalist firm since the 1950s have 
introduced new dimensions to regional imbalance which make 
imperative more direct state intervention to redress or allev-
iate regional problems. This is particularly true of the trend 
to monopoly and multi-national capital, which has established a .. 
new meso-economic sector between the conventional macro- and 
micro- economic orthodoxies as described in the literature. In 
the United Kingdom and the United states these meso-economic 
companies now domina te the upl=-er half of the most regionally 
mobile sector of the economy - modern manufacturing. Their 
power to go multi-national rather than multi-regional both 
undermines indirect intervention through incentives, and de-
creases the power of the modern capitalist state to harness their 
resources for the development of problem regions' (Holland 1976a, 
p.v &: vi). 
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The growth of multinational enterprise in recent decades has thus been 
rapid, and is illustrated by the following figures, again provided by 
Holland (1976a and 1976b). In the case of Britain, in 1950, the share 
of total net manufacturing output accounted for by the largest 100 
manufacturing companies was 20%. By 1970, this figure had risen 
substantially to 50%. It is suggested that this proportion will have 
risen to at least 67% by 1985. Similar figures for the United states of 
America show that in 1947, the largest 100 manufacturing corporations 
accounted for 23% of total net output. 8y 1970, this had risen sharply 
to 33%, a figure that is put in perspective when it is emphasised that 
by 1970, there were over 700,000 active manufacturing corporations in 
the U.S.A. (Holland 1976b). Similar statistics have been providad by 
Newfarmer (1980),who suggested that by 1968, the largest 1Q£ manufactu-
ring enterprises in the U.S.A. generated 61% of total net output. 
It is therefore clear that in both the U.S.A. and the U.K., and indeed 
in most countries of the world where multinational enterprise operates, 
the upper half of the manufacturing sector is dominated by a few enormous 
firms, and the lower half by many very small firms, the latter conforming 
rather more to the assumptions of micro-economic models. The dual 
economic structure that results in the modern capitalist states is 
disturbing, but the severe dualism that is generated in less developed 
countries is more savage, and seen by many to be more detrimental. 
The size and power of the MNCs has become a cause of increasing concern 
to many governments. The enormity of such companies is illustrated by 
the fact that their estimated annual turnover often exceeds the value of 
the gross national product of some E.E.C. nations, and is frequently 
several times the size of the GNP of less developed countries. In order 
to illustrate this point, Tugendhat (1971) produced a table of statistics 
comparing the GNP of a selection of nation states with the annual sales 
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turnover of some of the largest MNCs. Although the statistics, which 
are shown in Table 3.1 are out of date, they illustrate very well the 
financial and potential political power of roNCs, which has certainly not 
declined since 1969. This point is further illustrated by the I.L.O. 
(1973), who claimed that by 1972, the largest 100 economic units in the 
world consisted of 50 nation states and 50 multinational companies. 
The bargaining power of many of the larger MNCs is such that, especially 
in the present recessionary conditions, governments of all types go out 
of their way to attract their various activities in the hope that they 
will generate both revenue and employment, the multiplier effects of 
which (it is hoped) will diffuse throughout the host economies. In 
addition, the flexibility and resilience of manyMNCs is well illustrated 
by the example of Ford (Europe), who are able to negate successfully 
the effects of strikes in one area of their European production by 
transferring the halted production to other European plants, where 
reserve capacity is maintained in case of exactly this type of event-
uality. Thus, one of the major stre~thsor the MNCs lies in the mobility 
of capital, which allows for the rapid transfe~nce of production to 
locations where factors of production are more favourable. Finally, the 
political muscle of MNCs has already been mentioned with respect to the 
potential consequences of 'delinking' strategies by governments. 
Holland (1978) maintains that the growth of the meso-economic sector has 
transformed the structure of competition. This is significant as macro-
economic demand management policies assume that competition determines 
price formation at the micro-level, and that fiscal and monetary policy 
instruments are seen as being able to mani~ulate demand. It is becoming 
increasingly apparent that the MNC is attaining monopolistic powers that 
allow it to become a 'price maker' rather than a 'price taker'. In this 
S3 
·Table 3. 1 Multinational Company Annual Sales Turnover Compared With 
The Annual Gross National Product of Selected Countries (1969) 
GNPs in 1969 Selected 1969 Annual Nationali t~ 
~S 'ODD million} r~ultinational Turnover of 
Selected Countries Companies (5'000 million ) FiNes 
Netherlands 28.24 General Motors 24.30 U.S. 
Sweden 27 .85 Standard Oil (N.J.) 14.93 U.S. 
Belgium 22.82 ford 14.76 U.S. 
Switzerland 18.82 Royal Dutch/Shell 9.74 Neth/U.K. 
Denmark 13.99 IBM 7.20 U.S. 
Austria 12.47 Unilever 6.03 U.K./Neth 
Norway 9.73 I=-hilips 3.60 Neth 
Finland 9.14 lCI 3.25 U.K. 
Greece 8.40 Hoechst 2.27 W.Germany 
Ireland 3.40 Alcan Aluminium 1.22 Canada 
Source: Tugendhat (1971, p.2) 
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context~ 'There is every indication that meso-economic firms are 
continually increasing their share of the market despite the policies 
attempted at national and community levels to maintain market structures 
of the old style competitive model' (Holland 1978,p.169). 
Although this growth is not a conspiracy against the public interest, 
and is merely the natural outcome of economies of scale and the need for 
specialisation, the lar;er the firms become, the greater is their ability 
to earn super-normal profits. Consumer sovereignty has therefore been 
replaced by producer sovereignty. Com~etition still exists, but not as 
price competition. The main prizes have therefore become growth, 
flexibility, increased autonomy, and survival, goals which are not 
unlike those of many nations. But, perhaps the most disturbing aspect 
of all concerning the spectacular groluth of the meso-economic sector is 
the inability of even the modern capitalist states to control or influence 
significantly the activities of the MNCs. This would tend to suggest 
that the large numbers of " less developed countries have even less chance 
of successfully controlling and monitoring the activities of MNCs oper-
ating within their territories. 
There has, in fact, been a substant~al transfer of M~C activity away from 
the metropolitan core countries to the peripheral LOCs (SUCh as Malta), 
particularly during recent decades. This has in part been a logical 
reaction to the fact that many of the resources and raw materials 
necessary to the MNCs are located or produced in LOCs, but is also a 
response to the increasing tendency for LOCs to compete in the deliberate 
attraction of overseas enterprise by providing excellent production fac-
ilities, including for example, free trade zones (e.g. Abidjan, Ivory 
Coast). LO:s are also able to provide cheap and com~aratively well 
behaved (if unskilled) labour, a factor which many industrialists feel 
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they can no longer rely upon in the metropolitan core ccuntries, where 
wages are high, and trade unions often hostile. In short, LOCs have in 
many cases become locations where injections of international c3pital 
can rapidly yield dramatic financial rewards. 
It is difficult to assess the true extent to which ~~Cs have transferred 
their production to LOCs. Newfarmer (1980) quotes crude figures which 
suggest that in 1945, MNCs had invested approximately 20 billion dollars 
abroad, and that by 1976, this figure had risen to 290 billion dollars (U.S.). 
However, much of this investment has occurred in other developed count-
ries, a fact which is illustrated by the l.l.O. (1973) assessment that 
in 1970, only 27.4% of U.S. direct investment abroad occurred in lOCs. 
This is, nevertheless, a substantial advance upon previous decades. 
furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the recessionary diffic-
ulties of the 1970s have encouraged many MNCs to transfer their produc-
tion units away from comparatively high cost locations in developed 
countries. 
Opinions remain mixed as to the benefits accruing from the activities of 
MNCs in LOCs. 'Oiffusionist' economists tend to attribute major economic 
benefits to MNCs because they bring to LOCs deficient factors of produc-
tion such as capital, technology and managerial skills. Thus, the 
conventional view is that ' ••• for less developed countries too small to 
be viable as national economies under present technologies, research and 
capital requirements, and existing transportation and communications 
faeili ties, mul tina tional corporations are 0 ften "the only real hope'" 
(Siersteker 1978, p.2). Critics of r;NCs disagree very strongly with this 
viewpoint, refusing to accept this implicitly benign image of the ~NC. 
They observe that the interests of the MNC are rarely in harmony with 
tho39 of the countries within which they operate. levitt (1970, p.37) 
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explains that ' ••• the multinational corporation is responsible to 
nobody but itself. It pursues its own interests, and is not concerned 
for those of any external groups.' Levitt explains that the ~,NC's 
major ffiotivation is growth in its own right, which it achieves through 
profits. In the interests of continued growth and security, the MNC 
attempts to gain centrol of total production processes and related 
complementary and competing products through vertical and horizontal 
integration maneouvres, which may involve the creation of new sub-
sidiary companies, or the take-over and absorbtion of existing enterprise. 
One source of MNC power is its ability to create and exploit monopoly 
conditions at every level of economic activity. 
MNCs have ex~anded internationally most frequently throush direct 
inv83tment. Such investment usually ~nvolves the craation or absorbtion 
of some kind of permanent organisation abroad, which may for example be a 
manufacturing plant, an administrative centre, or a service establish-
ment such as a hotel. As a rule, parent companies prefer 1DO(w control 
over their subsidiaries, and have therefore shunned Joint-ownership 
unless local legislation or circumstances dictate otherwise. In addition, 
there is a preference for little or no direct shareholding in MNC sub-
sidi~ries because of what is claimed to be low profitability in the early 
stages of such enterprise. Instead, management encourages greater equity 
issue in the parent company, and concentrates on the transference of 
capital between segments of the corporation through the internal trade 
of materials, royalties and fees (Levitt 1970). 
To the diffusionists, the benefits of ~iNC activity easily outweigh the 
disadvantages. In terms of short term economic and political objectives 
at least, it is argued that the presence of ~INC branch pl~nts provides 
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em~loyment, high personal income for employees, fiscal benefits through 
taxation, better products, multiplier effects throughout the economy, 
transfers of technology, and improved balance of payments. The critics 
argue exactly the reverse on most of these points. It is, for example 
argued convincIngly that direct investment rarely contstitutes a sub-
stantial capital inflow, and that in the long term, it induces a signif-
icant transfer of income from poorer to richer countries through the 
structures of the MNCs. Indeed, Levitt (1970, p,75) observes caustic-
all that 'The success of the large corporation is reflected by a fact 
which has been little noticed: they do not lose money,' 
The differing attitUdes to MNC direct investment are of great importance 
because in some cases they represent, or at least explain the approaches 
of governments to economic development. for this reason, the next two 
sections of this chapter are devoted to both positive and negative 
reactions to direct investment. 
3.3 Pro-Direct Investment Arquments 
Lall (1974) has argued that it is possible, at risk of some over-simplif-
ication, to group attitudes to direct investment by MNCs into six major 
categories - three in favour, and three against. The pro-direct foriegn 
investment group has as its most extreme component what Lall refers to as 
'The Business School Approach'. Emanating from the business schools of 
the metropolitan centres, its characteristics include an implicit and 
central belief in the moral and practical virtues of the free enterprise 
system. There is also in this approach a tacit acceptance of the existing 
distribution of income within and between countries. It is frequently 
argued by critics that this attitude totally disregards the economic, 
political and social effects of the extension of the capitalist system 
into develo~ing countries. Consequently, the prescriptions for gov9rnment 
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policy that ensue centre exclusively on the well-being of business 
enterprises as op~osed to all other groups. Thus, it is assumed that 
an environment of stability and non-inter-
ference is most conducive to good business and universal prosperity. 
~any would suggest the the belief in 'good business' displayed by 
succ~ssive national administrations in the U.S.A. indicates an implicit 
acceptance of the Business School Approach. 
The second of the three pro-investment categories is the 'Traditional 
Economic Approach' which takes a more academic line of analysis, although 
its general attitude and conclusions resemble closely those of the 
business schools. Onca again, it leads to similar prescriptions involv-
ing laissez-faire, and the maximisation of foreign capital flows. Its 
assumptions are those of the diffusionist development paradigm, and 
also of normative economics. There is therefore considerable faith 
placed in the auto-corrective and distributive powers of the free market 
system. The numerous ceteris paribus assumptions therefore lead to 
little attention being paid to the vastly different economic, social and 
political conditions prevalent in developing countries. 
The traditional economic appro3ch therefore assumes that foreign invest-
ment constitutes a welcome net addition to investible resources in host 
countries, that it enhances their economic gr01uth, and that the pattern 
of growth which ensues is desirable. The liberalisation of international 
trade and capital flews is regarded as conducive both to total world 
welfare and to the welfare of each individual participating country. In 
J 
addition, foreign invast~ent is seen as bringing further benefits such as 
the introduction of new technology, improved management and organisation, 
superior marketing and market outlets, and sometimes, chea~er finance. 
Obviously, says Lall (1974), the benefits of these advantages are assumed, 
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3; ~S ~h~ vie~ ~hat if an ant~r~:i5~ :5 prcfitable, i~ ~ust ~~ £:od. 
'The "traditi=nal economic a~~roach" tharefore e~brac~s vast tracts of 
recaiv~d 6ccnomic wisdo~ as ~e!l as harc-headad business pragmatisn' 
(Lall 1974, p.44). The third c3tegory of pr~-inves;ment a~~roaches, 
ho~ever, sho~s lass faith in such busines~ pragmatism. The so called 
'~eo-Traditionalist' a~proach is concerned about the oligopclist, 
predatory and concentrated n.:tura of ~ultin~tional =nter~risa (Heath 1981). 
~hilst holding a basic belief in the dasi;ability of foreign ~nv~s:~ent, 
it recommends controls and official regwlaticn of m~ltindticnal activity. 
Followers of this 3~~roach ar3 thus ~ora realistic th~n ths ;enuine 
traditi~nalists, recognising some of tre "-are obvious hazards, includin; 
tha enormity and 31~rming power of contemporary GNCs. Indeed, ~eninou 
(1978, p.39) observ3s that, ' ••• at the very leas~, they (~!~C3) are ~n an 
e~ual footinG with governments; more often, they ars sU~9rior to them, 
and sometimes their masters,.' Conse~uently, he suggests that, '~~lti­
naticnals need ccntrolling bac~use, aven if they do n~:' ~p~ear as new 
political structures, they do act as fot~:s i~ the ~olitical aren~, and 
these forcas are more flexible and more affective than traditional 
;overnment bodies' (~eninou 1979, p.'03). 
The commonly sug;9st~d remedies to such excessive power incluc9 the 
~stablishment of multinational political institutions to cope with 
multination~l enterprise (Sehrman 1970), tha i~~lementation of various 
protective national measures, and dr33tic r3vers~ls of policy, d3signed 
to curtail monopoly powers and r3stors co~petiticn. The neo-tr3dition~list 
1. The record cf United 3tatas ~:~Cs, P3rticul~rly in Latin and C=ntral 
America, su;~ort3 this view, ~5 do 369rs'5 (1981) c~sErvations en 
the ~analti9s of d3lin~in;. 
", 
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school is, nevertheless, inherently in favour of multinational enterprise, 
and in fact sees its prescribed controls on the activities of MNCs as being 
both in the interests of the corporations as well as the natiens within 
which they operata. ~oreover, it is important to recognise that despite 
many overt political tirades condemning MNCs and the capitalist system in 
general, many governments throughout the world implicitly adhere to the 
neo-traditionalist approach by continuing in their attempts to attract 
MNC branch plants to their shores. 
In the case of Malta, the existence of a large number of GNCs indicltes 
that at least some of the ~ost independence governments must have adopted 
pro-overseas direct investment stances of some type. However, the posture 
of some of the more recent Maltese ad:ninistrations indic~te3 than on the 
surface at least, there has been a degree of official hostility towards 
MNC investment in Malta, an attitude rather more in keeping with some of 
the anit-direct investment attitudes. 
3.4 Anti-Oirect Investment Arouments 
Of Lall's (1974) three anti-direct investment stances, the 'Nationalist 
Ap~roach' is the mildest. As is the case with the neo-traditionalist pro-
investment approach, this is an increasingly common standpoint of national 
governments. The nationalist school is quick to question the basic vir-
tues of the free market system, and is therefore critical of the implicit 
assumptions of the diffusionist theorists who place their faith in the 
distributive powers of the laissez-faire economy. Consequently, it is 
argued that external and internal effects of foreign investment can 
damage host economies in numerous ways. These inclUde the surpression of 
domestic entrepreneurship, the im~ortation of unsuitable technology and 
products, and the undesirable extansion of oligopolist practices. 
Associ~ted with the latter is unnecessary product differentiation, heavy 
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advertising and excessive profit taking. Thus, it is argued that the 
market no longer provides an infallible guide to national welfare 
requirements. A classic exponent of the nationalist scheol is Levitt 
(1970). 
The nationalist school therefore proceeds to identify the costs of pri-
vate foreign investment as being too high because of the extraction of 
monopoly profits, the use of superior bargaining power by MNCs, unsuit-
able products and technology, frequently adverse environmental implic-
ations, transfer pricing, and 'unfair' marketing practices. The degree 
of integration with th8 international trading system implicit in 
allowing multinational enterprise to enter an economy is also seen as 
acting against the interests of the LOes. However, the 'naticnalist' 
school has little to say about alternative internal strategies of devel-
o~ment, and whether, for example, socialist or capitalist principles 
should be adopted as central philosophies of development. 
The main emphasis of the nationalist school is on minimising the cost 
and extent of foreign investment whilst extracting to the full its more 
desirable com~onents. Policy recommendations are therefore similar to 
those of the neo-traditionalist school, emphasising the need for the 
stringent regulation of foreign investments. Arguments for the eXChange 
of information concerning M~Cs between countries (espeCially LDes) are 
also advanced. The nationalist standpoint is therefore reformist in 
nature, and does not advocate the complete rejection of the capitalist 
system. It does, ho~ever, implicitly (and sometimes explicitly, as in 
the case of Levitt 1970) abhor the loss of natlonal sovereignty associated 
with integration into the world capitalist system. 
The second of Lall's (1974) anti-investment categories is the 'Dependence' 
62 
approach, and as is clear from its title, it attempts to embrace much of 
the varied dependency literature that has already been discussed in 
Chapter Two. The dependance approach incorporates many of the features 
of the nationalist school, but stresses the broader ramifications of the 
whole capitalist development procEss, of which foriegn investment is a 
vitally important element. It has, however, already been observed in 
some detail that summarising dependency theory is difficult, if not 
impossible, as there is no single, unified theory of dependence. 
At best, it can be concluded that most theories of dependence agree that 
dependent structures within an economy can seriuusly hinder, and in some 
cases, totally obstruct 'real' development. Through the confusion, 
Lall (1974, p.45) states that, 'The greatest contribution of the depend-
ency school is its broad perspective and its analysis of the internal 
political/economic forces which reinforce the historical dominance of the 
central capitalist countries.' Remedies arB therefore perceived as 
sweeping changes in both external reldtions and internal power structures. 
This type of attitude conforms with that of the declared post-1971 
Maltese revolutionary socialist administrations whose stated intentions 
have appeared to be radical compared with those of previous governments. 
It is inevitable that, in its most extreme forms, the dependence approach 
encroaches substantially onto the ground covered by the third anti-
investment category, the 'Neo-Marxist Approach'. The neo-r.arxists 
concentrate on class conflict, and the c8ntral concept of economic sur-
plus extracted from the LOCs by multinational enterprise and foreign 
investors. Thus, much debate revolves around theories of imperialism 
and exploitation (briefly covered in Chapter Two). Whilst the dependency 
school concerns itself with national develo~ment, the neo-marxist school 
is concerned with /-
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socialist revolution and development,preferably on an international 
scale. The remedies are thus predictably seen as being internal and 
international revolution, and the complete rejection of foreign capital 
lfrank 1967). Such an attitude is similar to that officially adopted 
(although not necessarily practiced) by the Eastern Bloc countries. 
In conclusion, the fact that dependency theory, for all its faults, can 
be seen to have substantial roots in all three anti-foreign investment 
schools is significant. An examination of some of the more central 
themes of anti-foreign investment, dependency based arguments is there-
fore valuable. 
3.5 Multinational Companips as Aqents of Dependence 
Because MNCs are amongst the most important agents in the generation 
of dependent s~o~res, a closer look at the effects of direct MNC invest-
ment in LOCs is desirable. 8iersteker (1978) has identified a number of 
areas of debate concerning the consequences of r.NC investment in LOCs. 
Of these, the first concerns the expected benefits to balance of payments 
in such countries following the establishment ofMNC branch plants. 
Conventicnal or diffusionist theorists argue that an improved balance of 
payments is likely. However, counter arguments point out that rlNCs often 
inject little capital investment, and frequently depend on scarce local 
capital sources within the LOCs themselves. It is also ~intained that 
~NC subsidiaries are deliberately restricted by parent companies to 
production for the local markets, and do not consequently concentrate on 
desired export production. 
~erhaps most alarming is the mounting evidence that MNCs remit excess 
profits, and that they employ transfer pricing m8chanis~s to avoid local 
tax payments. The latter problem is now perceived as being so serious 
that many countries (e.g. Tanzania) employ specialist personnel to detect 
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the transfer pricing of multinational enterprise. Furthermore, it is 
clear that even the comparatively advanced fiscal authorities of devel-
oped countries are unable to cope with such practices in their own 
territories, a fact which is confirmed by the pUblication by D.E.C.O. 
(1979) of a report and guide designed to minimise the problem. Never-
theless, the loss of revenue arising from such fraud is, in relative 
terms, far more serious in LOCs. ~eninou (1978) has suggested that 
MNC currency transfers have in some cases exacerbated or even initiated 
currency crises in some LOCs. 
The fact that MNCs frequently establish few, if any, linkages with the 
local economies within which they operate is also cited as a factor 
further diminishing the value of the MNCs! contributions to production 
(and import substitution) in LOCs. Furthermore, the net outflow of 
capital that frequently occurs, particularly as a result of transfer 
pricing, is seen as a major hindrance to development. The widely 
publicised income and employment multiplier effects never seem to 
materialise, and instead, there results an increased de~endence upon 
the r;NCs themselves to generate employment and overseas currency. 
Ideally, the integration of MNC activity into a domestic economy would 
prevent such dependence. This, unfortunately, rarely occurs, and the 
overseas sector remains isolated from the remainder of the economy. 
It is also observed that the presence of MNC branch plants can displace 
or obstruct indigenous production (Siersteker 1978). Thus, the compet-
itive advantages of many branch plants often allows them to out-compete, 
or buyout import substitution industries, transforming them into their 
own subsidiaries. In addition, they are often also in a ~osition to 
attract scarce skilled labour away from local companies using the lure 
of higher wages and salaries. It can therefore be arGued that the dama;e 
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dons to local factors of ~roduction inevitably reduces the possibilities 
and likely extent of self-sustained development. The productive structure 
that ensues is consequently increasingly dependent upon MNCs for advance-
ment. It is also significant that the displacement of indigenous prod-
uction is ' ••• a highly visible and much resented process' (Siersteker 
1978, p.10), which seriously reduc3s autonomy in national and regional 
decision-making (Levitt 1970). 
Dependency theorists in particular argue that MNCs encourage inappropriate 
patterns of consumption in LOCs. In this respect, it is clear that many 
alien tastes have been imposed upon LDCs' societies, a process referred 
to as 'cocacolonisation' by Levitt (1970). It seems that the shaping of 
consumer tastas is as vital to the operations of the large MNCs in the 
LOCs as it is in the metropoli. for example, MNC producers of electron-
ics products seem to have had a particularly strong influence upon 
consumption patterns on a global scale (Mattelhart 1979). Especially 
obvious cases include the worldwide trade of radios (even in the poorest 
countries), which themselves are amongst the strongest media of culture. 
Levitt (1970, p.75) explains that, ' ••• the corporation thus has a vested 
interest in the destruction of cultural differences and in a homogenised 
way of life the world over.' This suggests that cultural dependence is 
largely a consciously manufactured problem generated at will by the MNCs. 
The ease with which alien, and often detrinental consumption patterns 
may be established within LDCs stems from the relative might of the MNCs' 
competitive mechanisms, developed for the nuch more sophiticated and 
voluminous metropolitan markets. Thus, powers of innovation, gimmickry 
and trend-setting often rest with the ~NC rather than the local producer. 
Of enhanced value are the advertising and marketing techniques of the 
parent company which muy create totally new markets in LOCs. Once 
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established, capital intensive techniques and other competitive advant-
ages may be used to maintain extensive influence over consumption 
patterns. In many cases, the cultural dependence that ensues is so 
intense and complete that it is not detected by the indigenous population 
(Seers 1981). Perhaps one of the most alarming consequences of this is 
the weakening of links between the much more traditional (and frequently 
marginal) bulk of the economy and the new productive and extremely visible 
GNC sector. 
It is often argued by dependency theorists that MNC activity divides 
society in LOCs by altering social structures and encouraging the devel-
opment of a wealthy and increasingly alien socio-econcmic group. This 
~ bourgeoisie is seen as having more in common with metropolitan 
society than its own (Dos Santos 1970),. MNCs encourage the creation of 
this type of group through the provision of comparatively lucrative wage 
scales, and through strong incentives for ' ••• conformity through social-
isation pressures within the structure of the firm' (Siersteker 1978, p.22). 
It is argued that the existence and increased prosperity of these groups 
in LOCs exacerbates problems resulting from inappropriate patterns of 
consumption and associated cultural dependence. 
The increasing association between the metropolitan oriented groups of 
LOCs and the MNCs tends, not surprisingly, to coincide with a corresponding 
increase in the power of MNCs over the governments of LOCs. It becomes 
increasingly difficult to resolve conflict between MNCs and LOCs in 
favour of the latter, emphasising that the independence of government 
,. This concept has much in common with th3t of the feudal-imperialist 
alliance mentioned by Dos Santos (1970) and other dependency theorists. 
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policy-making and decision-making in many areas may be adversely 
affected, or even corrupted. Indeed, MNCs ' ••• do not hesitate to make 
capital out of the relationship which ties them to these countries. In 
so doing, they are certain for most of the time of being exposed to 
fewer risks than the country itself in the case of conflict' (Peninou 
1978, p.101). The penalties of delinking strategies may therefore be 
prohibitively severe for LDCs. 
It can, in addition, be argued that allied local groups oriented 
towards the metropoli are increasingly seen to be the major link 
perpetuating neo-colonial dependent relationships with the dominant core 
countries. Thus,friction with other social groups can induce further 
conflict and political instability. MNCs are therefore often regarded 
as ' ••• part of a process involving the accelerated growth of a sub-
system oriented toward the demands of a small priviligad section of the 
population ••• ' (Hansen 1981, p.27). 
Inevitably, closely related to the formation of such allied local groups 
is the problem of rapidly worsening income distributions. MNCs are often 
perceived as being instrumental to this process, particularly because of 
the comparatively high wages and salaries they encoura£e, and above all, 
the increased marginalisation of the traditional elements of the product-
ive economy. Thus, the worsening rift between rural and urban areas, and 
indeed between different urban areas, is often blamed to a considerable 
extent upon the activities of ~NCs. 
An increasingly common feature of export based MNC activity in particular 
is the dispersal of corporation activity on the basis of production stages. 
Thus, it has now become p~ssible for MNCs to carry out many diffarent 
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specialised stages of production in many different locaticns throughout 
the world. This is a disturbing trend for a number of reasons. First, 
it generally means that MNC branch plants are only concerned with 
production for the parent company. This tends to restrict very severely 
the potential linkages and positive multiplier effects accruing from 
export based ~NC activity. Also, because of heavy trading with other 
parts of the corporation, there is greatly enhanced potential for transfer 
pricing activities. There is also evidence to suggest that this type 
of branch plant, devised as it is to enhance the flexibility of prod-
uction,is most vulnerable to closure induced by policy changes, or more 
likely, market fluctuations and technological change. The latter factor, 
meanwhile, has not only permitted the staged breakdown of the total 
production process, but has also allowed much of the work required in 
the branch plants to be done by unskilled labour. The de-skilling 
proc6ss has helped to minimise the much desired technology transfer from 
the ~:NCs to the indigenous industrial sector. Sadly, it seems that many 
countries (Malta included) have become dependent upon labour intensive 
'de-skilled' branch plant industries. 
Technology transfer is one of the most important considerations as it is 
frequently technology, and usually innovative technology, which holds the 
key to the powers of r.NCs. Similarly, it is very often the lack of this 
indigenous technological capacity that prevents internally inspired 
industrial development impetus in LDCs. It is argued by MNC'critics that 
research and development is deliberately concentrated in the country of 
the parent company, to the detriment of the branch plant host countries. 
The tendency to retain and protect thair monopoly over certain types of 
technology is also seen as a factor that seriously hinders ~aluable 
technology transfer in favour of many LDCs. The latter point is 
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unfortunately inevitable, given the nature of captialist competition. 
Although the location of research and development establishments by 
MNCs in LOCs is seen as desirable, particularly as it indicates a 
possible intention to develop locally appropriate technology, Germidis 
(1977, p.26) has emphasised the dangers of 'pseudo-centralised research 
establishments.' These are apparently not gearsd to local requirements 
at all, and in the more unscrupulous casas, exist merely as a means of 
recruiting high quality local personnel cheaply on comparatively low 
salaries. Through the internationalisation of their personnel and the 
systematic destruction of national barriers, MNCs can often encourage, 
where desired, the transfer of skilled personnel overseas to other parts 
of the corporation. By means of this 'brain drain', ' ••• the brightest 
and ablest people from lower income countries swell the technical 
resources of private international empires'(Levitt 1970, p.108). 
The LOCs' problems in acquiring innovative tachnology are attributable 
to the fact that the 'technology market' is not a free one (Streeten 
1972), and that the diffusionist assumptions of the conventional devel-
opment schools are consequently unjustified. In many cases, therefore, 
MNCs choose locations in LOCs precisely becaUSe of comparatively low 
labour costs, which permit the use of technologically obsolescent 
equipment that is no longer sufficiently profitable (or safe) in the 
metropolitan centres. As a result, truly valuable technology rarely 
diffuses from the core to the periphery. This explains the marked 
transfer of only the traditional labour intensive industries in recent 
decades from the traditional industrial centres to less developed 
peripheral locations. 
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The above situation presents a number of developing nations, such as 
Malta, with a difficult dilemna. They have a choice between achieving 
economic growth dependent upon low wages and labour intensive industries, 
or development based on improved living standards. Obviously, achieving 
development targets that require increased wages seriously jeopardises 
the major advantages of locating MNC activity in such countries - cheap 
labour. Thus, some countries ap~ear to be in a situation that prohibits 
the achievement of. genuine development aims. Although this is a problem 
that has dogged many Maltese governments ( and will be raised later in 
this study), it must be recognised that the majority of LDCs are at 
present in a position in which both development and economic growth seem 
impossible. Unlike Malta, these nations may be referred to as Third 
world or underdeveloped countries. 
In summary, there is little doubt that technological dependence remains 
one of the most serious forms of dependence to afflict LDCs. The tragedy 
of the situation is that this dependence is not even upon contemporary 
or innovative technology, but is often merely dependence upon a small 
and inadequate flow of obsolescent discarded technology from the devel-
oped centres. Indeed, it is clear that one of the reasons for the 
failure of research and development establishments in LDCs is the 
fragmented (staged), incomplete and outmoded nature of the production 
processes that diffuse to the peripheral economies. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The importance of MNCs 1n most economies of the world can no longer 
be denied. Because this study questions the value of allowing economic 
development through the attraction of MNC branch plant activities, it has 
deliberately adopted an anti-direct overseas investment stance. Consequently, 
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a number of general detrimental dependency themes associated with MNC 
activity have been identified. These include balance of payments problems, 
the displacement of local production, the impositicn of inappropriate 
consumption patters, the alteration of social structures, a worsening 
income distribution, disappointing industrial linkages, and negligible 
technology transfer. These themes will be pursued in the chapters that 
follow, the intention being to assess the extent to which such problems 
apply in the Maltese case. The next two chapters, however, are 
concerned with the role of country size to development. It will soon 
become apparent that the question of country size complicates many devel-
opment and dependency issues, especially those discussed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SMALL COUNTRIES 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the reasons for the increasing interest in the development of 
small countries in recent decades has been a rapid increase in their 
number resulting from post-Wbrld War Two decolonisation. Despite the 
provision of nominal independence to such countries, many have remained 
dependent upon their former colonial powers, and have made little 
progress towards achieving their elusive development goals. It seems, 
therefore,that the quest for self-reliance and self-determination in 
small countries is much more difficult than in large countries, most 
obviously and frequently because of scarcities in indigenous human and 
physical resources. Small countries are thus often forced to rely 
heavily upon the international transfer of factors of production, and 
consequently, to depend upon precarious flows of trade, capital and 
technology from the metropolitan centres. 
In view of the abnormally severe difficulties of dependency facing small 
countries, it is not surprising that the size of countries is frequently 
associated with levels of development. Jalan (1982) has, for example, 
observed that, by using total population as a single measure of size, 
small countries may easily be associated with backwardness, under-
development, and dependence. Thus, he notes that of the 133 LOes for 
which data exist, 78 have populations below 5 million, and as many as 
49 countries less than 1 million. However, there are other facets of 
the concept of size that may be equally crucial, and it is important to 
recognise that the ado~tion of different variables representing country 
siz: will occur with different subjects of study. Countries may therefore 
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be small in many diffarent ways. In this context, Selwyn (1975) observed 
that smallness as represented by physic31 area may represent a narrow 
range of natural resources, whilst a small po~ulation may similarly 
correspond to a narrow range of available human resources. In 
addition, he suggested that a measure such as gross national product may 
be used to represent the extent of the internal market for industrial 
products. Clearly, many small countries, particularly examples such as 
Malta, are small on any measure. 
Some authors have suggested the use of size indices to classify countries 
on a multi-dimensional basis. Hence, using an example provided by Jalan 
(1982, p.43), an index of country size (Ii) of between nearly 0 and 100 
may be obtained for each of a chosen number of nations from the following 
formula, 
= 
, 100 
3 
P = Population 
+ 
Ai 
A "laX 
A = Arable Land Area 
V = Gross National Product 
i = country 
+ 
where 'P Max', 'A Max' and 'V ~ax' represent the highest values of 
population, arable land area and G~P respectively in the sample of small 
countries under study. Unfortunately, as Jalan (1982) observes, this 
type of approach is likely to be misleading in many cases because of its 
im~licit assumption that the small value of one variable may be directly 
compensated by larger values in other variables. 
Another of the major obstructions to the formation of a simple measure 
of smallness is the abundantly apparent variation in the type and history 
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of small countries. for example, it is easy to distinguish between 
mainland or continental small countries and small islands. Indeed, it 
is evident that many small countries are either land-locked or sea-
locked (Lloyd and Sundrum 1982). furthermore, it is often argued that 
historical circumstances, in tandem with location and associated strat-
egic factors, have conspired to generate distinct island characteristics 
in island nations. Caldwell and Harrison (1980, p953) argue that these 
differences ' ••• are based on social and economic characteristics, which 
can be summarised by saying that such states are more westernised. They 
were part of the European maritime system at a time when the West did 
not have the strength to penetrate continental areas to the same extent. 
On the whole, they retained their colonial links longer.' 
Much debate therefore persists currently as to whether there are distinct 
characteristics of 'islandnass' that render island nations distinct from 
other small countries. In a special issue of 'world Development' (1980, 
vol. 8), Dommen (1980) attempted to identify distinguishing characterist-
ics of island states by pairing a sample of island economies with 
continental countries displaying similar annual gross domestic products. 
Although the study depended excessively upon numerous implicit and 
unjustified assumptions, particularly concerning the use of GOP as the 
main criterion for pairing, there were several interesting general 
observations which were summarised as follows. 'The study supports the 
view that island countries are different, and indeed that they are 
p~rticularly fortunate places, where life is longer and nature is boun-
teous, though the menu may be short. Politics are friendlier. Hurri-
, 
canes are more dangerous than social unrest. 
In the same issue of 'World Development', Selwyn (1980) sugJests that the 
notion that islands are different from mainland small countries stems 
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from naturalists (such as Charles Darwin) who were concerned to identify 
the often dramatic bio~gical differences between island and continental 
environments. Selwyn observes that small countries differ widely, but 
that so do islands. He concludes that many of the social and economic 
conditions of small islands are also characteristics of small countries. 
'I find it significant that, when I carried out a study of islands 
for UNCTAD, the issues which forced themselves to my attention were 
those of small size, of remoteness, of dependence, of diversifi-
cation, or bargaining capacity with foreign investors or transport 
operators - all questions which could be parallelled in small, 
remote mainland countries, or indeed peripheral regions of many 
lar~er countries' (Selwyn 1980, p.9S0). 
Selwyn's reference to the peripheral regions of many larger countries is 
interesting and merits further attention. Economists, and to some extent 
geographers too, have frequently assumed regions to be smaller than 
countries. Obviously, the scale of many small countries makes the 
traditional practice of breaking up countries into regions difficult, and 
often meaningless. Selwyn (1975) perceptively points out that it is 
usually far more valid to view the small country as p~rt of an economic 
region. Reasons for this include the fact that the small countries are 
rarely self-sufficient, and are forced to trade heavily with neighbouring 
areas. In addition, the productive capacity of many small countries is 
heavily specialised, exacerbating dependence upon external sources for 
goods and services. Selwyn (1975) also points out that many Cases of 
double peripherality exist in which small countries find themselves on 
the periphery of a region which is itself on the periphery of a more 
prosperous metropolitan region. This view is sup~orted by Brookfield 
(1975b, p.S5) who noted that, ' ••• it is possible to identify regional 
structures in which small countries emerge as politically separate 
portions of the periphery of regional economies centred beyond their 
borders.' 
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Despite the difficulties of measuring and assessing smallness, country 
size remains central to the concept of the viability of small ccuntries. 
In the past, smallness itself has been assumed to be a problem, and by 
implication, large size has therefore been seen as a virtue. During 
the period of major decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s, it was argued 
by politicians in particular that many of the small colonies that were 
being granted independence (including Malta) were too small to be viable 
independent entities, and were thus unlikely to survive the transition 
from colony to independent nation state. However, by 1975, Selwyn was 
able to report that there were then more small independent countries with 
membership of the United Nations Organisation than ever, and that they 
showed every sign of continuing to exist. He also emphasised the 
shallow nature of the concept of viability by declaring that, 'Viability 
has no meaning except in relation to the purposes of the citizens of a 
country, and in the last resort any national unit which can maintain its 
separate existence is ipso facto viable' (Selwyn 1975, p.12). 
There remains, nevertheless, some doubt as to the nature of the 
independence and sovereignty that many small countries have obtained as 
a consequence of decolonisation. Thus, Lloyd and Sundrum (1982, p.31) 
point out that, with respect to small countries, the question at issue 
is whether national sovereignty should be interpreted in the same way as 
it is for large countries.' Certainly, the types of dependence prevalent 
in small countries, and the policies and implications associated with 
such dependence, would appear to differ radically from those of larger 
nations. This contention is extremely relevant as it follows on 
directly from the observations of Seers (1981 ) (see Chapter Two), who 
emphasised the tendency of traditional dependency theory to ignore 
obvious factors influencing numerous countries. One of the more obvious 
neglected ch~racteristics was country size. Clearly, in the case of small 
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countries such as ~alta, a dependency approach which attem~ts to examine 
concrete situations of dependency, as advocated by Cardoso (1972), Palma 
(1981) and Seers (1981 ), is most applicable, particularly as it 
should be able to incorporate the special circumstances influencing 
small countries. for this reason, the remainder of this chapter attempts to 
identify some of the major characteristics of small countries, and the 
manner in which these characteristics influence dependence, and the 
develo~ment process as a whole. 
4.2 Som~ Disarlvantar.es of 8eing Small 
Although not considered important by traditional dependency theorists, 
the often severe factor endowment deficiencies of small ccuntries have 
b8:n shown by Seers (1981 ) to be a major obstacle to development. Small 
countries were, for example, amongst the worst hit by the oil price rises 
(or 'oil shocks') of the 1970s (Seers 1982). However, most significant 
is the fact that the absenca of indigenous resources is not always 
restricted to tradable materials. Other common scarciti~s include basic 
items such as space, cultivable land and fresh water, all of which are 
in short supply in Malta. 
In addition to the usually severe deficiencies of physical resources in 
small countries, there is a frequent shortage of human resources. This 
situation stems From the smallness of the human populations involved, 
which usually results in small labour forces, shortages of skilled and 
professional personnel, restricted entrepreneurial activity, and a limi-
ted scope for technological develo~ment. Also signiFicant, especially 
where manufacturing industry is considered as the dasired engine of 
develo~ment, is the severely restrictive nature of internal markets in 
small cDuntries, and a general inability to achieve economies of scale. 
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The patterns of trade and production that develop in small countries are 
prone to concentration, both in terms of product group and trading 
partners. Kuznets (1960) explained this tendency in terms of the 
restrictod nature of the resource bases of small countries. Thus, given 
the economies of scale necessary to produce profitability, Kuznets 
maintained that it was likely that an economy would grow to rely heavily 
upon a comparatively small number of large producers manufacturing a 
narrow range of produce. Also crucial to this argument was the tendency 
of small nations to concentrate desperately on production with comparative 
advantage. Referring to empirical evidence supporting Kuznets's 
assertions, Jalan (1982) has noted that such trade and production 
concentrations render the economies of small countries extremely vulner~ 
able to often violent fluctuations in international market conditions. 
The weak trading position of small countries is exacerbated by the 
tendency of LOCs to compete with each other for the same markets by 
producing the same ranges of goods, such as textiles and clothing. 
Furthermore, trading conditions are worsened by the tendency for the 
export trade of small countries to be confined to a small number of 
market outlets, most frequently dominated by ~NCs operating from the 
former colonial power. Not only may this weaken a small country's polit-
ical powers of autonomy, but it can also render these economies unnec-
essarily vulnerable to additional market fluctuations occurring within 
individual metropolitan economies. 
It 1s interesting to note, however, that logical diversification 
strategies, both of export products and trading p2rtners, are further 
restricted by transport problems, particularly for the smaller and more 
remota economies. This is because, ' ••• commodity concentration in foreign 
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trade acts generally as a cost reducing factor in ocean transport if 
the cargos can be shipped in bulk on ocean carriers' (Sennathan 1982, 
p.215). Obviously, remoteness, diversified products and varied cargo 
destinations all lead to high costs as they frequently entail empty 
hauls (by air, boat, road or rail). It is in fact not uncommon for 
ships serving small countries (usually islands and archipelagos) to 
depend for their business upon multi-destination voyag=s which collact 
and deliver large numbers of small cargos. Not only does this directly 
add to the costs of trade, but it also massively increases delivery 
time, often ruling out trade in perishable goods, and further eroding 
the benefits accruing from trade. 
One of the more fundamental problems facing indigenous enterprise in 
small countries is the acquisition of secure and stable overseas markets. 
'Any new entrant into the world of international trade in manufactured 
goods and services faces a variety of handicaps even if its products 
are of good quality and of low price' (Lall and Ghosh 1982, p.150). The 
major hazards provided by overseas markets, especially in the metro-
politan centres, include traditional brand-name preferences, different 
national standards, speCifications and laws, a lack of direct and 
regular contact with customers, inevitable difficulties of maintaining 
a continuous flow of technical information oath to and from product 
consumers, and increasingly aggressive trade protectionism. The latter 
problem is exemplified by the European Economic Community, which controls 
and limits its trade with external producers using, amongst other 
d~vices, tariffs and trade quotas. 
It is inevitable that few indigenous enterprises in small countries will 
have sufficient expertise 3nd financial resources to establish permanent 
marketing outlets in overseas countries. Only in exceptional cases will 
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the scale of such enterprises merit the establishment of extensive 
overseas marketing networks. Small economies are consequently once 
again heavily dependent upon the ~NC for market outlets. Furthermore, 
although ~NCs have the international connections and structures capable 
of acquiring markets for s~all countries, the same structures lead to 
the divisicn of production into separate staged units (see Chapter Three), 
which not only reduce linkages and multiplier effects within the host 
economies, but also ~ermit intra-corporation transfer pricing practices. 
However, on a positive note, ~NCs, by virtue of their power and their 
internationalised production, are often better able to avoid some of the 
trade protection measures that afflict indigenous enterprises in small 
countries. 
The multinational enterprise is no longer the only international agent 
capable of fulfilling the marketing needs of the small economies. There 
are now growing numbers of foreign purchasing and retailing firms which 
are increasingly scouting the less developed world for suitable prod-
uction sources (Lall and Ghosh 1982). Although these companies in many 
respects represent a welcome development, over-reliance on their activ-
ities is extremely unwise as they are often extremely 'footloose'. Unlike 
many of the ~NCs operating in small countries, they have little or no 
capital invested in the productive enterprises themselves, and through 
their continuous scouting activities are easily able to transfer their 
contracts to other more competitive producers elsewhere. Indeed, this 
situation once again hi9hli~hts the fact that many small countries, and 
LOCs in general, are competing directly with each other for the mdrkats 
or the metropolitan cores. 
with respect to industrial production, many or the problems associated 
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with the establishment of manufacturing industry in small countries 
have already been raised. These have includad obstacles such as 
shortages. in both indigenous natural and human rescurces, and the 
restrictive nature of internal markets. These obstacles have in many 
cases been overcome or alleviated through the importation of absent 
factors of production and the export orientation of manufacturing 
industry. In this way, at least some of the constraints of production 
can be eliminated. Nevertheless, Brookfield (1975b, p.54) observes that, 
'.~.in a world where economies of scale are being constantly enhanced, 
the truly small and poor countries find that their maximum levels of 
operation lie further and further below the optimum.' Scale constraints 
therefore remain serious, despite export orientation, and they sariously 
limit the volume and the range of linkages which can develop around a 
growth industry such as a successful export staple. 
Jacobs (1975) has emphasised that, in addition to the problems already 
discussed, small countries face abnormally severe difficulties in 
maintaining public administration. This may partly be explained by 
shortages in indigenous personnel1, as well as predictable difficulties 
such as the financial burden of maintaining a comprehensive public sector. 
As a result, it is inevitable that small economies lack many of the 
valuable specialist administrative services necess~ry for the controlled 
sustenanCe of a new productive sector. There is therefore a serious 
need for the provision of many new services that were non-existent in 
the colonial period, and which have been neglected during the post-
colonial ern. Ideally, the provision of such new services would surpress 
1. It has already been observed elsewhere that the ~ublic sectcr in 
small countries frequently absorbs ~ lar;e proportion of the 
available skilled labour, thus depriving the private sector or 
suitable manpower. 
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tendencies towards informal and inefficient administrative procedure, 
and would help eliminate the debilitating inaccuracies and omissions 
which hav~ traditionally plagued public records in small nations,. It 
would also permit the establishment of institutions whose purpose it is 
to monitor, and if necessary, restrict the activities of ~NCs within the 
host countries. 
As has been hinted above, the cost of maintaining an eFFective public 
administratiun may seem to be prohibitively large to the governments of 
small countries. Certainly, economies of scale apply to public admin-
istration as much as they do to industrial activity. Some ~ublic sector 
activities are particularly costly, and may therefore be scaled down 
deliberately, despite the ramifications. One of the best examples of 
this is the diplomatic service. In spite of the inevitable isolation 
that ensues, most small countries are compelled to maintain skeletal 
diplomatic coverage throughout the world, and in some cases, to depend 
upon the services of their former colonists for diplomatic links. This 
situation .is unfortunate as it further restricts desirable access to 
overseas advice, information and markets (Cruise O'Brien '981, and 
Jacobs 1975). Such dependence upon exogenous diplomatic services also 
has potentially serious political consequences. 
4.3 Dependency Issues in Small Countries 
Perhaps the most significant difference between dependence in large and 
in small economies is the fact that large countries are able at least to 
consider trying to reduce dependence substantially, whilst small countries 
frequently have no o~tion but to tolerate their dependence, and try to 
1. for example, small countries (and lDCs in general) are renowned for 
inefficiencies and irregularities prevalent in thsir taxation systems. 
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minimise the negative effects that the condition may have upon their 
economies and societies. In short, the consequences of a delinking 
strategy (Seers 1981) are likely to be more damaging than beneficial in 
small economies, whilst such a strategy in a large country should have 
a greater chance of success. 
There are many conflicting views as to the extent and significance of 
dependence in small countries. Oemas (1975) identified five major forms 
of economic dependence operating to the detriment of small cDuntries. 
These included dependence through the foreign ownership and control of 
key sectors of the economy, and serious over-reliance generated throu9h 
the provision of aid to small countries. In addition to discussing 
dependence induced by trade concentration (both by industrial sector and 
market destination), Demas also mentioned the gravity of dependence 
incurred through the provision of technology and other human resources 
b, metropolitan agencies. Finally, he raised the problems of im~orted 
(often inappropriate) consumption and production patterns imposed upon 
small economies. Although these dependency links conform closely with 
many of the traditional manifestations of dependency theory, and are 
therefore seen to be present in LDCs of all sizes, Demas maintains that 
they are made more severe in small countries. The reasons for this 
include small internal markets, the open and vulnerable nature of many 
small economies, and the usually narrow human and physical resource 
bases. 
An alternative view of dependancy in small countries is held by 8lazic-
~letner and Hughas (1982, p.86) who declar9 that, with reference to small 
countries, ' ••• participating in international economic relations has not 
led either to economic or political dependance.' However, des~)ite the 
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surprising confidence exuding from this statement, most analyses of 
small countries tend to support the views of Demas (1975). for example, 
Jalan (1S82, p.39) states that, ' ••• the economic structure of most small 
countries is characterised by a r.luch greater dependence on foreign trade 
and foreign capital investment.' He proceeds to emphasise thnt the 
quest for self-reliance is much more difficult in small countries, and 
that there is consequently a much more profound reliance upon the inter-
national transfer of factors of production. A more severe view is that 
of ward (1975, p.129) who observed that, 'Small countries have often 
remained underdeveloped because of the distortions and rigidities built 
into their economies as a result of their integration into a world 
market from a position of profound weakness. Their imports and exports 
and general economic operations are more determined by th2 needs of the 
developed countries than by their own.' The latter point is central to 
dependency theory. 
Many small countries do indeed operate in the world markets from a 
position of profound weakness. This observation is supported by the 
neo-classical school of economics which views small countries as 'price-
takers' whose influence on terms of trade are negligible (Jalan 1982). 
Although most less developed economies may be ciassified as price-takers, 
it is significant that most small countries are unlikely ever to be 
able to operate on a scale sufficient to influence the world 
markets. Their position is therefore one in which establishing them-
selves as producers within the world markets is extremely difficult, and 
also one in which their sudden departure from direct participation within 
the world economy would have no repercussions outside their own countries. 
However, the bulk of the analyses of small countries seems to suggest 
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that given the necessary degree of flexibility, initiative and deter-
mination, small countries may overcome their endowed disadvantaGes and 
prosper within the world economy. It is therefore widely suggestad that 
' ••• trade, access to foreign technology and foreign direct investment 
would seem to offer the only means by which small countries can diversify 
their ex~orts, industrialise, and establish a viable base for long term 
growth' (Lall and Ghosh 1982, p.143). In this context, it is apparent 
that a number of the newly industrialising countries (~ICs) are 
small countries, the most obvious examples being Taiwan, South Korea, 
Singapore, and to some extent, Malta. However, it is also clear that 
such a development strategy requires the extensive involvement of multi-
national enterprise, the hazards of which have already been discussed. 
Predictably, many of those who advocate the attraction of MNCs also call 
for the introduction of safeguards which may ~rotect host countries from 
the more malignant, oligopolistic and predatory nature of multinational 
activity. This type of approach corresponds closely to the third of 
Lall's (1974) pro-foreign investment stances (see Cha~ter Three). 
The more radical theorists, not surprisingly, are swift to dismiss the 
apparently benign fedtures of the MNC, and the powers of the safeguards 
intended to curtail the less desirable elements of their activities. The 
monopolistic advantages of r.NCs, particularly in teChnological and 
marketing fields, are seen as alarming because of the economic and pol-
itical power which they wield over the fragile small economies. Small 
countries therefore operate from a particularly weak position when 
dealing with MNCs, which, in many cases, control all a small economy's 
major external linkagas (Brookfield 1975b). ~evertheless, Selwyn (1975) 
maintains that ~NCs can be persuadad to 'domesticate' their operations 
towards local in:er8sts, and that thay do not have to hav9 complete 
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control of key sectors of economies. Indeed, Lall and Ghosh (1982, 
p.157) go fu:ther by assuming ' ••• ex~ort based industrialisation under 
the aegis of MNCs to be desirable, and in fact essential.' They add that 
as an alternative two decades ago, such a strategy was inconceivable, 
but that now, following the outward expansion of M~C operations, and the 
growth of international subcontracting, the possibility that small 
economies may benefit from the restructuring of industry is no lonser 
remote. 
Despite their brimming optimism, even Lall and Ghosh are careful to 
mention many of the hazards and disadvantages associ3ted with ~NC 
operations in small countries. for example, because small economies 
cannot offer ~NCs the benefits of a profitable internal market, they 
must effer them inducements to locate their export activities in these 
countries1• There results a bizarre and wasteful situation in which 
small countri9s (and LDCs in general) are forced to compete amongst 
themselves for foreign investments, thereby diluting tho potential 
benefits accruing from overseas investment through the provision of 
unnecessarily generous fiscal (and other) incentives. Lall and Ghosh 
(1982, p.1610 conclude by' ••• accepting the sad fact ••• that developing 
countries will continue to compete with each other in offering fiscal 
incentives to foreign investors.' They add that, 'There are perfectly 
sood theoretical arguments for banding to;ether to tax ~NCs, but the 
number of countries is so large, and their political interests so diverse, 
that in practice it seems wiser to accept the inevitable conflict.' 
1. Small country d~pend8ncy differs markedly from that of lar~er LDCs 
as there is usually no signific2nt internal market for ~iNC~ to disrupt. 
Thus, dependency theory's observation that MNC~ systematically destroy 
indiGenous enterprise in LDCs in order to gaIn control of the domestic 
m3rket dOGS not necessarily hold true in most small countries. 
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Indeed, the weakness of the small countries in the face of the power of 
~NCs is further emphasised by the implications of the adoption of dalink-
ing state~ies. Clearly, the potential damage that may be inflicted by 
a disgruntled MNC upon a recalcitrant small host economy will in 
relative terms be far more savage than would be the case in a larger 
country. 
In addition to increasing participation in the internationalisation of 
production, many small countries are turning to the metropolitan countries 
(and also oil producing countries) for various types of 'aid'. Small 
countries now receive much more development assistance per capita than 
large countries (De Vries 1975). This situation may be explained partly 
by continued strong links (often strategic) with ex-colonial powers, who 
may have a 'conscience~ and may be concerned about the viability of their 
smaller former colonies. It is, in any casa, easy to see that aid donors 
prefer to provid3 aid to smaller countries1 because the expenditure 
involved is likely to be much less, and the beneficial results much more 
obvious and concentrated than in larger countries. It is also clear that 
aid is itself a source of external dependence, whether it is financial, 
tachnical or otherwise. Aid is frequently 'tied' in some respect, and 
also tands to be offered in a pre-packaged alien format that can often 
be'at odds with the perceived needs of the recipient country. 
In conclusion, successful economic dev910~ment in small countries seems 
to depend upon m~nipulating rather than attempting to eliminate depend-
ency links. This is because dependence in small countries is usually 
1. This is not necessarily always the case as larger countries are more 
able to finance feasability studies for projects, and giv3 assur~nce9 
of utility etc. 
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much stronger than in large countries, and is impossible to eradicate 
without seriously damaging most development objectiv3s. Dependence, it 
seems, should instead be transformed by countering the many disadvantages 
of scale afflicting small countries. Indeed, some of the newly indust-
rialising small countries such as Singapore and Taiwan have overcome their 
problems of scale and havp successfully achiev9d impressive economic 
growth through the ~ro~ag~tion of manufacturing industry, much of which 
is export-arianted. These countries owe their success to the many ~NCs 
that have located, and continue to locate,branch plants within their 
borders. In terms of dependence, these countries could not be more 
dependent upon PiNes ~nd other metropolitan agenci3s. What is important 
is whether the nature of this dependence is on balance socially ~nd 
economically beneficial, and whether such links enhance rather than 
detract from the long term stability and progress of develo~ment. 
4.4 Countering the Disadvantaoes of Small Countries 
It has already been suggested that dependence in small countries cannot 
be eliminated, or even substantially reduced, but that given a flexible 
and energetic policy framework, it can be manipulated into a position in 
which its benefits can be maximised, and its negative influences minim-
ised. Similarly, many of the more detrimental consequences of smallness 
may be countered effectively by such policies. 
It is important to recognise that revolutionary anti-capitalist altern-
ative strategies (epitomized by those desired by Frank 1967) are rarely 
compatible with the desperate material needs of most small countries. 
Such is the dependence of the small economy upon overseas sources for 
trade, technology and security that the defiance of world capitalism may 
be seen as potentially far more to the detrimemt of the small countries 
themselves than to the capitalist system. This point is sup~ort8d by 
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the view stated earlier that small economies are price-takers, 3n~ that 
their participation within, or withdrawal from the wcrld capitalist 
system is unlikely to affect anyone but themselves. Thus, any attempt 
at isolation, such as that advocated by the 'development from below' 
strategy of St~hr (1981) (see Cha~ter one) is usually not feasible. 
There is therefore no alternative c8velopment strategy available to 
small countries. Their governments usually see themselves as being 
confined to an overseas inspired industrialisation strategy as a basis 
of their dev8lcpment. ~anufacturing industry is seen as a valuable and 
essential contributor to national income, and a creator of much needed 
employment. In addition, it may aid a country's trading position by 
eliminating the need for some im~orts, and generating valuable foreign 
eXChange through export activities. In this respect, there is the 
added advantage that in small countries, there are few internal markets 
to exploit, and few indigenous industries to destroy. Indeed, the small 
scale of local markets necessitates export based activiti2s in the 
interests of scale economies, and these industries can improve the 
balance of payments markedly. 
The conventional view of industrialisation 1n the develo~ment process 
is exemplified by Thomas (1982. p.103) who stated that, 
It is generally agreed that industrialisation, in the sense of 
creating an efficient and expanding manufacturing capacity, makes 
a vital contribution to accelerating economic growth and devel-
opment. Manufactured goods tend to have higher incoma elast-
icities of demand over a wider range of income than other products, 
and dre ~roduced by techniques which g8nerally involve more 
linkages and greater possibilities of diVErsification and 
specialisation than those of other sdctors.' 
furthermore, it is significant that, das~ite the obvious dnd substantial 
factor of ~roduction disadvantages, large industrial bases have been 
successfully dave loped in small countries, a fact which sugJests that 
diffusionist strategies are applicable in some de;ree to small countri6s. 
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Thus, givEn that successful industrialisaticn has been shown to be 
possible, it is unsurprising t~ut it has b3come a major ;riority in so 
many develo~ment plans. Economists, meanwhile, further em~hasise the 
d~sirability of industrialisation by demonstrating that manufacturing 
as a proportion of GOP tends to be less in small countries (Kuznets 1971), 
and that there is a positive correlation between per capita income and 
the proportion of GOP that is accounted for by manufacturing output1• 
Little time is devoted to the less obvious and less measurable consaqu-
encas of industrialisation which, 3S has been suggestad, are not al~ays 
so positive. 
One of the major purposes behind industrialisation is that it const-
itutes a form of economic diversification within an economy, but it is 
important to recognise that it may itself require diversification. 
Broadening the economic base of smull economies is generally desirable 
as production is usually uncomfortably concentrated within a small 
range of sectors and activities. Brookfield (1975b) uses an ecological 
analogy when stressin~ this point, emphasising that mono-culture 
increases the chances and destructive potential of disease. However, he 
proceeds to distinguish between diversity and diversification, emphas-
ising the fact that the latter does not necessarily lead to diversity. 
He proceeds to suggest that a naive approach, ' ••• based on national 
balance of payments and on the import export economy may lead to forms 
of diversification that are detrimental to the structural divarsification, 
or diversity, that is a source of strength and adaptive capacity. to an 
open t depend~nt economy' (Brookfield 1975b, p.55). 
1. This, of course, neglects in particular income distributicn, which 
tends to be savaS91y skewed in favour of the very rich in the less 
developed world. 
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Bearing this in mind, Brookfield ~aintains that govern~ents rarely 
implement suitable diversification policies. In their efforts to 
increase their revenue bases in order to control the development process, 
growth in G~P and indescriminate diversification of the sources of GNP 
inevitably follow. Indeed, this can become a government fetish, leading 
to the encouragement of diversification that benefits the exchequeur 
and which ~roduces few linkages within the economy. This superficial 
'fiscal diversification' is seen as being in direct competition for 
imputs with much more desirable 'structural diversification', The 
latter is seen as being preferable because it, ' ••• improves the mobility 
of factors of production in the economy as a whole, and widens the range 
of opportunity for the mass of the people' (Brookfield 1975b,p.S9). 
The diversification process must also take into account existing 
diversity within the economy. In particular, it must not permit a loss 
of control over key growth areas of the economy. Indeed, 'Diversifica-
tion which per~its loss of control over the growth points of the economy, 
which evolves in isolation from the general economy so that it has faw 
direct linkage effects, and which benefits mainly the central revenue, 
tends to have its "s~read effects" channelled into central places where 
local control is already most eroded, and generate sharp rural urban 
differentials which create problems of a new order' (Brookfield 1975b, 
p.71). 
Despite the numerous hazards of diversification through industrialisation, 
it remains the most popular alt?rnative for the governments of most small 
countries. Export-oriented industrialisation is favnur9d in particular, 
and the M~C continues to be seen as the most suitable agent in this 
develo0ment process. Lall and Ghosh (1982) justify this position by 
observing that the MNC ~rovides sco~e for growth in components and 
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processes which are part of MNC integrated networks, where protectionism 
is much lower, and where the MNCs themselves constitute a powerful force 
that de-restricts trade. However, as has been mentioned previously, there 
are hazards and disadvantages associated with MNC staged production units. 
This serves to emphasise the necessity for governments of small countries 
to be selective when dealing with MNCs, taking care where possible not to 
attract unscrupulous enterprises, and being equally careful to attract 
compatible and complementary industries. Indeed, there is now an 
increasing need for the development of new industries in LDCs stemming 
from the worsening difficulties being experienced in traditional ~xport 
staples,such as textiles and clothing. Ideally, LDCs (particularly small 
countries such as Malta) are looking for industries that add greater 
value during processing, and which are skill and labour intensive, but not 
scale intensive. Thomas (1982) suggests that information and communic-
ations industries show considerable promise. 
Significantly, some small countrys' efforts at economic diversification 
have led them to develop non-manufacturing, service based activities, the 
most important of which has often proved to be tourism. Thus, many small 
countries with suitable climates, and which are sufficiently accessible 
to potential tourist markets, have indulged in rapid tourist development 
programmes. Unfortunately, many of the disadvantages faCing small 
countries when developing manufacturing industry also apply to those 
fostering new tourist sectors, not least because MNCs tend also to control 
international tourism. Small countries therefore operate in the world 
tourist markets from a weak position similar to that experienced by those 
attempting industrial development. This point is particularly well 
illustrated by the Maltese case. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
Whilst smallness undoubtedly presents some exceptional difficulties for 
many small nations, many of the problems that ensue are far from being 
insoluble. Small countries are at least fortunate in that their economies 
are of more manageable proportions. It is therefore possible that, with 
the assistance of the dynamic and even aggressive planning advocated by 
Seers (1982), integration into the capitalist system may be beneficial, 
and the commitment to growth and development successful. The fruition of 
such a strategy, and the balanced and stable evolutionary growth of the 
small economies is also heavily dependent upon the quality and strength 
of political leadership. A strong, determined and charismatic leadership 
can substantially reduce less desirable dependency links, and simultan-
eously inspire vigorous and diverse development goals. Indeed, Malta 
is particularly notorious for the aggressive manoeuvring that has 
severed many of the more detrimental dependency links with Breat Britain 
(Schaffer 1975). 
It is clear that a carefully balanced policy towards MNCs in small 
countries is essential. Excess aggression is likely to deter benign 
investors, whilst a lack of selectivity is likely to attract a malignant 
combination of industries. There is, in this respect, a serious paradox 
confronting the governments of small countries. This stems initially 
from the fact that MNCs have in the past favoured small countries when 
establishing overseas branch plants. The reasons for this include low 
labour costs, the ability to influence or dominate local and national 
decision-making in small countries because of the weak bargaining positions 
of the latter, and lastly, the often loose labour and financial controls 
prevalent in many small countries. Obviously, if a small country's 
government wishes to diversify its dependency links, impose its will upon 
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guest industries, raise living standards through higher wages, and protect 
its environment, it can often only do so at the risk of destroying the 
very features of the country that attracted the MNCs in the first place. 
Successive Maltese Governments have been confronted with this type of 
problem. The next chapter introduces Malta as a small country, and after 
brief comparisons with other small countries, proceeds to establish a 
number of dependency strands which can be pursued in later chapters of 
this thesis, and which may therefore be used to evaluate Maltese post-
independence development. 
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CHAPTER fIVE: THE CASE Of MALTA 
5.1 Malta as a Small Country 
Malta may be classified as a small country on any scale of measurement. 
Her modest 315 square kilometers render her one of the smallest nations 
in the world in terms of area, although her surprisingly large popul-
ation of 346,149 (in 1980) has ensured an extremely high average popul-
ation density of 1095 persons per square kilometer (Central Office of 
Statistics, 1980). The landmass itself has, unfortunately, little to 
offer in terms of material resources. Arable land (39% of the total 
surface area), whilst being productive where it exists, is generally 
restricted to lowland areas as the karstic Upper Coralline Limestone of 
the upland areas usually supports little or no soil cover (see Bowen-
Jones, Dewdney and Fisher, 1950). Similarly, fresh water supplies are 
restricted primarily as a consequence of serious catch~ent and storage 
problems (see Plates 5.1 and 5.2), generated by the limited surface 
area of the Maltese Islands, and also as a result of the hot Mediterr-
anean climate,which experiences 
seasonal and unreliable basis. 
its annual rainfall on a highly 
The only significant mineral resource with which ~alta is endowed is 
Glabigerina Limestone, which is an excellent building stone (see Plates 
5.3 and 5.4). The sedimentary geology (see figure 5.1) is otherwise 
unable to yield anything of great value, and is not even suitable for 
the manufacture of cement. There is, however, a possibility that oil 
may be found beneath Maltese territorial waters, although the extent 
of the territorial waters is currently disputed by neighbouring Libya 
(Department or Information 1980). 
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PLATE 5.1 A Dam Located in 
a ~altes8 Wi ed (dry valley ) . 
Thi s is one of ma ny dams 
designed to a rre s t sto rm 
runoff which would otherwis e 
flow away straight i nto the 
~e di te rran ean. By reduc i ng 
such runoff , dams s uch as 
this allow r ai nwate r to 
i nfil trate downward s through 
the geological s trata , 
r echar gi ng the aq ui fe r s . 
PLATE 5 . 2 A Covered Re s ervoi r Nea r the Bulebe l Industrial Estate. 
Covering r ese rvoir s is essential as evapot r anspirati on can 
accoun t for as muc h as 80% of wate r s t ored in open r ese rvoir s . 
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Figure 5.1 
PLATE 5.3. Quarry . One of a numbe r of Globigerina Limestone quar ri es 
in the Luqa area of Ma lta. Globigeri na Limestone currently 
represents the only ma jor mi neral r eso urce of the Ma ltese 
I s l and s . 
PLATE 5. 4 Quarry . Thi s view of the s ame quarry as above sho ws how the 
stone is quarried . Because it i s eas ily cut, it is possible 
to saw the stone directly out of the gr ound in uniform blocks 
using electrical saws mounted on r ai ls. The prod uction of t he 
stone i s thus both cheap and rapid. 
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In contrast with the marked lack of indigenous resources, Malta has 
for some years displayed a comparative wealth of human resources. Not 
only is the Maltese population a large one in terms of the country's 
physical siz;, but it is gsnerally well educated, bilingual (and often 
tri-lingual), and extremely adaptable and well disciplined in the 
industrial sphere. Several centuries of domination by overseas powers 
have helped an open, international perspective to evolve amongst the 
Maltese people. In this context, perhaps most significant"has been 
Malta's extraordinary geostrategic position and military value, which 
has begn the major reason for successive centuries of foreign domination 
(see 8lo~et 1967). 
During the 19th and 20th centuries, Malta was developed by the British 
(the last, but most important of the occup~gpowers) as a 'fortress 
economy' devoted to the maintenance of the British armed forces, whose 
function was the protection, maintenance and expansion of the British 
empire. In order to ensure an adequate supply of indigenous skilled 
personnel to service the fortress, the British authorities helped to 
establish educational establishments, and provided training facilities, 
particularly for jobs associated with the naval dockyards, and with 
local administration. 
Despite the industrious and resilient qualities of the Maltese popul-
atien, after world war two, it was felt by many British politicians that 
~alta wa3 far too small in every respect to survive as an independent 
nation state (Cox 1963). For this reason, whilst plans for world-
wide decolonisation were being formulated by Gritain, alternative plans 
for Malta were devised in which the archipelago would be integrated 
within aritain itself, receiving an allocation of three parliamentary 
1. The Maltese population is also heavily concentrated in the Harbour 
Region of the main Island (see figure 5.2). 
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seats in westminster (two for Malta, and one for GOzo). The plan was 
contrary to mainstream British colonial policy at the time, and much 
more in keeping with French colonial ~olicy (Austin 1971). 
The exceptional nature of the integration plans reflected the unusually 
high esteem both the British and Maltese felt for each other. Integra-
tion, nevertheless was never successfully achieved, initially because 
of opposition from the Maltese Church and various political Parties, 
although a majority in favour of Integration was achieved in a referen-
dum held in 1956 (Mintoff 1966). Faith in the Integration issue was, 
however, severely injured by the announcement in 1957 of SUbstantial 
8ritish defence cutbacks (HMSO 1957), which represented a severe body 
blow to the Malt3se economy. Although never united, the two major 
political parties of Malta became totally committed to political 
independence as a consequence of the intended run-down of the British 
defence establishments, and in 1964, Malta became an independent nation 
state. 
The continued presence of the British forces in Malta, despite the 
SUbstantial reductions in their size, probably prompted the British 
Qovernment to provide very substantial financial aid. Indeed, the 
First Development Flan of the ~altese Islands (1959-64) (Office of the 
Prime Minister 1959) was not only financed by the British eXChequer, 
but was also conceived by British development planners. As a result 
of the British capital provided for the development plan, and the war 
damage fund provided to repair the enormous damage incurred during 
~orld Uar Two, Mata received far more aid ~er capita than any other 
country within the British empire and Commonwealth. It seems, therefore, 
that it was seen as essential, in the interests of geostrategic stability, 
102 
and moral obligation, that ~alta's ability to function as an indep-
endent nation state was assured. Today, Malta's remarkable influence 
and hiGh levels of activity in the international community - epitomized 
by her role in the formulation of the International Law of the Sea (see 
'The Fardo Froposal' in Wenk 1972), and her activities in the non-
aligned movements - seems to indicate that any doubts as to the viability 
cf Malta as an independent nation state are unfounded. 
5.2 Recent Maltese Economic and Political Evolution and Dependence 
As would be expected, 164 years of British colonial rule in Malta 
resulted in the growth of strong dependency links between Great Britain 
and the Maltese Islands. It is, however, important to recognise that 
the geostrategic value of Malta, and the subsequent immense British 
military interests in the archipelago, helped to manufacture a form of 
intense dependencera~lyexperienced elsewhere in the world. A very 
large part of the Islands' economic activity was geared exclusively to 
the maintenance of the British furces, and by the time the first major 
military cutbacks were announced in 1957, it was estimated that as much 
as 27.1~; of the Islands' economically active persons were employed by 
the fortress sector (Pirotta 1977). Similar statistics suggest that as 
much as 48.9% of GNP was accounted for by the U.K. military service 
sector in 1957 (Plrotta 1977), and that even in 1973, after extensive 
cutbacks, over 25% of foreign exchange earnings were also accounted for 
by the fortress sector (Metwally 1977). 
The 1957 cutbacks in the fortress therefore represented a severe blow 
to the Maltese economy, the potential negative multiplier eFFects upon 
income and employment in the islands posing a severe threat to both 
economic and social stability. The only viable strategy was seen as 
rapid economic diversification away from the fortress. Initially at 
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least, m~st faith was placed in the pro~a;ation of manufacturing industry, 
which was surprisingly lacking in ~alta as a result of the British 
military dominance. 
Given the overwhelming deficiencies in indigenous resources, it was 
inevitable that Malta would become heavily de~endent upon external sources 
for vital materials. This situation persists today, more severely than 
every before, and has in fact been enhanced by the the post-independence 
industrialisation programmes. ~alta's development strategies have, in 
addition, called upon other forms of external linkage, including British 
government aid, alternative forms of foreign capital, and the adoption 
of overseas technology. The generation of the manufacturing sector has 
been particularly dependent upon the attraction of MNC branch plants, who 
have provided both the missing factors of production and the necessary 
overseas markets for large scale production. The development philosophy 
has therefore been diffusionist in nature, relying heavily upon foreign 
induced industrialisation, and depending upon the grOwth and prosperity 
of certain leading sectors within the economy (see Office of the ~rime 
Minister, 1959, 1964, 1970, 1973 and 1981). 
It is not surprising that, following independence in 1964, Malta's 
greatest dependency links would continue to be those with Great Britain. 
The continued strong British military presence ensured this, although 
damaging further military cutbacks were frequent and without warning or 
consultation during the 19609 (Cffic9 of the ~rime Minister, 1981). 
Because of strong commercial links between Great Britain and P;alta, as 
well as the British-conceived and funded develo~ment plans, it was 
inevitable that many of the first industries to be attracted to Pialta were 
branch plants and subsidiaries of British firms. Evan British companies 
(first 8aileys and then Swan Hunters) took over the dockyards, converting 
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them from military to civilian based activities (King 1978a). It seems, 
therefore, that whilst de~endence upon the fortress was declining with 
reductions in military establishments, so dependence upon British private 
enter~rise was increasing, a situation which helped maintain substantial 
levels of general dependence upon Britain. 
At the beginning of the 19705, it became apparent that a total with-
drawal of British and NATO forces was imminent, and despite the Prime 
Minister's, success at negotiating a five year extension (Wriggins 1975), 
the British finally withdrew in ~Iarch 1979. The impending departure 
of the British had, meanwhile, lead to increased urgency in the develop-
ment programme which was oriented around diversification of the economy 
away from the fortress (Office of the Prime Minister 1973). 
During the 19705, several important developments occurred that particul-
arly affected the evolution of the industrial sector. first, in November 
1970, ~alta successfully managed to gain associate membership of the 
E.E.C., which, whilst meaning little initially in terms of preferential 
trade arrangements, at least permitted the Maltese to export some of her 
produce to the E.E.C. countries under a system of rigid quotas (Tulloch, 
1975). On balance, this was clearly an arrangement that worked in 
favour of r.alta, but the accession to full Common Market membership of 
Great Britain in 1972 presented severe problems. Britain's membership 
of the E.E.C. has without doubt cut off Malta from a number of promising 
market outlets which had, in the past, been guaranteed by 
Commonwealth trade agreements. 
1. The Frime Minister of the time was,onca again,Dom P,intoff. 
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British 
E.E.C. associate membership, and its various renewals in the 1970s and 
1980s, has, however, helped prevent British companies from further 
dominating Plaltese manufacturing industry. A conscious policy of 
nationality based diversification has led to alternative foreign interests 
involving themselves in ~altese industry, the most notable examples being 
the West Germans. Nevertheless, this seems to have reinforced a condition 
of dependence upon the E.E.C. as a whole. furthermore, it is very likely 
that the E.E.C.will reduce its import quotas from countries such as ~alta 
when Spain and ~ortugal finally join the Community (Tulloch 1975). For 
this reason, diversification attempts have been extended well beyond the 
E.E.C.countries, and Malta is increasingly looking to the ~iddle Eastern 
~ab powers for markets and capital (Office of the ~rime Minister 1973). 
Indeed, it is significant that the full force of the oil price rises of 
the 19709 was prevented from causing lasting damage to ~~lta's economy 
by the provision of half-price oil by neighbouring Libya. 
Malta's dependence on E.E.C. markets has unfortunately gained genuinely 
problematic proportions because her industrial activity has simultan-
eously become dangerously polarised around the textiles sector (Grech 
1978). Predictably, it is for textiles and clothing products that the 
E.E.C. import quotas are severest (Secretariat of the Council of 
European Communities, 1970). Greece, the newest member of the E.E.C., 
and Spain and ~ortugal all have struggling textiles and clothing indust-
ries which, once inside the E.E.C. tariff system are likely to add to the 
already great pressures for reduced t9xtiles and clothing trade quotas. 
The heavy dependence upon single manufacturing sectors is 
undasirable, and the Maltese authorities have reacted by attempting to 
initiate further diversification programmes (Office of the ~rime Minister 
1981). Although new markets have been hard to find, recent governments 
in particular have attempted to establish parastatal enterprises, thereby 
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creating new industries (Malta Development Corporation 1979a)and Office 
of the Prime Minister 1981). 
There remains, however, considerable evidence suggesting that not only 
is Maltese manufacturing industry still heavily polarised around the 
textiles sector, but also that the export of manufactuped goods is still 
dangerously concentrated around a small number of market outlets, part-
icularly within the E.E.C. Even more alarming is the form of the manu-
facturing enterprisas that have been established. ~,any appear to be 
branch plants of large MNC companies, and merely serve as surplus prod-
uction capacity in prosperous years. Certainly there is evidence to 
suggest that in recessionary conditions, the Maltese branch plants are 
amongst the first production units to be discarded by parent companies 
(see Chapter Twelve). 
Manufacturing industry is not the only major component in the develop-
ment process. Malta has excellent harbour facilities which have been 
developed over the centuries by foreign military powers that have used 
them (King 1978b). Now the docks and harbours are almost entirely used 
for commercial purposes, and have been nationalised since 1968. They 
continue to be the single largest employer in the Maltese Islands, and 
are therefore of vital social and economic importance to the nation as 
a whole. With the completion of a shipbuilding complex at Marsa, 
employment levels in the dockyards will rise considerably above the 
current 5,000 mark. Once again, however, as is the case with the texti-
les sector, dependence upon shipping and related industries seems ill-
advised as ship-building and repair industries in particular. are 
suffering badly from the current recessionary conditions, and enormous 
global over-capacity. Nevertheless, the overriding advantage of the 
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dockyards is the fact that they are ~ata owned and controlled, and 
that penetration by overseas capital presents no threat at present. 
Given that most of ~alta's more traditional activities were oriented 
around the service and maintenance of the British fortress, the devel-
opment of a strong tertiary sector within the economy was to bs expected. 
Indeed, the development of a large tourist industry has become one of 
the major priorities of recent ~altese governments, and has successfully 
taken full advantage of one of Malta's major assets - her sunny, reliable 
and warm climate. Once again, however, the tourist sector suffers from 
an extreme over-reliance upon the whims of a comparatively small number 
of ov~rseas (and usually British) tour operators. Another disadvantage 
of tourism is its over-sensitive and often fickle nature, which can 
cause violent fluctuations in levels of activity. Furthermore, although 
proponents of tourism point to the substantial multiplier effects of 
tourist based activity, there is evidence to suggest that few of the 
benefits accruing from Malta's tourist activity are retained within the 
~altese Islands (see Chapter Thirteen). 
As far as cultural dependence is concerned, it is very clear that over 
a century and a half of generally benign British rule in Malta has made 
its mark in the Maltese Islands. The fact that relations between the 
British and the Maltese have on the whole been so good since 1800 has 
permitted a very great diffusion of British influence to occur. This has 
undoubtedly deeply influenced Malta's consumption patterns, and it seems 
that many ~altese people continue to focus their lifestyles around certain 
key elements of British life. Many young male Maltese, for example, 
continue to attempt to attain British work permits daspite the worsening 
recession in Great Britain. It would have been logical to expect the 
d~parture of the British forces to induce a reduction in the overseas 
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influences upon ~altese society, but the rapid development of tourism 
in recent years seems to have done far more than British military 
~ersonnel to impose alien cultures, habits and consumption patterns 
upon the native population (Busuttil 1971 b). 
Perhaps one cf the ~ost obvious and dramatic dependency links to have 
evolved since Wbrld war Two has been that of emigration. In the 
immediate post-war years, emigration from Malta was encouraged by the 
British administration, primarily because of the extremely high birth 
rate in the islands (Collins 1967). Following the beginning of the 
defence run-down and subsequent independence, the need for emigration 
waS once again perceived as being great, particularly in view of the 
worsening employment situation in ~alta. Most emigrants were assisted 
by the government, receiving financial help and the promise of employ-
ment in the destination countries. Estimates suggest that as many as 
90,000 emigrated between 1948 and 1967 (3~; of the 1948 population) 
(Jones 1973a),the vast majority of whom went to Australia. The migration 
of so many Maltese has undoubtedly enhanced Malta's international out-
look, a fact which is reflected in the keen widespread interest in 
Australian affairs in Malta and Gozo, and the preponderance of kangaroo 
door-knockers. Also of vital importance have been the large quantities 
of foreign exchange sent ba~k to Malta from the destination countries by 
the migrants. 
Now that the demographic situation in Malta seems to have stabilised, an 
emigration policy is no longer perceived to be necessary. Indeed, such 
a policy is unlikely to be in keeping with recent government policy, and 
Grech (1977) has observed that it tends to drain the country of its most 
able personnel. Emigration has therefore fallen to comparatively 
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insignificant levels in recent years. This may partly be explained by 
the world recession, which as discouraged countries from acceptin; more 
emigrants. In fact, the recession has enhanced the cyclical nature of 
emigration by inducing considerable flows of return migrants to Malta 
(King 1979 b& c). Since 1976, the numbers of return migrants have far 
exceeded the numbers of emigrants, a situation which has caused a degree 
of panic in some government circles because of rising domestic unemploy-
ment. The large numbers of return migrants are also an important 
consideration as they themselves form substantial overseas linkages, 
often bringing with them on their return comparatively alien ideas, 
standards and con&mption patterns, as well as foreign currency. 
External links with overseas countries, particularly Great Britain, are 
becoming increasingly contentious issues within Maltese politics. The 
electorate is rigidly (and spatiall0 polarised around two political 
parties (see figure 5.3). The ruling ~alta Labour ~arty (MLP) has in 
recent years ap~eared to adopt an increasingly antagonist 'delinking' 
strategy towards British intereots in ~Ialta. In reality, however, the 
~LP policies have done little to reduce dependence upon Britain, and 
have simultaneously helped to generate some degree of internal political 
instability. The MLF continues to promote a rigorous policy of non-
alignment, and is attempting to forge closer links with the Arab world 
(Malta Labour ~arty 1976). The Nationalist Party (PN), which has now 
been in opposition for over 10 years, seems to be in favour of alignment 
with the Western Alliance, and of continued links with Great Britain in 
particular (Nationalist Party of P:alta 1981). At a glance, it seems 
that much of the PN support idantifies rather mora with the British way 
of life than is the case for the r,LP sup~orterst who, it is claimed, like 
a far more traditional ~Ialtese existence. If this is genuinely the case, 
then it is ironic, given the circumstances of the late 19505 when the r,LP, 
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even then under the leadership of ~;r. Mintoff, steadfastly supported 
the integration of ~Ialta with Great Britain (Austin 1971). 
It is unfortunate that political instability is becoming a serious poss-
ibility within Malta. Much of the problem emanates from a constitutional 
crisis concerning the electoral process. Sadly, the constitution 
provided by the British on their departure has allowed for the adoption 
of an electoral system that is unstable. Despite the fact that it is 
meant to be a proportional representation systsm, gerrymandering is 
possible, and is seen by some to have already occurred, causing anom~ous 
general ~tion results in December 1981. The parliamentary machinery 
has proved to be unable to rectify the situation, and the political 
crises are becoming increasingly destructive, and more difficult to 
resolve. 
In conclusion, economic, cultural and political external linkages have 
ensured that Malta has, since independence in 1964, retained her condition 
of severe dependence. This is not surprising as her peripheral position -
on the southern flanks of Europe and the northern fringes of Africa -, 
her tiny size, and her lack of indigenous resources were bound to lead 
to a heavy reliance upon ouerseas sources for many materials as well as 
capital, technology and markets. It is unrealistic to suggest that Malta 
could have substantially reduced her external dependence, but it is 
reasonable to expect her various governments to have devised a development 
strategy to minimise the potentially harmful effects of such dependence. 
Such a strategy would, in particular, be expected to counter the adverse 
effects of the planned further enlargement of the E.E.C. Ideally, ~alta's 
economic structure should by now be displaying qualities of resilience, 
flexibility and diversity. Whether this is, or is not the case will 
become clear from the later chapters of this thesis. 
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5.3 A Comparison Between Malta and Some Other Small Countries 
The ~ialtese Islands are so exceptional that it is extremely difficult 
to compile a list of other small countries with which they are reasonably 
comparable. Furthermore, having Found such countrias, there is no 
guarantee that data, especially comparable statistics, will be available 
or trustworthy. Using various combinations of statistical sources, it 
has been possible to select a small number of small countries (mostly 
island states, like Malta), and some varied statistics to go with them. 
To be chosen for this analysis, the countries in question had to be 
relatively small in terms of both area 1 and population. Within the 
group, at least two newly industrialising countries - Singapore and Hong 
Kong - were chosen in order to provide direct comparisons with ~alta's 
industrialisation and development experiences. 
Hong Kong was included in the analysis because, despite the fact that 
it is not an independent state and retains crown colony status, there 
are statistics available which may be used to speculate over ~lalta's 
potential fate had independence not been granted in,1964. However, a 
more concrete analysis should be possible with Singapore, whose record 
displays significant similarities to that of Malta. Other countries 
chosen in the sample include some islands, some small mainland states, 
some from other peripheral locations throughout the world, and neighbour-
ing Cyprus from the Mediterranean. It was intended at one stage that 
Gibraltar should be included, but her totally exceptional circumstanc3s, 
and a lack of data resulted in her eventual omission. 
Table 5.1 provides some basic statistics for the sample of eleven small 
1. An arbitrary maximum of 30,000 square kilometers was chosen. 
113 
Table 5.1 Selected Small Countries: Demographic Statistics, Area, 
and I sland/f'lainland Status. 
Small 
Countries 
Barbados 
Cyprus 
Fiji 
The Gambia 
Haiti 
Malta 
~:auritius 
Rwanda 
Singapore 
1980 
Population 
275,000 
630,000 
626,000 
593,000 
5,739,000 
318,028 
943,000 
4,639,000 
2,374,000 
Trinidad and Tobego 1,154,000 
Hong Kong 4,900,000 
Area in 
Square Km. 
430 
9,251 
18,272 
11,570 
27,750 
315 
1,974 
26,388 
581 
5,128 
1,031 
640 
58 
34 
51 
207 
998 
478 
176 
4,086 
225 
4,753 
Island/ 
~iainland 
Island 
Island 
Island 
rr,ainland 
Island 
Island 
Island 
r-lainland 
Island 
Island 
rlainland 
Sources: Central Office of Statistics (1980), Kurian (1982), and 
Thomas (1982) 
Table 5.2 Selected Small Countries: Colonial Heritage and Political 
status. 
Small 
Countries 
Barbados 
Cyprus 
fiji 
The Gambia 
Haiti 
r'lal ta 
Mauritius 
Rwanda 
Singapore 
Trinidad and Tobego 
Hong Kong 
Major 
Colonists 
Britain 
Britain 
Britain 
Britain 
france 
Britain 
Britain 
Belgium 
Bri tain 
Britain 
Britain 
Sources: Kurian (1982) 
Approx. Date Date of Current 
1st Colonised Independ. Political Status 
1624 
1914 
1874 
1816 
1492 
1522 
1715 
1885 
1819 
1552 
1841 
1966 
1960 
1970 
1965 
1804 
1964 
1968 
1952 
1965 
1952 
ParI. Democracy 
Parti tioned 
ParI. Democracy 
ParI. Democracy 
Civil. Dictatorship 
ParI. Democracy 
ParI. Democracy 
Milit. Dictatorship 
1 Party Democracy 
ParI. Democracy 
Crown Colony 
NB Some countries were colonised by more than one power (e.g. Haiti). 
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countries. It is immediately apparent that ~alta is easily the smallest 
of the countries in terms of ar9a, and is the second smallest in terms 
of population, behind Barbados. However, although ~alta's average 
po~ulation density of approximately 1000 persons per square kilometer is 
extremely hiQh, it is easily surpassed by both Singapore and Hong Kong, 
whose land area is put under intense pressure by very large po~ulations. 
As subsequent statistics indicate, a large concentrat3d population 
may assist rapid industrialisation by providing concentrated internal 
markets and labour forces. The disadvantages of extremely small but 
concentrated populations is less easy to assess, although surprisingly, 
Malta does not seem to have suffered unduly from her scale problem. 
All but two of the eleven countries of the sample were originally 
British colonies (see Table Two), although some were colonised by other 
p~wers at various stages in their histories. The two nan-British ex-
colonies are Rwanda and Haiti, who were colonised by Belgium, and Spain 
and then France respectively. On closer analysis, it seems that the 
nationality of the major colonists is important, particularly with res-
pect to the types of government that have evolved in the newly independ-
ent countries. Furthermore, there can be little doubt that the varying 
nature of colonial rule has influenced mast former colonies' ability to 
achieve their various development goals. Thus, a larger sample of small 
Third world countries (Kurian 1982) reveals that.a particularly high 
proportion of former French and Belgian colonies, for example, are now 
ruled by civilian or military dictatorships, and show symptoms of deep 
political instability. ~any of these countries have an alarmingly poor 
development record, not entirely unrelated to their problems in the 
political sphere. British former colonies are also prone to political 
instability, but it is nevertheless the case that a larger proportion 
seem to have retained some form of parlinmentary democracy. ~hether the 
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survival of democracy assists develo~ment is a debatable point, but it 
is certainly true that political stzbility is an important pre-requisite 
to development. Thus, the importance of historical, colonial dependency 
links must not be discounted in the current develo~ment context. 
It is not possible to generalise meaningfully as to the importance of 
the length of the various countries' periods of colonisation, particul-
arly as the coloniser is different in many cases. However, it is reas-
onable to expect countries that were colonies for longGst to be most 
influened by the culture and administration of their colonisers. 
Equally, it seems sensible to expect the countries that achieved indep-
endence earliest to have achieved most in terms of post-independence 
development and self-reliance. Certainly, there is no doubt that the 
comparatively long period of British rule in Malta has had profound 
effects upon Maltese society, which now shows many outward signs of the 
British influence. The prolonged British presence also resulted in the 
establishment of important institutions and infrastructure in r'ialta which 
permittsd a smooth transition from crown colony to independent nation 
state. Other countries (including other former British colonies) have 
not been blessed with such good fortune. In addition, it is disturbing 
that many countries such as Haiti, apparently blessed with the advant-
ages of an early release from the colonial yoke, have made very little 
progress towards achieving major development goals. This is certainly 
also the case in some of the larger Latin American countries (e.g. 
Bolivia and Paraguay). Thus, as tables 5.3 to 5.6 illustrate, the 
length of the colonisation and inde~endence periods bears little relation 
to development. The critical factor is always the nature of the colon-
isation i tseH. 
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One of the most popular (and over-used) measures of living standards 
prevalent in the world's nations is the aggregate measure 'Gross 
National Product per Capita' (see Table 5.3). As has been mentioned 
in Chapters One and Two, it is an unsatisfactory measure because it 
cannot take into account income distribution or informal sector activ-
ity, and ignores other important, often social elements of d9velo~ment. 
Nevertheless, as a rough standardised measure of economic activity, it 
is relatively useful. Table 5.3 shows that within the eleven, Malta 
was ranked a healthy fourth in 1978, behind Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Trinidad and Tobago. With the exception of Cyprus and Barbados, the 
other countries are apparently far less fortunate. Table 5.3 also 
shows the average annual percentage growth of gross domestic product for 
the eleven countries during broadly com~arative time periods. Signif-
icantly, Malta's average annual growth was only surpassed by Singapore 
during the 1960-70 period, and between 1970 and 1978, the Maltese econ-
omy showed even more spectacular symptoms of growth, the average annual 
increase in GuP rising to 13.1%. The enormity of this percentage growth 
is put in perspective by the observation that, in comparison with more 
heavily industrialised countries such as Hong Kong and Singapore, 
Malta's growth was from an extremely low base, and was therefore not so 
large in absolute terms. Nevertheless, Malta's growth of GDP was spect-
acular, particularly in the 1970s, when neighbouring European economies 
were suffering from severe recessionary conditions. 
Table 5.3 also suggests that the manufacturing sector was responsible 
for a large proportion qf the growth in Maltese GDP. Similar figures 
for average increases in annual manufacturing output for the same two 
periods reveal that Malta experienced the greatest relative growth in 
manufacturing, particularly between 1970 and 1978 (22.1,:). Table 5.4 
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Table 5.3 Selected Small Countries: Economic Data 
G.D.P. ~anufacturin~ Sector 
Small GNP/Caeita Averase 01 Growth P.A. Averaae t~ Growth P.A. ~o 
Countries I r1978~ 1960-70 1970-78 1960-70 1970-78 
Barbados 1,960 6.3 2.0 n.a. 6.5a 
Cyprus 2,120 7.2 -1.5a 8.7 1.8a 
fiji 1,420 4.5 5.2a 5.4d 3.0a 
The Gambia 230 5.2 8.2 5.5 2.5f 
Haiti 260 0.1 3.9 -0.1 6 4 6 
Malta 2,170 8.5e 13.1 13.1e 22.1 
I"lauritius 830 1.6 8.5g -1.5 11.0a 
Rwanda 180 2.7 4.8 n.a. 2.4b 
Singapore 3,290 8.8 8.5 13.0 9.2 
Trinidad &: Tobego 2,910 3.9 3.4a n.a. -1.1a 
Hong Kong 3,040 10.0 8.2a 18.6 5.6a 
NB: a = 1970-77 c = 1954-70 e = 1962-70 9 = 1970-75 
b = 1972-77 d = 1955-70 f = 1973-77 h = 1970-76 
Sources: Central Office of Statistics (1980), Kurian (1982) and 
Thomas (1982). 
Table 5.4 Selected Small Countries: Data for Manufacturing Industry 
Manuf. outeut r"anuf. Goods as Exeorts of Manuf. 
Small as ~ of GOP I1f of total exeorts as a ~ of 1975 ~ 
Countries 1960 1978 in 1975 Production 
Barbados n.a. 10a 97 93 
Cyprus 12 15a 55 29 
fiji n.a. 12c 99 68 
The Gambia 2 1e 41 n.a. 
Haiti 10 13a 59 n.a. 
r"al ta 15 30e 98 53 
r'lauri tius 12 21 99 74 
Rwanda 1 15 5 6 
Singapora 12 26 84 81 
Trinidad &: Tobego 24 14 57 60 
Hong Kong 24 25 93 84 
Sources: Thomas (1982) !!lll a = 1975 c = 1973 e = 1977 
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confirms this, showing that manufacturing as a proportion of GOP was only 
15% in 1960, but had risen to 30,~ by 1977. Once again, this figure is 
the highest of the eleven. Thomas (1982) suggests that there is a 
strong positive correlation between total GNP per capita and the prop-
ortion of GOP accounted for by the manufacturing sector. Thus, the 
implication is that high proportions of manufacturing output in GOP 
indicate high levals of economic prosperity. 
From the 'conventional' or 'diffusionist' point of view, which perceives 
industrialisation as being paramount in the develo~ment process, Malta 
seems to have done well. Thus, Table 5.4 also shows that by 1975, 98% 
of Malta's exports (by value) were manufactured goods. with the 
exception of Cyprus, the countries in the eleven with lower proportions 
of manufactured exports show signs of negligible or even negative 
economic growth rates (see Table 5.3), and struggling development pro-
grammes. Table 5.5, meanwhile, displays further evidence of Malta's 
economic transformation, showing that in 1979, 28% of Malta's employment 
was in the manufacturing sector. Once again, Singapore and Hong Kong are 
the only countries of the chosen eleven to surpass Malta's position, 
whilst the figure for Haiti suggests that only 6% of employment was in 
manufacturing. In stark contrast to Haiti's position, Hong Kong's figure 
of 47% of employment in manufacturing seems impressive. 
As has been mentioned earlier, economic growth, and indeed rapid indust-
rialisation cannot in their own right be regarded as symptoms of stable 
economic development. The composition of the growth is, for example, 
particularly important. The remaining statistics in Table 5.5 concerning 
the contribution to value added by various manufacturing sectors, along 
with the composition of export manufacturers in Table 5.6, reveal that 
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Table 5.5 Selected Small Countries: More Data on Manufacturing Industry. 
~1979l 
Small at Emelo:z:ment in 1979: e 
Countries r'lanufacturing Textiles flietals Bev. 
Barbados 14 14 19 37 
Cyprus 20 22 9 30 
Fiji 18 3 11 69 
The Gambia 9 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Haiti 6 12 13 40 
Malta 28 38 16 20 
rf;auri tius 17 12 9 63 
Rwanda n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Singapore 29 6 48 7 
Trinidad &: Tobego 20 1 3 7 
Hong Kong 47 47 25 5 
Sources: Central Office of Statistics (1979) and Thomas (1982) 
Table 5.6 Selected Small Countries: The Comeosition of EXEort 
~anufactures bl Sector in 1975. 
Small Total Exeorts Z2 EXEorts of ~anufactures {197S} 
countries I million (1975) Textiles r:;etals Food/Sev. 
Barbados 103 17 8 69 
Cyprus 83 19 23 26 
fiji 157 97 
The Gambia 20 100 
Haiti 47 25 2S 32 
Malta 164 64 17 8 
Mauritius 294 7 4 89 
Rwanda 2 n.a. n.a. 40 
Singapore 4,510 6 32 7 
Trinidad & Tobago 1,170 1 2 8 
Hong Kong 5,592 50 27 2 
Sources: Thomas (1982) 
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Malta's economic growth has been very heavily dominated by the textiles 
sector. Although the textiles sector has played a prominent part in the 
progress of other countries such as Hong Kong, the dependence upon the 
one sector is dangerous, providing an obvicus source of economic instab-
ility. In this sense at least, Malta may be seen as being rather more 
vulnerable than most of the other countries of the eleven. 
Despite the serious concentration of Malta's new productiva activity, 
there is no doubt that she has impressively transformed her economy since 
the days of complete fortress dominance. The six tables (Tables 5.1 to 
5.6) show that she has more in common with the established newly indust-
rialising countries (NICs) of the sample - Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Indeed, it seems that r',al ta' s apparent advances are enough to prevent 
her from being classified ~s a Third World country (Kurian 1982). This 
may be a rather over optimistic view in the lcng term. However, a 
number of countries within the eleven may quite definitaly be classified 
as Thrid World countries, the stagnation and escallating poverty preva-
lent in these territories remaining, often despite urgent development 
initiatives. In this context, Haiti, The Gambia and Rwanda in particular 
show signs of little progress. Gther countries such as Trinidad and 
Tobego have benefitted from major local resource endowments such as 
petroleum. Currently, ~alta has no such resources, and must, like Hong 
Kong and Singapore, depend almost entirely upon externally inspired 
development impulses for economic transformations. Thus, a brief further 
comparison of the experiences of the three cases - Malta, Sin£apore and 
Hong Kong - is useful at this stage. 
All three countries were colonised, and strongly influenced by the 
British for well over 100 years. Hong Kong remains a crown colony. Once 
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again, all three had ( and have) excellent port facilities, which were 
both commercially and strategically valuable. In the case of Malta, it 
seems that geostrategic considerations were always dominant. The three 
territories all experienced severe damage and destruction during World 
War Two, and have experienced impressive industrial develo~ment since 
the conflict. Following reconstruction programmes, industrial growth 
gained momentum in the 1950s and 1960s, although in the case of ~alta, 
her extremely small size meant that her growth in absolute terms was 
rather less than was the case in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Singapore in particular provides an interesting comparison with rlalta 
as it achieved political independence in 1965, only one year after ~alta. 
However, unlike Malta, which continued to depend upon military functions 
long after independence, Singapore has been forced to build her prosperity 
upon entrpot trade (HMSO 1981). Thus, the port of Singapore has a massive 
turnover, and the economy as a whoe is governed by unfettered international 
market forces. Singapore therefore has also develo~ed a3 a prosperous 
commercial centre for the Far East. International capital is attracted 
from allover the world, and state intervention in the economy is rare. 
This contrasts markedly with ~alta, whose recent governments in particular 
have taken a far more active role in the development process. 
As was the case in Malta, the original industrialisation programme in 
Singapore was launched five years before independence, and involved the 
active encouragement and attraction of foreign investors through offers 
of tax relief, free repatriation of profits and ca~ita1, and other 
incentives (H~SO 1981). The imprJssiv9 industrialisation that followed 
was rather mora balanced than has been the case in Galta, both in terms 
of the range of productive sectors and overse3S participants. The scale 
of the Singa~ore industrialisation programrne is illustrated by the major 
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industrial estate, 'Jurong Town', which is the lar~est estate in South 
East Asia, and accommodates 955 factories (employing over 80,000 people) 
(H~So 1981). ~alta's largest industrial estate is Bulebel, whose 
comparatively small factories numbered only 84 in 1980 (Malta Development 
Corporation 1980). In addition, Singapore POSSEsses shipbuilding and 
re~airing facilities (employing approximately 25,000), and is also the 
third largest oil refining centre in the world. 
Singapore is often refarred to as one of capitalism's successes, as are 
other NICs such as South Korea end Taiwan. Certainly, the extent of the 
economic growth achieved to date, and its relatively balanced nature is 
more encouraging than is the case for Malta. However, it has been 
suggested that same of the sacrifices necessary for the development 
programmes have been great, particularly those concerning human rights. 
The mast cammon criticisms in Singapore's casa concern the often severe 
one party democracy, which has surpressed the power of the labour move-
ments (Bienefeld 1581). Thus, the harassment and im~risonment of trade 
union officials and the political opposition has prevented the evolution 
of an organised and effective labour movement, and has ensured that 
employers remain in a dominant position. It has also p9rmitted the ret-
ention of comparatively low wage levels and well behaved work forces. 
In ~alta, there appears to be no surpression of the labour movemen~ 
Indeed, the Islands' major union, The General Workers Union (GWU) seems 
to be flourishing. However, it is significant that the GWU has, since 
1971, been a major partner in government, largely because of its close 
alliance and traditional links with the governing Ralta Labour Party. It 
can therefore be argued that, as a result of this close link, the bulk 
of the Maltese working population is kept in line by its preferred govern-
ment. This may be a reason why Malta's labour forces are generally so 
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well behaved. Furthermore, allegations concerning the nepotism prevail-
ing between the Government and the dominant GJU are sup~orted by the 
Government's apparent hatred of the increasing numbers of independent 
trade unions that have sprung up in recent years. 
Hong Kong differs both from r~a1ta and Singapore because it remains a 
crown colony of Great Britain. However, the prevalent development 
conditions facing the colony have been similar in many respects to those 
of Malta. Thus, 'Since it was founded, Hong Kong's basic resources have 
remained the same: a superb natural harbour and a pragmatic and indust-
rious people' (HMSO 1981, p.488). Until world war two, Hong Kong's 
function was one of an entrepot, in this instance for trade with China. 
The Korean War, and subsequent UN embargo on China forced Hong Kong to 
diversify away from port activities. The diversification programme 
has resulted in Hong Kong becoming a leading producer of textiles and 
clothing, electronics and plastic goods. The growth has been especially 
successful in view of the destruction that occurred during the Japanese 
occupation (1941-45). As is the case in Singapore, the policy has been 
one of encouraging foreign free ent~prise on a relatively indiscriminate 
basis, and establishing Hong Kong as a free trade area. The colony now 
lives off ex~ort industry rather than entrepot trade, and benefits from 
excellent world-wide communications. Despite a very strong textiles 
sector, the Hong Kong economy seems to be well diversified compared to 
that of P,alta, and also benefits from a wide variety of commercial 
activities that have never been present in the Maltese Islands. The 
single major disadvantage facing Hong Kong is her colonial status and 
history. Uncertainty persists as to the fate of the colony when the 
1easa on the ~Jew Territories expires in 15 years time. This is already 
having adverse effects upon development in Hong Kcng as a whole. 
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It is difficult to assess the role of British administration in the 
industrialisation process of Hong Kong. On reflection, it seems that 
the major philosophy behind the policy has once again been one of allowing 
the forces of ca~italism to develop the colony freely, a policy which 
would probably never have materialised in ~alta had British rule been 
extended. Because of the geostrategic value of M~lta, it is unlikely 
that an extended British period of administration would have led to 
such a laissez-faire policy. In addition, the open policias of both 
Singapore and Hong Kong are not necessarily suited to the ~Ialtase case 
because of the extreme smallness of Malta. Indeed, ~alta's small pop-
ulation (never much more than 300,000) reduc8s the scope for major econ-
omic projects. Such is the gravity of the scale confinement that what 
would appear to some countries as a v2ry minor fluctuation in the world 
trading system can have a debilitating effect upon a very small economy 
such as ~alta. This explains to a considerable degree the policies of 
intervention operated by the Maltese, and indeed, by many other LDCs 
with small fragile economies. 
In conclusion, it can be said that, by comparison with many of the world's 
small countries, Plalta appears to have made great progress during the 
last few d3cades. Compared, however, with the newly industrialising 
countries such as Singa~ore and Hong Kong, Ealta's SUCCEsses have been 
small. The reasons for this include Malta's exceptionally small size, 
which has prevented the generation of large scale economic activity, and 
the evolution of a totally open economic strategy, based on the indescrim-
inate attraction of multinational enterprise. 
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CO~CLUSICNS TO SECTION ONE 
The main aim of this study was identified in the introductory chapter 
as being an evaluation of Malta's post independence development, which 
has itself been based upon the diversification of the Maltese economy 
away from the fortress sector. The means used to achieve economic 
diversification have been based upon the establishment of manufacturing 
industries, and the implicit acceptance of a diffusionist approach to 
development. ~alta has therefore opted to integrate herself into the 
world economy, despita the risks that this has involved. 
The dangers associated with the adoption of a traditional diffusionist 
ap~roach to development have been disCUSSJd briefly in Chapter One. In 
Chapter Two, the major hazards of diffusionist develo~ment were 
discussed in terms of dependency theory. Thus, a large part of the 
development problem was identified as being associated with the eradic-
ation of harmful symptom~ of dependence. The use of dependency theory 
created some problems, due in part to the nature of the theory itself. 
Of particular importance is the fact that dependency theory is not a 
unified body of theory, and is in fact very diverse in nature. This 
led to the need for selectivity when dealing with the theory. Also of 
importance was the fact that the theory is of little practical use in 
empirical studies such as this. finally, M~lta's exceptional character-
istics and history invalidated a large part of dependency theory. 
The latter point is well illustrated by the fact that the smallness of 
~alta has strongly influenced both her dependence, and her means of 
coping with that dependence. Consequently, there has been a need for 
the caraful adoption and adaption of a nu~ber of themes emanating from 
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dependency theory. For example, given that Halta's development 
strategy has become strongly dependent u~on the activities of overseas 
owned and controlled MNCs, many of the dependency themes ado~ted in the 
analyses to follow have been based upon the operations of the MNCs. 
Cf the many dependency themes to be pursued, one of the most important 
is dependence on the fortress sector. This has declins~throu9hout the 
post-independence period. The associated loss of income and capital 
resulting from the decline of the fortress has led to a strong 
dependence on alternativ8 sources of overseas capital for the post-
independence economic diversification programme. Consequently, foreign 
ownership and control, especially in MalteSE manufacturing industry, 
has been substantial. The manifestations of dependence in this context 
include the extent to which foreign ownership has dominated, and contin-
ues to dominate Maltese business. Of particular importance is the 
concentration of this dominance, both in terms of the nationalities of 
the foreign firms involved, and the specific economic activities that 
they dominate. Examples of measures used to examine this domination 
include the proportion of industrial output and employment,and share 
ca~ital controlled by foreign interests. 
Another major concern of this study is to examine the extent to which 
overseas interests such as the M~Cs have distorted the Maltese economy. 
The should once again be measured by the concentration of capital, labour 
and output in certain economic sectors. Undue dependence on anyone 
sector must be regarced as disturbing, as was the situation when the 
fortr9ss secter dominated the economy. Also of extreme im~ortance, 
especially in the case of manufacturing industry, is the extent to which 
the various activities of the economy are interlinked. Conventional 
thinking advQc3tes the pro~agation of a well integrated economy bound 
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together by networks of strong forward, backward and horizontal linkages. 
As has already bean explained, the tandency of ['I[\I':S to divide their 
activities into separate staged production units reduces the likelihood 
of linkages with the local economies within which their branch plants 
are located. It is important to examine the extent to which this has 
occurred in r·.alta. 
One of the most serious ~roblems facing peripheral economies is the 
acquisition of overseas markets, and one of the advantages of the attr-
action of MNCs to such countries is the fact that they are often able to 
provide efficient marketing structures well beyond the means of indig-
enous enterprise. The penalties can, however, be serious. ~uch dom-
inance can once again lead to unhealthy concentrations, both in the 
types of product exported by a country, and in the market d8stination 
countries to which the expo~ts are sent. In ~alta's case, British and 
E.E.C. market dominance are the major issues of interest, in conjunction 
with a marked dependence upon the ex~ort of clothing(especially denim) 
goods. 
Of the other types of dependence to receive attention in the chapters 
to follow, technological dependence is of im~ortance. Also of great 
significance in the Maltase case is cultural dependance, particularly 
with respect to the long and continuing British influence in the Islands. 
There are, in addition, a number of expected consequences of dependence 
that merit attention. These include potential alterations to indigenous 
social structures, and worsening income distributions, both of which are 
predicted by all forms of dependency theory. Other social and economic 
phenomena, such as fluctuations in unemployment, employment, female 
participation rates and emigration levels will also receive attention. 
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Using all these dependency themes, it .will_ be possible at the end 
of this study to come to a conclusion concerning the nature and extent 
of ~altese dependence, and also the quality and permanence of Maltese 
development. 
~axt, however, is Section Two, which provides the vital historical 
background to rlalta's development experiences, and which is especially 
important as it explains the origins of many of the more important 
sources of d8pendence. It is for exactly this reason that the first 
chapter concerns itself with pre-independence Malta, daspite the stated 
temporal confines of this study. 
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SECTION TWO 
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION TWO 
This section consists of three historical chapters that provide essential 
background information drawn largely from the available literature on 
Malta. The first chapter (Chapter Six) is concerned with relevant pre-
independence historical material. Of special concern in this chapter 
is the influence of changes in the geostrategic value of the Maltese 
Islands, and the corresponding effects upon the dominant fortress sector. 
Also covered are the demographic crisis that followed W~rld war Two, 
the events leading up to independence, and the first development plan 
(1959-64) that was implemented by the British in the final years of 
colonial rule. 
The remaining two chapters of the section are conceived around two 
distinct periods of post-independence government. Thus, Chapter Seven 
deals with the period of post-independence Nationalist Party government 
between 1964 and 1971, and Chapter Eight with the period of Malta Labour 
Party government that has persisted since 1971. The two periods of 
government in question were distinctive, and consequently, the various 
development strategies and published plans differ accordingly. However, 
the consequences of the two different phases of development appear to be 
surprisingly similar, indicating either that the rift between the two 
political parties is smaller than it appears on the surface, or that the 
development process in Malta has proved to be well beyond the control of 
either of the two types of government. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CRITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN MALTA BEFORE INDEPENDENCE 
6.1 The Anatomy of Colonial Rule 
The Maltese Islands have a long history of foreign dominance, stemming 
from their valuable location at ' ••• the navel of the Inland Sea ••• ' (King 
1979a~ p.258). Thus, 'The position of the Maltese Islands astride the 
sea lanes of the central Mediterranean, coupled with the main island's 
superb natural harbours and a terrain favouring the-defender, have long 
made these islands a coveted military possession, and during much of 
their history, a pawn in Mediterranean history' (Owen 1969, p.10). The 
government of Malta has therefore rarely been exclusively in the hands 
of the Maltese. A succession of invading powers, beginning with the 
Phoenecians and continuing with waves of Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans 
and Arabs established the pattern of foreign domination. There 
followed a period in which European dominance gathered momentum, and was 
consolidated by the ceding of the Islands to the Knights of the Order of 
st. John of Jerusalem, in 1522. The rule of the Knights was terminated 
by the arrival of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798, and the french were in 
turn dispossessed by British forces, in conjunction with a rebellious 
Maltese population, in 1800. 
Under British rule, Malta became a colony, and played a vital part 
1n the growth of the British Empire. Lord Nelson wrote in 1803, 't now 
declare that I consider Malta as a most important outwork to India, that 
it will give us great influence in the Levant, and indeed, all the 
southern parts of Italy' (Dale and Bartolo 1976, p.126). When Prime 
~inister in 1838, Wellington was also emphatic about the role of Malta, 
stating that, 'We nold it as an important post, as a great military and 
naval arsenal, and as nothing more.' (cited in Bowen-Janes et a1. 1960, 
--
p. 119). Thus, Malta developed into an important naval base, and dockyard 
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wages became increasingly important to the domestic economy. In 
consequence, the maintenance of the fortress produced a steady flow of 
income for the Maltese Islands, compensating for the considerable lack 
of indigenous resources, and permitting the growth and sustenance of 
a large population. According to King (1979a, p.258), this resulted 
in the British Empire becoming ' ••• a benevolent employment exchange for 
the Maltese.' 
The enhanced reliance on the armed services in occupation caused an 
increasingly serious distortion of the economy, reflected in 1836 by the 
growth in the value of imports to double that of exports1(Oale and 
Bartolo 1976). The entrepot trade that had developed, especially during 
the Napoleonic Wars,dwindled, and cotton growing and manufacturing, 
Malta's leading industry in the Nineteenth Century, was thrown into 
recession. It has been claimed that the British actively discouraged 
the growth of private industry for fear that it would take away skilled 
Maltese labour from the dockyards and military services (Grech 1978 and 
King 1979a). However, evidence provided by Bowen-Jones et ale (1960) 
--
suggests that, although the cotton industry may have employed as many as 
9,000 persons in 1861, well over 90% of these employees were female, 
and therefore unlikely to be employable in the dockyards. Competition 
from the dockyards for skilled labour was therefore unlikely to be the 
major cause of the demise of the industry, which was so well integrated 
that it included a full range of activities, from cotton growing to 
cloth manufacture. The major damage was probably perpetrated by cheap 
cotton imports from Great Britain. As a result of the decline of the 
cotton industry in particular, the proportion of economically active 
population engaged in manufacturing industry fell from 25% in 1851 to 
1. By 1918, exports covered only 10% of import costs, and by 1956, 
only 5% (Bowen-Jones!l~ 1960). 
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121% in 1948. Simultaneously, land was abandoned, employment in 
agriculture fell, and the only sector to gain significantly (outside 
the military) was 'Commerce and the Professions' (Balogh and Seers 1955). 
The Maltese economy therefore became so dependent upon the British armed 
services that the Islands prospered in times of war, and slumped 
noticeably in times of peace (Grech 1978). 
In the latter half of the Nineteenth Century,' the once buoyant ship-
building industry, which constituted the only other major manufacturing 
activity on the Islands, was also seriously affected by uncompetitiveness, 
brought about by the introduction of larger iron hull boats from British 
yards (Dale and Bartolo 1976). Inevitably, Malta became even more 
dependent upon the British military services. Despite the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869, and the subsequent boost to some civil port 
activities in Malta, the Canal enhanced still further the military 
orientation of the Islands' economy. Malta became a vital coaling 
station, the Islands acting as ' ••• an important stepping stone between 
Europe and Africa, half-way between Gibraltar and Suez'(King 1978a) 
(see figure 6.1), and also a vital base on routes to East Africa, India, 
Australasia and the far East. Meanwhile, any boom in civil port 
activity induced by the Suez Canal was reduced as a result of the 
increasing lengths of voyage possible in the new merchant ships, which 
no longer needed to stop in Malta. Shipping tonnages cleared in the 
Grand Harbour fell from 5.5 million tons in 1891 to only 3 million tons 
in 1894 (Bowen-Jones !i ~ 1960). Thus, dependence on British 
interest in the Island's strategic value seemed to become its corner-
stone for all time (Busutill 1969). 
It is significant that, as early as May 1912, a Royal Commission 
working from its own research and the 1911 census of Malta, declared 
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the Maltese economy to be precarious, and entirely dependent upon the 
British presence. It observed that a sudden withdrawal of the British 
fleet would reduce a large proportion of the population to idleness 
and starvation (HMSO 1912). Nevertheless, the findings of the 
Commission were not pursued, and there followed cyclical phases of 
prosperity and depression induced by fluctuations in military activity. 
This point is well illustrated by data provided by Bowen-Jones !l ~ 
(1960) on shipping tonnages cleared by the Maltese harbours, which 
show clearly that periods of boom correspond closely with surges in 
British military activity. The period around World War One was 
inflationary and unstable. The military base had once more proved to 
be useful against the Turks. However, peacetime heralded declining 
fortunes, culminating in riots in June 1919, which were related to the 
sudden dismissal,after the cessation of hostilities in 1918, of 15,000 
dockworkers. The disturbances induced the provision of some direct 
financial aid by the British in 1920. With the new funds, feeble 
attempts were made to diversify the economy by the encouragement of small 
industry, and the establishment of a Tourist Bureau in 1924 (Dale and 
Bartolo 1976). 
Efforts at economic development and diversification were severely 
hampered by the Great Depression, but from 1934, re-armament generated 
prosperity in the Islands. Once again, the emphasis returned to the 
service of the British military installations and personnel. During 
World War Two, employment in the naval dockyards reached its peak of 
over 12,000 (King 1978a)1' as did Malta's strategic importance to Great 
Britain. Malta played a decisive role in the Allies' eventual successes in 
1. In March 1957, the dockyards still employed 12,572 workers (Bowen-Jones 
1960). 
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North Africa and Italy. However, the damage and suffering inflicted upon 
the Islands was enormous. During June 1942, for example, Malta was reach 
day,the involuntary recipient of more German bombs than were dropped on 
Coventry during the day of the Coventry Blitz (Ramsay 1975). Following 
the cessation of hostilities, the British Government established a war 
damage fund of £30 million to be used for the repair of the Islands. 
Although the grant was comparatively generous, considerable damage is 
still evident, and until recently, it was estimated that over half the 
scarce piped water supply was lost due to the bomb damaged distribution 
system (Camilleri 1978). 
Despite the injections of capital emanating from the war damage fund, 
little economic diversification occurred in the immediate post war years. 
Such was the distortion of the economy that, by the 1950s, the British 
forces were still responsible for 25% of the total local employment, 
over 40% of the income from employment, and 60% of the country's foreign 
exchange earnings (Jones, H. 1971a). Furthermore, a new crisis was facing 
the economy, stemming from extremely rapid population growth. It became 
increasingly clear that the problem of unemployment was going to be 
enormous, and far more than the maintenance of the military services could 
absorb. It was factors such as these that caused the late 1950s to 
evolve into yet another critical phase in Maltese history. 
One of the major issues to emerge during the 1950s was that of 'Integr-
ation' with Great Britain. Although Malta was, in 1921, the first 
British colony to receive formal self-government (Frendo 1979), full 
independence from Great Britain was not seen unanimously as a logical 
advancement. It was felt by many people, both in Malta and Great Britain, 
that the Maltese Islands were too small to constitute a viable independent 
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nation state, and also that the close links that had developed between 
the Colony and its colonists were sufficiently strong to merit integ-
ration. In Malta, the pro-integration debate was championed by Oom 
Mintoff, the leader of the Malta Labour Party (MLP).1 
At the Malta Round Table Conference in 1955 (which was convened to 
discuss Integration), considerable emphasis was placed upon, 'The 
traditions which Malta has chosen to share with us (Britain). She 
voluntarily came under the British crown 150 years ago, and continued 
to accept, with the prestige and material benefits of being a 
stronghold in the Mediterranean, the difficulties of being an island 
fortress economy' (HMSO 1955, p.3). Clearly, therefore, many people, 
both in Malta and Great Britain, felt that the continuation of this 
relationship on a more formal basis was desirable. Thus, to many 
Maltese, the concept of complete dependence upon Great Britain, and 
more specifically, upon the one industry of defence, seemed to be highly 
desirable. 
1. Mr. Mintoff has led his party to victory at every general election in 
Malta since his.victory in 1971. 
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The apparent acceptance of the integration proposals by the British 
was exceptional, particularly because they ran quite contrary to the 
contemporary movement of colonial policy (Austin 1971). They were, in 
fact, far more consistent with the colonial policies of france, whose 
habit it was to turn her small colonies into 'D~partments' of france 
itself. The Maltese plan was that the islands should be represented at 
Westminster by three M.P.s, two representing Malta, and one for Gozo 
and Comino. In effect, it was felt that representation at the centre 
(Westminster) would lead to greater autonomy and security at home, and 
that such a formalised link would guarantee the diffusion of long term 
material benefits to Malta from the mother country. 
A full account of the unpleasant consequences of the integration debate 
is not necessary here. In brief, a referendum on the issue produced an 
ambiguous result, and whilst the arguments raged, the demotion of Malta's 
strategic status within the British and NATO defence policy was announced 
(HMSO 1957). It was realised by the MLP that the relegation of Malta 
by Duncan Sandys~ Defence White Paper to 'auxiliary base status' heralded 
the beginning of a period in which new forms of income were desperately 
required to replace an ailing fortress sector. All the major political 
Parties therefore favoured independence, but the vident disagreements 
that occurred between them, and the widespread anger at the defence cuts 
themselves, led to civil disturbances, the supression of indigenous 
government, and the imposition of direct rule from Westminster in 1959. 
Political instability during this period was enhanced by the fact that 
the Church, always a strong political force in Malta, was being squeezed 
out of Maltese politics by the competing political Parties (see Plates 
6.1 and 6.2). The crown colony administration lasted until 1962, when 
a new constitution and general elections heralded the apparent return 
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PLATE 6 .1 Mosta Church , Ma lta . 
Thi s church is one of the 
l a rgest a nd most beautiful in 
The Ma ltese Islands, and 
symbolises the powe r of the 
Maltese Roman Catholic Church. 
In the year s before independence 
i n 1964 , the Church was the 
majo r in te rnal pol itical forc e 
in the I s l ands , and acted, in 
effect , as the majo r medium of 
local governme nt . 
PLATE 6 .2 The New Church at Birkirkara , Ma lta. Since independence , the 
Church has been sq ueezed out of Ma ltese politics . Consequently, 
governments of both Parties hav e conflicted with the Church. 
This particular church was much criticised as it was felt by 
the Gov er nmen t that th e personal donations made to finance its 
construction could have been bette r employed if invested in t he 
Economy. 
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of democracy (Pirotta 1977). 
Although the defence cuts were logical, there is no doubt that the 
manner in which they were publicised and put into practice in Malta 
was both ill-advised and insensitive. In particular, the defence cuts 
helped to worsen an already disturbing political situation in the 
Islands. Thus, Blouet (1964, p.71) commented that, 'The difficulties 
attending the drafting of a constitution for Malta would suggest that 
internal political dissent is the greatest problem associated with 
independence for the Island.' The same internal political tensions 
and divisions persist today, and currently constitute the single most 
serious threat to further development. 
Despite the serious political tensions that emerged at ~he end of the 
colonial era, Malta showed many external symptoms of economic and social 
health at independence in 1964. Thus, Abela (1962) was able to observe 
that colonial rule had not prevented the evolution of free compulsory 
education, free secondary education, free medicine, old age pensions, 
and a national insurance scheme. The education standards in particular 
were remarkably high, both in the field of school subjects and pro-
fessional qualifications, such as medicine. Examinations were closely 
linked to the British system1, as a result of which English had become 
the official language. It was only following independence that the 
Maltese language was properly taught in school. Despite the controversy 
surrounding the language issue, the bilingual abilities of most Maltese 
have definitely become a national asset. Meanwhile, high education 
1. 'a' levels and 'A' levels, as well as more specialised subjects 
related to the professions, involved tha use of British examinations, 
and tha assessment of candidates' answers by British markers. Today, 
many British examinations are still entered by Maltesa citizens. 
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standards in Malta were complemented by a comparatively high standard 
of living, vastly superior to that of neighbouring Sicily (Cox 1963). 
'The widespread possession of refrigerators and television sets, the 
conspicuous absence of the under-nourished and the crippled, the 
farmers' mechanical aids and trucks, and the wealth lavished on parish 
churches, patron saints and pyrotechnics on feast days are all further 
indications' (Young 1963, p.264). 
Another feature of Maltese society was the care with which individuals 
spent their surprisingly high incomes, and their extraordinarily high 
propensity to save (Metwally 1977). This tended to lead to a situation 
in which the local economy was unable to utilise fully the available 
and plentiful capital. This was not only symptomatic of the restricted 
nature of the economy, but was also a feature of Malta's extreme fin-
ancial dependence on Britain. Abela (1962) observed that both local 
residents and banks in particular were prone to invest their assets 
abroad, particularly in Britain, and often in gilt edged securities. 
'Strong connections of local banks with london's "agents" increase the 
influence of British banking on the outlook and policy of Maltese banks, 
and encourage the banks to retain their liquid assets with tbs_london 
money markets and to invest surplus funds on the london security market' 
(Abela 1963, p.10). (ven·more disturbing was the fact that this tendency 
continued long after independence. furthermore, the inability of the 
Maltese to utilise locally the available capital was well illustrated 
by the first development plan (1959-64) which, especially in the tourism 
and manufacturing sectors, failed miserably to consume much of its meagre 
capital allocation (see section 6.4 of this chapter). 
Given the many disturbing features of Malta's economy at independence in 
1964, and considering the extremely small size of the emerging nation 
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state, many British observers suggested that Malta would not survive 
long as an independent country. faced with her rapidly declining value 
as a strategic base for Britain and NATO (see section 6.2), and an 
economy that had failed to respond to the overtures of a five year 
development plan, it was suggested that the maintenance of Malta's 
prosperity would be impossible under her changed circumstances. Thus, 
Cox (1963, p.265) claimed that, 'It is impossible to pretend that the 
Island can make ends meet without continued British aid ••• ·, and proceded 
to state that Malta's • ••• high standard of life was on the verge of 
catastrophe.' 
6.2 The Ge~trategic Value of Malta 
Malta's domestic history illustrates the immense importance of her 
strategic position within the Mediterranean. She has, as a result, 
played a vital role in tha shaping of Mediterranean and European history, 
and in the twentieth century played a crucial role on a global scale 
during World war Two. Malta's dependence upon her military potential 
has been strong enough to dictate the fortunes of her economy, to the 
extent that war has brought greater levels of prosperity to the islands 
than peace. Such has been the dependence of the Maltese Islands upon 
warfare that, in recent decades, it has been the changing technology of 
wars that has been one of the greatest influences upon the Maltese 
economy. The embanassment of Suez in 1956 heralded the beginning of 
the end of the British base, and it was significant that part of the Suez 
operation was carried out from Malta (Busuttil 1969). However, much 
more important was the launch of the first space module by the USSR in 
1957, a development which signified the beginning of the missile era. 
In a general context, the development of warfare can be convenisntly 
divided into four phases, the first of which - land based warfare- did 
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not affect Malta significantly. However, the second phase was one in 
which sea travel and sea warfare began to dominate. Thus, from the 
Roman period on~ards,well into the period of British domination, Malta 
became inextricably entwined within many European and North African 
conflicts. During the British era, sea power became the key to global 
influence, and was crucial to the extension, protection and trade of the 
British Empire. The third phase of warfare is technologically more 
complex, but can be linked to the aircraft, the development of which 
(between 1914 and 1960) dominated many wars. The potency of air power 
increased still further the need for secure overseas bases such as 
Malta, and the complex operational requirements of airforce maintenance 
often required labour intensive activity. Simulataneously, the devel-
opment of the submarine added to Malta's naval base, and encouraged 
the British to invest even more heavily in the fortress. It was during 
this period of Malta's history that the fortress became most dominant. 
The Maltese lost all control of their tiny local resources (Pirotta 1977), 
and by 1946, 29.9% of the economically active population was employed 
by the fortress. In the same year, the wages and salaries from the 
fortress amounted to 44.3% of the total national wages bill (Pirotta1977, 
p.27-30). 
The fourth phase of warfare is one dominated by nuclear missiles. The 
development of inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in addition 
to long range bomber aircraft, and the more sinister later generations 
of missiles (such as the MIRVs), has put a completely new complexion on 
global geostrategy. Thus,East and Prescott (1973, p.67) observed:that, 
'These new military techniques mean that the need for foreign bases has 
been reduced, and that the strategic importance of some island locations, 
such as Malta and Sri Lanka, has been sharply reduced.' Thus, by 1964, 
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seven years after the beginning of the rundown, the British base 
accounted for only 13.6% of total employment, and 23.0% of total wages 
and salaries (Pirotta 1977, p.27-30). 
In geopolitical terms, Malta's great value throughout recent history 
may be seen in the context of the containment or expansion of empires. 
During the Great Seige of 1565,in which the Turks attempted to gain 
control of the Islands, Malta was seen as an outpost of Christian 
civilisation, desperately trying to hold back the conquering hoards of 
Islam. Once again, during world war two, Malta played a crucial part 
in the containment of Fascism. In contrast, during the 164 years of 
British occupation, Malta was used as a military base for imperial 
expansion in the Middle East, the Far East and Africa. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, 'containment' became assoc-
iated with the general concern over the potential power base of the 
'Eurasian Heartland Power'. Fuelled by the thoughts of Mackinder (1904), 
many strategists held the view that the power controlling the Eurasian 
Heartland or 'Pivot Area' was in a position of potential world domination. 
It was therefore seen as vital that the powers controlling the surround-
ing 'inner' or 'marginal crescent' countries' contained any attempted 
expansion by the heartland power. Several other geopolitical writers 
have adopted and developed these ideas, including Spykman (1944) and 
Meinig (1956), in whose time, the threatening heartland power had been 
firmly interpreted as the Soviat Union. More significant was the concept 
of 'shatterbelts' between the opposing superpowers (Cohen 1963), whose 
constituent states' allegiances could swing back and forth between the 
superpowers. The influence of this type of geopolitical theory upon 
strategic thinking amongst the Western powers has been crucial, and was 
for some years after world war two,responsible for the great importance 
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of Malta in Western 'defence' strategy. Malta ~as therefore seen as a 
base vital to the Western control of the Middle Eastern shatterbelt zone. 
The arrival of the missile era provided a stern challenge to the tradit-
ional concepts of territorial defensib~lity fostered during the years of 
the British Empire. Despite the apparent certainty ~ith ~hich resources 
~ere withdra~n from overseas bases such as Malta, there remained a 
lingering doubt concerning the superpower's willingness to use their 
nuclear weapons. Consequently, uncertainty prevailed over the cont-
inued importance of conventional weapons, warfare and overseas bases. 
As will be shown in Chapter Eight, it was generally accepted that the 
maintenance of a British presence on Malta was too costly to the British 
exchequer. Ho~ever, the major puzzle to emerge was inherently negative 
in nature, but nevertheless of vital importance. The Western Alliance 
was unable to assess the financial savings gained from a withdrawal from 
Malta against the risk of the excellent military facilities being 
offered by an embittered Maltese government to the Soviet Union, or even 
the People's Republic of China. 
6.3 The Demographic Crisis 
Rapid population growth has, for most of this century, been seen as one 
of the most serious problems facing the Maltese Islands. One of the 
reasons for this is the small physical size of the islands (316 square 
kilometers), which has helped maximise awareness of population pressure. 
High birth rates in the islands have generally been attributed to the 
strong support of the Roman Catholic Church, which actively encouraged 
large families, and opposed birth control. Thus, the 1948 census shows 
that over 25% of completed families in Malta in that year had more than 
10 children. The high levels of fertility and natural increase in the 
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population were also attributable to the early age of marriage in Malta 
(King 1979b). 
(migration has traditionally been seen as the solution to Malta's 
population problems. Malta's first major phase of emigration occurred 
in 1907 following the end of a dock construction boom (Jones 1973a). 
The formation of a voluntary body known as the 'Malta Emigration Committee' 
impressed the Royal Commission of 1912, which proceeded to support the 
concept of systematic emigration. Several years later, as a consequence 
of a post war depression, emigration increased dramatically, and bet~een 
1918 and 1920, 10,000 emigrants left Malta (Jones 1973a). Their depart-
ure was assisted by the establishment of an Emigration Office in 1919. 
Malta's greatest period of emigration occurred during the immediate post-
_World War Two years (see figure 6.2). By December 1946, 12,000 people 
had registered for emigration, a figure that would have been larger were 
it not for the rigours of reconstruction. By March 1949, the figure had 
risen to 42,000, and had been boosted by the introduction of the 
'Assisted Package Scheme' in which 75% of the cost of each migrants' 
passage was paid for by the Emigration Office. In 1951, with emigration 
in full flow, it was assumed that 250,000 people constituted the optimum 
population level of the Islands (King 1979b). Thus, continued rapid 
emigration resulted in the departure of over 100,000 persons, of whom 
approximately 58% went to Australia, 22% to Great Britain, 13% to Canada, 
and 7% to the USA (King 1979). 
Such was the success of the assisted package scheme that Malta can now 
boast of achieving the highest post-war emigration rate in Europe. 
Opinions are divided as to the wisdom of the policy. King (197gb) and 
Grech (1978) suggest that by 1950, a 'skill drain' was already becoming 
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Figure 6.2 Annual Emigration 1946-64 Source: Central Office of Statistics (1967) 
apparent. Alternatively, Camilleri (1974) has calculated that had no 
emigration occurred, the 1970 population of Malta would have been 
approximately 420,000, compared with the actual figure of 322,187 (Central 
Office of Statistics 1970-71). In addition, he suggested that unemploy-
ment would have been a possible 22%, as compared with 4.7% in 1970 
(Central Bank of Malta, 1983). In contrast, Grech (1978, p.7) argues 
that Malta ' ••• lost a large proportion of the human capital it had 
invested in when many of the skilled left for better outlets.' This 
view is compatible with those of Collins (1967, p179) , who hinted that 
one of the l!!! desirable alternatives facing Malta in 1957 following 
the announcement of the defence cuts was to encourage further emigration 
as this would risk, ' ••• converting the archipelago into a nation of old 
age pensioners, unmarried women, priests and goats.' 
It is important to stress that Maltese migration was intended to be 
permanent and global in nature, features that distinguish it from other 
European migration patterns. Thus, whilst it is possible to identify 
strong and potentially negative dependency links associated with, for 
example, Turkish, North African, Iberian, Yugoslav and Italian temporary 
migration flows to and from Western European countries, Maltese migration 
flows are markedly different 1n character. Dependency strands in Maltese 
migration may be identified as those linking the programme with Great 
Britain and the British Commonwealth as a whole. However, despite the 
importance of remittances, the consequences of Maltese migration seem to 
have been far less culturally, socially and finanCially traumatic. This 
is well illustrated by the effects of recessionary conditions in Western 
Europe which have helped enhance the insecurity, and increase the 
expulsions of many migrant workers in Europe. In addition, comparatively 
small cultural differences betwaen Maltese people and those of their 
destination countries, and their knowledge of the English language, have 
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permitted less traumatic settlement for most Maltese migrants. Jones 
(1973a) observed that Maltese migrants have been well received in 
Commonwealth countries and in Great Britain, not only because of their 
use of the English language, but also because of the colour of their 
skin, Britain's guilt over the gravity of the defence cuts, and the 
excellent system established by the emigration administration that 
found them work. 
Although the major feature and advantage of Maltese migration has been 
its permanence, there is substantial evidence to suggest that Maltese 
sources have seriously overestimated the effects of the migration 
programme (King 1979c). The reason for this is that, until 1975, the 
Maltese authorities failed to measure the flow of return migrants. 
King (1979b) suggests that as many as 30% of migrants in the decades 
after the war may have returned to Malta. This figure is substantially 
less than has been the case in other European source countries, but 
nevertheless represents a large proportion of the migrant flow. Many 
returnees came back to Malta in the knowledge that regulations existed 
preventing them from gaining employment or claiming social security 
benefits. Many also returned with substantial capital after many 
prosperous years overseas. The returnees have helped to establish firm 
links between the Maltese Islands and their receiver countries, part-
icularly Australia. Thus, the main distinction between Maltese and 
other European flows of returnee migrants is the fact that the Maltese 
returned voluntarily, whilst other migrants were expelled from their 
adopted countries. 
Since independence, with the exception of a few bursts of emigration, 
the number of Maltese leaving the Islands has fallen. This may be 
attributed both to improved conditions and prospects in the Maltese 
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Islands themselves, a huge reduction in Maltese population growth, and 
most important, adverse economic circumstances and restricted migration 
opportunities in the four major receiver countries. furthermore, the 
recessionary conditions prevalent within the world economy have also 
helped to increase the flow of return migrants,so that since 1975, the 
numbers of return migrants have each year exceeded the numbers leaving 
the Islands. This situation represents a serious problem, especially 
to governments intent upon stemming rapid increases in local un employ-
mente 
6.4 The first Development Plan (1959-64) 
In 1959, the British authorities reacted to the serious crisis by 
helping to devise and fund the first of several development plans, 
known as , 'Development Plan for The Maltese Islands 1959/64' (Office 
of the Prime Minister 1959). It was hoped that the plan would provide 
an effective basis for the economic diversification of the economy, 
and with the assistance of assisted emigration, pave the way for a 
stable transition towards independence in 1964. The plan document 
itself was explicit concerning Malta's changed circumstances. It 
declared, 'Economic, and with it political, policy must be based on the 
knowledge that the secure standard of livelihood based on service expend-
iture is sooner or later certain to be lost' (Office of the Prime 
Minister 1959, p.2). When commenting on the available choice of policy, 
the Plan was emphatic •••• 
'There is, in fact, no real Choice. The only practical course is 
to direct every effort, of investment, administrative measures and 
legal machinery, and of the skills of the people, towards the 
achievements of a self-supporting and viable economy which will, 
of itself, sustain and in· .. due course improve the living standards 
now attained. It is often asserted in Malta that there is another 
possibility, that Her MaJesty's Government or some other Govern-
ment will provide as a free gift, without any strings, the money 
needed to maintain Malta's living standards, in short, that a 
permanently subsidised nation is a practical proposition. This 
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demoralising aim is clearly not within the bounds of possibility, 
and cannot seriously be entertained as a possible aim of conscious 
policy.' 
'The aim of economic and political policy must, therefore, be to 
make a considerable diversification of the economy in the next 
few years, the shock of the change being cushioned by the still 
continuing and substantial, though declining, service spending' 
(Office of the Prime Minister 1959, p.2) 
Two of the Plan's more specific and important aims were therefore to 
establish full employment, and to maintain (and not increase) living 
standards. In order to do this, its priorities were the conversion of 
the dockyards to civilian use, the development of manufacturing industry, 
and the development of tourism. Total capital expenditure was projected 
as L32.25 million, L29 million of which was to be provided by the 
British exchequeur. Of the latter, L19 million was in the form of a 
grant from Colonial Development and Welfare Sources (Office of the Prime 
Minister 1959). Much of the remainder was comprised of loans from the 
British Government. Meanwhile, it was intended that, during the period 
of the plan, emigration should continue to be encouraged as the 
projected employment generation was estimeted as only 7,500 new jobs. 
Much of the projected capital expenditure was to be used on infrastruct-
ural projects already initiated by the colonial administration. However, 
£16.25 million was allocated to 'new spending'. Only £3 million of this 
was allocated for industrial development, despite the strong verbal 
emphasis on industrialisation in the plan. £6 million was set aside for 
the conversion of the dockyards to civil use, whilst an extremely meagre 
£0.5 million was allocated to tourism. The size of the grant allocat-
ions shows that the conversion of the dockyards was seen as crucial to 
Malta's futu~e development. The British shipbuilders 'Baileys' were 
contracted to carry out the conversion, but after considerable controversy 
and delay, the contract was eventually switched to the Tyneside firm of 
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Swan Hunter (King 1978a). 
Central to the planned industrialisation was. an industrial attraction 
policy. The policy was clearly based upon the same economic assumptions 
as those of British regional policy, and was heavily diffusionist in its 
approach. It was considered vital that overseas investors and entre-
preneurs be attracted to the Islands. In this way, it was hoped that 
overseas companies could act as central stimuli from which further 
new industrial and general economic activity could emanate. The major 
incentives provided for overseas enterprise included corporation ta~ 
relief (tax holidays), relief from customs duties, the provision of 
grants and loans for new companies, and the provision of fully serviced 
industrial sites and factories (Buttigieg 1975). 
It is perhaps surprising, particularly in the context of more recent 
development experiences, that the Maltese were unable to utilize a 
large proportion of the capital set aside for the plan period. However, 
as has already been explained, Malta's traditional investment practices 
had for many years been oriented towards investment overseas, usually in 
the British money markets. In addition, the embryonic nature of the 
economy led to a failure to provide sufficient numbers of viable projects 
requiring finance. Thus, by 1964, the plan had been able to generate 
only 1,800 jobs (Jones 1971a), a figure far below that of the plan target 
of 7,500 jobs, and extremely disappointing given the further substantial 
job losses in the fortress sector. 
Although in many respects the plan failed to achieve its ambitious targets, 
it must be said that there were achievements in not directly productive, 
but nevertheless important fields. Most significant were the vital 
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infra structural projects , such as the Marsa industrial estate. These 
advances were vital to the successes of subsequent. Plans. Busuttil 
(1970, p.68) summarised the Plan's industrial achievements as follows. 
'It must be remembered that Malta's industrial programme, dating from 
1959, was introduced at a time of considerable uncertainty about Malta's 
future and with the Islands' ability to serve as a location for export-
oriented industries unproven. Little was known of the problems of 
attracting and establishing new industries.' He concluded that it was 
clear that ' ••• the package seems to have been drawn fairly heavily on 
experiences in the Development Areas of the U.K., particularly Northern 
Ireland.' 
In conclusion, it seems that although the first development plan failed 
to achieve many of its goals, including reduced unemployment levels and 
broad economic diversification, it laid the foundations for future 
development, particularly as a result of infrastructural improvements. But, 
rather than attempting to fully solve the domestic social and economic 
problems caused by the rundown of the fortress, the planners chose the 
easy (and traditional) option of encouraging emigration. Simultaneously, 
they attempted (and failed) to prevent further cuts in the fortress sector. 
However, perhaps the most important feature of the Plan was the fact that 
several of its major constituents, including its industrial attraction 
policias, were to survive in almost exactly the same format in subsequent 
Plans (see Chapter Seven). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: OPEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - POST-INDEPENDENCE NATIONALIST 
PARTY ADMINISTRATIONS 1964 - 1971 
7.1 Introduction 
The task facing the second five year development plan (1964-69) seemed 
initially to be more daunting than that which had faced its predecessor 
in 1959. The first plan had failed to achieve most of its projected 
aims, and both unempi¥ment and emi9ration had by 1964-5 reached new 
peaks (see rigure 7.1). A mood of pessimism therefore hung over the 
independence ceremonies. It was observed that, in the 43 years that 
had elapsed between the provision of self-government and independence, 
remarkably little had been achieved in the way of preparation for 
full independence. Consequently, C. B. Jones (1964, p.l00)concluded 
that, 'The tragedy of the Island!s plunge into independence at this 
stage is that it comes at a time when the Island has not been prepared 
to ~eet such eventuality.' 
By independence, it had also become clear that political problems 
were already a serious potential threat to the stability of the new 
nation state. Thus, Austin (1967, p.93) commented that. 'The misery or 
a large and growing unemployed section of the population, primarily in 
the most explosive centre of the Islands' political life - the dockyards 
in the Three Cities and Valletta - presents a serious problem to 
government both in the short and the long term.' Under these circum-
stances, the second development plan was conceived merely as B holding 
operation (Jones, H. 1971a)in which the primary objectives were to 
prevent the further lowering of living standards and increases in unemp-
loyment during the period of continued British forces withdrawal. Above 
all, it was seen as vital that further socio-economic decay be prevented, 
thereby reducing the chances of debilitating political instability. 
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One of the first significant observations of the second Plan was the 
long term nature of Malta's development problem, which it claimed was 
only soluble in the context of a series of further five year develop-
ment plans. It was assumed that, on the basis of advice provided by 
United Nations experts, 'ultimate viability' would not be achieved 
before 15 - 25 years of economic planning had been sustained. The 
'open' nature of the prescribed development strategy, and its inherent 
diffusionist tone is well illustrated by the Plan's statement that, 
'During this period Malta will require outside help in terms of kno~-how, 
grants and loans to achieve the required economic transformation' (Office 
of the Prime Minister 1964, p.1). This illustrates particularly well 
that the Maltese government's interpretation of development at that 
stage remained confined mostly to economic targets. 
further evidence of the second Plan's strongly diffusionist complexion 
was provided by the statement that, ' ••• outside help will be essential 
until the economy reaches the "take-off" stage of development, when 
endogenous forces will be expected to support growth and lead the 
economy to eventual maturity'(Office of the Prime Minister 1964, p.1). 
The strong influence of Rostowian theory is easily detectable, as is the 
implicit assumption that Malta's path to development could be compared 
with that of most developed or developing countries. However, as King 
(1979a) correctly asserted, the Maltese development problem has never 
been one comparable with the Third World development problem. Thus, the 
Maltese Islands did not have to develop from a low standard of living, 
or low levels of formal activity. This point 1s best illustrated by 
comparing Malta's economic development problem with a traditional model 
of economic development such as Clark's (1951). Clark implied that the 
process of economic development involves the transition of an economy 
from a situation in whiCh primary production (eg Agricultural production) 
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dominates, through a phase in which secondary activity (manufacturing 
industry) becomes predominant, into a mature and relatively stable 
condition in which tertiary (service) activities become widespread. 
Malta's problem clearly does not fit into this scheme because she was 
not developing from a position of agricultural or primary sector 
dominance. Indeed, Malta was faced with the reverse of the Clark model. 
In 1964, there persisted a relatively high standard of living. but a 
rapidly declining tertiary sector based upon the service of the British 
fortress. The desired diversification strategy was one which. in part-
icular. sought to revive and recreate manufacturing industry (a second-
ary sector), thereby putting the Clark scheme into reverse. The second 
development plan was therefore not so much concerned with 'take-off' as 
with the prevention of a disastrous crash landing by the Maltese economy. 
7.2 The Second five-Vear Development Plan 1964 - 1969 
The paragraph below was contained within the second development plan, 
and indicates the fact that the government was fully aware of the 
precarious position of the Maltese Islands at independence in 1964. 
'It is manifest that the second five year plan must budget for a 
higher capital expenditure than was attained by its predecessor. 
The Defence White Paper has intimated that Malta will be reduced 
to a forward operating base. This implies that the annual service 
expenditure will be reduced by some £10 million by 1967. The con-
sequences of this rundown have been assessed by a joint study group 
composed of United Kingdom and Maltese officials. The study group 
concluded that if no remedial measures were taken by 1967, unemp-
loyment would reach about 20,000 on fairly favourable assumptions 
and 29,000 under less favourable assumptions, National Income 
would drop by 15%, whilst government revenues would suffer sub-
stantial reductions' (Office of the Prime Minister 1964, p.2). 
The second Plan was itself not only based upon the findings of the study 
group mentioned above, but was also dependent upon the advice provided 
by a United Nations Mission which carried out research in Malta in 1963. 
Among the more notable recommendations of the Mission was the advice 
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that the Government should establish a Central Bank and a Development 
Corporation. In addition, it was suggested that emigration be 
sustained at a level of 10,000 persons per annum. The latter figure 
was eventually considered too great by the Government, which, on the 
advice of the Robens Report (Robens 1967), settled for 7,500 as a more 
realistic and satisfactory figure. Meanwhile, the Central Bank of Malta 
was formed in 1968, whilst the Malta Development Corporation (MDC) also 
formally came into being in 1968, replacing and improving upon 'The Aids 
to Industries Board'. 
A strong preoccupation with the population problem is apparent through-
out the text of the second development plan. Over-population was assumed 
to be an antl-development factor (Office of the Prime Minister 1964, P.S), 
and the plan emphatically stated that Malta could not afford to sustain 
further population growth in the plan period. However, it also recog-
nised the various problems associated with emigration, particularly its 
sex and age selective nature, and the influence this has upon population 
age and sex structures. It is significant that the problem of sex 
structure was recognised in the plan, which perceived that a rise in 
female activity rates was inevitable, both because of the changing sex 
structura, and social pressure. Thus, the female activity rate of 18.2% 
in 1964 was projected to increase to 20.0% by 1969. Despite such 
considerations, the Plan considerably underestimated the role 
labour was to play in the development process. 
female 
As was the case with the first development plan, economic diversification 
was to be aChieved in three major sectors - the dockyards, the manufact-
uring secor, and tourism. However, the most important of these sectors, 
that of manufacturing industry, was to be altered substantially on the 
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basis of the experiences of the first plan. In particular, much 
dissatisfaction was evident concerning industrial attraction policies, 
which were in the second plan destined to become more selective. The 
fUst plan's policy had proved to be both too generous and too indisc-
riminate, as was shown by the notorious Rambler Cars venture. The 
plant was meant to assemble cars for the North African and Middle East 
markets, but assembled only 200 cars before closing (Cox 1963). The 
second plan visualised increased selectivity being achieved through 
tha curtailment of grants and the introduction of a scheme of interest 
free loans to ensure the attraction of more efficient and committed 
enterprise. It also hoped to encourage more local investment, and 
extolled the virtues of joint (overseas and local) investment enterprise. 
There was, however, no mention of a state sector comprised of profit-
seeking parastatal enterprise, all the burden of development at this 
stage remaining upon the shoulders of the private sector. rurthermore, 
despite the above intentions, grants to overseas industrialists 
remained numarous, and attraction indiscriminate. 
The development of tourism, which had been negligible during the first 
plan was to be more substantial in the second. A comprehensive scheme 
involving grants and loans to new hotels, loans to old hotels, and 
further assistance to beach establishments, catering projects and a 
yacht centre was conceived. In addition, advertising, publicity and 
promotion was seen as essential for market acquisition. The remaining 
pillar of the diversification programme, the dockyards, were also 
allocated SUbstantial sums for. capital investment. This was seen as 
both economically and politically essential given the dockyard's 
reputation as the 'Achines Heel' of Malta's development problem (Jones, 
H. 19718, p.139). 
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With the assistance of a total of £51 million in British aid, the 
second plan was able to budget for a total investment programme of 
£38.4 million, of which £8 million was immediately allocated towards 
grants and loans for tourism, agriculture and industries. Major items 
of expenditure included £2.2 million on much needed water supply devel-
opment and repairs, £2.2 million on port development, £5.9 million on 
industrial development, and £3.6 million on tourism. A further £1.3 
million was aliocated to agriculture, primarily for the development of 
glasshouse horticulture to which the Islands' climate was well suited. 
The total investment programme was thus considerably greater than that 
of its predecessor. 
In contrast with the first plan, the second plan was an overwhelming 
success with respect to the objectives layed down in the plan (Dale and 
Bartolo 1976). The plan seemed to lead to unprecedented expansion and 
prosperity, and allowed both unemployment and emigration to fall sharply, 
whilst retaining a balance of payments surplus (King 1979a). The success 
was totally unexpected, and involved expansion in light manufacturing 
industry, tourism, and property and construction. Jones (1971a) main-
tained that the reasons for the boom included the stability induced by 
independence. He also suggested that once early successes had been 
achieved, others followed more easily and more rapidly with increasing 
confidence. The increase in activity was undoubtedly facilitated by the 
establishment of the ~OC, and further assisted by the recommendations 
of the Robens Report (Robens 1967). Another crucial factor was the 
escallation of costs experienced by British domestic industry, which 
had begun to look for cheaper overseas production locations. Malta 
seemed especially well suited to the needs of British satellite firms, 
and the fiscal arrangements such as the tax holiday, and the absence of 
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selective employment and capital gains taxes were well appreciated. 
British firms also benefitted from the widespread use of the English 
language, which permitted communication between management and work-
force. Also of importance was Malta's inclusion within the Sterling 
Area. 
One of the major features of the period was the growth in the adoption 
~ of female labour, which was very much cheaper than male labour, and in 
many instances, such as in the textiles and electronics sectos, better 
suited to the various jobs required (King 1979a) •. To some extent, this 
was seen as undesirable as the growth in industrial employment had been 
intended to benefit the large numbers of semi-skilled male workers 
being released by the fortress sector. Nevertheless, many males were 
employed too, and by the end of the plan period, almost 10,000 new 
industrial jobs had been created in approximately 150 projects, many 
of which were functioning on the specially created industrial estates 
of Marsa, San Gwann, Bulebel, Kordin and Mriehel. Other sectors 
benefitting from the boom included construction, whose workforce incr-
eased by 80% in the plan period. Impressive advances in tourism also 
occurred in this period as a result of a substantial hotel building 
programme, and a large increase in tourist arrivals (see Figure 7.2). 
It was estimated that employment in tourism increased from 7,350 in 
1964 to 9,810 in 1968, an increase of 33.5~ (Office or the Prime Minis-
ter 1970). 
The second plan's total expenditure was far in excess of that of the 
first plan, and by the end of the plan period, an unexpended balance of 
only £5 million remained. Between 1964 and 1968, GNP in real terms rose 
by 38% whilst unemployment dropped from approximately 8,000 to 4,000. 
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It had been expected that gainful employment levels would by the end I of 1968 have risen to 83,000, but the actual figure achieved was 
95,800. Similarly, after a current account balance of payments deficit 
was experienced in 1964, a surplus balance was experienced in each of 
the subsequent four years (Office of the Prime Minister 1970). 
Statistics, therefore, indicated that in conventional economic terms at 
least, the second development plan was a resounding success. 
There were, however, set-backs that occurred between 1964 and 1969. 
for example, in 1966, just as economic expansion and diversification was 
accelerating, the British government announced that it was going to 
quicken the run-down of the fortress (Jones, H •. 1971 a). It was in the 
discussions between the British and Maltese governments arising from 
this decision that the Robens Joint Mission was conceived. The Robens 
Report (1967) ammounted to a review and update of the second plan, and 
its decisions and recommendations were treated as such. The new 
recommendations included a job creation target of 15,000 by 1972, in 
addition to which inrr~structural projects involving improvements to 
pert facilities, electricity distribution and water supply were suggested. 
Of importance in the industrial programme was a recommendation that the 
Government should encourage advanced factory building on government 
estates on a much larger scale than had previously occurred. In the 
tourist sector, the report was concerned that restraints on the develop-
ment of new hotel capacity should be removed. 
The Government hoped that the MOC, the formation of which had been urged 
by the Robens Report, would help eliminate the ingrained conservatism 
that afflicted the average Maltese saver, thus causing much of the 
available indigenous capital to be invested abroad as previously, usually 
in Great Britain (Abela 1962). It was hoped that the MOC could provide 
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the basis of an institutional framework that could put the bulk of 
local private savings into productive harness within the Maltese economy 
(Office of the Prime Minister 1970). The more specific tasks of the 
MOC were to help initiate industrial projects, to encourage the partic-
ipation of private capital, and to provide assistance and advice to 
entrepreneurs. However, perhaps the most important function of the 
MOC was, ' ••• to take over, on an agency agreement with Government, the 
duties of administering aid monies in the industrial and tourist devel-
opment sectors. In the exercise of its functions the corporation can 
make all forms of investment, including the direct ownership of indust-
rial enterprises ••• ' Office of the Prime Minister 1970, p.15). This 
heralded the beginning of the evolution of Maltese parastatal industry, 
although the growth of State enterprise was restricted until after 1971, 
when the Malta Labour Party regained power. 
In conclusion, the second development plan seemed to be successful, 
although the ~ld manner in which many of its targets were exceeded would 
seem to indicate that the development process was already far beyond the 
control of both Maltese private and public institutions. This is to be 
expected, given the emphasis that was placed on the role of the private 
sector, the involvement of overseas enterprise, and the general laissez-
faire and diffusionist natura of the Plan. The experiences of the period 
were, meanwhile, not entirely positive, and the many problems and critic-
isms that emerged during the late 19609 and early 1970s will be raised 
in section 7.4 of this chapter. Amongst these is the observation that 
the second development plan failed to cater for the more social aspects 
of development, concentrating entirely upon economic problems. This 
was in fact also a feature of the third development plan. Indeed, in 
many respects, the third plan seemed to act merely as an extension of 
the second plan. 
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7.3 The Third Development Plan of the Maltese Islands (1969-74) 
Perhaps the major feature that distinguished the Third Development Plan 
from its predecessors ~as its professional and glossy presentation. 
This is important because it reflects to a considerable extent the 
increased confidence and pride that the Nationalist Party placed in its 
development policy. This assertion is supported by the fact that over 
one third of the document (pages 1-55 out of 134) ~as occupied by 
analysis and praise of the second plan. Buttigieg (1975 , p.28) 
explains that the third plan was designed merely to continue with the 
economic performance achieved during the previous plan. Thus, 'The 
long term aims and policies of the Third Plan were practically the same 
as those advanced in all the previous plans.' Dale and Bartolo (1976) 
agree with this conclusion, emphasising the fact that this included 
inducing further economic ties with Great Britain. 
Once again, the immediate aims of the plan were the creation of employ-
ment opportunities and the raising (not only maintaining, as previously) 
of living standards. As before, the core of the strategy was industrial 
policy, especially infrastructural outlays, the industrial estate 
programmes, end fiscal and financial aids. Total capital expenditure 
for the period 1969-74 was projected as £48.45 million, of which £8.59 
million was to be allocated to industrial development. Of the latter, 
a. sum of £3 million was designated for direct assistance to industries 
in the form of grants and loans. Unlike the previous plans, assistance 
to hotels ~as separated from the industrial assistance scheme. A further 
£5.25 million was allocated for factory construction. It was hoped that 
the development of industry would by 1974 have generated 13,500 new 
jobs (Office of the Prime Minister 1970). 
Of the few modifications contained in the third plan ~ere further 
164 
; 
• \ 
J' 
i 
restrictions on the provision of grants to new enterprises in Malta. 
Whilst grants were to continue,_ it was felt necessary to increase the 
role of loans as long term industrial incentives. Thus, wherever poss-
ible, interest free loans were to be substituted for grants. Also, 
although aid would still be available for the expansion of existing 
projects, entrepreneurs were expected to resort increasingly to re-
invested profits or commercial sources for the necessary capital. The 
MOC was, in addition, able to provide further assistance by indulging 
in equity participation and providing commercial loans. Meanwhile, the 
tourist sector was to be nursed broadly along the same lines as before, 
the emphasis being on the attraction of t ••• as many tourists as possible 
to Malta ••• • (Office of the Prime Minister 1970, p.S7), and the intention 
to make their stay on the islands as pleasant as possible. However, 
one significant difference was the recognition for the first time of the 
market dominance problem. It was recognised that the 70% share of 
tourist arrivals held by the British market constituted dangerous 
dependence, and the plan therefore stated its intention to diversify its 
tourist markets. 
The only other major innovation in the third plan was the intention to 
gain associate membership of the E.E.C. It was hoped that this would, 
•••• help producers in their quest for forign markets! (Of rice of the 
Prime Minister 1970, p.S6). Membership was in fact achieved in 1970, 
and substantial reductions in tariff rates for Maltese exports to the 
E.E.C. were obtained, although it was argued that the~E.E.C. concessions 
were not sufficiently generous. E.E.C. associate membership was event-
ually to become vital to Maltese interests following Britaints accession 
to full E.E.C. membership in 1972. rurthermore, during the middle and 
late 1970s, relations with other E.E.C. countries were to have important 
consequences for the Maltese economy. 
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The third development plan survived for less than two years, after 
which a change of government led to its eventual replacement with the 
fourth (seven year) development plan. The change of government was 
brought about by the 1971 general elections which, ironically were 
strongly influenced by one of the major failings of the second and 
third plans - the property and construction boom. The negative effects 
of the boom upon the Maltese communities were symptomatic of the absence 
of a social dimension to Maltese development policy (Boissevain 1977a). 
This, and other problems will be dealt with in the next section (7.4), 
which will concern itself with the records of both the second and 
the third Plans. Because of the similarity of the two plans, and the 
fact that the third plan was able to operata for only two out of its 
designated five years, it seems logical to treat the years between 1964 
and 171 as one plan period. 
7.4 A Critical Assessment of Nationalist Party Rule 1964-71 
Many of the aggregate macro-economic indices, particularly those chosen 
by the Nationalist Party administrations, show the 1964-71 period to be 
ona of considerable economic advance. Thus, after peaks of emigration 
and unemployment in 1964 and 1965, the two rates fall dramatically in 
the late 1960s (see figure 7.1). Similarly, despite the slow expansion 
of the GNP in the early 1960s, rapid growth in national income followed 
in subsequent years, although it must be remembered that this was from a 
low base. Meanwhile, advances were achieved in the conversion of the 
dockyards to civilian use, although problems here were widespread, 
leading to the eventual nationalisation of the yards in 1968. The 
Government recognised the need for increased technical education and _ 
training if industrialisation was to be both pervasive and permanent, 
and it was also recognised that the industrial attraction policy needed 
to be far more selective. finally, the administration was sufficiently 
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perceptive to realise that Malta's associate membership of the E.E.C. 
was likely to be essential to the development prospects of the 1970s. 
Ouring this period, the concept of dependence was alien to the develop-
ment planners of Malta, Great Britain, and most of the Western hemi-
sphere. This is unfortunate as, in the Maltese case, awareness of some 
aspects of dependency theory would possibly have allowed the Maltese to 
improve various segments of their development programmes. In this 
context, the observations of Section One of this thesis are relevant es 
it is clear that Malta was not, and never has been, in a position which 
allows her to eliminate her exceptionally serious dependence. Her only 
alternative has been to manipulate and control her dependency links, 
thereby reducing the negative effects of her dependence. Unfortunately, 
. this did not occur during the years of Nationalist Party administration, 
and Malta emerged into the 1970s displaying potentially harmful economic 
and social structures. 
By 1971, the manufacturing sector was displaying symptoms of damaging 
imbalance. for example, although there were no statistics to show it, 
most new manufacturing industry was financed and controlled by British 
MNCs. A large number of expendable satellite ventures had been estab-
lished by British companies, examples including the GKN, Plessey and 
PVC Plastics companies. More alarming was the increasing dominance 
within manufacturing of textiles and clothing firms, which in 1971 _ 
accounted for 26% of total gross output and over 25% of total employment 
in the sector (see figure 7.3). One of the consequences of the 
increasing textile sector dominance was a rapid increase in the female 
participation rate which had already reached 22.1% in 1969 (Office of 
the Prime Minister 1970), over 2% in excess of the projected figure. 
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As figure 7.4 illustrates, the proportion of male employees in the 
textiles sector fell substantilly during this period. 
Increases in the female participation rate may be welcomed for social 
reasons, but the role of women in the new industries worried the Maltese~ 
Government as the new jobs ~ere intended for the large portions of the 
male workforce in the fortress sector facing unemployment. As a result 
of the increasing demand for female labour, female unemployment1 fell 
quickly from a peak of 11.3% in 1965 to under 3% in 1969, and thereafter 
remained at a considerably lower level than that for male unemployment 
(see figure 7.5). The popularity of female employment may be explained 
in terms of easy supply, suitability to the available jobs, and the lower 
wages paid to women in Malta. The latter point negates to a considerable 
extent the social advances associated with the increased female part-
icipation rate. 
In conclusion, Maltese manufacturing industry was by 1971 inextricably 
linked to the British economy, and was therefore both economically and 
politically vulnerable. In addition, much of the industry was based on 
textiles, an area of industrial activity which, even in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, was showing signs of profound instability. finally, 
it was clear that much of the overseas investment had occurred because 
~alta provided the opportunity to take advantage of extremely low labour 
costs, which, in the case of female labour, could be described in some 
circles ae expoitation. Given that it was the stated central long term 
aim of the Nationalist Party administrations to increase living standards, 
it was clear that the attraction of labour intensive low wage industries 
1. The percentage of females (aged 15-60) registered for employment, 
and without a job. This is extremely difficult to calculate due to 
a lack of precise statistics, and Maltese unemployment regulations 
concerning females. 
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was, in the long term, bound to clash with Government policy. 
Tourism, the other major 'success story' of the period was also showing 
signs of serious structural weakness by 1971. Despite very rapid 
increases in the numbers of tourist arrivals per year, the proportion 
of the tourists that originated in Great Britain continued to grow, 
and rarely fell below the 70% level (see figure 7.2). Although concern 
at the extreme dependence on the British markets and tour operators was 
expressed in the third plan, no market diversification was achieved or 
seriously attempted. Instead, the potentially harmful nature of the 
dependence was illustrated by a change in Sterling regulations intro-
duced by the British government, a move which caused a shortfall of 8% 
to occur in tourist earnings in 1970 (Jones, H. 1971a). 
The problems of the tourist sector were not confined to British market 
dominance. Heavy British investment in Maltese hotels was evident. 
More important was the fact that most of the package tour operators were 
British owned and controlled, as were the airlines which transported 
the holiday makers. Consequently, it was abundantly clear that many 
of the desired benefits of the tourist activity (such as profits and 
employment) were being exported from Malta, mostly into the hands of 
British private enterprise. In short, the entire sector was owned and 
controlled by predominantly British interests, once again ensuring that 
the fortunes of Maltese tourist activity were inextricably linked with 
those of the British economy (see Chapter Thirteen). 
The problems were, unfortunately, not restricted to those concerned with 
overseas control and reduced benefits from tourist activity. Through-
out the 1960s, fears grew concerning the environmental implications of 
tourist development. This view was typified by the following comment. 
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'All those of us who know and love Malta and the Maltese feel not a 
little apprehensive at the thought of holiday camps, bingo halls, 
private beaches and the litter, rowdiness and shrill complaints of 
liverish and un acclimatized tourists' (Round Table 1964-65, p. 43). 
Eight years later, Dennis (1972, p.45) seemed to confirm such anxieties 
with the observation that, 'The tourist and settler have been invited 
in with enthusiasm, to replace the sailor and the soldier and to defend 
the poor from unemployment. The resulting invasion, which bears no arms 
except money, has done more damage in five years than was ever done in 
five thousand.' 
Authors such as Dennis were venting their criticism in particular at 
the spectacular property boom which afflicted the Maltese islands in 
the ~id and late 1960s (Brett 1971). A combination of tourist induced 
property speculation and an influx of so called 'six-penny settlers'1' 
who also desired Maltese property, induced a violent increase in land 
prices of at least 200% between 1967 and 1969 (Dale and Bartolo 1976). 
Collins (1967) observed that the boom was occurring well before 1967, 
citing an example in Gozo (which in general was affected less severely 
by the boom (King 19798) ) in which a piece of land worth £600 in 1963 
was sold for £40,000 in 1966 (see Plates 7.1 and 7.2). King (19798) 
noted that the unharnessed building boom was accompanied by negligible 
structural planning on the part of the authorities, which in turn led to 
8 break in the harmonious relationship between Maltese natural and 
cultural environments. factories and hotels caused few 
problems, but the real problems emanated from the space-consuming 
villas, houses and apartment blocks erected for British tax exiles. 
These alien elements in the landscape were often magnified in importance 
1. Six-penny refers to the very low rate of income tax - 6d in the 
pound - paid by British settlers, which indicates that the settlers 
were deliberately attracted by the Nationalist governments. i 
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PLATE 7.1 Property Development in Gozo. Property speculation in Malta 
and Gozo during the 1960s encouraged exactly this type of 
development. In this case, these houses are likely to be 
destined for rich Maltese families, or for the rented holiday 
villa sector of the tourist industry. 
< ~ •• 
. _"'!.~""':.~._ .. ~ .. ", .... ,... ...• _,,_~_ ~ r 
PLATE 7.2 Property Development in Gozo. This salubrious dwelling is 
likely to be for a wealthy Maltese family. ~roperty specul-
ation in Malta during the 1960s did not only benefit overseas 
investors, but also favoured a number of wealthy Maltese, who 
were able to build for themselves houses such as this in Mgarr. 
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by their elevated sites (Jones, H. "1971b). 
Such was the attraction of the Maltese property boom to the British 
investor that there were cases in which British businessmen applied for, 
and received, industrial development grants from the MOC,which they 
promptly used to speculate in Maltese property. A number of British 
(and apparently Italian) businessmen in particular were therefore able 
to abuse Malta's industrial aid scheme. However, there were a number of 
instances in which such speculators were caught by the sudden slump that 
occurred in 1969, and consequently sustained considerable losses. 
One of the more sinister elements of the boom was the fact that many 
wealthy Maltese also benefitted greatly from the property speculation, 
and worse, that many were, according to the MLP opposition,members of 
the Nationalist Party, whose government, it is claimed, prevented any 
sort of planning restrictions. furthermore, the vast amounts of 
capital invested in Maltese property, and the elderly pensioners who 
chose to settle in Malta,were inevitably British. Indeed, the entire 
boom had its origins in the British money markets (Brett 1971). Such 
was the direct influenceof the British economy upon the Maltese economy 
that significant structural alterations to the Malta's economic structure 
were induced during this period. This is best illustrated by figure 
7.6, which shows that British investment caused a very dramatic growth 
in the Maltese construction sector in the late 1960s, both in terms of 
output and employment. This undesirable distortion of the Maltese 
economy ended with unfortunate consequences in late 1969, when the 
reversal of the boom rendered many employees in the construction secto~ 
unemployed. 
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The period of post-independence Nationalist Party rule undoubtedly 
failed to reduce the Maltese Islands' dependence upon Great Britain. 
for example, although many specific factors benefitted British firms 
in particular, the development authorities continued to encourage 
British enterprise more than firms from other countries. Thus, 
Dowdall (1972, p.193) was moved to summarise the Nationalist Party's 
record as follows. 'The three main features of the Nationalist's 
diversification programme were to stimulate industrial investment, which 
has mainly been British; to attract tourists, who are predominantly 
British; to offer tax concessions to wealthy settlers, again mainly 
British, creating an ex-patriate social stratum to replenish the 
thinning ranks of captains, colonels and admirals.' 
Dissatisfaction resulting from the building boom,and the chaos in the 
dockyards in particular,resulted in the election of Dom Mintoff's 
socialist Government in 1971. This apparently heralded the beginning of 
a new era of development in which ~ independence from Great Britain 
was to be a vital objective. The new Government reacted swiftly by 
suspending the third development plan, and conceiving its own (fourth) 
plan, which in turn came into operation in 1973. The Malta Labour Party, 
still under the leadership of Dom Mintoff, have won two general elections 
since 1971, and form the current Government of Malta. The next chapter 
(Chapter Eight) will therefore deal with the Mintoffian era - from 1971 
to the present. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: INTERVENTIONIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT - POST-INDEPENDENCE 
MALTA LABOUR PARTY ADMINISTRATIONS (1971 - 198 ) 
8.1 Introduction 
It is easy to judge the performances of the Nationalist Party governments 
and Plans harshly, particularly in vie~ of the fact that economic 
diversification could have been less, and dependence on Great Britain 
~orse by 1971. However, Dowdall's (1972, p.190) comment that, 'Of all 
Britain's former colonies, it would be difficult to find one where the 
transition to self-government had brought less change than in Malta', 
suggests the degree to which dependence had not been alleviated, 
manipulated or diversified. The instability within the structure of the 
Maltese economy induced by excessive dependence on Great Britain had been 
well illustrated in the late 1960s and early 1970s by a down-turn in 
Maltese economic fortune - increases in unemployment, and falls in 
tourist arrivals and industrial output - explicable in terms of unnecess-
arily strong linkages with the British economy. There was therefore an 
unquestionable need for proper diversification (Sams and Davies 1975). 
Part of the down-turn of the early 1970s was probably a direct consequ-
ence of the trauma (both within and outside Malta) experienced 'ollowing 
the change of Government in 1971. Mr. Mintoff's abrasive style of 
Government has, since 1971, been a source of internal political instab-
ility that has not aided the evolution of stable economic advance within 
Malta. furthermore, the manner in which he and his party has retained 
power seems to be highly controversial, and has, at the last two elect-
ions, involved widespread allegations of electoral malpractices. Under 
the Mintoffian administration, the field of government power has been 
extended, penetrating hitherwundisturbed sanctuaries of Maltese life 
(see Plates B.1 and 8.2). There have, for example, been increases in 
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PLATE 8.1 The Auberge de Castille , Valle tta, Malta . Thi s building 
contains the ' Prime Minister's Office' and th e Gov ernment's 
Department of Information. It has become a symbol of Govern-
ment in Ma lta, especially since 1971 when a succession of 
Labour Party administra tions introduced polici es that were 
more interventionist than tho~of previous Na tionali s t Party 
Governments. 
PLATE 8 . 2 ' The Times ' and ' Sunday Ti mes ' (of Ma lta) Building, Valletta . 
This building was gutted by Labo ur Farty demonst rators in 1979, 
and is seen here in the l at t e r stages of demolition in 1982. 
Critic s of the Labour Governments maintain that this is one of 
many cases in which 'government intervention' has gone too far . 
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the Government control of education, the broadcasting media, retailing, 
and legal activities (King 1979a). To the uninitiated, these develop-
ments may c~nstitute a marked deterioration in the democratic tradition 
of the Maltese Islands. However, in the context of the dubious electoral 
practices of the Nationalist Party in the 1962 and 1966 general elections, 
the MLP's behaviour is understandable, although not necessarily justified. 
During the 1960s, Malta Labour Party members were forced to contend with 
excommunication from the Church, a situation which constituted unwarranted 
interference in the political process by the Church on behalf of the 
Nationalist Party (Mintoff 1966), and which was especially serious given 
the deeply religious nature of the Maltese communities. The continuation 
of the political struggle during the 19708 and 1980s, by both fair means 
and foul, should therefore not be underestimated, both in terms of its 
inevitability given past circumstances, and the often damaging influences 
it has had on the development process. 
Many of the controversial decisions to be made by the MLP administrations 
were entirely logical and desirable, given the high levels of dependence 
on Great Britain prevalent in the early 1970s. Of the 'political frontiers' 
to be crossed in this period (Office of the Prime Minister 1977), one of 
the most important was the battle for a new order in the Mediterranean, 
based on neutrality and non-alignment. The commitment to non-alig~ment 
signified the end of the fortress era, and although an extension of the 
British military presence was negotiated in the interests of achieving a 
more smooth economic transition to non-fortress activity, the British 
forces were eventually to withdraw completely in 1979. In 1976, Malta 
joined the group of 77 non-aligned states, and proceeded to attempt to 
diversify her international links by signing numerous bilateral agreements 
with countries which have included Libya, Italy, the People's Republic of 
China, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, france, West Germany and Algeria (see Plates 
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8.3 and 8.4). 
According to the s~lement to the 1973 -1980 development plan (Office 
of the Prime Minister 1977), the departure of the British forces was 
vital to the plans of the MlP government. The British media chose to 
believe that the Maltese forced the British and NATO garrison to leave 
the islands in 1979 on the basis of this type of statement,which was 
common throughout the MlP literature of the time. In reality, however, 
the MLP did not want to encourage a rapid departure of the fortress. 
As Wriggins (1975) observed, Mintoff deliberately engineered a five 
year extension of the base by encouraging fear (particularly in the 
U.S.A.) of a Maltese alliance with the Soviet Union. Thus, whilst 
making noises to the contrary, the Maltese Government successfully 
managed to retain the valuable British presence, despite the clearly 
stated desire of the British Ministry of Defence to abandon the Maltese 
base by 1974. There were, meanwhile, other developments which const-
ituted important reductions in dependency links between Malta and Great 
Britain. Of these, one of the most important occurred on 25th August 
1971 when Malta broke the one to one parity with Sterling, eventually 
fixing her exchange rate from a basket of predominantly European 
currencies (Grech 1978). This was a very significant decision because 
wild, and usually negative fluctuations in the international value of 
Sterling in this period could have had destabilising and damaging 
effects upon the Maltese economy. 
One of the most important features distinguishing the MlP administrations' 
development philosophy from that of the PN was the strong element of 
social policy evident within the Plans. Boissevain (1977a) notes that 
the PN's major objectives of full employment and increasing living stand-
ards assumed the distribution of the benefits from such achievements as 
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PLATE 8.3 The China Dock, Grand Harbour, Malta . As part of a conscious 
policy designed to diversify trade and aid , recent Maltese 
governments have sought to establish ties with non-Euro pean 
countries. This particular project was achi eved with sub-
stantial technical and financial assiatance from The People's 
Republic of China . 
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PLATE 8 . 4 The Paola Mosque, 
Paola, Malta . The finance 
for this mosque originates in 
neighbouring Libya, a country 
with which Ma lta Labour Party 
governments in the l ast 
decade ha ve been anxious to 
develop close relations. 
being relatively unimportant. MlP policy, on the other hand, placed 
less faith in the distributive powers of the traditional market mechan-
isms, and consequently displayed elements of policy not considered by 
the PN administrations. Thus, the MLP priorities were independence 
from power bloc affiliations, higher living standards for all, and spec-
ific improvements for the socially disadvantaged. 
The MLP, which established,amongst other services, old age pensions 
and a national health service during its earlier period of power in the 
1950s (Kaim-Caudle 1981), extended its social policy in the 1970s th~ough 
the implementation of a progressive personal taxation system, and the 
rigorous control of prices and incomes. It seems that one of the 
advantages of the smallness of the Maltese economy is the apparent ease 
with which prices and incomes may be controlled by the central admin-
instration. One of the features of this control has been the intro-
duction of universal statutory wage and salary increases through the 
Government's major Budget Directives (Minister of Finance 1982). Usually, 
this involves a small percentage increase, and a standard bonus awarded 
to every worker, whatever his or her status. This has eliminated the 
destabilising effects of free collective bargaining, and has both in 
relative and absolute terms, raised sUbstantially the incomes of the 
lower paid groups. Whilst complaining about the imposition of such wage 
and salary increases upon their companies, the private sector generally 
appreciate the stability it has created, although it is claimed that 
there is evidence that the frequency and size of the rises is acting to 
the detriment of Malta's general international competitiveness. 
According to Kaim-Caudle (1981, p22), ' ••• In the field of income redist-
.ribution, the Socialist Government had by early 1980, achieved the 
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objectives it set itself in 1971. It almost certainly achieved them 
to an extent which neither its supporters nor its opponents would have 
thought possible when it took office.' Almost as impressive has been 
the public sector housing programme introduced to counteract the 
destructive effects of the building boom and slump of the late 19605. 
The housing shortage was eliminated with the assistance of a public 
sector housing programme which provided about 4,500 rented dwelling 
units (Office of the Prime Minister 1982). The success of the pro-
gramme prompted Mr. Mintoff to claim, without hesitation, that, 'We 
pride ourselves on having the best housing conditions in Europe' 
(M.E.E.O. 1980, p.3). Mr. Mintoff also became hostile towards what he 
referred to as the parasitic British Settler group by increasing 
taxation rates, and by restricting property sales and the employment 
of non-Maltese. This was intended to prevent a recurrence of the 1960s 
externally induced property boom. 
Social policy also made its mark in the field of employment. For 
example, the MLP Governments decided that it was both wasteful and 
socially undesirable to restrict itself to indirect initiatives conc-
erning the reduction of unemployment (Office of the Prime Minister 1973). 
It was therefore decided that a corps of able bodied men should be 
recruited from the ranks of the unemployed. The 'Labour' or 'Pioneer' 
corps were employed by the Government, on incomes only marginally higher 
than the unemployment benefit, to carry out important infrastructural 
projects such as road and reservoir construction. This policy would 
be strongly opposed by trade union organisations in other countries of 
Western Europe, but in Malta, the dominant General Workers Union was 
officially allied to the MLP government, and party to the decision. 
Also of great importance in the field of employment was the introduction 
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of legislation designed to promote sexual equality. It is impossible 
to assess how effective this has been as many employers have been able 
tD pay their female workers less on the basis of their youth and inexper-
ience. It is also difficult to determine the extent tD which the legis-
lation was responsible for the extraDrdinary increases in female employ-
ment in the Islands during the 1970s. figure_ 8.1 shows that the rate 
of female unemployment fell at one stage to under 1%. Thus, in 1978-79, 
female labour became SO scarce that a state of full female employment 
could be said to have existed. In the same periDd, male unemployment 
still stood at 3.6% (see figure 8.1, and Central Bank of Malta 1981). 
As is illustrated by the strict control of prices and incomes in Malta, 
a feature of the MLP's rule of the islands has been increased central-
ised control. This has involved the nationalisatiDn Df essential 
industries and services. Of the latter, one of the most important 
cases was the nationalisation of the banking sector, which resulted in 
the formation of the Bank of Valletta and the Mid Med Bank in 1973 
(Office of the Prime Minister, 1982). In particular, it was hoped that 
this move would prevent Maltese investment funds from being lost abroad 
as previously, and would also permit greater proportional Maltese 
ownership in new industrial and tourist enterprise by encouraging 
indigenous investment1• In -addition, the formation of the 'Investment 
finance Bank' in 1977 was intended to further assist medium and 10ng-
term financing. Meanwhile, Malta's fuel and energy industries were 
nationalised 1n 1977, a process which coordinated energy provision and 
delegated responsibility to 'Enemalta'. The public sector was further 
1. According to Metwally (1977), all that has happened is that the 
Maltese, who are by tradition great savers, have now chosen to 
consume far more of their incomes. 
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enlarged by the growth of parastatal manufacturing industries. 
On the surface, the content of the MLP development plans contrast 
dramatically with the content of the PN development plans, which 
donated little space or emphasis to social policy, nationalisation or 
the growth of central administration. Indeed, such was the divergence 
of opinion on these issues that the 1981-85 development plan (Office 
of the Prime Minister 1981, p.51 stated that, 'The ultimate objective 
of economic development is social progress.' Inevitably, this necess-
itated the provision of mechanisms allowing for the more efficient 
sharing of the fruits of development (King 1979a), particularly in 
view of the unpalatable consequences of the unfettered boom of the late 
1960s. This, it was argued by the ~LP, could not be achieved without 
a more centrally planned growth process which, it was hoped, would 
provide adequate means of intervention within the economy. As expected, 
by furthering their attempts to achieve these new objectives, the 
successive MLP administrations further alienated the PN, who regard many 
of the new measures as infringements of liberty. This has exacerbated 
the already tense political situation in the Islands. 
It is interesting that, despite the increased social orientation, many 
of the common objectives of the socialist administrations were similar 
to those of previous PN governments. ror example, priorities included 
the creation of employment, a healthy balance of payments, the encourage-
ment of savings to fuel investment, the promotion of tourism, and in 
particular, the expansion of manufacturing industry. ~ost important, 
however, was the fact that, as with the PN plans, the MLP administrations 
encouraged the attraction of overseas MNC investment in the Maltese 
economy. Also of great significance was the belief in the desirability 
of industrial linkages. Thus, the attraction of industries which were 
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likely to generate linkages with other parts of the domestic economy 
was seen as a priorit~as the ensuing expected employment and income 
multiplier effects were regarded as desirable. 
The performance of the 1973-80 Plan was, on the surface, very impressive. 
Against a back-drop of the total withdrawal of the British base, a 
major world recession, repeated increases in petroleum prices, worsening 
trade protectionism and declining markets, Malta was able to reduce 
her unemployment drastically, increase industrial activity, increase the 
number of tourist arrivals, improve general living standards, and achieve 
many of the social objectives layed down in the plan. These objectives 
were not achieved without costs, however. ror example, despite stated 
intentions to the contrary, the growth of both tourism and manufacturing 
industry has encouraged more severe dependency structures. This, perhaps, 
was inevitable as the new Plan continued to place faith in the role of 
multinational capital in the development process. In practice, therefore, 
both the MLP and the PN attitudes towards overseas investment were 
surprisingly similar, and may perhaps be classified as falling into the 
third and mildest of Lall's (1974) 'pro-foreign investment' categories 
(see Chapter Three). 
Consequently, although the record of the MLP administrations until 1979 
looked impressive, many ominous dependency structures remained, and in 
Bome cases had become more extreme. rurthermore, the PN cast doubts on 
the validity of the MLP government statistics which, it was suggested, 
were rather more optimistic than they should have been (M.E.E.O. 1980). 
It was factors such as these which caused King (1979a) to conclude that 
Malta's new autonomy was at least partially mythical in nature. 
190 
8.2 The Development Plan for Malta 1973-80 
It is useful at this stage to become familiar with some of the economic 
projections that acted as the guidelines for the attainment of the Plan's 
objectives. The Plan's major aim was the reduction of unemployment (as 
in the P.N. plans), and the creation of 20,400 new jobs by 1980. During 
this period, it was calculated that 6,400 jobs would be lost as a 
consequence of the British withdrawal (6.2 % of the total gainfully 
occupied in 1973). A further 1,500 jobs would be lost following the 
disbanding of the labour corps. Thus, it was estimated that the net 
increase in the number of gainfully occupied would be 12,500 (Orfice of 
the Prime Minister 1973, p.26). By 1980, although the Labour Corps 
had not been disbanded, an increase of 16,755 jobs had occurred (Central 
Office of Statistics 1980 ). 
The Plan projected correctly that by 1980, the foreign payments account 
would balance, despite the loss of the British rent payments for the 
fortress. Meanwhile, Gross Domestic Product, although varying from year 
to year, was expected to grow in real terms by an average of 5-6% per 
annum. No standardised statistics that represent real growth in GOP are 
yet available for 1973-80 in Malta1, but crude unadjusted measurements 
suggest that Maltese GOP grew by an average of 13% per annum, a figure 
which compares well with the performance of other countries in the same 
period (see Chapter rive, Table 5.3, p.118). It is significant, never-
theless, that the Plan itself is quick to play down the importance of 
GOP growth in the development process. 
1. Real growth estimates are particularly difficult to compute for this 
period because of the inflationary turmoil created by the oil price 
rises of the mid and late 1970s. 
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Of the essential development pre-requisites, the Plan saw export 
expansion and a high rate of investment as vital. It was clear that it 
based its hopes, as did its PN predecessors, on the prosperity of export 
based manufacturing industry. As a result, the Plan projected an 
increase in the number employed in industrial enterprises from 
28,066 in 1972 to 44,910 by 1979 (Office of the Prime Minister 1973). 
Significantly, the figure actually achieved by 1979 of 31,394 was much 
less than planned, and shows that employment growth must have occurred 
in other areas, and that many gains in jobs within the manufacturing 
sector were probably countered by substantial job losses due to the 
comparatively short life-span of many businesses. It is likely that 
tourist-related services will have generated much new employment, but 
one of the most significant employment sectors to gain employees was 
the Government sector (see rigure 8.2). This was ironic as the 1973-80 Plan 
states its intention to trim down the Government_sector by 1506 from 
22,406 to 20,900 jobs (Orfice of the Prime Minister 1973, p.30-31). In 
reality, Government sector employment in the period 1972-79 jumped by 
6,242, an increase of 27.9% (Central Office of Statistics 1972 and 1979). 
These statistics tend to support the PN's allegations that the Govern-
ment have been disguising unemployment problems by absorbing surplus 
labour into the Government sector. Still more embaD3ssing for the 
Government was the fact that the vital manufacturing sector was losing 
employment by 1979-80 (Central Office of Statistics 1980). 
There is no doubt that a considerable proportion 0' the new employment 
generated during the period 1973-79 must have occurred in tourist and 
related services. The 1973-80 plan set itself an ambitious target of 
350,000 tourist arrivals per annum by 1979. However, the sector 
experienced wild and unexpected growth, and the number of tourist arriv-
als in 1979 was registered as 618,310, of whom over 70% were British 
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Soyrce: Central Office of Statistics (1970/71-1980) 
Pirotto(19771 
(Central Office of Statistics 1979). Thus, whilst more than achieving 
its aim.of increasing tourist intake, the plan had failed completely 
to diversify tourist markets (see rigure 8.3). rurthermore, the Plan 
stated the intention to retain the situation in which 60% of tourists 
used hotel accommodation, largely because the use of hotel accommodation 
induces greater tourist expenditure and greater income and employment 
multiplier effects. Unfortunately, by 1979, World Tourism Statistics 
revealed that only 54% of tourist arrivals in Malta used hotel accomm-
odation, and the the figure was continuing to fall in favour of cheaper 
self-catering accommodation (World Tourism Organisation 1978). 
In conclusion, the 1973-80 plan seemed to set logical and ambitious 
targets. Many of the statistics that are available suggest that, 
although many objectives were not achieved, others were attained and 
even exceeded be~ond the Government's most optimistic expectations. 
This would seem to suggest that, contrary to the stated intentions of 
the Plan, the development process remained well beyond the control of 
the Government and its agencies. This is not surprising, given the 
turmoil within the world economy, and emphasises the need for the flex-
ibility in development planning advocated retrospectively in the 1981-
1985 plan (Office of the Prime Minister 1981). Above all, however, the 
lack of control over the development process is symptomatic of the fact 
that the MLP governments have, like their PN counterparts, surrendered 
the control of the Maltese economy by deliberately attracting overseas 
MNC enterprise. Thus, despite the anti-capitalist labels which have 
adorned recent MLP manifestos and development plans, their policies 
differ only slightly from the diffusionist pattern of their PN predece-
saors. 
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8.3 Manufacturing Industry 
One of the first actions of the new MLP administration in 1971 was to 
abolish the existing industrial incentives scheme on the grounds that 
it was uneconomic, and merely benefitted foreign capitalism. New 
incentives were reintroduced with the new development plan in 1973, 
emphasising the MLP's commitment to continue the efforts to attract 
multinational capital. The new incentives were, however, less generous 
than their predecessors (King 1978c). Thus, the 1973-80 plan stated, 
'The new package of incentives approaches inducements to industries 
in an entirely different manner. The new incentives support and 
reward success ••• and presuppose operational viability ••• ' 
'The new policies are based on the assumption that Malta does not 
need to offer these gifts and that Malta has enough intrinsic 
advantages to give new industries a reasonable expectation of 
profits' (Office of the Prime Minister 1973, p.12-13). 
No longer in the incentives package was there a ten year tax holiday, 
or grants for new companies' investments. Instead, the MOC offered 
packages of low interest or interest free loans, and provided tax relief 
only on reinvested profits. The other incentives included the removal 
of tariffs on imported raw materials and machinery, and the provision 
of ready-built, well serviced, low rent factories. In order to encourage 
overseas investors, the Maltese Government publicised some of the various 
'natural' attractions of the Maltese location, particularly the quality 
and plentiful supply of Maltese labour. Not only were wages one third 
of those of Western Europe (sse Chapters Ten and Eleven, and King 1979a), 
but the productivity of the labour force was also good, enhanced by what 
was claimed to be the lowest strike rate in Europe (M.E.E.O. 1980). 
In addition to the changed incentive package scheme, the 1973-80 plan 
placed great emphasis on the need for joint'ventures between Maltese and 
overseas interests, thereby encouraging local participation. This, it 
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was hoped, would not only foster greater indigenous control of economic 
activity in Malta, but would also encourage the necessary transfer of 
managerial and technical expertise to Maltese personnel. As a consequ-
ence of the latter, the number of work permits issued to expatriate 
personnel in all sectors was cut back, a move which generally did not 
deter investors. The plan proceeded to state that it was the long term 
aim of its policy that, as a result of increases in the number of joint 
ventures and the growth of Maltese managerial expertise, the means of 
production within the Maltese economy would become predominantly owned 
by Maltese persons and institutions (Buttigieg 1975). 
In the short term, meanwhile, it was felt that there remained a need 
for overseas investment and ownership in the Maltese economy, and it 
was therefore important to assure that diversification away from British 
economic dominance was achieved. In this respect, the Plan targets were 
at least partially achieved. Between 1973 and 1980, a large number of 
British firms ceased operations in Malta. These losses were more than 
compensated for by heavy investment from West Germany (see Chapter Twelve), 
particularly in textile and clothing activities. Although there were 
other substantial investments from, for example, Japanese sources, the 
enormity of the German involvement represented a swing away from depend-
ence solely upon Great Britain to a more complete dependence upon the 
E.E.C. as a whole. This situation was brought about by the enlargement 
of the E.E.C. in 1972, which included Great Britain for the first time 
within the Community. The enlargement amplified the importance of the 
negotiated extension to Malta's associate membership of the E.E.C. during 
the 1970s and 1980s, which in turn helped to encourage enterprise from 
other E.E.C. countries (such as The Nether+ands) to participate in the 
Maltese economy. Nevertheless, heavy dependence upon the E.E.C. instit-
utions and enterprises is not a satisfactory condition. 
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Perhaps the most significant departure from the PN's development 
strategy in the manufacturing sphere was the Government's use of the 
~OC as an entrepreneurial agent. The 1973-80 plan emphasised that the 
state was no longer going to confine itself to a backing role and leave 
the private sector to initiate economic activity. Instead, there was 
to be much greater state involvement, especially in situations where the 
private sector failed to take the initiative, or where considerations 
of public sector interest were involved (Office of the Prime Minister 
1973). Consequently, the State became involved in profit-making 
enterprise, and with the assistance of Chinese capital and technology, 
attempted to establish a number of import substitution industries. 
Unfortunately, many of these ventures ran into extreme difficulty soon 
after commencing production, and a number closed within two years of 
opening. There were, however, successes, which included a number of 
Joint ventures between the MOC and overseas private and public enter-
prises, the most commonly mentioned of which is 'Medelec Switchgear', 
an enterprise combining the resources of G.E.C. (U.K.) P.L.C., the MOC, 
and the Libyan Arab Maltese Holding Company Limited. The ~oe has also 
helped to establish State owned enterprise outside the manufacturing 
sector, the best examples being the national airline 'Air Malta', and 
the not so successful 'Sea ~altat shipping company. 
Despite the efforts of the MOC, foreign ownership of enterprise in 
~alta has reached alarming proportions. King (1979a) observed that by 
1976, over half the aided industries in Malta were either partly or 
wholly foreign owned, and that 58.5% of the total industrial share 
capital was foreign owned. In 1971, the MOC annual report (MOe 1971, 
p.10) had stated that the 37 wholly foreign,owned industries, ' ••• inc-
luded the very largest of the sector. Units owned solely by Maltese 
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numbered 69, but were generally amongst the smallest.' Grech (1978) 
explains that this situation did not alter during the 1970s, and that 
by 1976, the proportion of industrial share capital owned by overseas 
interests had fallen only marginally to 57.6%. This figure probably 
under-represents the extent of foreign ownership as the share capital 
of many firms is often only nominal, and usually is not proportional 
to conventional measurements of the size of firms, such as annual 
turnover or employment (see Chapter Twelve). It seems that a number of 
subsidiary firms operating in Malta choose not to raise the bulk of 
their capital through share issues. 
There is therefore considerable evidence to suggest that Malta's means 
of production are still well beyond the control of both public and 
private sector Maltese agencies. This has important implications, for 
as well as illustrating the fact that the 1973-80 plan has failed to 
increase the Maltese ownership and control of industrial activity in 
the Islands, it also casts doubts as to the ability of future economic 
policy to influence the productive sector of the Maltese economy. This 
could be important, for as Grech (1978) pointed out, in December 1976, 
the 12 largest wholly foreign owned firms in Malta provided 30% of the 
aided sector's employment. rurthermore, King (1979a) estimated that in 
1979, the single largest private enterprise in Malta, Bluebell Malta 
Ltd. (makers of Wranglers Jeans, and an entirely American owned company) 
accounted for approximately 20% of Malta's export earnings. 
The case of Bluebell not only illustrates the extent of foreign 
ownership and control over the Maltese economy, but also shows the extent 
to which the textiles sector continues to dominate Maltese manufacturing 
, 
industry. Despite statements in the 1973-80 plan declaring an intention 
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to be more selective when attracting new industries (thereby avoiding 1 
the further growth in importance of the clothing industries), a massive 
growth in textile sector activity occurred in Malta during the 1970s. 
This is best illustrated by the percentage of total manufacturing 
employment in the textiles sector, which in 1972 stood at 27.3%, and 
which by 1979 had risen to 42.1% (Central Office of Statistics 1972 and 
1979). 
Grech (1978) was especially concerned with the low levels of linkage 
established by textile related and other guest industries. There were, 
in fact, very few links between most industrial firms and other producers 
on the islandS. As was the case with the PN Plans, the MLP believed 
industrial linkages to be important to the evolution of a stable 
industrial base. Unfortunately, the vertical and horizontal integration 
that has taken place within so many MNCs prevented any real need for 
business with the host economies,such as Malta (sea Chapter Three). 
Thus, the carefully staged production processes of the MNCs ensured 
that their Maltese satellites' activities were directed inwards towards 
the MNC parent organisations rather than outwards towards local contract-
ors. 
The desired multiplier effects of industrialisation in Malta have there-
fore been as disappointing under recent MLP administrations as they were 
in the days of PN rule. Matwally (1977), unlike Grech (1978), believes 
that for this reason, industrialisation should not be the central focus 
of development policy. In its place, Metwally suggests that service 
1. The Plan also strongly criticised the record of its predecessor, 
which it claimed foolishly allowed structural imbalance - also 
clothing sector dominance - to distort the manufacturing sector. 
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activities, such as tourism, should be encouraged as they generate far 
greater linkages within the Maltese domestic economy. There are, 
ho~ever, convincing arguments against encouraging all types of linkage, 
particulraly in view of the likely consequences of recessionary cond-
itions, especially in small economies. Negative multiplier effects 
following a factory closure are probably more undesirable than the 
positive multiplier effects were desirable when the factory began oper-
ations. 
It is difficult to summarise the industrial performance of the Maltese 
Islands since 1971. Perhaps the most important issues are those of 
foreign ownership and control, and textiles dominance. The performances 
of alternative manufacturing sectors have not been spectacular, probably 
because they were less able to take advantage of the cheap labour, and 
because of the complicated influences of the petroleum price rises. 
The failure of the manufacturing sector to meet its employment targets, 
and its unstable structure (resulting from textiles sector dominance) 
has as a result enhanced the importance of the dockyards and tourist 
sectors. 
8.4 The Dockyards 
In addition to the manufacturing sector, the dockyards and tourism have 
since independence been regarded as vital pillars of development. The 
dockyards, because of their strong manufacturing orientation, are .dealt 
with in some detail in Chapter Eleven, and have been treated in the main 
part of this analysis as part of the manufacturing sector. The Maltese 
Government, however, have always treated the dockyards as a separate 
sector of the economy for historical reason9. A brief examination of 
their recent performance is therefore necessary at this stage. 
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One of the major features of the dockyards is that they traditionally 
formed the heart of the Maltese economy, particularly during the days 
of complete fortress dominance. Since independence, and after a brief 
period of control by British shipbuilding companies, they have been 
Maltese owned and controlled. Nationalisation was surprisingly 
enforced by a PN government in 1968. The decision to nationalise was 
made after the closure of the Suez canal in 1967, which had deprived 
the yards of much needed business. In addition, increasing unrest within 
the labour force in the dockyards had discouraged Swan Hunters, the 
British company in control until 1968. Industrial relations continued 
to deteriorate after 1968, and a pledge of support for the dockworkers 
in 1971 by the MlP was one of the reasons for the return to power of the 
MlP in the General Elections of the same year. 
Once in power, the MLP rationalised the dockyards, and injected the 
investment that they had promised. The most important single develop-
ment was a 300,000 dwt capacity drydock designed and financed by the People's 
Republic of China. The Chinese assistance involved the provision of 
a 117 million soft loan and the service of 700 Chinese technicians 
(King 1978a and 1978c). In addition, the Government has embarked upon 
a shipbuilding project in Marsa. This is seen as a particularly 
ambitious project, given the extremely depressed state of the world 
shipbuilding industry. The new shipyard is expected to open during 
1983. 
Despite the shipbuilding venture, a large part of the dockyard activit-
ies will remain in ship repairs and maintenance, which, according to 
M.E.E.D. (1980) account for approximately BO% of annual sales turnover. 
I 
Important installations include modern tanker cleaning facilities, and 
other specialist equipment designed to cater for the requirements of 
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(what was until 1983) a flourishing offshore oil industry in the 
Mediterranean. However, despite an increased dependence upon oil 
based business, the yards are well diversified, and perform numerous 
small metal-manufacturing functions for the Islands. Examples of this 
type of work include the structural steel work that forms the 
supporting structures for the Government factories on Malta's various 
industrial estates. 
It seems that much progress has been made since the unstable period 
in the 1960s. Since 1973, the dockyards have benefitted from the 
reopening of the Suez Canal, which had by 1977 ensured that approx-
imately 40 commercial ships passed Malta every day (King 1978a). Aided 
by new austerity measures in 1973, combined with the cheap but high 
quality labour, and increasing expertise, Maltese competitiveness has 
been difficult to counter in the Mediterranean. Indeed, in March 
1982, ships were queuing for attention at the mouth of the Grand 
Harbour. The apparent prosperity of the yards is illustrated by the 
extraordinary fact that they have made a profit in most years since 
1971. The ability of the Maltese yards to function at a profit whilst 
heavily subsidised competitors incur increasing losses, is officially 
explained in terms of the now excellent labour relations, more efficient 
working practices, and a streamlined workforce. However, opponents of 
the ~LP Government suggest that the official statistics on the profit-
ability of the yards are false, and that this is supported by the fact 
that few detailed precise figures on profitability have been available 
since 19731 (King 1978a). It is claimed that because the dockworkers 
I 
1. This proved to be a problem in the analysis of the dockyards of 
Chapter Eleven as dockyard statistics are mysteriously excluded from 
the annual censuses of production. 
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and their dependents form the heart of MLP support, the MLP Governments 
are obliged to give unlimited financial support to the dockyards in 
order to maintain their mandate. 
The importance of the dockyards to the Maltese economy cannot be 
doubted, both in terms of income and employment. Most important, however, 
is the fact that they are owned and controlled by the State, in the 
interests of the state. for this reason, their role in the development 
process in more likely to be fulfilled, a situation which contrasts 
with that of the other pillars of development - manufacturing industry 
and tourism - both of which are largely controlled by overseas companies. 
furthermore, unlike the rest of the manufacturing sector, the yards are 
linked strongly with other sectors of the local economy, particularly 
the construction sector. However, on an ominous note, the most important 
factor affecting their well-being is their link with world markets. which 
have continued to deteriorate. It is surprising that the Maltese yards 
have managed to prosper to date in such conditions, and it can only be 
assumed that at some stage, the savage global recession afflicting 
shipbuilding and repairing will affect Malta. 
8.5 Tourism,1 
The new development plan of 1973 placed great emphasis upon tourism as 
a pillar of development, and upon the need for the diversification of 
tourist markets. Other priorities included the need to attract 
wealthier high spending tourists, the need to reduce seesonality, and 
the need to utilise under-utilised hotel capacity. A vigorous advertising 
1. As was the case with the previous passage on the dockyards, only a 
brief section on tourism is required h~e as a detailed analysis is 
performed later,in Chapter Thirteen. 
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and promotion campaign in both Western Europe and North Africa was 
initiated. Because of the surplus hotel capacity, hotel building was 
initially slowed down, and incentives such as tax holidays ended (as 
in the manufa~turing sector). Mean~hile, the responsibility~of hotel 
building and major tourist projects was transferred to the MOC, and 
the Tourist Board was confined to administrative functions, most of 
which involved the coordination of the activities of the private and 
growing state sectors. Thus, the new overseas publicity campaigns 
constituted 90% of the total allocation for tourism in the fourth 
development plan (Central Bank of Malta 1980 ). 
Increased public sector involvement in manufacturing industry was 
mirrored in the tourist sector. Thus, the MOC and other Government 
agencies began to take up interests in tourist businesses, such as 
tour operations and hotels. The intention was that, unlike other 
(Nationalist Party) administrations, the MlP Governmenuwere deter-
mined to exercise control over the tourist sector. Government control 
was further enhanced by control over the graded classification of 
hotels and other tourist premises, the control of catering and hotel 
charges, and the levy or a room and an airport tax. Not surprisingly, 
opponents of the MlP Government claimed that Government interference had 
become too costly and too restrictive for the privata sector operators. 
The 1973-80 plan set itself a target of attracting 370,000 tourists 
by 1979, a figure which required an ambitious annual growth rate of at 
least 10% in tourist arrivals per annum (Office of the Prime Minister 
1973). However, to the surprise of the authorities, the target was 
exceeded by over 67%, the actual figure fo, tourist arrivals reaching 
618,000 (sae rigure 8.3). By 1980, the annual total had risen even 
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further to 728,732 (Central Office of Statistics 1980), a peak from 
which total tourist arrivals were to subside in 1981 and 1982 (see 
Chapter Thirteen). 
Although the tourist boom has exceeded even the wildest expectations, 
thereby compensating for disappointments elsewhere in the economy, 
there were a number of alarming features of the growth in the tourist 
arrivals. first, far from diversifying the tourist markets, they 
had achieved even greater dependence upon British tourists, who in 
1980 accounted for 76.5% of total tourist arrivals. Second, the 
desired wealthy high spending tourists had not materialised, and 
increasing numbers of tourists were spending less by choosing self-
catering accommodation. Indeed, the slight alleviation of the season-
ality problem had been achieved through the promotion of extremely 
cheap off-season packages. Third, the large numbers of tourist 
arrivals also placed a great strain upon the existing infrastructure, 
the most common manifestations of which were the frequent cessation of 
the water supply, and a surplus of sewage, which often found its way 
onto the streets. Thus, it became apparent, at some cost, that there 
was a limit to the number of tourists absorbable without incurring 
damage to social and economic structures (M.~.E.O. 1980). 
In conclusion, it must be said that the MLP Governments of the 1970s 
failed to implement their stated policies, and consequently failed to 
control the tourist sector, a criticism also applicable to the PN admin-
istrations of the 1960s. Although there are many allegations claiming 
that the MLP administrations deliberately ignored their own declared 
policy, it seems more likely that the root of the problem of loss of 
control stems from the dominance of Maltase tourism by overseas (especially 
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British) tour operators. This, and other ~~ral themes, are discussed 
more fully in Chapter Thirteen. 
8.6 Strategic Issues 
It was clear to Mr. Mintoff in 1971 that, although it was politically 
and socially desirable to allow the British forces to withdraw entirely 
from Malta in 1974 (following the expiration of the 10 year defence 
treaty), the Maltese economy remained insufficiently diversified and 
too vulnerable to sustain the loss of the British fortress rent. It 
also occurred to Mr. Mintoff that his bargaining position was not as 
weak as might have been expected. Dowdall (1972, p190) explained that, 
'Mintofr must be as aware as anyone else that Malta's strategic value 
to NATO is not in Britain's use or the Island, but in denying its 
facilities to the Russians.' The threat of another Cuba, this time in 
the Mediterranean, sutcessfully forced the U.S.A. to insist on a 
continued NATO presence on Malta, despite Mr. Mintoff's expensive terms 
(King 1979a). There resulted a new 'Treaty of Mutual Defence and Assist-
ance with Great Britain', the terms of which heavily favoured the 
Maltese. The British undertook to treble their annual rent payments 
to £14 million, to reduce the 3,500 military personnel and their 7,000 
dependents to a mere 30 men, to provide a further £2.5 million apparently 
already owed to the Maltese Government, and to provide a £7 million 
concessional development loan (Wriggins 1975). In addition, the Maltese 
insisted upon maintaining an increasingly non-aligned stance by refusing 
to accommodate the American Sixth rleet, a move which pleased the People's 
Republic of China, from whom considerable development assistance was 
being received. (Financial Times, 6th February 1975). The United States, 
meanwhile, was appeased by the knowledge t~t access to the Maltese harbour 
facilities had also been denied to the Soviet Navy. 
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It seems that Mr. Mintoff's diplomatic activities in the early 1970s 
can be equated with the aggressive manoeuvring advocated by authors 
such as Seers (1981), who suggested, probably with Malta in mind, 
that, under such circumstances, small countries may reverse and even 
exploit their dependency. In this context, Mr. Mintoff's diplomatic 
skills are further emphasised by his ability to obtain development loans 
from a diverse selection of countries. The Financial Times (6th February 
1975, p.22) summarised Mr. Mintoff's achievements as follows. 'Without 
giving the impression of going cap in hand, he has managed to pick up 
soft loans from China, france, Canada, Libya and Saudi Arabia.' 
Non-alignment remains a central part of the MLP Government policy, and 
is, on the surface at least, aimed at attaining political and economic 
detachment from Great Britain. The MLP has always maintained that the 
policies of the PN in the 19605 maintained such levels of dependence 
upon Great Britain that the independence achieved in September 1964 was 
only nominal in nature. It was for this reason that Malta was declared 
a Republic on 13th December 1974, this particular date replacing the 
previous independence day as a ~aJor national holiday. Whilst pursuing 
non-alignment still further, the Maltese Government have affiliated 
Malta to the group of 77 non-aligned states, and continually referred 
in their development plans and associated literature to the need for 
Malta to act as a Euro-Arab bridge (see Office of the Prime Minister 
1973, 1977 and 1981). The especially strong Middle Eastern flavour 
to the current development policy is illustrated by the decision to 
make Arabic compulsory in the Maltese SChools curricula, alongside 
Maltese, English, and Italian. 
, 
During the mid-1970s, the non-alignment policy was assisted by the 
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rapid withdrawal of the British fortress's equipment and personnel. 
Between 1970 and 1971, the percentage of total Maltese employment in 
the fortress fell from 6% to 0% (Pirotta 1977, and see rigure 8.2). 
Simultaneously, the percentage of total foreign exchange earnings 
provided by the fortress, and the percentage of Maltese Government 
revenue also provided by the fortress, both fell to zero from over 
25% in 1973 (Office of the Prime Minister 1977). In March 1979, the 
British forces withdrew completely from Malta, thereby bringing to an 
end over 2,000 years of overseas military domination. 
8.7 Conclusions 
The MLP Governments' positive achievements are perhaps best illustratad 
by using comparisons with Western European countries in the same period. 
ror example, whilst recessionary pressures adversely affected the 
European economies, forcing unemployment rates into double figures, 
the official unemployment rate in Malta was falling to a level of 2.7% 
(see rigure 8.4). However, the M.E.E.O. (1980, p.4) asserts that, 
'Perhaps the most meaningful vote of confidence has been cast by return-
ing Maltese expatriates - after decades of being a major exporter of 
people, there has since 1975 been a small. but steady, net flow of 
immigrants.' (see figure 8.4). 
Although there have been notable successes in the new public sector, 
there have also been failures. for example, attempts to verticalise 
the textiles and clothing industries by establishing, with the assistance 
of Chinese technology, a spinning and weaving mill,resulted in disaster. 
Other parastatal industries, such as 'Sea Malta' have also fared badly. 
rurthermore, some public services such as )elecommunications, and most 
important, water supply, seem to have been very badly managed. This is 
unfortunate as inadequacies in infrastucure have hindered the development 
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of both manufacturing industry and tourism. It seems, therefore, that 
there is considerable room for improvement in the management of the 
public sector. This would tend to suggest that it was unwise to 
expand the activities and responsibilities of the public sector to such 
an extent, given the insufficient management expertise and financial 
resources available. It has also been suggested that the public sector 
has been extended in the wrong directions, and that greater emphasis 
should have been placed on the provision in Malta of international 
services. Under these circumstances, it has been argued that Malta 
could have transformed herself into the 'Geneva of the Mediterranean', 
especially following the demise of the Lebanon. Economists such as 
Metwally (1977) suggest that this would have produced more income and 
employment multiplier effects than has been the case with the continued 
emphasis on manufacturing industry. 
. ; 
One or the most serious criticisms of the MLP Government is that the l 
increased centralised control of government is leading. to widespread 
corruption. Certainly, there is mounting evidence to support this, 
especially in the retailing sector. The PN are also critics of the 
.anner in which Government intervention has occurred in private industry, 
maintaining that the compulsory maintenance of specific labour levels 
is strangling private enterprise. In addition, the PN continues to claim 
that the MLP has doctored the available statistics, concealing unemploy-
ment by failing to disband the labour corps, and by absorbing many of 
the Jobless into idle occupations in government service. But perhaps 
the severest criticism of the MLP is their industrialisation record, 
which.is adequate in absolute terms, but extremely worrying in terms of 
its internal structure. Malta's industrial ~apacity is now even more 
dependent upon unstable textile sector industries than was the case in 
1971 (see figure 8.5). The promised extra-selectivity has not occurred, 
210 
30 
20 
10 
o 
-~------~ 
" 
" 
1970 1972 
I 
/ 
/ 
~;' 
19]4 
---
1976 
% Manufoctur i ng 
__ - __ Employment in the 
~tiletseaor 
------... ----/0 ~ufacturing 
19~ 
Gross Output in the 
Textiles Sector 
1980 Years 
Figure 8.5 Per Cent Manufacturing Output & Employment In Textiles 
1970-80 
Source: Central Office of Statistics (1970171-19801 
211 
and the consequences will probably be serious in the 1980s. Similarly, 
the tourist sector was to be diversified through the attraction of 
wealthier, non-8ritish tourists. In reality, the expansion that 
occurred was achieved through what seems to have been the deliberate 
attraction of very large numbers of low-spending British tourists, and 
the growth of less desirable non-hotel accommodation. 
Meanwhile, the dockyards, the other major pillar of Maltese development, 
constitute an area of activity which, like the textiles sector, is 
currently suffering a period of global instability and over-capacity. 
The Maltese yards will be extremely fortunate if they too are not 
eventually afflicted by the recession. The Maltese economy as a whole 
therefore remains in a highly unstable, dependent and vulnerable cond-
ition, despite the much advertised MLP promises of autonomous development. 
Unfortunately, current political instability has encouraged intransigen~e, 
and the new MLP Plan (1981-85) (Office of the Prime Minister 1981) 
merely represents a continuation of existing development policy. This 
is disappointing to many who support the more conventional economic 
policies of the PN, and is equally distressing to socialists such as 
Vassallo (1979), who perceiving the MLP development policies to be 
implicitly pro-capitalist, deplore the resulting multinational invest-
ment in Maltese economic activity. To those such as Vassallo, the only 
real success __ of the MLP period of government to date has been its 
80cial policy. 
, 
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CONCLUSIONS TO SECTION TWO 
This section has illustrated the fact that the Maltese situation 
bears little relation to the experiences of other less developed 
or even underdeveloped countries, and that many of the traditional 
development and underdevelopment experiences are completely irrelevant 
to this analysis. This has been shown in the simplest terms by referring 
to Clark (1951), whose development model predicts a logical transition 
from rural based and extractive primary activity, through the dominance 
of manufacturing industry to a mature condition of service dominance. 
The Maltese case is manifestly different, and has required a reverse 
transition from service (or fortress) dominance to productive activity. 
This has largely involved the development of light manufacturing 
industry and the commercialisation of the dockyards. It has also been 
possible, with the assistance of a buoyant tourist industry, to retain 
a strong element of service activity throughout Malta. 
Chapter Six showed that in the post-world war two years, when the 
British defence industry remained dominant, the Maltese were happy to 
remain dependent upon Great Britain, and more specifically, upon the 
fortress. The contentment was soon terminated by the 1957 defence white 
paper announcing the end of Malta's role as a major base - an unpleasant 
development currently facing Gibraltar. The defence cuts marked the 
beginning of a concerted drive towards independence, and what was hoped 
would eventually become autonomous development. 
In Chapter Seven, the MLP's attempts at autonomous development were 
outlined. Theirstratagy was one which was" explicitly diffusionist, and 
involved the export of their potential con~rol of the economy - espec-
ially the manufacturing and tourist sectors - into the hands of a 
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number of MNCs. The results included dangerous concentrations in 
industrial structure, ownership and markets, and especially serious 
dependence upon Great Britain. The potentially dangerous consequences 
of their loss of control of the economy were well demonstrated by the 
propoerty boom of the late 1960s, which had its roots in the london 
money markets. Indeed, the entire development programme was strongly 
influenced by the British, who had devised and financed the first 
development plan during the years immediately before independence. In 
this period, there was no viable alternative to export industry based 
development, and the British planners logically applied strategies that 
they were using within their own regional policy, especially in Northern 
Ireland. Consequently, the attraction of overseas firms in order to 
provide much needed absent factors of production was a logical decision 
under the circumstances. 
In Chapter Eight, the MlP's attempts at autonomous development were 
outlined. It must be recognised that they inherited what were already 
dependent structures. However, the adoption of an implicitly diffusion-
ist development strategy ensured that, if anything, dependency structures 
gained strength within the Maltese economy. 8y 1980, concentrations 
within the economy Were even worse than in 1971, and were exemplified 
by a strong dominance of unstable clothing industries within the 
~anufacturing sector, and the astonishing preponderance of British 
visitors amongst annual tourist arrivals. Thus, despite strong policy 
statements to the contrary, the MlP inadvertently strengthened the 
tendencies towards concentration that it had pledged to reduce. 
There have, however, been positive aspects to the MlP period of attempted , 
development. Attempts at diversifying external dependency links have 
occurred, and have included the encouragement of Eastern Bloc and Arab 
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ventures in particular. Not all have been successful, but some have 
taken root and prospered. Similarly, in the field of diplomacy, and aid 
and trade links, countries such as Czechoslovakia and Libya have begun 
to figure prominently. Also, despite the loss of control of tourism 
and light manufacturing industry, the important dockyards remain under 
indigenous State control. In addition, the adoption of welcome and 
successful social policies have benefitted many of the more marginal 
members of the Maltese community. 
Many of the general observations and trends included in Section Two 
were gleaned from the existing literature and summary statistics on 
Malta. A closer examination of Malta's economic structures is now 
required, and this is to be performed in the chapters contained within 
the next section. 
, 
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SECT! ON THREE 
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION THREE 
This section constitutes a detailed examination of the Maltese 
economy. Three out of the five chapters deal exclusively with manu-
facturing industry, and use official aggregate statistics. They are 
therefore concerned with development at the macro-level. The fourth 
chapter (Chapter Twelve) deals also with the manufacturing sector, 
but does so at the micro-level,using data collected in an industrial 
survey. This material is designed to complement the material discussed 
in the previous three chapters. finally, the last chapter of the 
section (Chapter Thirteen) concerns itself with tourism, the other 
major pillar of development on which the Maltese economy is perceived 
to depend. Dependence within the tourist industry is identified, 
and can be seen to be as severa, if not more so, than is tha case in 
Maltese manufacturing industry. 
, 
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CHAPTER NINE: THE STRUCTURE or MANurACTURING INDUSTRY IN MALTA 
9.1 The Importance of the Manufacturing Sector 
The dominant role ascribed to the growth of manufacturing industry in 
all the Maltese development plans (see Chapters Six, Seven and Eight) 
reflects a widespread and worldwide belief in the dlffuslonlst develop-
ment paradigm and its assumptions concerning the generative powers of 
manufacturing industry (see Section One). In the late 1950s and early 
1960s, Malta was in the unusual position of possessing a highly devel-
oped service sector, and very little manufacturing capacity. It was 
therefore predictable that the economic diversification programme 
would rely heavily upon conventional industrialisation as the major 
means of breaking the dependence upon the declining British fortress. 
Some industrial activity existed before the first development plan of 
1959, but was confined to extremely small scale activity. At this time, 
exports were very small, most production still being confined to local 
distribution in the restricted home market. In the years since the 
first development plan, this situation has altered dramatically in 
favour of export based activities and comparatively large scale produc-
tion. 
One of the central features of the diffusionist thesis is the belief 
that the growth of a .anufacturing sector - usually a group of 
chosen industries, often referred to as a growth pole (Perroux 1955) -
will encourage the growth and diffusion of industrial activity through 
the evolution of both forward and backward linkages. In this way, inv-
estment in manufacturing activity is expected to generate what may be 
called (in Keynesian terminology) 'multipli~ effects'. The popularity 
of manufacturing industry in many development strategies is partly 
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explained by the traditional belief that manufacturing industry, 
through its linkages, is able to induce the greatest income and employ-
ment multiplier effects within a developing economy. 
The wisdom of this strategy as it is usually implemented has already 
been called into question in Section One, and it is significant that 
alternative development strategies have in some instances been adopted 
(e.g. Tanzania and China). In the Maltese case, the unique problems of 
scale and history have also caused dissent amongst development planners. 
for example, Metwally (1977) successfully alienated the MLP government 
by suggesting that far greater multiplier effects were to be gained by 
investment in service sector activity, most notably tourism. Metwally 
supported this suggestion using econometric data and equations calcula-
ted from official government statistics. Thus, he was able to show 
that, of the three critical development sectors - the dockyards, 
manufacturing industry and tourism - tourism has had by far the 
greatest positive effects upon the Maltese economy (Metwally 1977 and 
1979). Metwally ensured his own loss of credibility by advocating 
the encouragement of overseas settlers as part of a package of inter-
national service provision. His econometrics were also called into 
doubt by critics who included Oelia (1978). 
Despite the many arguments, manufacturing industry remains the focus 
of the current development plan for Malta (Office of the Prime Minister 
1982). for this reason, the remainder of this chapter, and all but 
one of the remaining chapters of this section deal exclusively with 
manufacturing activity in Malta. or great importance is the structure 
of Maltese manufacturing industry, which net only influences the nature 
and scale of the benefits accruing to the Maltese economy, but also 
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determines the long term stability of Malta's industrial base. 
Government-aided industry now constitutes the bulk of Malta's indust-
rial activity, and consequently deserves a brief mention at this stage. 
The aided sector includes almost every large scale manufacturer in 
Malta, and as a result,accounts for almost all formal sector indust-
rial activity. Thus, by 1980, 73% of total manufacturing employment 
was in the aided sector, a considerable advance from the 61.1% of 
1973 (MOC 1980). 
To qualify as an aided firm, a company must have received, and be 
receiving, some sort of official ~overnment assistance through the 
Malta Development Corporation (MOC). Such assistance includes any of 
the official Government incentives, and therefore involves assistance 
such as the provision of loans, grants, factories, and import duty 
concessions. One of the most common forms of incentive has been the 
provision of ready-built factorias on Government-built industrial 
estates (see Plate 9.1, and figure 9.1). As a result, a large 
proportion of the aided sector operates from industrial estates. In 
1980, the distribution of factories in operation throughout the estates 
was as shown in Tabla 9.1 below. 
Table 9.1 The Numbers of factories on Government Industrial Estates 
in 1980. 
Estates 
Marsa 
San Gwann 
Mriehel 
Bulebel 
Kordin 
Ricasoli 
Hal far 
XewkiJa (Gozo) 
Others 
Source: MOC (1980) 
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No. of Factories 
Total 
57 
26 
16 
71 
31 
7 
6 
10 
17 
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PLATE 9. 1 Bulebel Industri a l Estate . Thi s i s the large s t of the 
Government industrial estates . The factori es are 
const ruct ed from the uniform globigerina limestone 
blocks quarried loca lly ( see plates 5 . 3 and 5 . 4 ), and 
the s t eel s ub s tructures are us ually ma nufactured in 
the dockya rds of the Grand Harbour. 
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Marsa is the oldest of the estates, but Bulebel has become the largest. 
Ricasoli and Hal far are likely to grow in importance. Unfortunately, 
it has not been easy to encourage manufacturers to locate in Gozo,on 
the Xewkija estate. 
The aided sector has continued to grow since the MLP industrial devel-
opment policies became operative in 1973, despite their less generous 
incentive packages. There has, however, been an increase within the 
sector in the dominance of the textiles sector activity (see Table 9.2). 
Despite a fall in the average workforce in textile activity, in 1980, 
Table 9.2 The Number of Aided rirms, and the Average Employment per 
firm, by Sectors, 1973 and 1980. 
Number of firms 
Sectors 
food & Beverages etc. 
Textiles, Clothing etc. 
Chemicals, Plastics etc. 
Metala & Machinery etc. 
Total 
1973 
........... 
15 
51 
18 
40 
160 
Sources MOC (1980) 
1980 
........... 
16 
90 
18 
74 
255 
Average Employees 
1973 1980 
........... 
46 87 
151 130 
101 82 
82 67 
96 87 
textile activities retained an average of by far the largest workforces 
1n the aided sector. Textiles were also major .ources of exports, 93% 
of the sector's production being exported in 1980 (MDC 1980). In the 
same year, the aided sector as a whole exported 81% of its output. Of 
these exports, 76.3% found their way to E.E.C. countries. 
Of the 255 aided firms operating in 1980, 21 benefitted from direct , 
State involvement. Of these, three were completely State owned, in 
seven, the State had a majority share-holding, and in the remaining 
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eleven, the State had an equal or minority share-holding. However, 
despite the publicity given to parastatal enterprise, most of the 
aided sector consists of private enterprise, an important and large 
segment of which is owned and controlled by MNCs. 
Because of the dominant position held by the aided sector within the 
Maltese economy, and especially within the manufacturing sector, the 
discussion and analyses which follow will be concerned to a great 
extent with aided sector activity. Consequently, despite the fact 
that the primary concern of the chapter is Maltese manufacturing 
industry as a whole, some statistics and discussion will relate spec-
ifically to aided industry. This situation has been encouraged not 
only by the dominance of the aided sector within manufacturing industry, 
but also by the high quality of statistics provided by the MOC concer-
ning the aided sector. 
Finally, some explanation is necessary concerning the sectoral classif-
ication of Maltese manufacturing industry in this analysis. This has 
been dependent to a great extent on the Maltese classification system, 
which has, unfortunately, not always been consistent. The sector of 
most interest - the Textiles Sector - consists of textiles, clothing and 
footwear manufacture. The Food Sector has as its major constituents 
food, beverage and tobacco manufacturers. The Chemicals Sector is made 
up of Chemical and Plastics industries. Finally, the Metals sector 
consists of metals and machinery industries, and includes electronics. 
The Metals sector is complicated by the fact that the dockyards are 
not included within its official statistics. Thus, although this study 
has chosen to include the dockyards as a ma~ufacturing industry, it has 
not been possible to combine the dockyard statistics into the macro-level 
statistics. 
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9.2 The Employment structure of Maltese Manufacturing Industry 
Because of the decline of the British fortress, one of the major aims 
of the industrialisation policies was the provision of employment. It 
was hoped that industrial growth would replace the jobs lost in the 
fortress sector, and would also provide employment for the growing 
numbers of young male Maltese reaching working age. The growth of 
total employment in manufacturing was unfortunately slow during the first 
development plan period, but picked up quickly during the post-independ-
ence years. Thus, in 1959, total employment in manufacturing was only 
11,000, and had by 1979 risen to a peak of 31,400 (see figure 9.2, and 
Central Office of Statistics 1964 and 1979)1. The importance of 
employment in manufacturing also increased in relative terms during the 
1959-79 period. Thus, in 1959, only 12.6% of the gainfully occupied 
population were employed in manufacturing industry. By 1979, this 
figure had risen to 26.5% (see figure 9.2,and Central Office of Stati-
stics 1964 and 1979). Simultaneously, the proportion of employed 
persons in the direct service of the British fortress fell from 18.3% 
to 0% (see again figure 9.2, and Pirotta 1977). The manufacturing 
sector has therefore become one of the most important sources of employ-
ment in the post-independence ere, end in this respect, successive 
Maltese Governments of both complexions may claim aome degree of success. 
Unfortunately, the structure of manufacturing employment is less pleas-
ing. As is illustrated by figure 9.3, Malta has failed to diversify 
her industrial base. During the 1964-79 period, whilst total manuf-
acturing employment was increasing substantially, dependence upon 
textile sector enterprise for employment was increasing to unsurpassed 
« 
1. By 1980, the figure had fallen back to 30,355 in manufacturing 
industry (Central Office of Statistics 1980). 
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levels. In 1964, 22.3% of the total employment in manufacturing activity 
was accounted for by textiles sector enterprise. By 1979, this figure 
had risen to 42.1%. Other sectors remained relatively stable, and metal 
manufactures, in relative terms, advanced only slowly from 17.7% to 19.4% 
of total manufacturing employment in the same period. The Chemicals 
sector, however, illustrated well the potential vulnerability to external 
influences of certain industrial sectors operating in Malta when the 
OPEC induced oil price rises of 1973 caused the employment in Maltese 
chemical industries to contract from 5.~' to 1.2% of total manufacturing 
employment in only two years. Meanwhile, as expected, the relative 
importance of food related industries declined consistently throughout 
the period, despite the fact that in absolute terms, the numbers of 
employees remained stable (see figures 9.3 and 9.4). 
Although increases in total employment in manufacturing industry have 
been considerable since independence, the sex structure of the new 
employment has given cause for concern. Whilst it has been the stated 
intention of all Governments since the mid-1960s to increase female 
participation in the economy of the Maltese Islands, the provision of 
jobs for the unemployed males leaving tha fortress was a more serious 
priority. However, the nature of the employment provided by the new 
industries favoured female labour. This is best explained by the 
domination of the textiles sector, the workforce of which was 73.7% 
female. Thus, whilst full female employment was achieved by the late 
1970s, male unemployment remainded a problem1• During this period, the 
Government reacted by recruiting large numbers of males into government 
services, increasing the percentage of male personnel in the government 
, 
1. At this time (1979), female participation in the Islands had risen to 
31.1%, a rise during the decade of over 10% (Central Office of 
Statistics 1979). 
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sector from 80.5% in 1971 to 85.4% in 1979. 
In summary, the manufacturing sector has since independence become a 
major source of employment in Malta. However, manufacturing Jobs have 
in recent years not increased in number as much as was desired. Thus, 
in 1980, the fourth development plan's (1973-80) manufacturing employ-
ment target of 44,910 was never reached, the shortfall amounting to 
13,516 jobs (30%). furthermore, most of the Jobs provided were filled 
by women, a factor which exacerbated surpluses in the supply of male 
labour. Nevertheless, most disturbing of all was the dominance of the 
textiles sector, which by 1980 accounted for over 40% of manufacturing 
employment. The instability of the textile sector throughout the world 
would tend to suggest that the long term future of many Maltese manuf-
acturing Jobs is in Jeopardy. 
9.3 The Output of Maltese Manufacturing Industry 
The total gross output of the manufacturing sector followed an exponen-
tial growth pattern during the 1964-79 period, the greatest growth in 
the value of output occurring from the mid-1970s onwards1- years which 
were Characterised by rampant international inflation. The complex-
ities of the international money markets and the relationship of the 
Malta Pound to the hard currencies hinder the calculation of 'real' 
increases in output for this period. However, other indicators (SUCh 
as the number of employees and establishments in the manufacturing 
sector) indicate that substantial increases in real output were attained. 
During this period, Maltese manufacturing industry was transformed from 
predominantly small Beale enterprise supplying only the Maltese domestic 
markets to almost entirely export-based manufacturing activity. 8ecause , 
1. See figures 9.5 and 9.6 
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of a complete absence of indigenous raw materials in Malta, one of the 
major disadvantages facing the manufacturing sector has been the high 
import content of manufacturing production, a factor which has helped 
ensure that the net output of the manufacturing sector is substantially 
less than gross output (see figures 9.5 and 9.6). Although this has 
acted as a disincentive to overseas enterprise, extremely low unit 
labour costs in Malta as well as the various Government incentive 
packages have encouraged many MNC subsidiary companies to beetablished 
within Malta. 
The increasing importance of manufacturing industry to the Maltese 
economy is well illustrated by the rise in the proportion of annual 
GOP accounted for by the manufacturing sector (see figure 9.7 and Table 
9.3). In 1964, only 33.9% of GOP was generated by manufacturing activity 
in Malta, but by 1977, this had risen to 69.0%. The growth of manuf-
acturing activity slowed in the late 1970s, but by 1980, manufacturing 
still accounted for 62.2% of GOP (Central Office of Statistics 1969, 1977 
and 1980). Part of the fall in the proportion of manufacturing output 
within GOP may be attributed to the strong growth of tourism within 
the Maltese economy in the latter half of the decade (see Chapter 
Thirteen). 
The constituents of Maltese manufacturing output between 1964 and 1980 
display a pattern similar to that of manufacturing employment. 
Measures of both gross and net output show that the textiles sector is 
by far the largest contributor to manufacturing output. It is also 
apparent that the textiles sector can attribute its enhanced importance 
within the Maltese economy to the very rapip growth of clothing indust-
ries in the mid-1970s (see figures 9.8 and 9.9). Of the other major 
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sectors, metals remained relatively stable, whilst chemicals suffered 
severely from the oil price rises. The food and beverages sector, as 
expected, declined in relative importance as other sectors grew in 
stature. 
It is possible, by using measures of both gross and net output, to 
roughly estimate the average value added by each sector of manufact-
uring industry. This can be dome by taking net output for a single 
year as a proportion of gross outPut~. Subsequent computations (see 
Table 9.4) reveal that large material inputs and little value added 
during manufacture contributed to the low index value for the food 
sector (22% in 1964). This figure fluctuated wildly between 1964 and 
1980, and eventually rested at a much improved 31.5% by the end of 1980. 
As is to be expected, the chemicals sector experienced a serious set-
back in the mid-1970s as the oil price rises caused large increases in 
the costs of materials •.. Meanwhile, the metals sector in 1964 appeared 
to be the most productive, net output representing 48.8% of gross output. 
The sector proceeded to rally dramatically during the early and mid-1970s, 
but from 1977 onwards, declined as material costs Bscallated, again 
propelled by the energy price rises of the mid-1970s. Finally, the 
textiles sector in 1964 displayed symptoms of low productivity, net 
output constituting only 27.9% of gross output. 8y 1980, this propor-
tion had risen to 44.7%, an advance that is easily explained by the 
growth of clothing industries within the sector, and economies of scale. 
Comparative statistics for the clothing sector between 1964 and 1980 
1. In this case, gross output can be defined as the total value of 
manufacturing output, whilst net output consists of the total value 
of manufacturing output with the cost~of material inputs subtracted.) 
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Table 9.3 Gross Domestic Product, Gross Manufacturing Output, and Gross 
Manufacturin Output as a Percenta e of Gross Domestic Product. 
1964 - 1980 
Date GOP (M£'OOOs) Manur. Gross Output (M£'OOOs) Gross Manuf. Output 
a % of GOP as 
1964 49,175 16,655 33.9 
1965 52,735 19,410 36.8 
1966 58,788 21,949 37.3 
1967 63,664 24,201 38.0 
1968 71,298 29,818 41.8 
1969 81,996 35,062 42.8 
1970 94,921 38,827 41.0 
1971 97,763 40,981 41.9 
1972 102,205 48,733 47.7 
1973 115,689 65,045 56.2 
1974 131,582 84,105 63.9 
1975 165,757 98,660 59.5 
1976 203,714 132,144 64.9 
1977 239,780 165,357 69.0 
1978 277,617 181,349 65.3 
1979 325,779 212,080 65.~ 
1980 391,964 243,638 62.2 
Sources: Central Office of Statistics (1966, 1967, 1969, 1970-71, 1973 
1977 and 1980). 
Table 9.4 Net Output as 8 Percenta~e of Gross Output for Major 
Manufacturing Sectors, 1964 - 1980. 
Date Total l'Ianuf. Textiles Metals Chemicals rood Clothing 
- -
1964 30.8 27.9 48.8 30.9 22.0 39.2 
1965 34.1 31.1 47.2 35.5 26.4 36.8 
1966 36.6 36.3 47.9 42.0 28.1 47.0 
1967 39.8 37.0 48.2 45.2 27.5 50.6 
1968 38.5 41.6 49.5 42.7 27.1 48.2 
1969 41.0 38.8 55.2 46.4 28.2 43.9 
1970 39.9 38.9 54.1 43.5 27.3 40.0 
1971 42.2 48.4 54.3 40.8 26.6 43.5 
1972 41.1 46.1 56.7 45.1 25.7 40.2 
1973 38.8 34.0 54.0 45.9 25.9 36.6 
1974 35.5 33.4 52.2 33.9 21.1 34.1 
1975 40.1 42.9 50.9 40.9 26.4 44.7 
1976 41.0 42.8 52.9 40.0 25.5 42.7 
1977 39.7 40.9 46.5 39.9 26.4 41.0 
1978 41.1 42.5 47.6 45.3 26.6 43.3 
1979 42.7 42.2 48.3 
, 
40.2 30.9 41.5 
1980 42.7 44.7 42.5 38.9 31.5 44.1 
Sources: As in Table 9.3 above. 
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suggest that clothing industries appear to have experienced relatively 
high productivity throughout the period, and that they were at least 
partly responsible for the lead the textiles sector as a whole displayed 
over the other manufacturing sectors in 1980 (see Table 9.4). 
In summary, manufacturing output is heavily dominated by the textiles 
sector, which owes its elevated importance to the spectacular growth of 
clothing establishments in the 1970s. Once again, this shows that 
recent Government policies stating the need to diversify manufacturing 
away from the textiles sector have failed. However, although textiles 
sector activity is not renowned for its long term stability, it is 8ig-
nificant that it appeared to be the most productive of the major manuf-
acturing sectors. 
9.4 The Scale of Production 
The scale of much of Maltese manufacturing activity altered substantially 
between 1964 and 1980. As has already been mentioned, following the 
comparative failure of the first development plan (1959-64), much of 
the manufacturing sector was dominated by small scale home market oriented 
activity. By 1980, the manufacturing sector was completely dominated by 
the aided sector, which was comprised of much larger scale, export 
oriented industries that had taken advantage of the incentive packages 
offered by the Maltese Governments. The non-aided sector remained 
dominated by small scale, often part-time and informal enterprise, 
frequently confined to small workshops and to the local markets. The 
enhanced scale of the new industries was entirely dependent upon heavy 
investment, which followed a predictable sectoral pattern given the 
employment and production distributions discussed in the previous sections 
, 
of this chapter. 
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The bulk of total annual investment in the manufacturing sector in the 
early 1960s occurred in the food and beverages sector, and in the 
textiles sector, which was dominated by spinning and weaving 
activities (sea Figure 9.10). As would be expected, the importance 
of the food and beverages sector declined in relative terms between 
1964 and 1980. The textiles sector, however, expanded, largely because, 
following the high capital costs of equipment. installation, comparat-
ively less investment was required in subsequent years. The jump in 
the importance of textiles in the early 1970s was entirely attributable 
to the growth of clothing establishments. It is significant that the 
capital investment required in the establishment of clothing factories 
is less than is the case for spinning and weaving industries, whose 
production processes require complex and expensive machinery. This 
point is illustrated by data (by sector) for investment per employee 
per annum, which shows clothing investment per head to be substantially 
less than is the case for other industries (see Figure 9.11). This is 
also a consequence of the highly labour intensive nature of the clothing 
industries. 
Of the other manufacturing sectors, metals showed a substantial increase 
in relative importance during the 1960s, and after a setbeck during the 
mid-1970s following the oil price increases, stabilised in subsequent 
years. Investment in Chemicals related industries were also hit badly 
by the oil crises. Perhaps most significant has been the increasing 
proportion of total manufacturing investment taken up by the 'other' 
category. This includes growing industries such as non-metalic minerals, 
wood, cork, paper, printing and furniture manufacturing ventures. Also 
of importance, however, has been the uptur~ in the relative importance 
of textiles sector investment, despite the diversification efforts 
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aimed at reducing textiles domination. This point is supported by the 
data for annual investment per head (see figure 9.11), which shows the 
great extent to which investment per head in clothing establishments 
has grown in the 1970s. 
Interpretation of figure 9.11 is, nevertheless difficult as investment 
per head is influenced by both investment and employment levels. 
However, one of the more notable features to emerge is the enormous 
growth in the investment per head in the food and beverages and chemicals 
sectors. This is probably attributable in the case of food and bever-
ages to strong linkages with the rapidly expanding tourist sector in 
Malta. In the case of chemicals, it is likely that the mid-1970s oil 
crises required the shedding of a large proportion of the sector's 
labour force in the interests of economic survival. Simultaneously, 
injections of new capital. rendered the chemicals sector more capital 
intensive, thereby further increasing the levels of investment per head. 
The effects of the new investment on the scale of Maltese manufacturing 
establishments are perhaps best represented by annual data for the aver-
age number of employees per establishment in each sector (see figure 
9.12). figure 9.12 shows the enormous growth in the average size of 
textile sector establishments which, once again, is almost entirely 
attributable to growth in the 1970s of large clothing establishments. 
The comparative size of the textile and clothing establishment work-
forces, as compared with the less spectacular growth of investment in 
the textiles sector indicates that textiles activity in Malta is much 
more labour intensive than capital intensive. This is a feature of 
textiles sector activity throughout the wor}d, and is a major reason 
for the mobility of textiles industries. The international mobility of 
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textiles activity is well illustrated by the fact that many MNCs have 
chosen Malta as a suitable location for their branch plants, a choice 
that has been encouraged in particular by the comparatively cheap 
labour costs in Malta (see Chapter Ten). 
The effects of the oil crises upon the chemicals sector are especially 
apparent from rigure 9.12. Until 1973, chemicals establishments 
appeared to be recruiting labour. However, between 1973 and 1975, the 
average number of employees per establishment fell from 41 to 12, a 
decline which, if repeated in a more important sector, such as textiles, 
would be catastrophic. Other sectors, meanwhile, were less volatile 
than textiles and Chemicals. The food and beverages sector was the 
most stable, whilst the performance of the metals sector was disappoin-
ting. Despite a jump in average employment per establishment, metals 
never rose far above an average of 20 persons per factory unit. 
In conclusion, the only sector of Maltese manufacturing industry to 
recruit significantly larger workforcas and achieve very much greater 
economies of scale during the 1960s and 1970s was the textiles sector. 
The ease with which this transformation was possible was largely due to 
the comparatively small levels of investment required to establish this 
type of industry. Clearly, the dramatic nature of the transformations 
aChieved by the textiles sector, especially in the 19708, seduced the 
Maltese Governments into permitting the enhancement of the Maltese 
economy's dependence upon the textiles sector. Although this may have 
seemed justifiable in the short term, particularly in view of the 
difficulties associated with the establishment of alternative indust-
ries, such dependence is bound to be a 80ur~e of instability within the 
Maltese economy in the long term. 
244 
9.5 The Ownership of ~altese ~anufacturing Industry 
It is extremely unfortunate that detailed ownership data for the 
various sectors of Maltese manufacturing industry were unobtainable, 
particularly in view of the fact that they probably exist in convenient 
form under the guard of a particular Government department or organ-
isation. As has already been mentioned, ownership statistics were 
amongst a large number of important variables probably provided by 
industrial censuses, but not published in the annual statistical 
volumes. This is at least partly because the material collected in the 
industrial censuses was guara~eed confidential status in order to 
encourage the complete cooperation of respondents to the questionnaire. 
Ownership data is in fact available in crude documentary form at the 
Department of Trade. However, the task of searching the extensive 
files on each company and computing shareholding totals (as well as 
assuming the nationality of some shareholders) for every registered 
manufacturing enterprise was perceived as being too time consuming. 
Instead, it was decided that ownership data should be collected for 
the same sample population that constituted the industrial questionnaire 
survey that was carried out for this study (see Chapter Twelve). This 
~as done at the Department of Trade in Valletta, and the task was made 
considerably easier by the staff in the records office, whose assistance 
was very much appreciated. Because the ownership statistics obtained 
relate more closely to the bulk of the micro-scale level of the 
questionnaire data, they have not been included within this chapter. 
Ownership data concerning manufacturing industry in ~alta is important 
because it is generally assumed that the patterns of shareholdings should 
represent to some degree the extent of ov~seas capital involvement 
within the manufacturing sector. This in turn should represent the 
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degree to ~hich Maltese industry is controlled by overseas interests, 
and also the extent to which profits generated in Malta are exported. 
fortunately, some general statistics relating to foreign shareholdings 
are available, although they are published by the MOC only as aggregate 
totals for the government aided manufacturing sector as a ~hole (see 
Table 9.5). The data in Table 9.5 is not entirely representative as it 
deals exclusively ~ith the aided sector. However, for reasons discussed 
earlier, it seems safe to assume that an analysis of overseas overseas 
ownership confined to aided industries is sufficient at this stage. 
Table 9.5 Percenta~e Shareholdin~s in the Aided Manufacturin9 Sectorz 
A~~re~ated b~ Nationalit~1 1978 - 1980. 
% % % 
121! .!ill. 12IDl 
Maltese, (State) MOC, 60.5 100% 42.1 100% 47.8 100% Private , 39.5 57.9 52.2 
Total I 48,2 ll:.! l§.d 
E,E.C. U.K. • 9.9 10.8 13.5 Italy I 2.4 2.1 1.8 
West Cermany I 8.0 7.8 10.1 
Netherlands I 2.6 2.9 2.5 
Other LE .C. I 3.0 6.6 4.9 
Total LE .e. I 25.9 30.3 32.9 
U.S.A. I 16.2 18.7 16.3 
Libya : 5.0 4.9 
Japan J 1.9 2.4 1.7 
Other I 7.8 6.2 5.8 
Total Share Capital I £15,970 £14,585 £19,549 
(M£'OOO) 
Sources: Moe (1978, 1979, and 1980). 
Because of difficulty in obtaining back issues of the MOe annual reports, 
it has proved to be impossible to produce a long time series from 1964-80. 
, 
The data for 1978-80 are, nevertheless interesting, and deserve some 
attention. Of great significance are the Maltese ownership levels ~hich, 
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by 1978, had been strongly reinforced by the growth of parastatal 
industries from a very low base in the early 1970s. However, in 1979, 
there occurred a sharp decline in Maltese total, and Maltese state 
shareholdings (the latter being represented by the MOC), induced by 
the failure and closure of several of the new parastatal enterprises. 
The gravity of the failure of these state ventures is reflected in the 
value of total shareholding in the aided sector, which fell in 1979. 
By 1980, the downward trend had been emphatic~lly reversed, and both 
total Maltese and Maltese State interests had regained some of their 
relative importance. 
Meanwhile, the relative importance of E.E.C. interests had continued to 
grow, with a noticeable recovery in British interests between 1978 and 
1980. Also of importance was the growth of West German investment, 
which had advanced f~om negligible levels in the early 1970s. As will 
be shown in Chapter Twelve, much of the new German investment has been 
associated with the clothing industries. However, perhaps the single 
most important segment of manufacturing investment originated in the 
U.S.A. (16.3% in 1980), and this was mostly accounted for by Malta's 
largest private sector manufacturer, the Bluebell Corporation. Their 
main product, Wrangler's Jeans, remain the largest single source of 
exports and employment in the Maltese Islands, a fact which ensures that 
the Maltese Government attempts to retain good relations with the 
Corporation's management. Of the other multinational interests, Libyan 
investment is possibly most important, representing the increased 
economic and political links that have been forged between Malta and 
Libya during the 1970s. 
, 
Although such aggregate proportional shareholding figures provide an 
indication of the degree of overseas capital involvement in Maltese 
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manufacturing industry, it is important to recognise that in the 
Maltese case, the total value of individual companies' shareholdings 
is rarely proportional to the size of the companies' operations, as 
measured by indicators such as the value of annual output, and employ-
ment levels. Thus, comparatively large ventures may have as little as 
M£\OOO or even M£100 share capital. consequently, the aggregate 
ownership figures provided by the MOC reports do not accurately 
represent the extent to which overseas interests control Maltese 
industrial capacity and employment levels. This situation is similar 
to that persisting in the hotels sector (Spiteri, A. 1977), where 
many companies have in the past chosen to raise their capital through 
means other than equity issue, such as loans from parent companies. 
This has often allowed for more efficient repatriation of profits through 
loan repayments, and interest charges on such loans. 
In the case of the hotels sector, it has already been possible to 
convert ownership figures into data representing the various proportions 
of hotel accommodation capacity controlled by overseas interests. 
Similar calculations are also possible for companies operating in the 
manufacturing secto~ based on the value of their annual output for 1979, 
and their employment in 1980, as provided in the questionnaire survey. 
Thus, at this stage, all that can be said is that, since independence in 
1964, over 50% of the Maltese manufacturing sector has been controlled 
by foreign interests, and that the involvement of E.E.C. capital in 
particular is still on the increase. 
9.6 The Direction and Content of Trade 
Of the many other features of Malta's manuf~cturing sector, the pattern 
of export trade is one of the most important. Predictably, trade is 
partly governed by the nationality of the many parent 
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companies with 
manufacturing capacity in the Islands. As expected, Table 9.6 reveals 
that a large proportion of Maltese exports go to the E.E.C., particul-
arly as a result of Great Britain's successful attainment of full E.E.C. 
membership in 1972. The importance of the growth of the E.E.C. as a 
recipient of Maltese exports cannot be overestimated in view of the 
tariff and quota measures being exerted by the European Community upon 
non-member states. Malta has been fortunate in this respect because 
she has so far been able to negotiate and renegotiate preferential 
treatment for her exports,since gaining associate membership of the 
E.E.C. in 1970. However, the likely E.E.C. enlargement (to include 
Spain and Portugal), in conjuction with worsening recessionary press-
ures within the E.E.C. itself, are likely to render such heavy 
dependence upon the one market as a precarious condition. 
Within the E.E.C. group of countries, it is interesting to note that 
the relative importance of Great Britain has declined from over 40% in 
Table 9.6 Percenta~e Exeorts to Various Destinations ~b~ valuel 
Selected Years 
% % % % 
Countries 1961 1969 1971 1979 
- - -
Great Britain 27.6 34.4 40.4 21.2 
Italy 26.3 10.8 8.4 4.1 
West Germany 0.8 4.9 8.4 37.2 
E.E.C. Total 34.6 25.6 26.1 77.9 
U.S.A. n.d. n.d. n.d. 2.1 
Source: Central Office of Statistics (1967, 1969, 1972 and 1980) 
1971 to under 25% of exports by 1979. This decline, whilst being 
, 
in 
emulated by Italy, has been more than countered by West Germany, whose 
share of Maltese exports has risen from a tiny 0.8% in 1961 to 37.2% 
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in 1979. This immense increase in importance is a measure of the 
enhanced importance of West German manufacturing companies operating in 
Malta, the presence of which was under-represented by the aggregate 
shareholding figures of Table 9.5. Partly as a consequence of overtures 
made by Maltese delegations in West Germany in the 1970s, a large 
number of West German industrialists chose to establish subsidiary 
plants in Malta, thereby taking advantage of Malta's comparatively cheap 
labour. As a result, West Germany is the only OECO country with which 
Malta regularly experiences a trading surplus. The increase of the 
E.E.C.'s share of Malta's exports from 26.1% in 1971 to 77.9% in 1979 
is therefore partly a consequence of the growth of West German interests 
in Malta, but is also a direct consequence of Britain's newly gained 
inclusion within the E.E.C. 
One of the major anomalies to emerge from the trading figures is the 
small volume of exports that are directed to the U.S.A. In 1979, the 
M.O.C. suggested that 18.7% of aided sector share capital in Malta was 
American owned. Simultaneously, only 2.1% of Maltese exports found 
their way to American markets. This discrepancy is easily explained by 
the fact that companies such as Bluebell have deliberately chosen to 
locate in Malta in order to use Malta's E.E.C. associate membership and 
trading concessions to penetrate the European markets. 
The content of Maltese exports is, however, a cause of major concern. 
As Table 9.7 illustrates, textiles sector products are inevitably the 
most important constituent of Maltese export trade. The increasing 
protectionism being shown by the E.E.C. and non-E.E.C. countries, on 
top of the recessionary pressures themselv~s, would seem to further 
emphasise that the Maltese manufacturing sector is in desperate need 
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Table 9.7 Percentage Annual Exports in Metals and Textiles Sectors 
of Maltese Manufacturing Industry, in Selected Years. 
% % % 
Years Textiles Sector Clothing sub-Sector* Metals Sector** 
1961 9.8 8.7 4.1 
1969 34.2 19.8 4.4 
1971 43.5 28.9 2.8 
1979 47.4 41.7 2.3 
Sources: Central Office of Statistics (1967, 1969, 1972 and 1980) 
(N.B. * The Clothing Sector is included within the Textiles Sector. 
** The Metals sector excludes figures from the dockyards in 
this case.) 
of further diversification. It is therefore essential that, in the 
interests of stability, the continued advances of the textiles and 
clothing industries be discouraged. The Maltese economy would undoubt-~ 
edly benefit from growth in the importance of alternative activities in 
the manufacturing sector. 
9.7 Internal Issues Within the Manufacturing Sector 
One of the most frequently stated problems of the Maltese manufacturing 
sector is its obvious lack of industrial linkages. It has become 
increasingly apparent that the overseas corporations which choose to 
locate their subsidiary plants in Malta do so precisely because there is 
no need to forge any major links with the domestic economy. This type 
of simple situation is seen as desirable because it allows the MNCs to 
directly control most aspects of production. The only major factor of 
production not directly within their control is the labour force, and it 
is usually for precisely this reason that such companies choose to locate , 
in Malta. According to the MOC (1979b),Malta has one of the best 
industrial relations records in the world, and the fact that Maltese 
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labour is also inexpensive, relatively skilful, and flexible has been 
seen as a major reason for Malta's past successes in attracting overseas 
enterprise. 
Generally, therefore, the only major linkage between most of the aided 
industries and Malta's domestic economy is the labour force. The 
subsidiary plants are consequently able to act as isolated productive 
enclaves. Even some of the state and privately owned Maltese ventures 
interact only very occasionally with other Malta based manufacturers. 
The Government aided manufacturing sector is also spatially segregated 
from the Maltese domestic economy. Whilst traditional, often informal 
unaided activity is usually confined to workshops within the residential 
areas, the aided sector enterprises are positioned in specially 
constructed Government industrial estates that have usually been care-
fully located on the periphery of the harbour based metropolis in the 
East of Malta (see figure 9.1). fortunately, the small size of the 
Maltese Islands dictates that a person may commute from any part of 
the main island of Malta to any of the major industrial estates with 
few problems. The spatial dominance of the Valletta conurbation, and 
the added magnetism produced by the new industrial estates is therefore 
not such a problem in Malta itself. It is, however, a problem for 
Gozo, which acts as Malta's economic periphery. It has, to date, 
been possible to establish only a small number of new industries in 
Gozo's XewkiJa industrial estate, which accommodated only ten factories 
in 1980 (MOC 1980). 
The spatial imbalance of Malta's manufacturing growth has therefore 
not been a major problem. other sources oJ imbalance have, however, 
proved to be more important. As has already been mentioned, the domin-
ance of female labour in the new industries has not been universally 
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appreciated. Similarly, the increases in state entrepreneurship and 
powers of intervention have been poorly received in some circles. There 
is, for example, evidence to suggest that protective measures introduced 
by the Governments of recent years to protect new State ventures have 
seriously damaged 'competing' private sector activity. 
9.8 Conclusions 
A number of crucial dependency themes emerge from the material in this 
chapter, and are directly linked to the themes developed in Section One 
of this study. Employment statistics for the Maltese economy as a whole 
are especially interesting. They show, for example, that whilst 
employment in the fortress sector had been reduced to nothing in 1979, 
a much desired increase in employment in manufacturing industry had been 
achieved. However, by 1979, over 40% of the new employment in manufact-
uring was concentrated not only in the textiles sector, but also within 
a major stage of production in the textiles sector - clothing industries. 
This situation was recognised by the Maltese authorities as being highly 
undesirable. furthermore, it was clear that, far from providing 
employment for male workers released as a consequence of the closure of 
the fortress, the new distorted manufacturing sector employed mostly 
young women. 
Industrial output figures reveal a similar pattern to that produced by 
the employment statistics. Thus, by 1977, manufacturing industry's 
share of annual GDP had advanced to almost 70%. The dominance of the 
textiles sector was, however, again very clear, and attributable to the 
growth of clothing industries during the 1970s. The demise of the 
, 
chemicals industries during this period illustrates the fact that 
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external influences can quite easily debilitate an entire manufact-
uring industry. If such circumstances were to afflict the textiles 
sector, the consequences would be disastrous. This point is further 
emphasised by the fact that the textiles sector includes the largest 
manufacturing units (excluding the dockyards) within the Maltese 
Islands. 
Trade statistics also provide alarming information. Predictably, the 
most obvious concentration is in textiles sector goods. Also important 
are the market concentrations, especially in the E.E.C. The dominance 
of the E.E.C as a recipient of Malta's exports is undesirable because 
of the Community's ability to restrict trade in its own interests. 
Within the E.E.C. bloc, strong dependence upon West Germany and Great 
Britain's markets also gives cause for concern. Aggregate trade 
statistics are, however, not especially revealing, and the questionnaire 
data outlined in Chapter Twelve helps to reveal the intricate nature of 
Malta's export trade. 
The lack of internal linkages within the manufacturing sector continues 
to arouse great concern. This is compounded by the fact that it is not 
only overseas companies that choose not to interact with the local 
economy. Many of the more advanced Maltese firms adopt a similar 
attitude, and are tied in a similar fashion by contracts to large over-
seas firms. Once again, this type of situation will be examined in 
greater detail in Chapter Twelve. 
Perhaps the most important information to emerge from this material is 
the great extent of foreign ownership within the Maltese manufacturing , 
sector. The preponderance of MNC subsidiary plants is a direct 
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consequence of the industrial attraction policies of Governments of both 
Parties, and illustrates the extent to which Malta's productive capacity 
is beyond the control of Maltese private and public institutions. 
Moreover, the strong concentrations of British, West German and American 
capital detected probably underestimate the extent of overseas control 
over manufacturing activity in Malta. It is also important to observe 
that it is precisely such a loss of control over the manufacturing 
sector which encouraged the distortion of the sector in favour of 
the textiles industries, the concentration of trade, and the extreme 
lack of internal linkages with the local economy. The same overseas 
investment has, nevertheless, permitted a large amount of industrial 
development and social reform that could not otherwise have occurred. 
The next chapters in this section deal with the manufacturing sector 
in greater detail, and Chapter Twelve examines the data yielded by 
the industrial questionnaire survey carried out in Autumn 1980. 
, 
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CHAPTER TEN: THE TEXTILES SECTOR 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the textiles sector in greater detail using 
aggregate statistics provided by Grech (1978), the Central Bank of 
Malta, the Malta Development Corporation, and the Central Office of 
Statistics in Malta. It was felt that the Textiles sector deserves 
this special attention because of its dominant position within the 
structure of Maltese manufacturing industry. This chapter also ties 
in with a section on textiles manufacture in Chapter Twelve, which 
deals with the micro-scale data collected in the field in 1980. 
Malta's successful attraction of textile industries since 1964 has 
occurred as a result of the internationalisation of this sector, which 
has in the last two decades led to the growth of new centres of 
production throughout the world, the best examples of which include 
Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea. One of the major 
factors behind the redistribution of production has been the cost of 
labour, which has often become prohibitive in the traditional producer 
countries. Thus, for the labour-intensive industries such as textiles, 
the new international division of labour has been governed to a 
considerable degree by labour costs. 
Grech (1978) has observed that there were a number of associated factors 
which encouraged the movement of production to cheap labour locations 
such as Malta. rirst. , it was easy to obtain the machinery necessary 
for production anywhere in the world. Second, the raw materials 
necessary were also widely available throug~out the world, in some cases 
being in surplus supply. However, most important was the highly imper-
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feet nature of the international labour market. Hence, the cost 
of labour to the manufacturer was not governed by market forces, but 
more by the varied historical, social, political and economic forces 
prevalent in the different countries of the world. 
The direct cost of labour was therefore not the only important factor 
to be considered when attracting MNC subsidiary plants away from the 
traditional producer countries. Other vital factors include the quality 
of the labour. The important qualities in question have involved the 
levels of education, adaptability, industrial relations, and~e plenti-
ful supply of labour. In addition, many MNCs could be wooed by pack-
ages of incentives offered by countries anxious to attract their branch 
plants. Offers of tax concessions, grants, free premises and other 
attractions were made by many countries as well as Malta. Also of vital 
importance to the MNCs was political compatibility and stability. The 
threat of nationalisation or revolution presented too great a risk for 
most MNCs. 
In the case of Malta, MNCs were offered stable and friendly domestic 
politics, and a high quality labour force that was well behaved, 
relatively well educated, reasonably productive, and poorly paid. In 
addition, the supply of labour was plentiful, and enhanced by large and 
increasing numbers of females seeking jobs. In many cases, the avail-
ability of females had a double advantage. They were often far better 
at the required jobs than males, and simultaneously, it was possible to 
pay them less. In 1975, the average female wage in the Maltese clothing 
industry was only 68.4% of the average male wage. further inducements 
provided by the various Maltese Government~included packages of tax and 
tariff concessions, factory provision, loans and grants. 
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Despite the importance of government incentives, labour costs were 
perhaps the single most important location factor in the Maltese case, 
as is suggested by the questionnaire results of Chapter Twelve. Table 
10.1 shows the extent to which high unit labour costs (wages per hour) 
forced clothing manufacturer~ to search for new production locations 
outside the countries of tne industrialised centre. 
Table 10.1 provides an idea of the enormous difference between the 
labour costs in the traditional producer countries and those in the 
new producer countries. Also of relevance is the fact that the hours 
worked per week tended to be far less in the traditional production 
centres. Thus, using ILO statistics, it seems that a male Swedish 
clothing worker earned 11 times his South Korean counterpart per week 
in 1980. Obviously, Maltese labour costs do not compare with those 
of South Korea, but according to the calculations summarised in Table 
10.1, in the 1970s2 , both Maltese temale and male labour in the clothing 
industry was paid well under half the wages being paid to equivalent 
British and West German workers. 
Thus, Malta's low labour costs have been a major factor behind the 
successful attraction of MNC subsidiary companies. Grech (1978, p.28) 
summarises by observing that Malta has ••• 
' ••• a very specific role in the international division of labour, 
a role that it tied in the main to unskilled labour intensive 
operations applied at the production level with no role in 
purchasin9, marketin9 or research. This may be the lot of the 
developing countries and especially the smaller ones - a role 
that reserves the main controlling factors and creative elements 
1. Clothing companies form a major component of textile sector activity, 
and in the case of Malta, constitute the largest part of the sector. 
2. It was in the mid-1970s that Malta wa~most successful at attracting 
MNC clothing firms. 
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Table 10.1 Aeeroximate Average Earnings eer Hour of Clothing 
Workers in Selected Countries z 1966 - 1980. 9 centsLHour 
Great 
.!!!2l Sweden Plalta South* Britain Germanx; Japan Korea 
PI F 1'1 !. 1'1 F 
- - - 41 26 1966 35 
1967 88 
-
39 43 27 
1968 
-
92 45 39 24 
1969 116 72 105 54 40 26 
1970 133 82 124 61 45 28 14 
1971 148 95 153 264 230 76 53 34 16 
1972 164 106 173 316 277 98 57 39 17 
1973 184 122 257 391 345 147 69 47 16 
1974 215 151 256 404 359 167 80 56 21 
1975 223 159 279 491 422 183 101 69 20 
1976 203 152 322 556 518 214 97 77 29 
1977 234 176 356 599 562 231 119 82 39 
1978 278 208 423 598 577 305 136 97 53 
1979 395 296 512 740 708 326 171 127 64 
1980 441 341 508 790 748 310 170 127 70 
* 
South Korea's statistics are very approximate because of her floating 
currency. Korea. and most of the sample countries have implemented 
sudden devaluation policies at some time. These lead to occasional 
surprisng trends in these statistics. 
Sources: IlO Yearbooks of labour Statistics, 1967 - 1981 
Note: The international comparison of wage levels using this type of 
data is highly unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Plost 
important is the fact that ILO statistics rafer to average wage 
levels for a 12 month period, whilst exchange rates are likely 
to vary substantidly during the course of a year. In the case 
of the 1975-80 period, violent fluctuations in exchange rates 
were far more common than had previously been the case. The 
choice of representative exchange rates for each year was 
therefore difficult and approximate. 
In addition to the exchange rate problems, there are many 
other sources of innacuracy. The IlO. for example, point out' 
that comparisons are risky because of international variations 
in employers social security expenditure, costs of training, 
costs of welfare services, costs of transport for workers, 
tax rates, workers' clothing etc. etc. The above statistics 
must therefore be treated as only a rough indication of 
varying international wage levels in the clothing industry. 
, 
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of the system in locations elsewhere - on the other side of the 
globe!' 
As a consequence, therefore, of multinational investment and inter-
national subcontracting, Malta has, like many NICs, been able to 
industria lise to a great extent through the growth of a textiles sector. 
10.2 A History of the Maltese Textiles Sector 
According to the Central Bank of Malta (1977a), the textiles sector 
may historically be divided into four different sub-sectors (see Table 
10.2). The Bank proceeds to group the sub-sectors into two major 
Table 10.2 The Constituent Sub-Sectors of the Textiles Sector 
1. Yarn and fibre Processing and Productions 
2. Manufacture of Knitted Garments Textiles 
3. Cottage Crafts 
4. Manufacture of finished Textile Goods Clothing 
sections, the first of which includes the first three categories under 
the general heading of 'Textiles Industries'. The second section is 
concerned exclusively with clothing, which includes footwear. In the 
context of Maltese industrial development, it was textile industries 
that were the first to develop within the aided industries sector. The 
enormous growth of clothing establishments occurred much later, 
especially during the 1970s. for this reason, it is necessary to deal 
first with the textiles industries. 
10.2.1. Textiles Industries 
, 
Of the three components of the textiles industries, the manufacture of yarns 
and fibres proved to be the most important in the early years of Malta's 
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industrialisation programme, and soon surpassed the cottage industry 
in terms of output and importance. However, in more recent years, 
production in this sector slowed considerably.- The more recent poor 
performances have been blamed on the fact that most of the firms 
produce only one product, using a single process. Such inflexibility, 
particularly within such an unstable industry, has been a hindrance. 
The high import content of the industries, and their complete depend-
ence upon export markets has further exacerbated the damaging effects 
of fluctuating external influences upon comparatively inflexible prod-
uction schedules. The Central Bank of Malta (1977a) complains in part-
icular of the low linkage effects of this type of activity. 
Knitting processes were introduced into Malta much more slowly than 
yarn and fibre production. Major advances in knitting manufacture in 
the Islands occurred in the late 1960s, this sector becoming the most 
dynamic element of the textiles industries by the mid-1970s. Much 
of this growth was associated with the increasing use of man-made 
fibres. One of the important advantages to emerge from the use of 
the synthetiC yarns was that they are generally stronger than natural 
fibres, a proper~y which permits the more efficient use of fast-
running machines. 
The cottage industry, which constitutes the earliest of the three 
textile industry components, has also increased in importance during 
the last 10 years. Many small firms specialising in the production 
of 'Malta weave' fabrics on hand operated looms, manufacturers of lace, 
and producers of hand-knitted and crocheted goods, existed in.some form 
before the first development plan of 1959.1 However, such enterprises 
have grown both in number and size since the growth of Maltese tourism, 
and the subsequent expansion of demand for souvenir goods. The 
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advantages of this type of activity stem from the greater linkages 
with the domestic economy, the labour intensive nature of the processes 
involved, the easy access to the tourist markets, the absence of over-
seas capital investment and control, and the provision of work and 
income to many of the more peripheral and marginal Maltese communities. 
Before the first development plan of 1959-64 (Office of the Prime 
Minister 1959), the textiles industries consisted entirely of small 
scale cottage based activity. During the 19605 there occurred a period 
of unrestrained growth in which fibres and yarns grew to dominate the 
sub-sector. Thus, between 1961 and 1966, the textile industry boosted 
its share of manufacturing output by 22 times (Central Bank of Malta 
1977a). The enormous increase in textiles production occurred as a 
consequence of the opening of five spinning firms and three knitting 
firms, all of which were mostly or entirely foreign owned. As is 
apparent from Table 10.3, between 1966 and 1972, the textiles sector 
stagnated as a result of competition from low cost far East producers, 
and trade protection following a textiles recession in the U.S.A. and 
Western Europe. Although production recovered once again after 1972, 
it was mainly assisted by increases in the production of knitted cloth. 
furthermore, the period of stagnation demonstrated the volatile nature 
of the textile industries, and the potential dangers of excessive 
dependence upon them. 
It was hoped that, in particular, the growth of textiles sector ~ 
activity would create new sources of employment in Malta. In 1959, 
the textile industry sub-sector apparently employed only 280 persons, 
a figure which constituted only 4% of total manufacturing employment. 
, 
This figure probably underestimates the workforce, particularly in the 
cottage industries, as there is evidence to suggest that prior to 1964, 
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Table 10.3 Gross Output, Employment and Export Time Series Data for the Textiles 
Sub-Sector, 1964 - 1979. 
Gross Output Employment Domestic Exports 
Amount in As a ~ of Number As 'a ~ of Amount in As a ~ of ~ Gross 
Mi'OOQ Manuf.Output Employed Manuf. Emp. Mi'OOO Tot.Exports Output Exp'd 
1964 1913 12 1240 10 1166 28 61 
1965 3171 16 1660 12 2577 42 81 
1966 4160 19 1950 14 3510 46 84 
1967 3669 15 2050 13 2842 40 76 
1968 4101 14 2360 13 3381 33 82 
1969 4792 14 2820 14 4003 32 84 
1970 4130 11 2570 13 3446 28 ' 83 
1971 4520 11 2300 11 2418 23 54 
1972 4690 10 2230 10 3968 18 - 85 
1973 7141 11 2280 9 5499 17 77 
1974 7874 10 2432 10 6554 15 83 
1975 7507 8 2527 10 6032 12 80 
1976 9774 7 2595 10 8493 11 87 
1977 9909 6 2749 10 7404 7 75 
1978 9878** 5** 2660** 8** 839~ 7** 8~ 
1979 9939** 5** 2286** 7** 10785** 8** **109* 
Sources: Central Bank of Malta (1977a, and unpublished statistics compiled in 1982) 
NO * figures of over 100% are explicable in terms of stockholding and bottlenecks in 
marketing. 
** Provisional 
the smaller producers failed to complete the industrial census 
questionnaires. In 1964, the 1,240 employees in the textiles sub-
sector amounted to 10% of the manufacturing workforce. A peak of 14% 
of the total workforce in manufacturing occupations was attained in 
1966, after which a steady decline in relative importance has occurred. 
By 1980, textile industries accounted for only 8% of manufacturing 
employment. It is estimated that currently, over 90% of this employ-
ment is made up of unskilled operatives, Whilst only 3% of the work-
force is represented by qualified technicians (Central Bank of Malta 
1977a). 
One of the most significant features of the employment in textiles 
has been that it is highly female intensive, although it is less so 
than in the clothing industries. In 1958, when cottage industries 
dominated, B7% of the workforce was female, as compared with 25% for 
manufacturing industry as a whole. The expansion of fibre and yarn 
manufacture encouraged a decline to a low female ratio of 56% in 1963. 
Reductions in the importance of females in this sector occurred because 
of the increasing use of heavy machinery, and most important, the 
adoption of shift work routines which conflicted with traditional views 
concerning the role of women in Maltese society. However, the growth 
of knitting industries caused female participation to advance to 
approximately 60%, as opposed to 40% for manufacturing industry as a 
whole (Central Office of Statistics 195B, 1961 and 1977). 
Because of the use of complex and expensive machinery, textiles 
industries are amongst the most prominent sectors in the utilisation of 
capital. This is a consequence of the hig~ installation costs when a 
textiles firm is established. For this reason, the growth of textiles 
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industries in Malta has been confined mostly to the aided sector, 
whose share of the sector's employment reached over 90% in 1974. The 
high initial outlays on plant and equipment have also given rise to 
relatively large issues of share capital (for Malta), much of which 
is foreign owned (see Table 10.4). However, it is significant that, 
Table 10.4 Percentage Sources of Paid-Up Share Capital in Aided 
Textile Industry,1970 and 1975. 
lliQ. 1975 
-Malta (state) 2 18 
Malta_ (Private) 23 35 
Total Maltese 25 53 
Italy 44 38 
British 25 5 
Other roreign 6 4 
100% 100% 
Source: Central Bank of Malta (1977a) 
since the MLP came to power in 1971, Maltese interests in the textiles 
industries have advanced considerably. Table 10.4 shows that in 1970, 
only 25% of share capital was in Maltese hands, Whilst in 1975, 53% of 
the paid up share capital was subscribed by Maltese investors. A large 
proportion of this growth was accounted for by the MOC, which had taken 
on a more entrepreneurial role in the development process. Nevertheless, 
the Questionnaire material contained in Chapter Twelve will reveal that 
Maltese interests are probably overstated by the official statistics. 
Between 1970 and 1975, there was a substantial fall in the relativa 
importance of British share capital in the textiles sub-sector. During , 
this period, some British investment in most sectors of the Maltese 
265 
economy ~as scared away by the aggressive politics of the new MlP 
administration, ~hich may be seen to some extent as having indulged in 
a mild de-linking strategy during this period. Meanwhile, the fall in 
the Italian proportion of textiles share capital ~as only small by 
comparison, and occurred primarily because of the growth in Maltese 
interests. There seems, nevertheless, to be a strong pattern to the 
investment. Overseas investment is most prevalent in the spinning and 
weaving activities, which in 1970 accounted for 83% of textiles over-
seas share capital. Much of the new private and public sector Maltese 
investment has occurred in the new knitting ventures in which only 42% 
of the share capital originates abroad. This increase in Maltese 
ownership and control has to be welcomed, particularly in view of the 
naturally volatile tendencies of the industries. The Central Bank of 
Malta (1977a, p.24) explained that, 
'The high level of foreign control of the textile industry often 
led to sharp fluctuations in sales and employment, against which 
the local authorities could take no short term remedial action. 
Thus, in spite of the benefits accruing from the presence of 
satellites of large foreign firms in terms of the availability of 
markets, the inflow of technology and other externalities, a sound 
industrialisation policy necessitates the enhancement of local 
participation in industry.' 
Unfortunately, the nature of the Maltese public sector participation 
that has resulted in the textiles sub-sector has not been as satis-
factory as might have been expected, and between 1975 and 1980, a 
number of reversals were experienced by Maltese parastatal textile 
ventures. A specific example of this will be examined in Chapter Twelve. 
The nature of Maltese textile exports has changed substantially since 
1959. Originally, textiles exports ~ere confined to the hand woven 
fabrics of the cottage industries, which managed to contribute only 
1 - 4% of the total value of exports. 
, 
Following the arrival of the 
multinational yarn producers, and then the locally based knitting 
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enterprises, textile exports expanded rapidly. Textiles sub-sector 
exports contributed most in relative terms to Maltese total exports 
during the late 1960s, their relative importance declining in the 19705 
as a result of the advances in other types of exports, especially 
clothing (see Table 10.3). The reason for the comparative stagnation 
of the exports of textile goods stems from the poor performance of 
yarns. fortunately, the losses in sales of yarn were compensated for 
by advances in knitted fabrics, which by 1975 accounted for at least 
half the exports of the textile industries (Central Bank of Malta 1977a). 
Italy and Great Britain have traditionally been the recipients of the 
largest shares of Maltese textiles exports, reflecting to some extent 
the distribution of foreign owned paid up share capital. However, in 
the mid-1960s, the U.S.A. and Canada established themselves as major 
markets, only to be overshadowed by the E.E.C. countries. By 1975, the 
9 E.E.C. states absorbed no less than 85% of the total textiles exports, 
roughly equally divided between yarns and knitted goods. Most of the 
more recent developments in the Maltese textiles trade have, meanwhile, 
been determined not so much by free market forces as trade agreements 
designed to protect many traditional centres of textile producti6n. 
for example, the British market would have been of far greater importance 
had recessionary conditions in their domestic textile industries not 
prompted the British in 1966 to impose trade quota agreements on 
trading partners such as Malta. Britain's example has since been 
followed by other countries that have also traditionally been 'committed 
to free trade', such as the U.S.A. (1967), and most recently, the E.E.C. 
as a whole (1970/71 and 197B). The quotas have been most severe on 
yarn producers, which explains w~y knitted goods have been 
able to strengthen their position within the SUb-sector. 
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By far the most important trade agreement has been that stemming from 
the association agreement with the E.E.C. in 1971. The concessionary 
quotas imposed upon Maltese manufacturers - 750 tons of cotton yarn 
and 600 tons of man-made fibre yarn - have undoubtedly restricted yarn 
manufacturers in Malta. In response to Malta Government requests, 
these quotas were raised in March 1976 to 910 tonnes and 800 tonnes 
respectively. However, the sector was badly affected by the new quota 
restrictions unilaterally imposed by the E.E.C. on Malta in late 1978 
when both sides failed to come to a new agreement. fortunately, since 
then, further relaxation of the restrictions has been achieved (see 
Table 10.5 below). 
Table 10.5 Malta E.E.C. Quota Agreements 1979-81 
1979 1980 1981 
Category (~) (~) (~) 
Cotton Yarn 1,700 2,000 2,100 
Cotton fabrics 1,600 1,700 1,800 
synthetic fabrics 130 200 210 
Source: Mid Med Bank (Winter 1979) 
Clearly, the prosperity of the textiles sub-sector depends very much 
upon the generosity of the E.E.C. quotas, which may be reduced at any 
time. The inclusion of Spain and Portugal's textiles industries within 
the E.E.C. tariff system is very likely to induce such a reduction in 
Malta's current quotas. 
10.2.2 Clothing Industries 
The other half of the textiles sector is concerned with the manufacture 
, 
of finished textile goods, which is often referred to as the 'making-up' 
sector. In Malta, this group of activities is dominated by clothing 
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industries, although there is some activity associated with the 
production of footwear, and textiles for house furnishing, canvas 
and embroidery products. Because of the strong emphasis on clothing 
manufacture within the sector, and the format of the various sources 
of aggregate statistics, this sub-sector will be referred to in this 
text as the clothing industries. 
Clothing industries have since the mid-1960s not only grown to dominate 
the textiles sector (see figure 10.1 and Plate 10.1), but have also 
attained a position in which they dominate Maltese manufacturing as 
a whole. This contrasts sharply with the situation in 1958 before the 
first development plan when clothing manufacture consisted mainly of 
small establishments producing principally for the home market, less 
than one third of sales going abroad (Central Bank of Malta 1977b). 
The immense growth in clothing manufacture that occurred in the late 
1960s and the 1970s may be attributed entirely to direct foreign 
investment by MNCs, which transformed the sector by establishing large 
scale production techniques. The impact of the new overseas invest-
ment is best illustrated by figure 9.12 (in Chapter Nine) which shows 
that between 1964 and 1980, the average numbers of employees per clothing 
establishment rose from 5 to 51, the latter figure being one of the 
highest for manufacturing activity in Malta. Thus, whereas in the late 
1950s there was only one clothing firm employing over 100 persons, in 
1976, there were 24, accounting for well over 90% of the sub-sector's 
gross output. Simultaneously, 95% of gross clothing output was exported, 
most of which found its way to E.E.C. countries •. 
One of the features of the Maltese clothin~ industry which causes most 
concern is its high demand for imported fabrics, which gives the industry 
the highest import content after food basad industries. Thus,for 1974, 
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PLATE 10.1 A Clothing Factory Located on the Bulebel Industrial Es t ate . 
This particular f actory is one of many tha t arri ved in Malta 
during the 1970s , helping to render Ma lta's manuf acturing 
sector even more dep endent upon clothing industries, and the 
textiles sector in general . 
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the Central Bank of Malta (1977b) estimated that 59% of the goods and 
services used by clothing firms were imported. Furthermore, the 
clothing industry provides no intermediary output to be used by other 
local firms. Consequently, the much desired linkage effects on the 
rest of the industrial base are even more restricted than those of the 
textiles industries examined earlier. Much the same pattern is 
beginning to emerge in the footwear industries, which until the 1970s 
were similarly dominated by small scale, locally oriented producers. 
Since 1975, the impact of both overseas, and privately owned and State 
owned Maltese ventures has reoriented the industry towards a familiar 
pattern of isolated export based activity. 
The only element of the clothing sub-sector to display significant 
linkages with the Maltese domestic economy is the smallest element of 
the sub-sector, which is dedicated to the manufacture of 'finished 
textile articles'. Ironically, the firms in this grouping produce 
items such as bed linen, blankets, towels, tents, badges and other 
embroidery work, and do not produce clothing. Production is generally 
small scale, and according to the MOe (1979), there is little scope 
for expansion. The stated reason for this is a heavy dependence upon 
the home markets, which consumed over 80% of the output in 1975 (Central 
Bank of Malta 1977b). However, such industry clearly acts as useful 
import SUbstitution activity, and there is even evidence to suggest 
that important linkages may be developing with other firms in Malta. 
For example, a new embroidery firm is now able to sell a large proportion 
of its output - clothing labels - to a number of clothing manufacturers. 
Nevertheless, perhaps the greatest contribution of these small producers 
seems to have been to supply the growing t~rist sector with essential 
items such as bed linen and towels, which would otherwise have been 
imported in far greater quantities. 
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It is significant that the clothing sub-sector was slow to react to 
the aids to industry scheme, which in its early years, was dominated 
by the textile industries. The shift away from textiles in favour of 
clothing industries dating from the late 1960s may be seen as a 
consequence of the labour intensive nature of clothing naufacture, 
and the relatively low labour costs prevalent in Malta (see Table 10.1). 
Whilst the clothing industries have expanded through the further 
recruitment of labour, textiles industries have tended to expand 
through increased capital investment in machinery, a fact which has 
permitted the comparatively capital rich countries to retain a larger 
proportion of their textiles production capacity than has been the 
case for clothing industries. 
other reasons for the sudden growth of the clothing sub-sector have 
included a worldwide boom in clothing demand based in particular on 
blue cotton denim. In the case of Malta, many of the newer clothing 
firms produce denim clothing. By 1975, 58% of clothing sales were of 
trousers, most of which were denim jeans (Central Bank of Malta 1977b). 
Thus, with the assistance of booming jeans sales, the clothing sub-
sector managed to advance its share of manufacturing gross output from 
7% in 1964 to 31% in 1976, after which provisional statistics indicate 
that the sub-sector's proportional contribution remained stable (see 
Table 10.6). This situation raises further doubts as to the viability 
of the Maltese industrial structure, for in Malta, not only is manuf-
acturing industry dominated by a textiles sector heavily oriented towards 
clothing manufacture, but the production of clothing is itself also 
heavily dominated by denim clothing. The need for diversification 
of production therefore seems to be more de,perate than may have origin-
ally seemed to be the case. 
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Table 10.6 Gross Output. Employment and Export Time Series Data for the Clothing 
Sub-Sector, 1964 - 1979. 
Gross Out2.!:!!. Employment Domestic Exports 
Amount in As a ~ of Number As a ~ of Amount in As a t! of ~ Gross 
ML'DOO Manuf .0ut2!:!!, Employed Manur. Emp. Mt'OOO Tot.Exports Output Exp'd 
1964 1093 7 1524 12 318 8 29 
1965 1203 6 1531 11 452 7 38 
1966 1472 7 1636 11 822 11 56 
1967 1832 8 1675 11 1033 14 56 
1968 2627 9 2093 12 1816 18 69 
1969 3542 10 2258 11 2484 20 70 
1970 4560 12 2642 13 3197 26 70 
1971 4789 12 3229 15 4784 32 100* 
1972 8097 17 4119 18 6792 32 84 
1913 11392 18 4985 20 11724 37 103* 
1974 19122 23 6039 25 17267 41 90 
1975 26862 27 6223 26 25547 51 95 
1976 40709 31 7808 30 37519 47 92 
1977 50999 31 8747 31 49150 47 96 
1918 58722** 32** 9901** 30** 51745** 44** 88** 
1979 69761** 34** 11029** 32** 61441** 45** 8B** 
Sources I Central Bank of Malta (1977b, and unpublished statistics compiled in 19B2) 
NO * figures of over 100% are explicable in terms of stockholding and bottlenecks in 
marketing 
** Provisional 
" 
The expansion of employment in the clothing industries reflects the 
expansion of production (see Table 10.6). The proportion of manuf-
acturing employment provided by clothing establishments has increased 
from 12% in 1964 to 28% in 1976, and approximately 34% in 1980 (Central 
Office of Statistics 1980). The Maltese authorities view the contrib-
ution of the clothing sub-sector to employment in Malta as crucial, 
especially as sUbstantial proportions of the profits of the sector leak 
abroad to MNC parent organisations. However, the extremely heavy 
dependence upon female labour in the sector has disappointed the 
authorities, who were keen to resolve the comparatively high male 
unemployment in the Islands. Until the mid-1960s, the female orient-
ation was less pronounced and averaged only 43% of the total workforce. 
This was because the sector was then composed of many small male 
dominated tailoring and cobbling workshops (Central Bank of Malta 1977b). 
Subsequently, the growth of large scale clothing establishments has 
resulted in the recruitment of female labour, and a sUbstantial increase 
in the rate of female participation in the Maltese economy as a whole. 
The proportion of females employed in clothing establishments is now far 
larger than both in the textiles industries, and total Maltese manuf-
acturing industry, and in 1980 stood at 76%.(see figure 10.2). 
Another of the major features of the clothing sub-sector's workforce 
is its high turnover. This is to be expected in a country where the 
female population is obliged to conform to family-based tradional 
values. Thus, where a clash occurs between family and employment, it 
is usual for the female worker to abandon her employment in the interests 
of her household. As a result, very few of the female employees are 
married, and their average age is between ~ and 20 years. This is to 
the advantage of the employers as they are able, despite anti-sex 
discrimination laws, to pay their female employees less on the grounds 
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of their youth, inexperience and lack of service. In addition, over 
seven eighths of the workforce are usually classified as operatives, 
the lowest and least well paid grade of employee. It is, however, 
important to recognise that operatives in the clothing sub-sector are 
considerably more skilled than their counterparts in the textiles 
industries,since the efficiency of clothing manufacture depends heavily 
upon the operatives dexterity and speed (Central Bank of Malta 1977b). 
The heavy reliance of the clothing industries upon large labour 
inputs is symptomatic of an industry that has traditionally been one 
of the least capital intensive of the manufacturing sector. However, 
the vastly increased scale of operations in Malta has required sub-
stantial capital investment, the bulk of which has come from abroad. 
One of the advantages of the clothing sector has been the flexibility 
that has resulted from its low capital intensity. Expansion plans in 
a clothing factory require comparatively little capital outlay as the 
extra machines cost relatively little. On the other hand, the textiles 
industries use complex,expensive and large scale equipment. Consequently, 
the capital investment required to expand textiles enterprises is 
likely to be very much greater than for similar expansions within the 
clothing sub-sector. The considerable influxes of capital into the 
clothing sub-sector in recent years therefore demonstrates the enormity 
of the sector's growth. 
Unlike the textiles sub-sector in which Maltese interests have increased 
proportionally during the 1970s, the clothing sub-sector has been 
characterised by the increased dominance of foreign owned share capital. 
Although the aggregate figures for shareho~ings are not accurate, the 
available statistics up to 1976 (see Table 10.7) indicate that the role 
of Maltese interests within the clothing industries has declined, 
277 
falling from a comparatively healthy 43% in 1970 to a meagre 16% in 
1976. This contrasts very sharply with the increase in the share of 
the U.S.A.'s paid up share capital from 17% to 61% in the same period. 
The immense increase in American involvement was not only caused by new 
MNC subsidiaries, but was also a result of the expansion of the 
important Bluebell Corporation into additional factories in Malta and 
Gozo. Increases in this type of American involvement explain the 
preponderance of denim Jeans production within the clothing sub-sector. 
One of the most significant changes to occur in the structure of paid-
up share capital has been the sharp decline in British interests, a 
Table 10.7 Percentage Sources of Paid-Up Share Capital in the Aided 
Clothing Sub-Sector. 
1970 1976 
........... ........... 
Maltese State 0 11 
Maltese Private 43 5 
Total Maltese 43 16 
U.S.A. 17 61 
Great Britain 36 7 
'Other Sterling' 4 0 
West Germany 0 11 
Other foreign 0 6 
100% 100% 
Source: Central Bank of Malta (1977b, p.21) 
decline which was emulated in the textile industries. Ouring this 
period, it seems that Anglo-Maltese relations deteriorated, both dis-
couraging investment, and in some cases, encouraging the closure of 
, 
businesses. However, it is also likely that inflation helped contribute 
to the relative decline in importance of the British interests. Meanwhile, 
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one of the most significant positive developments has been the growth 
of West German interests from nothing in 1970 to 11% in 1976. The 
latter figure probably underestimates the role of West Cerman interests 
in the clothing sub-sector, which by 19BO had helped to ensure that 
West Germany had become Malta's most important trading partner. 
Despite the advantages associated with the arrival of MNC subsidiary 
plants in Malta, anxiety concerning their presence has increased in 
recent years. In 1977, the Central Bank of Malta estimated that no 
less than 57% of clothing establishments in the aided sector were 
controlled by non-residents. Over 75% of the foreign controlled 
ventures were identified as being wholly foreign owned. This indicated 
that the clothing sub-sector was heavily dependent upon strategies that 
were not only determined abroad, but that were conceived in the inter-
ests of multinational capital as opposed to the Maltese economy. Most 
of Malta's clothing production is therefore controlled by parent 
companies which administer marketing, and procure raw materials, patterns 
and work-study data. The subsidiary plants' main function is usually 
merely to carry out production instructions and to minimise production 
costs. Equally disturbing is the tendency for joint ventures. with 
(oreign majority shareholdings to operate on a 'cut, make and trim' 
(CMT) basis, in which the local partner is normally paid commission on 
the value added. Once again, the local firm had no direct ties to 
markets and sources of supply (Grech 197B). 
The arrival of the many MNC subsidiary clothing ventures has boosted 
the exports of clothing, which rose between 1965 and 1976 by an average 
46% per annum (Central Bank of Malta 1977b}, clothing eventually 
accounting for 85~ of the textiles sector's total exports in 1976. 
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Simultaneously, the proportion of clothing production that was exported 
had risen to 92% by 1976 (see Table 10.6). As is the case with textile 
exports, most clothing exports are directed towards the E.E.C. The 
traditionally most important British markets have now been surpassed by 
West Germany, which now imports over three times the quantity received 
annually by the U.K. The E.E.C. as a whole accounted for 84.4% of 
clothing exports by 1979, and West Germany an impressive 56.5% (Central 
Bank of Malta, unpublished statistics). Meanwhile, the U.S.A. in 1966 
accounted for almost one third of Maltese clothing exports. This market 
disappeared as clothing producers (especially American MNCs) concentr-
ated on exploiting the European markets provided by Malta's association 
agreement with the E.E.C. It is claimed that the clothing sub-sector 
has more diversified markets than the textiles sub-sector, but the fact 
that the major recipients of Maltese clothing exports are all in the 
E.(.C. means that both sub-sectors are completely dependent upon the 
(.E.C.'s common trade policies. fortunately, the E.E.C. has in recent 
years improved its quotas on clothing goods exported by Malta (see 
Table 10.S), but harsher restrictions may follow, as was explained 
previously. 
Table 10.S Malta (.E.C. Clothing Quota Agreements, 1979-81 
Cate90ries 1979 (Units) 1980 (Units) 1981 (Units) 
IT' Shirts 1,900,000 2,200,000 2,200,000 
Knitted Outerwear 1,500,000 1,600,000 1,700,000 
Trousers 11,000,000 12,000,000 12,400,000 
Blouses 1,500,000 1,700,000 1,700,000 
Shirts 500,000 550,000 600,000 
Source: Mid Med Bank (Winter 1979) , 
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10.3 Integration Issues in the Textiles Sector 
A major feature of the Maltese textile sector is that its components -
textiles and clothing - have developed independently of each other, a 
fact that emphasises the extreme lack of linkages within the sector. 
The 2 main factors inhibiting coordinated development in the textiles 
sector are the lack of fabric production, and of dyei~g and finishing 
facilities. In 1977, the Central Bank of Malta (1977b) therefore 
concluded that there was sUbstantial scope for vertical integration 
involving the introducUanda weaving sector,which would satisfy the 
needs of both spinners and clothing producers. Such a development 
would not only permit import substitution, but would also save on 
customs duty, freight and insurance costs, as well as avoiding some of 
the more awkward E.E.C. import regulations concerning the origin of the 
constituent materials of certain products. 
Clearly, diversification into weaving is only feasible if domestic 
industry could achieve internationally competitive levels as regards 
price, quality and service. A major problem of fabric production, 
dyeing and finishing capacity is the vast range of fabrics, yarns and 
dyes used, making it difficult to achieve sufficiently large weaving 
and dyeing runs in the Maltese case. However, there are situations 
where large quantities of narrow range cloth qualities are required, 
blue cotton denim being the classic case. Unfortunately, to date, the 
only major venture attempting to provide sUbstantial weaving capacity 
of this nature in Malta - the state owned 'Spinning and Weaving Limited'-
failed disastrously (see Chapter Twelve). In order to salvage some 
weaving capacity, the company was de-nationalised in 1979, a large 
portion of the stock being purchased by a U.S. MNC. The latter has , 
since drastically rationalised the venture, but in 1980, severe problems of 
inefficiency were still said to exist. 
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Given the generally accepted need for diversification away from the 
textiles sector, it seems strange that the Maltese Government should 
have become so obsessed with enlarging the sector still further by 
developing a weaving industry. The prospects of even a well integ-
rated textiles based activity are not good, and have been deteriorating 
annually as protectionism has continued to obstruct free trade. 
Furthermore, as well as external threats to the Maltese textiles sector, 
there is a danger that institutionalised wage rises may deprive Malta 
of her major industrial attraction - cheap labour. Should this happen, 
the labour intensive textiles sector will be the first to suffer. 
Currently, the world trade situation is deteriorating, particularly 
for textile goods, as international trade protection measures increase 
in number and intensity. In the past, much of Malta's textile produce 
has found its way _to Great Britain because of the heavy involvement of 
British interests in Malta's new industries. Also important was the 
fact that Malta had traditionally benefitted from the Commonwealth 
preferences based on the Ottowa Agreement of 1932. Britain's accession 
to the E.E.C. in 1972 has changed Malta's trade patterns, causing 
extreme dependence upon the E.E.C. as a whole, but simultaneously 
encouraging a diversification of markets to other E.E.C. countries, 
most notably West Germany. Such dependence upon the E.E.C. must be 
seen as being dangerous as a single E.E.C. ruling could cripple a large 
part of the Maltese economy. Such a ruling is becoming increasingly 
possible as the recession shows no sign relenting, and E.E.C. enlarge-
ment looms. Table 10.9 shows the great extent to which the textiles 
sector has grown to dominate Maltese manufacturing industry, and the 
overwhelming dominance of the E.E.C. market,. There is therefore a 
desperate need for rapid diversification both away from the textile 
sector, and away from E.E.C. markets. The attempted integration of 
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the textiles sector does not seem to be a valid strategy as it will 
both enlarge the sector still further, and worse, induce more severe 
negative multiplier effects when (or if) recessionary pressures on 
the sector become more severe. 
Table 10.9 Aggregate Textiles Sector Data for Selected Years 
% Gross Manu' % Manuf. Emp-
Years Output in the loyment in the 
Textiles Sector Textiles Sector 
% Exports 
that were 
Textile Goods 
% Textiles 
Exports 
to E.E.C. 
1965 22 23 49 15 
1970 23 26 54 39 
1975 33 36 63 77 
1979* 39 39 53 85 
* Provisional figures only. 
Sources: Central Bank of Malta (1982) I Unpublished Statistics 
The next chapter examines metal based industries, which are usually 
seen as the activities most capable of neutralising the textile sector 
dominance. 
, 
283 
CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE METALS SECTOR 
11.1 Introduction 
Given the recognised undesirable dominance of manufacturing industry in 
Malta by the textiles sector, the metals sector has, since the late 
1960s, represented an~ea of hope for governments of both complexions. 
Expectations rested not only on the assumption that a growing metals 
sector would provide more employment opportunities, but also that it 
would. provide Jobs specifically for the male unemployed rendered Job-
less by the rundown of the British naval facilities. This was regarded 
as especially convenient as many of the newly redundant dockworkers were 
skilled or semi-skilled personnel ideally suited to employment in new 
metals industries. 
There were other perceived advantages of a dynamic metals sector. for 
example, metals sector activities benefitted from the absence of (.(.C. 
restrictions on most metals sector imports to the Community, a fact 
which boosted the much desired export potential of the sector. Unlike 
the textiles sector, since 1977, no tariffs or quotas have been imposed 
upon Maltese metals exports to the (.E.C., although complex rules of 
origin do still apply. Meanwhile, the roots of a prosperous new metals 
sector were seen to lie in Malta hersel~ within the scores of small 
workshops scattered throughout the Islands. Thus, it was felt that 
there was greater potential for the inducement of indigenous entre-
preneurial activity, which would possibly rely far less upon external 
sources of capital and technology. Above all, it was hoped that metals 
sector activity would be far more prone to internal linkages than was 
the case in the textiles sector. , 
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Unfortunately, a consistent definition of the metals sector has been 
difficult to achieve as the official statistics tend to alter their 
aggregates, thereby varying the contents of the sector, and obstructing 
comparative time series analyses. Nevertheless, with the assistance 
of statistics provided mainly by the Central Bank of Malta and the 
Central Office of Statistics in Malta, analysis of this sector is 
possible. furthermore, it should be possible to tie in some of the 
material with that obtained in the questionnaire survey outlined in 
Chapter Twelve. 
The industries within the sector fall into two main groups. The first 
of these is the 'metals and machinery' sub-sector, and the second the 
'transport equipment' sub-sector. The latter of the two groups is 
especially important as it includes the vital dockyards. 
11.2 The Metals and Machinery Sub-Sector 
11.2.1 Introduction 
As its name implies, this sub-sector can itself be divided into two 
distinct parts based on metal fabrication and the manufacture of 
machinery. The former is by far the oldest component of the sub-sector 
and dominated until the mid-1960s. At that time, approximately half the 
output of the sub-sector was accounted for by breaking yards whose 
production has since diminished in importance dramatically. The 
advance away from scrap metal based activity has involved a growth in 
the manufacture of metal furniture, plumbing fixtures and fittings, 
and spectacle frames. Prior to the spectacular development of the 
latter, this portion of the metals sector proved to be encouragingly 
, 
male intensive, the percentage of male employees usually amounting to 
over 90%. However, the arrival of one large West German firm 
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manufacturing spectacle frames has, because of its preference for 
female personnel, reduced the male percentage to 80% (Central Bank of 
Malta 1977c). 
The manufacture of machinery has been slow to develop on a large scale, 
and was initially confined to small Maltese owned workshops assembling 
and repairing electrical equipment, and manufacturing and erecting the 
forests of TV aerials which dominate the Maltese urban skyline. 
However, substantial investments by MNCs in the manufacture of electri-
cal machinery have transformed this portion of the metals sector. The 
new participants include companies from West Germany, Great Britain, 
Japan and the U.S.A. In contrast to the local enterprises in the sector, 
their production has been comparatively large scale, export oriented, 
and extremely female intensive. In 1968, females constituted only 10% 
of the electrical machinery sub-sector's workforce. By 1976, this 
figure had blossomed to 77% (Central Bank of Malta 1977c). More recent 
statistics reveal that by 1980, female dominance in these activities 
had retreated, females constituting only 57.5% of the workforce (Central 
Office of Statistics 1980). 
As can be seen from rigure 11.1, the growth of electrical machinery 
manufacture from the late 19608 onwards accounted for much of the 
growth achieved in the sub-sector as a whole. In the final analysis, 
this growth must have come as a disappointment to the Maltese author-
ities, not only because of the female intensive nature of the employ-
ment that it provided, but also because of the type of production 
involved. It has now become clear that the electronics industry came to 
Malta for exactly the same reasons that th~ textiles sector firms arrived 
in such large numbers. Although government incentives were important, 
cheap labour and access to E.E.C. markets were paramount (see Table 11.1). 
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Table 11.1 A proximate Avera e er Hour of Electronics 
Workers in Selected 1966 - 1980. cents/hour 
Great West Sweden Japan Malta South*' 
-Years Britain German::: Korea 
!l I M r M r 
- - -
1966 51 45 
1967 107 57 46 
1968 112 68 44 
1969 130 80 128 82 47 
1970 149 92 150 99 52 21 
1971 172 109 186 31Q 264 125 62 27 
1972 192 124 210 362 315 163 75 24 
1973 216 144 308 444 385 225 97 23 
1974 248 177 312 461 401 262 98 30 
1975 275 200 408 536 472 306 98 42 
1976 249 192 395 638 576 342 106 56 
1977 279 214 440 682 615 398 126 62 
1978 341 259 519 686 626 537 144 77 
1979 470 358 634 835 775 547 170 88 
1980 560 426 636 669 812 523 179 106 
* As in Table 10.1, South Korea's statistics are very approximate 
because of her floating currency. Korea, and most of the sample 
countries have implemented sudden devaluation policies at some 
time. These lead to occasional surpr~ng trends in these 
statistics. 
Sources: ILO Yearbooks of Labour Statistics, 1967 - 1981 
Note: The same caution when interpreting ~e.statistics in Table 10.1 
must be used when examining the statistics in this table. 
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Once again, in the case of labour, further cost cutting was achieved 
through the use of youthful cheap female labour. 
Table 11.1 shows the extent to which Malta's cheap labour has become an 
attraction for MNC branch plants. Although countries such as South 
Korea remain in a more advantageous position in this respect, it is 
interesting to note that Japan, once a cheap labour location, now seems 
to pay its electronics workers comparatively high wages. or the other 
countries in the table, the British wage levels (more than double 
Malta's) are easily surpassed by West Germany, and in Sweden, wages seem 
to be remarkably high. Another interesting point is the fact that the 
Maltese and ILO statistical publications seem to deny the existence of 
female workers in these activities in Malta. As has already been 
stated, and as will be illustrated in Chapter Twelve, electronics 
industries are in fact very heavily dependent upon female labour. 
Perhaps the most disappointing feature of the electronics industries 
in Malta was the predictable lack of linkages with the local economy, 
caused by the MNC subsidiaries' tendency to trade sole~y with their 
parent companies. This is largely a consequence of the character of 
the electronics industries attracted to Malta. Much of the activity 
was heavily staged, and involved merely the assembly of ready-made 
components supplied by the parent companies. Under these circumstances, 
the need to trade with the host economy is usually very slight. This 
has not only reduced still further the possibility,of positive multi-
plier effects within the local economy, but has also enhanced the 
chances of sudden obsolescence, as was painfully illustrated by Plessey 
Microsystems (Malta) ltd., which closed dow_ in early 1981. 
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It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that the arrival of the electronics 
firms has been almost as disturbing as that of the textiles industries. 
Little in the way of skill is transferred because the manufacturing 
processes have been deliberately devised to eradicate the need for 
skilled labour. In addition, the use of components, and the tight 
administrative control of the parent companies facilitates illegal trans-
fer pricing operations. Finally, for technological reasons, this type of 
activity is even more volatile and unreliable than textile sector 
activities. 
Electrical machinery is not the only type of machinery produced in 
Malta. There is also a small mechanical machinery industry, although 
until recently, this showed no signs of growth. This is a strongly 
male intensive activity which tends to be restricted in the main to the 
manufacture of machine tools. The reason for the poor record of this 
type of activity stems from its capital intensive nature,.and the 
difficulty of achieving scale economies in Malta. 
11.2.2 General Features 
Following the arrival of MNC enterprise in the sub-sector during the 
late 1960s and 1970s (primarily in the field of electronics), the scale 
of production grew substantially. Thus, in 1959, only one firm employed 
more than 60 workers, a figure which had risen to 18 by the end of 1976. 
However, in comparison with the growth of the textiles sector, the 
growth was late. This may be explained by the aids to industries 
scheme, which, up to 1966, had given no grant assistance to firms in 
this category. This trend was reversed between 1967 and 1969 when the 
proportion of grants being allocated to me~ls_and machinery ventures 
rose from 28% to 65% by value. This had resulted from the authorities' 
sudden recognition of the diversification problem (Central Bank of 
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Table 11.2 Gross Output. Employment and Export Time Series Data for the Metals and 
Machinery Sub-Sector. 
Gross Output Employment Domestic Exports 
Amount in As a ~ of Number As a ~ of Amount in As a ~ of 
Ml.'OOO Manuf. Output Employed Manuf. Emp. M{'OOO Total Exports 
1959 477 4.9 482 6.0 379 32.0 
1960 511 4.8 514 5.8 365 26.6 
1961 633 5.8 623 7.5 600 31.0 
1962 597 5.0 677 6.6 211 13.1 
1963 658 4.8 631 6.7 241 8.1 
I\) 1964 966 5.8 840 6.8 375 8.9 
10 1965 1082 5.6 919 6.8 411 1.6 -"' 
1966 1159 5.3 1011 7.0 398 5.2 
1967 1423 5.9 1150 7.3 330 4.6 
1968 1831 6.2 1219 7.2 446 4.4 
1969 2491 1.1 1954 9.7 582 4.7 
1970 3044 7.8 1933 9.4 919 8.0 
1971 3932 9.6 2317 11.0 1807 12.0 
1972 5812 11.9 3221 13.8 3835 17.8 
1973 8469 13.0 3749 14.9 5762 18.1 
1974 10687 13.0 3712 14.7 6662 15.7 
1915 12311 12.5 3665 15.0 6974 13.9 
1976 11755 13.4 4053 15.4 10590 13.2 
1977 24413 14.8 4732 16.6 n.a. n.a. 
1978 28399 15.7 4915 16.6 n.a. n.a. 
1979 34714 16.4 5154 16.4 n.a. n.a. 
Sources: Central Bank of Malta (1977c) 
Central Office of Statistics (1976 and 1979 ) 
Malta 1977c). 
Table 11.2 provides data for the entire metals and machinery sub-sector. 
Gross output, employment and domestic exports statistics all show the 
impact of the arrival of the MNC subsidiaries. In all three groups of 
statistics, substantial advances occurred in the years following 1967. 
The fact that the sub-sector managed to increase its share of total 
manufacturing output, employment and exports at a time when other 
sectors (particularly textiles) were also advancing, is impressive. It 
is,nevertheless,unfortunate that so much of the growth has been 
accounted for by electrical machinery (see Table 11.3 and figure 11.1). 
Several inevitable reversals in the volatile electronics industries 
have since 1976 led to a substantial relative and absolute reduction in 
their importance within the sub-sector. fortunately, these set-backs 
Table 11.3 Percentage Gross outeut and Emelolment Accounted for bl 
the Constituent Industries in the Metals & Machinerl Sub-
Sector z 1976 - 1979. 
~ Gross Outeut 
Industries 1976 1977 1978 1979 
- -
Fabricated Metals 48.4 45.9 51.3 55.7 
Electrical Machinery 47.6 50.9 43.6 37.5 
Mechanical Machinery 4.0 3.2 5.0 6.8 
! Emelolment 
1976 1211. .l21!! 1979 
-
fabricated Metals 40.0 42.7 45.7 46.4 
Electrical Machinery 52.0 46.7 43.2 40.5 
Mechanical Machinery 8.0 10.6 11.1 13.2 
Sources: Central Office of Statistics (1979) 
, 
had until 1979 been more than offset by advances in fabricated metals, 
which include" the expansion of the spectacle frame enterprise mentioned 
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earlier. Thus, the sub-sector as a whole by 1979 accounted for over 
16% of both total manufacturing output and employment. 
The arrival of the MNC subsidiaries has drastically altered the 
pattern of ownership within the sub-sector. As Table 11.4 shows, in 
1968, 46.2% of paid-up share capital was accounted for by private 
Maltese interests. The only major shareholding emanating from outside 
Malta were Bri Ush (41.7%), and to a lesser extent, those fro m the 
U.S.A. (9.6%). By 1976, influxes of West German and Japanese capital 
Table 11.4 Sources or Paid-Up Share Capital in the Metals and Machinery 
Sub-Sector, 1968 and 1976. 
% in 1968 % in 1976 
Private Maltese 46.2 24.7 
state Maltese 0.0 11.0 
Total Maltese 46.2 41.7 
Creat Britain 41.7 12.7 
U.S.A. 9.6 6.0 
West Germany 2.5 21.0 
Japan 0.0 12.0 
Other Foreign 0.0 6.6 
100.0 1.Q!hQ . 
Sources: Central Bank or Malta (1977c) 
were especially prominent. British and American interests had 
remained stagnant during this period, whilst the urgent need for State 
intervention to diversify the manufacturing sector away from textiles 
had led to parastatal interests of 17%. 
Superficially, the ownership statistics loQk encouraging, especially 
in view of the continued total Maltese interests of over 40~. However, 
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as will be emphasised in Chapter Twelve, share capital data once again 
under-represent the extent of foreign interests and control. Moreover, 
the Central Bank of Malta (1977c) reveals that in 1976, the mechanical 
machinery and fabricated metal industries were 56% and 58% Maltese 
controlled respectively, according to accumulated share capital data. 
The electrical machinery industries were, in contrast, only 13% Maltese 
controlled. furthermore, the Bank explains that in real terms, 94% of 
exports and 60% of employment in the whole sub-sector were foreign 
controlled in 1976. 
As is implied above, the growth of exports from this sector can be 
attributed to the new MNC participation, and more specifically, the 
electronics industries, which, by the mid-1970s were accounting for 
almost 45% of total exports in the sub-sector. In the earlier days of 
fabricated metal dominance, most exports went to the British markets. 
Currently, the new MNCs have encouraged the advance of West Germany, 
which is now the single most important customer. The combined import-
ance of the British-and West German markets has ensured that the E.E.C. 
continues to account for over 80% of the sub-sector'a exports (Central 
Bank of Malta 1977c). This trade concentration, which is similar to 
that in the textiles sector, is not desirable. It is hoped that in the 
future, advances can be made in the libyan, Middle Eastern and Japanese 
markets, which accounted for less than 10% of exports in 1976. 
The continued dominance of the E.E.C. as a recipient of exports stems 
from Malta's associate membership of the E.E.C. This initially 
resulted in a 70% tariff reduction for goods in this sub-sector, and 
since 1977, has resulted in no tariffs at atl. This has rendered Malta 
an attractive location, especially for Japanese and other non-E.(.C. 
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firms, whose goods would otherwise find access to the Community both 
difficult and expensive. Initially, the rules of origin for the 
components of various goods were restrictive, but these have gradually 
been relaxed since 1976. There are, however, obvious problems 
associated with such dependence upon the E.E.C. Clearly, it is as 
easy for the E.E.C. to tighten as it is to relax its import regulations, 
and continued recessionary pressures within the Community indicate that, 
as is the case with textiles goods, the sudden introduction of tighter 
regulations is quite possible. 
Meanwhile, the linkages within this half of the metals sector are very 
disappointing. One of the major problems has been the research 
intensive nature of the many product components, which inevitably leads 
to a very high import content. As has already been explained, this 
situation is encouraged by the tendency of MNC subsidiaries to specialise 
in one stage of production, especially in electronics assembly. 
Unfortunately, easy remedies seem unlikely as most of the vital inputs 
are too varied and insubstantial to Justify import substitution policies. 
The Central Bank of Malta (1977c) also identifies the problem of the 
absence of iron and steel producing facilities in Malta as being a 
serious obstacle. Once again, the necessary scale economies, and the 
energy intensive nature of the iron and steel making process rules 
this option out. This particular problem is not very serious at present 
because of the current over-capacity in world iron and steel production, 
which ensures that heavily subsidised iron and steel are available in 
copious quantities throughout the world. 
In conclusion, it seems that the prospects ~f this sub-sector are mixed. 
Current reports from Malta suggest that many industries are closing down 
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as recessionary pressures are finally beginning to afflict Malta. 
Nevertheless, this is a sub~sector dear to the Government's heart, and 
there will therefore be considerable State intervention to save and 
create new industry. The Government maintains that the prospects are 
good, especially in electronics, where the technology is so dynamic that 
investment in complex automated plant is too risky in the long term. 
Consequently, they believe that electronics will continue to require 
cheap, high quality labour like that to be found in Malta. However, if 
electronics overcomes its sliding performances of the late 1970s and 
advances still further in the 1980s, it will provide more female jobs 
than male. Moreover, although the sub-sector as a whole pays higher 
wages on average than other industries, electronics firms pay low wages, 
as is illustrated in Chapter Twelve. finally, a resurgence of electro-
nics will not assist in the creation of a well integrated industrial 
base, and will add to the instability of Maltese industry because of 
the often short life-span of many MNC subsidiary electronics ventures. 
11.3 The Transport EQuipment Sub-Sector 
This part of the metals sector is dominated by seacraft-oriented 
activit~ based in the dockyards of the Grand Harbour. The dockyards, 
even with their reduced workforce, remain the largest single employer 
in the Maltese Islands. The other areas of activity in the field of 
transport equipment include aircra~and landcraft industries, both of 
which are only minor industries compared with the marine based 
activities of the harbours. 
The importance of the transport equipment industries is illustrated by 
the fact that the Nationalist Party, and nOJ the Malta Labour Party, 
chose to nationalise a large part of the sector in 1968. Very strong 
State interests continue to dominate, and render the sector the only 
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portion of the Maltese economy that is directly under the control 
of Maltese interests. for this reason, the various Governments of 
Malta have been doubly anxious to see that these industries flourish. 
Their male intensive employment potential remains great, as does their 
ability to earn foreign exchange. Also of crucial importance is the 
trading pattern of the sub-sector, which is no longer dominated by 
Europe and the E.E.C. 
11.3.1 The Seacraft Sector 
The seacraft sector grew to its dominant position within the Maltese 
economy because of Malta's geostrategic location astride the Mediterr-
anean (see Chapter Six). Most of the dockyard activity was originally 
confined. to naval repairs, but the Sritl,h ds~ence cuts of 1957 
resulted in the need for a rapid conversion of the harbours to commercial 
activity. This task was delegated t~ C.H. Bailey (Malta) Ltd. in April 
1959, who, with the assistance of £7.8 million loaned from the British 
Government, were instructed to act accordingly. A series of events led 
to the termination of the Bailey contract and the appointment of Swan 
Hunter and Wlgham Richardson Ltd. as managing agents in May 1963. Sharp 
declines in the once plentiful and profitable repair work for the 
British navy, and extreme international competition for commercial 
business led to substantial losses,which were exacerbated by the 
closure of the Suez Canal in 1967. The dockyards were eventually 
nationalised in April 1968, and the British Government agreed to provide 
£3 million for further diversification of the yards. 
Heavy losses continued into the 1970s, worsened by increasing inter-
national competition and industrial unrest. In 1973, the Maltese , 
Government was forced to introduce austerity measures involving changes 
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in wages and working hours, in the interests of flexibility. There 
resulted a sharp reduction in overhead expenses, and the first operating 
profit in 12 years. The situation was further aided by the reopening of 
the Suez Canal after 1975. Apparently, the dockyards have achieved 
small profits in every year since 1973. However, statistics are 
extremely difficult to obtain, and are not contained in official Govern-
ment publications1• 
The dockyards complex retains 6 drydocks including one recently built 
with the assistance of the People's Republic of China (lee Plate 11.1) which 
can accommodate vessels up to 300,000 dwt. Also within the Jurisdiction 
of the dockyards is the Ricasoli tanker cleaning installation, now fully 
operative after safety regulation problems. The dockyards have 
diversified their activities away from maintenance and repairs towards 
building activities, which have recently included two 6038 dwt parcel 
tankers for the Chinese. Manufacturing is not confined to 
boats, and includes pipeline laying equipment, wharfside cranes, pressure 
vessels, structural building, floating docks and mooring buoys, and even 
lamp posts for Maltese streets. The dockyard also administers a yacht 
yard, and provides travelling emergency repair parties. 
The ingenuity of the Maltese dockyard craftsmen cannot be doubted. As 
is the case with the economy as a whole, new equipment is so costly that 
second hand rejuvenated and repaired equipment must be used to the full. 
The resourcefulness of the Maltese is well illustrated by their use 
1. Despite their absence from Gover~ment publications, statistics are 
included in a Central Bank of Malta Report on the transport industry 
published in 1979. They are, however, aggregate statistics, and 
include other activities. 
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PLATE 11.1 
PLATE 11.2 
The Gr and Harbour . To the right of this picture is the 
new China Dock , which has a maximum capacity of 300 , 000 dwt . 
Malta Shipbuilding Ltd . Part of the new shipbuilding 
complex und er construction during 1982 in Ma rsa Creek . 
The new complex is du e to begin op erations during 1983 . 
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of half the TorreyCanyon supertanker (last seen sinking into, and 
polluting the English Channel) as an oil storage tank in the heart of 
the harbour complex. turthermore, the dockyards represent the only 
area of the Maltese economy where the Maltese have dealt adequately 
with their own international marketing requirements. The Malta 
Drydocks now have their own office in london, which explains their 
ability to acquire much desired contracts with companies such as 
Cunard. In addition, the dockyards have agents in West Germany, the 
U.S.A., East Germany, Italy, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Saudi Arabia, 
trance, Hong Kong, Greece, Egypt, libya, the Netherlands, Belgium 
and Norway, all of whom are able to attract business. 
At present, the dockyards, and a number of very small businesses 
account for the entire seacraft industry. Shortly, however, Malta 
Shipbuilding ltd. (see Plats11. 2) will begin operations in Marsa 
Creek. This venture, which is 70% Maltese State, 11% Algerian and 
19% libyan owned, is planned to build ships of up to 120,000 dwt. In 
addition, it hopes to involve itself in offshore and onshore marine 
engineering (especially associated with the oil industry), as well 
as structural steel work. At such a time of crisis in international 
marine engineering and shipbuilding, it seems surprising that any 
government should indulge in the creation of such an enterprise. 
Nevertheless, the officials maintain that there is a glut only of large 
ships, especially oil tankers, and that the new shipyards diet of small 
ships and engineering projects should provide adequate sustenance. 
Also under construction is the new Marsaxlokk Port, which was seen to 
be necessary following space consuming increases in ship repairing and 
building activity in the Grand Harbour dockyards. Marsaxlokk, in the 
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South of Malta, was perceived to be an ideal location for the new port 
because of its excellent natural harbour, and the surrounding area 
available for industrial development and container facilities. The 
planned installations include substantial container facilities as well 
as the general cargo berths. The project is intended to encourage the 
development of Malta as a transhipment centre for the Mediterranean 
(Office of the Prime Minister 1977). This, it is hoped, will also 
reduce Malta's unhealthy dependence upon the often strikebound and 
hopelessly inefficient Italian ports. The project is being partly 
financed by a soft loan from the Saudi Fund for Development. 
11.3.2 The land and Aircraft Industries 
80th the landcraft and aircraft industries are so small that they merit 
little attention. Aircraft based activity has until recently been 
confined to a small American company which services and maintains small 
aircraft used in the oil exploration industry. Recently, the acquisition 
of Boeing aircraft by the State airline, 'Air Malta',nas necessitated 
the recruitment of local maintenance crew. The sector has otherwise 
remained static. 
The land craft sector is more substantial, but extremely fragmented. 
There are, for example, 270 establishments that employ less than 6 people, 
and consist of family garage enterprises and workshops on the fringes of 
the formal sector. There have, nevertheless, since the 1960s, been 
several advances in the industry. These have involved the establishment 
of vehicle assembly plants (see Plates 11.3 and 11.4 ). Car, coach 
and caravan assembly are now all performed on the Islands to varying 
degrees of success. In the late 1970s, the Islands' main car assembly 
venture in Marsa was in serious trouble. The condition of the other 
ventures is not known. 
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PLATE 11 . 3 
PLATE 11 . ~ 
Car Assembly Ltd ., Ma r sa . Thi s factory assembl es car s 
from kit s sup pli ed by Briti s h Leyland . Unfortunately , 
such ventu r es have pro ved to be uncompeti tive , l ar ge ly 
because of an inability to achieve economies of sca l e . 
In this pa rticula r cas e , the company has r esorted to 
car r epairs and maintenance . 
Mobile Homes Ltd , Kordin . A l a r ge pro portion of ~a lta ' s 
l and vehicle ' s sub- sector is accounted f or by the ma nu-
facture of mobile homes . Th ese part i cula r home s are to be 
exported to Middle Eastern coun tries for use in the oil 
indus try . 
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11.3.3 The Transport Equipment Sub-Sector: General Points 
During the 1960s, the transport sub-sector was completely dominated by 
the dockyards, which accounted for as much as 97% of the sub-sector's 
gross output in 1960 (see Table 10.5). Consequently, as the dockyards 
suffered serious reversals as a result of the fortress rundown, the 
transport sub-sector's share of total manufacturing output fell from 
almost 32% in 1960 to 13% by 1970 (see Table 10.6, and Central Bank of 
Malta 1979). Simulataneously, the transport sub-sector's share of 
manufacturing employment and domestic exports also fell from positions 
of dominance within the manufacturing sector. The spectacular nature 
of the decline was perhaps deceptive, for much of it was relative, and 
in the long term, more due to the diversification of the manufacturing 
sector than the continued absolute decline of the dockyards. 
During the 1960s, repairs to British and NATO seacraft usually accounted 
for 8D% of the seacraft industry's output. 8y 1979, this source of 
income had disappeared completely. The dockyards compensated for the 
loss of business by concentrating on commercial ship repairs and 
shipbuilding, which, in the 1970s, accounted for over 25% of the 
seacraft industry's output (Central Bank of Malta 1979). The land 
vehicles industry, meanwhile, grew in importance during the 1960s 
(see figure 11.2), producing almost 40% of gross output by 1978. 
figure 11.2 also reveals that the dominance of seacraft in the 
transport sub-sector's employment structure has declined steadily 
since 1960. Table 11.5 shows that employment in the dockyards 
has remained relatively constant, indicating that the seacraft industry's 
proportional decline was mostly caused by the proportional increase in 
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Figure11.2 Composition of The Transport Equipment 
Sub-Sector 1960-78 
Source: Cent rei Bank of Molta (1979) 
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Table 11.5 The Transport Equipment Sub-Sector: Supplementary Data 
Concerning the Dockyards, 1960 - 1978. 
Total Emelo~ment ! of Sector Eme. ! of Manuf. Eme. 
in the Dock~ards in the Dockyards in the Dockyards 
1960 5629 97.3 47.0 
1961 5184 92.5 40.4 
1962 4993 90.0 38.1 
1963 4825 80.2 34.3 
1964 4871 77.5 39.3 
1965 4828 77.1 35.8 
1966 4826 73.2 33.4 
1967 4781 71.1 30.2 
1968 4680 69.6 26.2 
1969 4792 66.2 23.9 
1970 4815 74.4 23.5 
1971 4784 69.9 22.1 
1972 4864 73.8 20.9 
1973 4698 72.3 18.7 
1974 4601 68.7 18.0 
1975 4782 71.8 19.6 
1976 4809 72.7 18.3 
1977 5019 75.2 17 .6 
1978 5045 75.0 16.8 
Sources: Central Bank of Malta (1979) 
The General Workers Union of Malta (unpublished statistics) 
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Table 11.6 Gross Output, Employment and Export Time Series Data for the Transport 
Equipment Sub-Sector, 1960 - 1978. 
Gross Output Employment Domestic Exports 
Amount in As a ~ of Number As a ~ of Amount in As a ~ of 
Ml'DOO Manur. Output Employed Manuf. ErnE.!. I'll '000 Total Exports 
1960 5051 31.8 5788 40.4 4710 77.5 
1961 4795 29.1 5607 42.4 4535 71.1 
1962 4536 26.4 5546 40.8 4255 68.4 
1963 4153 22.9 6014 41.0 3669 54.9 
1964 5063 24.1 6289 36.0 4447 51.5 
1965 5614 23.3 6264 33.7 4893 44.7 
1966 6455 23.6 6596 33.2 5562 42.6 
1967 5258 18.7 6728 31.6 4331 3B.9 
1968 5923 17.7 6724 29.1 3826 27.4 
1969 7606 19.2 7237 28.3 4960 29.6 
1970 5401 13.0 6470 25.5 2872 19.3 
1971 6124 13.7 6842 25.4 3975 20.9 
1972 7842 14.5 6592 23.3 5363 20.9 
1973 10059 14.0 6501 21.1 7083 1B.3 
1974 14027 14.7 6704 21.9 11379 21.3 
1975 15723 14.0 6660 21.2 12581 20.4 
1976 17590 12.0 6612 19.9 12733 14.4 
1977 22806 12.4 6678 18.4 17315 14.8 
1978 23326* 11.4* 6730* 17.8* 17755* 14.2* 
Sources: Central 8ank of Malta (1979) 
N8 *Provislonal 
the importance of the land craft industry employment1• Meanwhile, 
perhaps the most important feature of the employment provided by the 
transport equipment industries in general is that it has never been 
more than 2% female. Because of the physically demanding nature of 
much of the work, management assumes. that females should be restricted 
to the few clerical and secretarial positions available. Another 
encouraging aspect of the industries is the fact that their employees 
receive comparatively high wages (Central Bank of Malta 1979). 
Because of the very large quantities of equipment and the scale of the 
installations required by the seacraft industries, the transport sub-
sector is the greatest consumer of capital in the Maltese economy. 
The central importance of the transport equipment sub-sector to the 
Maltese economy, and the enormous quantities of capital that it requires 
(which are beyond the means of the Maltese Private sector) has-induced 
heavy state involvement1• The Central Bank of Malta's (1979) owner-
ship figures for 1969 and 1979 confirm the heavy involvement of the 
state. In 1969, the State owned 95.5% of the sub-sector's share capital, 
and Maltese interests in total accounted for all but 0.1% of the 
accumulated share issue. By 1979, Maltese interests had retreated in 
favour of a substantial Libyan holding of 17.7%. Maltese State control 
nevertheless remained unChallenged, a fact which must have encouraged 
the authorities. Undoubtedly, the degree of Government control over 
this sector has prompted the Government to persist in its attempts to 
retain the dockyards as a central element in the development programme, 
1. By 1960, enormous and sudden declines in employment had ceased in the 
dockyards, the workforce of which had settled at a level of between 
4,500 and 5,100. Before 1960, the workforce varied between 6,000 and 
13,000, depending on strategic conditions. 
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despite the threat of increased recessionary pressures. 
Further encouragement may be gained from export data, which not only 
shows a welcome decline in dependence upon seacraft exports, but also 
displays a diversified pattern of export destinations. Table 11.7 
reveals that sources of E.E.C. business have been surpassed by Libyan 
and especially African markets. This contrasts with the other major 
sectors of Maltese manufacturing industry, which have, as has already 
been demonstrated, become dependent in particular upon both E.E.C. 
markets and capital. 
Table 11.7 TransEort E9uiement Sub-Sector Exeort Data for Selected 
EXEort Destinations. 
Libya Africa E.E.C. 
~ ~ 1 Total 
1'1£'000 Sector 1'1£'000 Sector 1'1£'000 Sector Exeorts Exeorts Exeorts Exeorts 1'1£'000 
1960 a 0.0 a 0.0 4 100.0 4 
1965 a 0.0 51 32.7 32 20.5 156 
1970 0 0.0 a 0.0 208 98.6 211 
1975 475 38.7 912 74.3 77 6.3 1228 
1978 2113 22.1 2347 24.5 247 2.6 9566 
Sources: Central Bank of Malta (1979) 
The prospects of the transport equipment sub-sector are not certain. 
For example, the negative influences of the international shipping 
crisis are inevitable, but the Maltese authorities maintain that the 
worst conditions are prevalent in the construction of large scale 
vessels, and that their own operations are still in demand. Nevertheless, 
the construction of a new shipbuilding yard is a hazardous venture, and 
is potentially disastrous. Meanwhile, the drydocks appear to have 
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developed an enviable reputation and have been able to retain a 
steady flow of customers. When visited in mid-1982, they were so busy 
that there were queues of vessels at anchor offshore, and the yards 
were working full night shifts. Given the reversals currently being 
experienced elsewhere in manufacturing industry, it seems possible that 
the transport equipment sub-sector, dominated as it still is by the 
dockyards, may re-emerge as the strongest portion of Malta's economy. 
11.4 Conclusions 
The metals sector clearly has two separate and distinct components. 
The metals and machinery sub-sector has now been penetrated extensively 
by multinational capital, and therefore cannot be said to be operating 
entirely in the interests of the Maltese economy. turthermore, its 
vulnerability to international market fluctuations, and more especially, 
its dependence upon (.(.C. markets says little for its long term 
stability. Ironically, the transport equipment sector, which is 
dependent upon one of the world's most depressed industries, remains 
comparatively stable, it seems as a consequence of firm Government 
control. It seems that the apparent successes of the Government's 
management of the transport equipment industries may have encouraged 
some of their ventures in other sectors of the economy, and may yet 
encourage more substantial projects in the metals and machinery 
industries. Such a strategy should be welcomed,as the current structure 
of the weaker half of the metals sector fails to inspire confidence. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE: THE QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY - RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
12.1 Introduction 
The survey was designed to gather detailed data on the structure of 
Maltese manufacturing activity, thereby providing information concerning 
ownership, production, employment and decision-making at the micro-level. 
~he questionnaire itself can be seen in the Appendix at the rear of this 
volume~) The original intention was to interview the managing directors 
(or equivalent personnel) of 100 firms operating in Malta. This target 
proved to be rather ambitious, especially in view of the limited period 
of fieldwork, and the elusive nature of the respondents. finally, 
completed questionnaires for 56 factories were gained, and the data from 
these firms constitutes a large part of this chapter. 
12.2 Operational Problems 
One of the initial problems facing the survey was the choice of a suitable 
sample. The firms eventually chosen for inclusion within the sample were 
picked randomly from a total of 1680 manufacturers, of which 345 were 
aided projects in 1980. However, in order to ensure a fair represent-
ation of Malta's new industrial capacity, firms were chosen from the 
largest 400 employers using data provided by the federation of Industries. 
Also, using similar data provided by the Department of Trade in Valletta, 
a proportionally operated quota system was adopted. Consequently, the 
largest category of manufacturers was that of the textiles sector, and 
the second largest representation that of the metals sector. The 
proportions adopted were roughly consistent with the total employment per 
sector in 1979 as provided by official statistics. The sample is there-
fore stratified, its composition being made up on the basis of the 
distribution of employment within the manufacturing sector. Some of 
the firms chosen for inclusion 
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within the sample were not aided. As will become clear later in this 
chapter, the examples of unaided industry tend to display abnormal 
characteristics compared with the bulk of the sample population. 
Despite this, the non-aided industries included here are very much 
larger than most ventures in the unaided sector, which usually display 
very small workforces and output. 
The advantages of choosing a sample dominated by aided firms were 
numerous. For example, most were easily contactable by telephone, most 
had competent, reliable and communicative management with which an 
appointment could be made, and most were spatially concentrated on the 
accessible industrial estates. However, the most important reason for 
choosing predominantly aided industry in the sample is that the 
development of manufacturing industry in Malta since independence in 
1964 has occurred almost entirely through the growth of aided industry 
(see Chapter Nine). 
Having chosen the sample of 100 firms, a letter was sent to each 
requesting cooperation and assistance with the questionnaire, asking for 
an appointment, and declaring not only that the information was for 
academic purposes only, but also that the data gained would remain 
confidential. Unfortunately, only a total of 20 out of the 100 firms 
chose to reply to their letters. Consequently, it was necessary to 
make contact and arrange interviews by telephone. This was not 
particularly satisfactory, and was possibly partly responsible for the 
refusal of eleven firms to cooperate. A further three firms refused to 
cooperate when visited personally, either on the grounds of suspected 
industrial espionage, or because of fears of Government investigation. 
There seemed to be no systematic bias linking the non-respondents. 
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Once contact had been made, it was generally the case that full 
cooperation was obtained from the respondents. It was especially 
fortunate that English was so widely spoken. In the cases where 
expatriates were employed, they were usually either British because 
of the British nationality of their company, or at least spoke English 
because of the need for communication with their respective work forces. 
This point is particularly important as the same degree of communic-
atian and cooperation could not necessarily be expected from non-aided, 
small-scale and less formal industries, whose ability to retrieve the 
desired information was also in doubt. 
Although the original intention had been to leave the questionnaires 
with the respondents to allow them to answer the various questions at 
their leisure, this proved to be impracticable. The reasons for this 
include problems of ambiguity and errors that encroached into the 
unassisted questionnaires. Furthermore, in two memorable instances 
early in the survey, the questionees refused to relinquish their 
answer forms. This was unfortunate as the forms already contained 
information on ownership that had been researched from the Oepartment 
of Trade's register of partnerships in Valletta 1• It was also partic-
ularly unfortunate as one of the firms: was the largest private 
enterprise operating in Malta. In this particular case, notes taken 
during the interview (not written on the questionnaire form), and 
documentary work carried out elsewhere compensated in part for the 
initial loss. 
1. The task of completing the questionnaire was made considerably 
easier by a preliminary two week period spent at the Department of 
Trade, who provided ownership data on each of the firms of the 
sample. They were also able to confirm that four of the chosen 
firms in the sample had closed down. 
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Given these experiences, it was decided that the best strategy was one 
which required half-hour interviews with each of the contributors. 
This seemed to work well, although the accuracy of some of the inform-
ation gained was occasionally dubious. ror example, the excessive ease with 
which certain figures came to mind, and the haste which was imposed upon 
some of the sessions indicates that in some instances, the data received 
may have gained. a fictional edge. However, as is apparent from the 
questionnaire itself (see pages 437-441 ), most of the questions were 
easy to answer. Perhaps most significant was the tendency to approximate, 
particularly when proportional statistics were required. This is, 
unfortunately, inevitable, as will be~plained shortly. 
In some cases, information retrieval by the respondents was exceptionally 
difficult. This was often the case when historical information was 
required. ror example, it was not always easy to recall previous 
employment levels. Worse still was the tendency of MNC subsidiaries to 
deal so closely with their parent companies that the value of the 
transactions between the parent and subsidiary were not accurately known 
by the respondent. In one instance, a manager maintained that his firm 
received the necessary materials from the parent company without paying 
for them, assembled them, and then returned the finished product without 
receiving payment. Only the wages and salaries, and incidental variable 
costs of production were apparently administered by the subsidiary 
management. 
As the survey progressed, it became increasingly apparent that some 
questions were either gaining spurious answers, or no responses at all. 
These were gradually removed from the questionnaire. It was also 
possible, with the benefit of only a little experience, to rephrase some 
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of the questions, thereby gaining an answer more rapidly and accurately 
than had been the case initially. for these reasons, the entire survey 
was carried out orally, using the afore-mentioned half hour appointments. 
It is difficult to assess the degree to which a systematic bias may 
have afflicted the survey as a consequence of the response rate. The 
20 firms out of the 100 that answered the letter of introduction were 
visited as all offered their cooperation. There seemed to be no common 
feature linking these companies. Interspersed between the successful 
visits to the remaining 36 companies in the survey was the occasional 
encounter with an uncooperative firm. There was, however, no common 
feature linking these firms, which ranged from local small ventures to 
large MNC subsidiaries. 
12.3 The Questionnaire Itself 
The questionnaire was divided into nine major sections, the first of 
which was concerned with general information. The second section 
required information about the Government incentives that had, or had 
not, been exploited by the firm. Unfortunately, the third section, 
which contained questions on employment structure, had to be simplified. 
for example, a large number of firms were unable to recall the levels 
of employment when the firm first came into operation. furthermore, 
they found the various employee classification systems too complicated 
and highly ambiguous. It was therefore decided that the section should 
be restricted to questions on the number of male and female employees 
at the time (i.e. November 1980), the date and level of the firm's peak 
employment, the standard operative's weekly wage, and the number of 
expatriate personnel employed by the firm. 
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further problems were experienced in the fourth section, on production 
and trade. This is well illustrated by difficulties concerning the 
value of production input and output, which are both distorted by 
varying stock levels. Malta is especially prone to shipping problems, 
largely because of heavy dependence upon the unreliable Italian ports. 
In order to prevent the shipping bottlenecks from harming production, 
many producers in Malta hold large stocks, both of production inputs 
and items for export. As a result, it is common for the annual exports 
of some firms in some years to exceed the value of the firms' annual 
output. Also, as has been mentioned, the close relationship between 
overseas parent companies and their Maltese subsidiaries occasionally 
has a strange influence upon input and output data. 
for these reasons, section four of the questionnaire was also simplified, 
and consequently only requested information concerning the value of 
annual gross output in 19791, and the proportion of that output that 
was exported. In addition, information concerning the major export 
destinations was required, as was the approximate proportional distrib-
ution of the exports. Meanwhile, the information required in section 
five, which concerned itself with local linkages, also had to be 
rationalised as many respondents found it impossible to assess the 
importance of local linkages to their businesses. Thus, instead of 
requesting varied statistics on local transactions, the questionnaire 
was confined to asking about the nature of the various linkages in 
existence. 
Both sections six and seven of the questionnaire, which were concerned 
with equipment and training respectively, .were also problematic, and 
1. Because of the approximate nature of'this data, it is not examined 
in great detail in the sections that follow. 
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had to be again confined to qualitative data. This was not, however, 
the case with section eight, which required information on ownership. 
This was attained in considerable detail prior to the survey through 
documentary work in the records section of the register of partner-
ships, in the Department of Trade, Lascaris, Valletta. This data has 
proved to be both interesting and useful. 
The final section of the questionnaire (section nine) was particularly 
revealing. . By asking for general comments concerning Malta as an 
industrial location, it was possible to appreciate many of the problems 
facing manufacturing operations in Malta, and indeed, many of the 
problems facing the Maltese Government. An outline and analysis of the 
data collected in this section of the questionnaire will be included in 
the latter stages of this chapter. 
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12.4 Constituents of the Questionnaire Sample Population 
Of the 56 firms in the sample, 25 were textile sector firms, 15 metals 
sector firms, and the remaining 16 'miscellaneous' manufacturers. 
Table 12.1 below shows the breakdown within these categories, and also 
provides employment totals for the sectors of the sample. 
Table 12.1 Classification of rirms in the Survey 
Textiles Sector rirms: Total Employment: 5,192 
a) Spinning, Weaving and Kni tUng: 6 
b) Clothing 16 
c) footwear 3 
-Total 25 
~etals Sector rirms: Total Employment: 2,655 
a) Electronics : 6 
b) Machine Tools 2 
c) Transport Equipment 2 
d) ~iscellaneous Metals I 5 
-Total 15 
~iscellaneous rirms: Total Employment: 2,966 
a) Chemicals Based Industry 7 
b) rood & Beverages : 3 
c) Paper & Printing I 4 
d) Other : 2 
Total 16 
Grand Total 56 Total Employment or Sample: 
-
10.713 
As was mentioned previously, textiles and metals firms dominate the 
survey because of their proportional importance in the manufacturing 
sector as a whole. 
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Table 12.2 classifies the firms of the sample on the basis of 
ownership and control. Of the seven categories, the largest and most 
important is 'multinational controlled subsidiaries', which accounts 
for 20 out of the 56 firms. The second largest category is that of 
'privately owned Maltese companies'. With the exception of overseas 
owned independent companies and state owned Maltese firms, the remainder 
of the firms in the sample are controlled by joint interests. The fact 
Table 12.2 Type of F"irms in the Sample, by OwnerShip and Control 
Textiles Metals Misc. Total 
1. Subsidiaries of MNCs 10 8 2 20 
2. Overseas Independent Cos. 2 1 1 4 
3. Maltese Dominated Joint Ventures 2 2 2 6 
4. Equally Divided Joint Ventures* 1 a 2 3 
s. Overseas Dominated Joint Ventures 2 2 3 , 
6. state Owned Maltese Cos. 1 a 1 2 
,. Privately Owned Maltese Cos. , 2 5 14 
-
*50% Maltese/50% Overseas Totals 25 15 16 56 
that, in the case of both the textiles and metals sectors, almost half 
are MNC subsidiaries is significant. This is in stark contrast with the 
miscellaneous sector, in which only two of the 16 firms are owned by MNCs. 
Table 12.3 gives a further breakdown 0' the 20 MNCs in the sample by 
providing nationality data. The dominance of British and West Germen 
Table 12.3 Overseas Controlled MNC Subsidiaries in the Sample b~ Sector 
and Nationality. 
I&f.German British Swedish U.S.A. Dutch Japan Total 
Textiles 4 3 2 1 a a 10 
Metals 3 2 a a 1 2 8 
Miscellaneous a 2 a a a a 2 
- - - - - -
Totals , , 2 a 1 2 20 
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interests is most apparent, as is the strong Japanese presence in the 
metals sector. The presence of American interests is under-stated by 
Table 12.3 because the one American firm included within the survey is 
the largest private sector employer in Malta, and is responsible for 
a surprisingly large proportion of the textile sector's annual output. 
Swedish and Dutch interests are comparatively small. 
It has been possible, using the sample and its MNC subsidiaries, to 
examine the major phases of MNC investment in the Maltese economy. 
This has been achieved by assembling the arrival dates (in Malta) of the 
MNCs, by nationality. In this way, an'average' date of arrival has been 
calculated, the results of which can be seen in Table 12.4. The U.S.A. 
has the earliest average date of 1967 because its only representative in 
the sample arrived in that year. Much more significant is the average of 
Table 12.4 MNCs in the Sample - Arrival Profile, by Nationality 
Nations of Origin No. of Firms Average Arrival Date 
U.S~A. 1 1967 
Great Britain 7 1968 
Sweden 2 1972 
West Germany 7 1974 
Japan 2 1974 
Netherlands 1 1975 
1968 for the British firms. This illustrates very well the fact that it 
was predominantly British firms that invested in Malta during the 
immediate post-independence years of Nationalist Party (P.N.) rule in the 
1960s. The West German MNC's average arrival date of 1974 is even more 
significant. This correctly represents a pattern of West German 
investment in Malta, primarily within the textiles and metals sectors, 
which occurred during the 1970s,in the period of new Malta Labour Party 
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(MLP) administration. This was a time in which the Maltese Government 
showed a great interest in diversifying the economy away from dependence 
on British interests. During this period, West Germany surpassed 
the U.K. as the single largest source of overseas capital investment 
in Malta, and simulataneously became Malta's most important trading 
partner. The West Germans were not the only non-British investors at 
this time. Swedish, Japanese and Dutch interests (as well as many 
others not listed in the sample, which include French and Italian investments) 
all established themselves in the Maltese Islands during the 1970s. The 
unfortunate aspect of this period of development was the fact that, as 
had been the case in the 1960s with British investment, textiles activity 
proved to be the most common beneficiary of the new investment. 
Finally, before moving on to deal with the different sections of the 
questionnaire data in greater detail, it is important to demonstrate 
the dominance of the MNC operators within the sample, and indeed within 
the Maltese economy as a whole. This is best illustrated by the 
employment figures provided in Table 12.5. These show that the average 
Table 12.5 Employment Breakdown of Total Sample. 
Type of F'irm No. of Firms ill Employees Av. Employees ~ Employees in Sample 
!'INC Subsidiaries 20 35.7 6,249 312 58.5 
Maltese State Cos. 2 3.6 376 188 3.5 
Maltese Private Cos. 14 25.0 1,130 81 10.6 
Others 20 35.7 2,927 146 27.4 
Total 56 100.0 10,682 191 100.0 
size of MNC subsidiary workforces (312) is substantially greater than for 
other types of firm. Furthermore, MNC subsidiaries account for a 
disproportionately large share of the total employment within the sample. 
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In contrast, Maltese private companies, which include the few non--aided 
firms in the sample, have an average workforce of only 81, and consequ-
ently account for only 11% of the sample's employment total. This data 
illustrates well the dominance of MNC subsidiaries in Maltese manufact-
uring industry, and justifies the attention given to MNCs in the sections 
that follow, which deal with textiles, metals and miscellaneous manufact-
urers respectively. 
12.5 The Textiles Sector 
Table 12.1 shows that 10 out of the 25 textile sector firms in the 
sample were subsidiaries of foreign owned and controlled MNCs. Table 
12.6 adds average employment figures to the data for the textiles sector 
of the sample. This illustrates the fact that in the textiles sector, 
the MNC ventures are usually the largest. However, it is interesting to 
Table 12.6 Typeso' rirm in the Textiles Sector of the Sample, by 
Ownership, with Average Employment. 
Types of rirm No. of rirms No. of Employees Av. Employment 
MNC Subsidiaries 10 3,173 317 
Overseas Independents 2 113 57 
All Types of Joint Venture 5 B2B 166 
Maltese State Companies 1 210 210 
Maltese Private Companies 7 868 124 
Total 25 5,192 208 
to nota that the Maltese owned private enterprise is substantially more 
advanced in the textiles sector than it is in other aectors, where the 
average employment is usually very much less than 1241• Perhaps the moat 
surprising feature of Table 12.6 is that of the low employment levels of 
1. In the metals sample, the average employment levels of Maltese private 
firms was only 67. In the miscellaneous section of the sample, it was 
only 31. 
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overseas independent textile sector companies. 
Sixteen of the 25 firms in the sample manufacture various types of 
clothing. Of the remaining 9, 6 produce textiles, and 3 footwear. It 
was felt that this sample was a fair representation of the total structure 
of the textiles sector in 1980. As has already been explained, most of 
the sector is now made up of clothing manufacturers, who strengthened 
their position during the 1970s. Large scale footwear manufacturers, 
meanwhile, did not exist in ~alta before the mid-1970s, but have since 
made their mark in the ~altese economy. Textiles manufacturers have, 
meanwhile, diminished in importance, although knitted fabric producers 
(3 out of the 6 textile firms in the sample) have secured significant 
advances in recent years. The numerical dominance of the clothing firms 
is further enhanced by their employment levels (see Table 12.7), which 
Table 12.7 Categories or Textile Sector rirms, and Employment Oata. 
Types of rirm No. or firms Total Average Employment Emplo;z:ment 
Clothing firms 16 4,101 265 
Textiles firms 8) Knitted fabrics :5 365 122 
b) Others :5 151 50 
c) Total 6 516 86 
;ootwear :5 575 192 
Total 25 5,192 20e 
indicate that their scale of activity is considerably greater than is 
the case for the remainder of the textiles sector. However, the 
average employment levels of the footwear firms in the sample indicate 
that the footwear manufacturers 1n ~alta are also attempting to achieve 
scale economies, and that their processes ~re, like their clothing 
counterparts, extremely labour intensiv~. 
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figure 12.1 shows the major phases of textile sector development clearly 
by illustrating the arrival date and ownership category of each of the 
firms in the sample. It is immediately apparent that 4 out of the 5 
earliest arrivals were textile firms, a feature which correctly represents 
the extent to which textiles firms dominated the textiles sector in the 
early post-independence years. from 1966 onwards, the massive influx 
of clothing industries becomes apparent, after which the arrival of 
footwear manufacturers in 1974-76 within the sample identifies the birth 
of a new industry in Malta. 
Perhaps the most obvious and important feature of figure 12.1 is the 
phases of overseas involvement that it represents. Up to, and including 
the year 1971, British controlled firms were clearly dominant. In 
addition, the only Maltese firms represented in the sample were small 
private ventures. In 1971, the newly elected socialist administration 
adopted new policies which were probably partly responsible for the 
absence of any further British investment within the 
sample. In consequence, during the 19708, a wide variety of non-British 
investors in the textilee sector were attracted to Malta, most partic-
ularly from West Germany. Also of importance in this period were the 
increasing numbers of State-owned, and Joint State-owned and overseas-
owned ventures, a development which heralded the birth of Maltese State 
capitalism. 
It has been possible to produce more detailed ownership data for the 
sample than was the case for the manufacturing sector as a whole in. 
Chapter Nine, and the textiles sector in Chapter Ten. Ownership data 
for the textiles sample are provided in Table 12.8, which shows in its 
first columns the total value and proportional value of various nationa-
lities of share capital. The first and most obvious feature of note is 
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the enormity of the U.S.A.'s total. This is in fact almost all 
accounted for by one company, which is indeed in a position of dominance 
over the entire sector (and some would say, the economy). However, 
because the ownership figures refer to a sample, the inclusion of this 
large firm has given the U.S.A. rather inflated importance. furthermore, 
the share issue of many companies bears no relationship to the scale of 
activity of such companies. This is confirmed by the remaining columns 
Table 12.8 Summar~ of Ownershie and Control Data for Textiles Sector 
firms in the Samele, by Share Capital, Employment and Output. 
Share Caeital Proportional Proeortional 
Countries PI£'OOO Allocation Allocation of 
of Origin Total Value is of Labour force ~ Output PI£IOOO ! 
Malta (Total) 486 24.4 1,380 26.9 7,149 17.8 
Malta (state) 152 7.6 479 9.3 4,290 10.7 
Malta (Private) 334 16.8 901 17.6 2,859 7.1 
U.S.A. 1,000 50.3 1,421 27.7 17,680 44.0 
West Germany 256 12.9 727 14.2 5,78l 14.4 
Luxembourg 83 4.2 117 2.3 780 1.9 
breat Britain 62 3.1 858 16.7 4,498 11.2 
Greece 60 3.0 120 2.3 1,500 3.7 
Switzerland 27 1.4 63 1.2 300 0.7 
Sweden 9 0.5 423 8.2 2,375 5.9 
Italy 4 0.2 24 0.5 158 0.5 
TOTAL 1,989 100.0 5,133 100.0 40,224 100.0 
of Table 12.8, the data for which was gained by allocating the production 
and employees of!!Eh!!£! on the basis of the proportional nationality 
of share capital ownership. Thus, it can be seen that West Germany's 
proportion of share capital for the sample (12.9%) under-represented her 
influence upon this sector of the sample. Consequently, over 14% of both 
the textiles sample labour force and gross output were 'controlled' by 
West German interests. 
Perhaps the best examples of under-representation are provided by Great 
Britain and Sweden. In the case of the former, British share capital 
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accounted for only 3.1% of the textile sample's total share capital, but 
simu]aneously, 16.7% of employment and 11.2% of output was accounted for 
by British interests. The undervalued status of British influence by 
share capital accumulations may be explained in terms of the age of the 
share issues involved. Because many of the British firms in the sample 
are amongst the oldest firms of the aided sector, and because of inter-
national inflation that has occurred since their arrival and share issue, 
their original share issue is disproportionately small. The same 
situation does not apply in the case of the Swedish interests, which 
arrived in 1972. Between them, their share capital amounts to less than 
£10,000. This has led to a bizarre situation in which Swedish share 
capital is only 0.5% of the textile sample total, Whilst the percentage 
of the labour force and output controlled by Swedish interests amounts 
to 8.2% and 5.9% respectively. Other examples, such as the large Maltase 
parastatal company in the sample with only £100 share issue illustrate 
the arbitrary natura of the results achieved from simply summing share 
capital totals. 
Table 12.8 illustrates well the extent to which overseas interests control 
the textiles sector. It also shows that, although Maltese intarests in 
tha sample own almost a quarter of the share capital, well over 80% of 
the sector's output is probably controlled by overseas interests. The 
~r significant participants in this sector of the Maltese economy are 
clearly American, British and West German. As was shown in Figure 12.1, 
the West Germans are the newest arrivals. This is supported by data 
concerning changes in ownership collected in the survey. Two of the 
most interesting cases of ownership transfer involved Wast German firms 
buying out British interests. There is also a case of a third British 
firm, in this instance being bought out by a local Maltese firm, which 
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rescued the venture. In addition to these changes, there were a number 
of more complicated transformations, in one of which a British firm bought 
a majority holding in a wholly owned Maltese venture. Meanwhile, of 
rather greater importance was the failure of a State owned textile venture 
which the Government attempted to revitalise through the injection of 
American capital. This particular case is discussed in detail in section 
12.6 of this chapter. 
As was described in Chapters Six, Seven and tight, all Governments since 
1959 have been committed to the attraction of overseas investment through 
the provision of incentives. Table 12.9 provides the findings of the 
survey on incentives. All the firms in this sector of the sample were, 
Table 12.9 The Number of rirms in the Textiles Sector of the Sample 
Receiving Government Incentives.* 
Incentives 
Provision of Government ractory 
Import Duty Concessions 
10 Year Tax Holiday (relief/exemption) 
Reinvestment Tax Concessions 
Cheap factory Rents 
Grants from MDC 
Loans from MOe 
No. of rirms Receiving the Incentive 
25 
25 
8 
4 
17 
5 
3 
(out of total of 25) 
*Any firm that has received an incentive in the past that hadi by the time 
of the survey, expired, was counted as a recipient of that incentive. 
at some stage, provided with Government built factories on industrial 
estates. Similarly, all firms received some type of import duty co nce-
8aion if they were importing capital equipment, or if the goods they 
were importing were for eventual re-export. However, only a small 
proportion of the firms received 10 year· tax holidays. This is because 
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14 out of the 25 firms arrived in 1971 or after, thereby missing the 
chance to benefit from such tax incentives following the return to 
power of the MLP in 1971. From 1973, firms were offered a different 
type of tax concession - the reinvestment tax allowance - which was 
designed to encourage the reinvestment of profits into the Maltese 
ventures. Only 4 firms claimed to have benefitted from this incentive. 
The provision of cheap factory rents turned out to be a contentious 
issue as many of the longer term residents complained that, after their 
original lease had expired, there had been a very sharp increase in the 
rents of their Government owned factories. As far as grants were 
concerned, noone had received any such generous assistance since the 
demise of the PN in 1971. In contrast, speCially negotiated cheap loans 
occurred during both the PN's and the MLP's periods of office. 
The intention of the industrial attraction policy and its incentives 
was to generate employment as rapidly as possible, especially for the 
large numbers of male unemployed discarded by the British fortress. It 
was therefore hoped that large scale establishments would grow within 
the new manufacturing sector. Table 12.10 shows that the textiles 
sector firms that established themselves between 1958 and 1976 were 
frequently substantially larger than was previously normal for the 
Maltsse economy (see Chapter Ten). Indeed, 1n 1980, the average number 
Table 12.10 Firms in the Textiles Sector Sample by Size of Workforce 
Range of Establishment 
SiZe by Number of Employees 
Under 50 
50 - 99 
100 - 199 
200 - 299 
300 - 399 
Ovar 400 
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Freguency (N • 25) 
3 
7 
6 
5 
2 
2 
of employees per establishment for manufacturing industry as a whole 
was only 17 (Central Office of Statistics 1980), as compared with 208 
for the sample of aided firms in the textiles sector of this survey. 
A breakdown of Table 12.10 in figure 12.2 shows that the smaller firms 
are mostly Maltese, and usually private sector ventures. In contrast, 
the firms with the larger workforces are usually MNC subsidiaries. This 
explains the results already seen in Table 12.8 concerning the 
proportional control of the textiles sector by various national and 
international interests. 
Data from the survey concerning sex ratios supports the national trend 
explained with the assistance of aggregate statistics in Chapters Nine 
and Ten. As can be seen from figure 12.3 below, 14 out of the 25 firms 
employed workforces that were less than 20% mals. The average sex 
ratio for the textiles sector of the sample was only 22.7% male. It 
seems that, not only are women in ~alta bettsr suited to textile sector 
employment than men, but also that it is possible to pay them less, 
despite the anti-sex descrimination legislation introduced sincs 1971. 
This is because the high turnover of female staff, who are encouraged 
to leave factory employment when they become married. It is possible, 
therefore, not only to pay them less on the grounds of their youth and 
inexperience, but also because of their usually shorter periods of 
service with the firm. The high turnover of female labour also allows 
the firms to adjust the size of their work forces more easily. Consequ-
ently, when reduction is required, it can be achieved easily by natural 
wastage, a situation which reduces the burden of redundancy payments. 
Most firms were either unwilling or unable to give detailed information 
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on the wages of both sexes working in their factories. As a result, it 
was only possible to gather data on the average operatives' weekly wage, 
and even this was achieved in only 23 out of the 25 of the sample. 
figure 12.4 shows that a large number of the reduced sample (8) paid 
a wage equivalent to the legal minimum wage of M£22.80. This is possibly 
deceptive as each firm had its own system of bonuses, usually conceived 
with the intention of alleviating serious absenteeism problems. 
Nevertheless, it is significant that the textile sector firms in the 
sample tended towards paying substantially lower wages than was the case 
in the metals and miscellaneous sectors. Perhaps most important, however, 
is the fact that there was no evidence to suggest that MNC subsidiaries 
paid either lower or higher wages than other firms. This would seem to 
suggest that the MNCs have not seduced employees away from indigenous 
enterprise using high wages. On the contrary, it appears that they have 
obtained all the labour that they need by inducing increased female 
participation in the economy. In this sense at least, it could be said 
that MNC activity has been complementary in relation to indigenous 
enterprise. Meanwhile, it seems that, within the sample, there is a 
concentration of 4 Maltese private ventures, all of which in 1980 paid 
their operatives only the State minimum wage (see figure 12.4). 
Given the usually volatile nature of textile sector activity, the 
questionnaire included a question concerned with peak employment data. 
It was felt that, if most firms had shed labour since reaching a level 
of maximum employment prior to 1980, then the industry may already be 
in decline. figure 12.5 shows that 12 firms out of the 24 that 
answered this question were experiencing their highest employment levels 
at the time of the survey (Autumn 1980). The remaining firms had all 
employed larger workforces at an earlier date. Not all of the latter 
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were in an unstable condition. It can be seen from figure 12.5 that 
there seems to be no visible relationship between the time of arrival 
in Malta and the date of employment peaks. further examination of the 
past peak firms is, however, revealing. Table 12.11 shows that, of 
the 12 past peak firms, half are Maltese. Perhaps most significant are 
the three British MNC subsidiaries, all of which were apparently past 
Table 12.11 Past Peak Textile firms in the Samele. b:£ Nationali t:£ 
and Product. 
Nations of Origin Number of F'irms 
Maltese: state 1 
Private 5 
Total 6 
-
Great Britain 3 
Illest Germany 1 
U.S.A. 1 
Joint Venture 1 
-
Grand Total 12 
-
Product Groups 
Textiles 5 
Clothing 7 
footwear 0 
Total II 
their peak employment potential in 1980. Also of importance is the 
fact that 5 out of the 6 textile manufacturers in the sample were also 
past their peak employment, a fact which demonstrates the recent 
reduction in the importance of textiles production within the textiles 
sector as a whole in Malta. Of the firms supporting their highest ever 
employment levels, only one was a texti.les manufacturer, whilst 8 
clothing and all 3 footwear producers registered peak levels of 
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employment at the time of the survey. 
The industrialisation programme was not intended to produce only 
increased employment opportunities. Income multiplier effects were 
also expected, as was the generation of an interlinked and stable 
industrial base. Unfortunately, this desired situation has not 
materialised, largely because most of the MNC subsidiaries have usually 
failed to establish linkages with other producers in Malta. This point 
is partially illustrated by figure 12.6, which shows that 16 out of the 
25 textile sector firms in the sample exported between 91 and 100 per 
cent of their total output. Twelve out of the 16 claimed that they 
exported 100% of their production in 1980. This indicates that a very 
large proportion of Malta's textiles sector output is exported, and 
that the sector is, in domestic terms, very poorly integrated. further-
more, the fact that much of the production that is not exported is 
finished produce that finds its way directly onto the local markets 
would seem to suggest that the absence of local linkages in this sector 
is worse than it appears. 
figure 12.6 also shows that all bar,one of the firms exporting 50% or 
less of their produce are Maltese ventures. The Joint venture. amongst 
these firms was in fact the State textile firm that ran into difficulties. 
This particular firm 1s one of the few operating within the sector that 
does have significant local linkages (see section 12.6 of this chapter). 
Meanwhile, all but one of the MNC subsidiaries within the sample 
exported more than 90% of their exports, supporting the claim that MNCs 
do not encourage linkages between themselves and the local economy. 
As would be expected given the patterns,of ownership concentration 
discovered earlier, the pattern of export destinations is also highly 
%Out~ N=25 
Expor __ I 
91- my. M IMn IM~LlV IJVIGB 1GB 1GB IWGIWG IWG SWZJSWIJSNIlUSA I 16 
81 - !n GB wu . 3 
71-00 1 
61 - 70 
51 - 00 JV 1 
u 
u 41 - &) 1 I.Jt 
lh:Jer 40'1. (for ownership Key. see Figure 12.1 J 3 
Flgure12.6 The Proportion of Output Exported by Textiles Sample Firms 
concentrated. The results of the questionnaire reveal that 13 firms 
out of the 25 in the textiles sector of the sample sent all their 
exports to one destination. Of these, all 4 West German owned MNC. 
subsidiaries sent 100% of their exports to their parent companies in 
West Germany. Two out of the 3 British companies, and 1 of the 2 
Swedish firms did the same. Similarly, the one British independent 
company in the sample exported all its produce to one customer in 
Great Britain. However, perhaps most important of all was the fact 
that 3 Maltese enterprises (2 private, and 1 State owned) exported all 
their produce to individual West German customers. Two other Maltese 
firms sent all their exports to British and Italian customers respect-
ively. This is symptomatic of the fact that,even where Maltese 
interests control manufacturing capacity, they have no control over 
market outlets. Thus, a large proportion of the manufacturing capacity 
that is supposedly controlled by Maltese interests is in fact 
subcontracting work, and is consequently also controlled by outside 
interests. Worse still is the fact that subcontracting work is often 
the most vulnerable of all to severance in recession conditions. 
It seems, therefore, that the pattern within Malta's textiles sector is 
one of isolated and externally oriented production, which has little or 
no linkage with the domestic Maltese economy. This contention 1s 
supported by 80me simple data collected on industrial linkages. Of the 
24 firms which answered the relevant section of the questionnaire, 20 
claimed that their production processes benefitted from no material 
inputs provided by other firms operating in Malta. Of these, 6 firms 
claimed that they did use some packaging materials provided by a Maltese 
firm operating in Malta, but that these i~puts were negligible. 
Exceptions to this pattern included firms which purchased locally 
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manufactured labels, chemicals and miscellaneous materials. The 
number of firms denying providing other manufacturers operating in 
Malta with production inputs was 19. Of the miscellaneous materials 
and services provided by the 5 exceptions, fabric dyes were the most 
common. As far as local services were concerned, the only significant 
common linkage was the use of accoun~~, whose auditing services are 
required by law. This was a common feature of every firm, and does 
not therefore require further attention. 
Given the high level of autonomy and isolation maintained by MNC 
subsidiaries in particular, it would be reasonable to expect such 
organisations to insist upon filling their management positions in 
Malta with expatriate personnel. Strangely, this was not the case. Of 
the 14 firms in the sample employing no expatriates, most were Maltese. 
However, ~ British firms, 1 Swiss and 1 West German firm, in addition 
to 2 Joint ventures, all employed no Qxpatriates. Most of the remaining 
firms, which included the rest of the MNC subsidiaries, employed either 
1 or 2 expatriates. Only 2 firms employed three or more overseas 
personnel. Most intriguing of all were the 2 Maltese ventures - one 
state and one privately owned - employing expatriates. In one instance, 
the person was German, and was there to ensure that standards were 
adequate for the German customers. In the other case, a British 
technical expert was employed to oversee production 1n the early and 
difficult stages of a new venture. 
Unfortunately, the results of the questionnaire concerning equipment 
and personnel training were disappointing and not very detailed. What 
did emerge was the fact that all firms in the sample used ~ second 
hand machinery, and all also used some new machinery. In eddition, it 
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was impossible to compute the value of equipment in most factories 
because of varying rates of depreciation, and variations in practices 
and types of insurance broker. In the case of training policy for 
personnel, several generalisations could be made concerning the 
entire sample. first, all operatives were trained on the Job, initially 
on paper in the case of clothing manufacture, after which they were 
accepted for full time employment if their performance was satisfactory. 
In the case of middle management and technical staff, training was done 
on the Job, and at the new local technical colleges, and the University 
of Malta. Higher management and technical personnel were either trained 
locally like their middle management counterparts, or sent abroad to 
relevant centres of learning. Also, in many cases, the temporary use 
of expatriates as training personnel proved to be useful. 
In summary, assuming the questionnaire sample survey to be representative, 
it seems that a large part of the ~altese textile manufacturing sector 
is not only controlled by overseas interests, but also that the locally 
controlled ventures are also in effect controlled by overseas enterprise. 
furthermore, the sector's manufacturing units are extremely isolated, a 
situation which ensures that linkages with the internal economy are kept 
to a minimum. The sector is therefore highly vulnerable to external 
fluctuations in economic fortune, particularly those affecting the £.£.C. 
12.6 The Case of Malta Spinning and Weaving Limited 
~alta Spinning and Weaving limited (MSW Ltd.), which was included within 
the sample, is a special case which meri~s further attention. The Company 
represented the Maltese Government's major attempt to provide an 
import substitution industry, and simultaneously integrate the textiles 
sector. With the assistance of technology from the People's Republic 
of China, a large manufacturing plant covering 4! acres was established 
in buildings on the old Ta'Cali aerodrome. The intention was that it 
should provide local manufacturers with fabric that they would other-
wise have been forced to import. Unfortunately, the project rapidly 
developed into an embarassing failure for the Covernment, which has 
since attempted to rescue the operation through investments offered by 
the Texaco Corporation. 
Grech (1979, p.82) detected some of the problems facing MSW Ltd. 
before its dramatic rationalisation in late 1978. He pointed out that, 
• 
' ••• this plant cannot bleach or dye fabric 1• Although the quality of 
the fabric seems to be acceptable, the width of the fabric seems to be 
unacceptable. As a whole, the setting up of the this plant in spite 
of the insistence by the Government that the locally operating clothing 
firms should buy their cloth from it, has not gone a long way either 
to substitute imports or to verticalise the industry. The basic problem 
with this plant is that it has been set up with little consideration 
for the market it was meant to serve.' 
The company became '~dina Weave' in late 1979 following the Texaco 
intervention. The enormity of the disaster from the Covernment's point 
of view is reflected in the employment figures of the firm. In its 
infancy between 1976 and 1978, 700 people were employed in the Ta' Cali 
1. This may be connected with the severe annual water supply problems 
facing the Islands. 
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factory, making MSW ltd. one of the largest single employers in the 
Maltese economy outside the dockyards. After rationalisation, only 
86 employees were retained on the 4t acre site. The manager maintained 
in November 1980 that even his much reduced plant was working at only 
33% capacity. Of the total production, 95% was directed to one local 
customer, whilst the remaining 5% was exported to an Italian customer. 
MSW ltd. represents one of a number of failures that have occurred 
amongst the new generation of parastatal industries. Because of the 
political implications, it is often difficult to obtain information on 
these closures. However, of the more spectacular failures, an 
ornamental glass factory and a carpet factory are perhaps the most 
notable. 80th were established, as was MSW ltd., with the assistance 
of Chine~aid. MSW ltd. remains the most important failure because of 
the scale of the venture, and the fact that it represented a failed 
attempt at vertical integration within an important industrial sector. 
To criticise the parastatal sector 1n general would be unjustified. 
There have been a number of ventures that have been successful to date, 
one of which has been included in the textiles sector sample. further-
more, many projects have been initiated in particular with both local 
and overseas interests, and have shown promise. Given the recent 
decision to call Texaco to the rescue of MSW Ltd., the MLP Government 
clearly belives that Joint ventures form a stable medium for State 
enterprise. 
12.7 The Metals Sector 
The metals sector sample 1s also dominated by MNC subsidiary companies, 
which constitute over half the 15 companies represented in the survey. 
Table 12.12 shows that, in addition to the 8 MNCs, there arB 4 joint 
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venture enterprises, 2 privately owned Maltese ventures, and one 
foreign independent company. The average employment figures also 
given in Table 12.12 reveal that, as expected, the MNC subsidiaries 
Table 12.12 Types of Metal Sector Firm in the Sample, and Average 
Employment Data. 
Types of Firm Number of firms Average Employment 
MNC Subsidiaries a 232 
Overseas Owned Independents 1 26 
Jointly Owned Ventures 4 160 
Private Maltese firms 2 67 
State Owned Maltese Firms a 
Total 15 177 
-
are usually very much larger than other operators within the sector. 
Jointly owned ventures, it seems, are also generally larger ~han the 
Maltese private firms. Most important, however, i8 the fact that each 
of the firm categories has an average employment level that is subs tan-
tially less than that of the textiles sector. This indicates that 
metals sector firms are not only less numerous than their textiles 
counterparts, but also that they tend to_employ. fewer personnel. 
Classifying types of metals sector production was complicated, but as 
can be seen from Table 12.12, electronics firms have assumed a strong 
position within the sector. This is largely because the assembly of 
electronic equipment, like much textiles activity, is labour intensive, 
and therefore requires the plentiful supplies of cheap labour that Malta 
have been so eager, and able, to provide. Other representatives within 
the sample include machine tool and transport equipment manufacturers, 
in addition to which there is a sizeabl~ miscellaneous category. Average 
employment data,also in Table 12.13, reveals that the largest employers 
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Table 12.13 Metals Sector Sample 
Average Employment. 
Categories of Production, and 
Types of Product Number of firms 
Electrical Machinery 
Mechanical Machinery (machine tools) 
Transport Equipment 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
6 
2 
2 
5 
15 
-
Average Employment 
162 
70 
74 
279 
are in the miscellaneous category. One of the reasons for this is the 
presence in Malta (and in this category) or a German spectacle frame 
manufacturer, which has now become one or the largest private sector 
employers or the Islands. Electronics firms, meanwhile, seem to 
maintain moderate levels or employment, whilst the remaining machine 
tool and transport equipment manufacturers have shown little long term 
employment potential. 
The year or arrival statistics (see figure 12.7) reveal an even more 
distinct pattern than was the case in the textiles sector sample. The 
2 oldest firms are Maltese, and the next 4 to arrive were all British1• 
After 1971 and the election or the new MLP administration, all the 
arrivals were again non-British. Of these, 3 were West German, and 2 
Japaness. Of the 10 firms to arrive since 1971, 5 manufacture .. 
electronics. The aixth or the electronics manufacturers was British, 
and arrived in 1969. At the time, it was hoped thdt thia particular 
rirm would help lead the way for similar ventures, thereby aiding 
diversification away from the textiles sector. Unfortunately, electro-
nics technology 1s highly dynamic, and the introduction of the silicon 
chip rendered the Maltese plant Obsolescent. It closed in early 1981, 
1. One of the British firms was subsequently taken over by a West 
German MNC. 
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with a loss of 165 (mostly female) jobs. At its peak in 1972, this 
venture employed 624 persons. 
As was the case in the textiles sector sample, West German investment 
has become prominent since 1971, as have Japanese and Dutch interests. 
Also, although there are no completely State owned ventures in the sample, 
there are 2 comparatively recent Joint ventures in which there remains 
a strong State interest. As has already been explained, the State 
has been keen to take an active role in the diversification process. 
However, MOe officials confirmed that it has been far harder to attract 
metals sector enterprise than it has been to induce textiles based 
activity, a fact that explains Malta's distorted industrial structure. 
The eagerness with which the Maltese Government attempted to attract 
non-textile based activity is evident in Table 12.14, which shows that 
as many as one third of the firms in the sample received substantial 
Table 12.14 ~8ltese Government Incentives in the Metals Sector Sample 
The Incentives 
Import Duty Concessions 
10 Year Tax Holidays 
Reinvestment Tas Allowance 
Cheap ractory Rent 
ractory Provision 
Grants 
Cheap Loans 
Number of Recipient rirms (N-15) 
14 
4 
6 
14 
15 
5 
3 
grant aid, in addition to the usual official aid. As was the case in all 
industries, 10 year tax holidays were restricted to those firms that 
arrived before 1971. Similarly, the reinvestment tax allowance was only 
3M 
available to firms arriving in 1973 and after. All the questionees in 
this sector ~ere housed in Government built factories, and all bar one 
claimed that they benefitted from cheap factory rents. Only one firm, 
a company assembling cars from British Leyland kits, claimed that it 
received no import duty concessions. This was because its entire output 
was destined for the home market. 
Clearly, the role of incentives in this sector has been important, 
particularly as indigenous entrepreneurship has sho~n little initiative. 
The fact that 8 out of the 15 firms in the sample are overseas owned 
MNC subsidiaries is evidence in itself. Table 12.15 examines the 
ownership statistics in further detail. Accumulated paid up share 
Table 12.15 Metals Sector Sample - Summary or Ownership and Control 
Data, by Share Issue, Employment and Output. 
Share Capital 
Countries of 
Origin 
Malta (Total) 
Malta (state) 
Malta (Private) 
West Germany 
Great Britain 
Netherlands 
.Japan 
Libya 
Czechoslovakia 
Canada 
TOTAL 
. 1'1£'000 
Total Value % 
985 
249 
736 
454 
227 
0.1 
400 
1,060 
160 
54 
3,338 
29.5 
7.5 
22.0 
13.6 
6.8 
12.0 
31.2 
4.8 
1.6 
100.0 
Proportional 
Alloca tion of 
Labour roree % 
334 
136 
198 
928 
395 
122 
553 
133 
88 
102 
2.655 
12.6 
5.1 
7.5 
35.0 
14.9 
4.6 
20.8 
5.0 
3.3 
3.8 
1QO.0 
Proportional 
Allocation 01' 
Output 1'1£'000 % 
1,575 
574 
1,001 
10,321 
2,371 
235 
4,800 
780 
360 
1,275 
21,716 
47.5 
10.9 
1.1 
22.1 
3.6 
1.7 
5.9 
100.0 
capital statistics reveal that 29.51. of the sample's share issue was 
Maltese controlled. The bulk of this was Maltese private investment. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the largest portion of share capital (31.2%) was 
owned by Libyan interests. West German interests, meanwhile, accounted 
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for only 13.6% of the share issue, and British interests a meagre 6.8%. 
A totally different pattern is achieved in the second column of Table 
12.15, which divides labour force for each firm on the basis of the 
firm's proportional nationality. This reveals that the dominant 
Libyan share capital was responsible for only 5% of the sample sector's 
employment. As expected, West German interests accounted for 35% of the 
employment, whilst Japanese and British interests accounted for 20.8% 
and 14.9% of employment respectively. As was the case with Libyan 
involvement, Maltese ventures were apparently over-capitalised, and 
provided only 12.6% of the sample sector's employment. 
The third column of Table 12.15 deviates even further from the pattern 
established by share capital accumulation. Thus, Libyan and Maltese 
interests were apparently responsible for only 3.6% and 7.2% of output 
respectively. In contrast, the West German firms accounted for a 
surprisingly large 47.5% of production. Other major contributors 
included Japanese interests with 22.1%, and BritiSh interests with 
10.~fo of the sample sector's total output. These statistics confirm 
the view stated earlier that aggregate ownership statistics based on 
accumulated share issue do not accurately represent the degree of 
overseas control in the Maltese economy. In the case of the metals 
sector sample, West German interests ara clearly dominant. 
The importance of West German involvement in the Maltese economy 
should not therefore be underestimated. Similarly, in relative and 
absolute terms, the decline of British interests cannot be denied, and 
is well illustrated by one particular company which was struggling badly 
in the early 1970s. It was eventually purchased by a German company, 
which has since expanded production dramatically. Maltese interests, 
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meanwhile, are over-represented in official statistics, as are Libyan 
investments, which also receive considerable publicity. It seems that 
this sector in particular has been heavily dependent upon overseas MNCs 
for capital, technology, markets, and entrepreneurial stimulus. 
rigure 12.8 shows that, unlike the textiles sector, there is no 
discernible relationship between the .. size of the respective firms' 
workforces and their nationality. All that can be said is that most of 
the firms employed between 50 and 300 employees, a generalisation which 
is consistent with the average workforce .for the sample eector of 177 
persons. 
Sex ratio data for the sector's workforce is more interesting. Civen 
the worrying dominance of female labour within the textiles sector, there 
is no doubt that the Maltese Covernment hoped that the metals sector's 
workforce would be predominantly male. rigure 12.9 shows that 8 out of 
the 15 firms had workforces thatw~e over 90% male. Unfortunately, the 
few firms at the other end of the scalew~e mostly labour intensive 
electronics manufacturers, a fact which ensured that the proportion of 
employees in the total sample sector that were male was a disappointing 
48.9%. 
weekly wage levels in the metals sector seem to be considerably higher 
than those in the textiles sector, a contention that is supported by 
official Government aggregate statistics. rigure 12.10 shows that none 
of the firms in the sample paid their operatives the minimum wage. 
Indeed, 9 out of the 1S paid comparatively healthy weekly wages of 
between ML26.00 and ML30.00. This compares favourably with all sectors. 
The average weekly wage for the sample was ML29.01, a high rate compared 
with the ML26.0S of the textiles sample sector. There was no detectable 
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relationship between the ownership of the various firms and their wage 
levels. Thus, it was not possible to generalise about the levels of 
wages paid by MNC subsidiaries. However, it could be said that in 
situationsof surplus labour supply similar to that prevalent in Malta, 
MNCs do not need to offer higher wages than local firms to attract 
sufficient labour. 
Of the 15 firms in the survey, 11 had never employed larger workforces 
than those engaged at the time of the survey. However, the 4 remaining 
firms showed signs of decline. One was a Japanese electronics venture 
having difficulties with European contractors, and another a Maltese 
private firm assembling cars from kits. The latter was suffering 
severely from competition from Maltese car importers, who were able to 
undercut their local market. furthermore, planned exports fa the Middle 
East were impossible as the company selling them the kits was also 
selling completed cars to the Middle East at well below those obtainable 
by the Maltese venture. The remaining two firms were in severe 
difficulties at the time of the survey. Both were British, and both 
have closed d~wn their Maltese operations since the survey. In one 
instance, the redundant employee. were immediately employed by a competing 
West German firm which manufactured exactly the same product range. 
A familiar pattern emerges from the data concerned with the proportion 
of annual output exported. Twelve out of the 15 firms exported over 
90% of their produce. Only 2 firms - 1 Maltese and 1 joint venture -
exported less than 50% of their production. The direction of exports 
was closely related to ownership. Thus, the J West German MNC subsid-
iaries sent over 90% of their exports to their parent companies in West 
Germany. Only 1 of the 3 sent 100% of its production and exports to 
the parent company, indicating that the links between parent and 
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subsidiary were not as great as in the textiles sector. Exactly the 
same situation applied to the 2 ailing British companies, one of which 
exported all its output to its parent, whilst the other dispatched only 
90%. The Dutch subsidiary behaved 'normally', sending all its produce 
to its Dutch parent company, whilst the Japanese 
subsidiaries exported all their produce to sister subsidiaries in the 
E.E.G. In the latter two cases, the Maltese location not only provided 
access to cheap labour, but also allowed the Japanese companies to 
avoid a number of E.E.G. tariffs and quotas because of Malta's E.E.G. 
associate membership. 
other interesting features to emerge from the direction of exports 
data include the fact that one of the Maltese firms worked on a sub-
contracting basis for a West German company, which absorbed all the 
company's production. Also of interest was the fact that 10 out of the 
15 firms in the sample sent 100% of their exports to E.E.G. countries. 
Of the remaining 4 exporters, all sent the bulk of their exports to 
Libya. One further significant feature of this sector's exports was that, 
especially in the case of electronics firms, the Maltese plants tended 
to produce only components, or semi-assembled pieces of equipment. 
Consequently, they rarely dealt with more than a few stages of production, 
and did not produce finished products ready for retailing. 
The latter point leads directly onto the question of linkages with the 
local economy. Once again, Government officials are undoubtedly 
disappointed at the lack of linkages within the metals sector. Of the 
15 firms questioned in the survey, 12 maintained that they received no 
inputs to their production process from other firms working in Malta. 
Furthermore, 13 out of the 15 firms said that they produced no inputs 
to the production processes of other firms operating in Malta. Two 
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other firms said that they received substantial inputs in the form of 
woodwork and furniture items. Of the two firms providing goods and 
services for other industries, one specialised in heat treating and the 
other in chrome plating and die casting. All the evidence therefore 
suggests that linkages with the· local economy in the metals sector 
are Just as tenuous as they are in the textiles sector. 
Because of the wide variety of equipment used by the various producers 
in the sample, generalisation is once again difficult. All the 
respondents maintained that they used both second hand and new machinery. 
The comments on machinery made by the Maltese manager of 8 German 
machine tool firm were, however, most interesting and revealing. He 
was very critical of many Maltese entrepreneurs' overwhelming preference 
for British machinery. He suggested that too many Maltese businessmen 
pay more for inferior British equipment, despite the availability of 
superior, cheaper non-British machinery. He cited his own factory's 
machinery, stating that of his 15 machines, only 1 was British, and 11 
was the one that always caused the trouble. Although his comments were 
clearly motivated by his personal frustrating experience with the 
British machine, it is nevertheless relevant that such a preference for 
British goods should be perceived 16 years after independence. 
The training routines of the various metals sector firms fell broadly 
into the same pattern as those of the textile sample sector pattern. 
Operatives were usually trained on the Job, whilst the more complicated 
occupations required some kind of training at local schools and 
colleges. Higher management was again dominated by Maltese personnel, 
some of whom had been trained abroad. In addition, there was a small 
complement of expatriate personnel. some of whom were only temporarily 
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employed for the purpose of training their Maltese replacements. The 
2 exceptions to this pattern included. a Japanese company with a special 
permit allowing 4 expatriates. The other case was a Maltese State 
joint venture with a Czech firm. In this case, technical requirements 
apparently led to the need for 7 expatriates. 
The latter case represents one of a number of Maltese State Joint 
ventures with overseas companies. These efforts are not only designed 
to diversify the economy, but are also intended to encourage market 
diversification. Consequently, they are at least partly responsible for 
the recent growth in importance of Libya as a recipient of Maltesa 
metals sector exports. Such Joint ventures represent the latest 1n a 
series of desperate attempts by the Maltese Government to break the (.E.c.1 
textile sector dominance. It remains to be seen if they will achieve any 
long term success. 
In summary, it seems that the metals sector is also dominated by 
multinational enterprise. There are few viable linkages with the 
Maltese economy, and in many instances, the Maltese subsidiary plants 
merely represent a minor and often dispensibla stage of an MNC's total 
production process. In short, despite the efforts of the Maltese 
Governments and the MOC, the metals sector appears to be in a precarious· 
situation similar to that of the much criticised textiles sector. 
12.8 Miscellaneous Manufacturers 
Only 2 of the sample of 16 firms in this category were MNC subsidiary 
companies (see Table 12.16), and one was a small foreign owned indep-
endent company. Also included were 6 Maltese compani9s - 5 private, and 
1 State owned and a variety of joint venture enterprises. Of the 16 
firms, 7 were Chemicals sector firms, 3 food and Beverages producers, 
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Table 12.16 Miscellaneous Sample Sector rirms, by Ownership. 
Type of firm Number of nrms Average Employment 
Subsidiaries of British MNCs 
Maltese (private) Companies 
Maltese (State) Companies 
Overseas Independents 
Joint Ventures 
Total 
2 
5 
1 
1 
7 
16 
-
705 
31 
166 
60 
153 
179 
and 4 paper, printing and packaging firms (see Table 12.17). Clearly 
this sample is not large enough to be representative of all non-textiles/ 
metals manufacturing industry in Malta. However, it does at least throw 
Table 12.17 Types of Miscellaneous Sample Sector rirms by Product 
Group. 
Type of rirm Number of rirms 
Chemicals and related Industry 
rood and Beverages 
Paper, Printing and Packaging 
Others 
Total 
7 
:5 
4 
2 
16 
-
some light upon some of the other activities that constitute the Maltese 
manufacturing sector. 
As can be seen from Table 12.16, the 2 subsidiary companies are by far 
the largest companies in the sample. They are both British owned firms, 
one of which manufactures bank notes (legally), the other speCialising 
in the production of rubber seals. The scale of the two companies' 
operations results in their dominance of this section of the sample, both 
in terms of employment and production. -Once again, however, ownership 
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data based on accumulated paid up share capital (see Table 12.18) are 
misleading. In this case, British controlled share capital accounts ror 
only 32% of the total, although British interests are apparently 
responsible for 61.0% and 57.1% of employment and production respectively. 
As has been the case in the other sectors, Maltese share capital data 
Table 12.18 Miscellaneous Sector SamEle - Summar): of OwnershiE and 
Control Data, b): Share Issue, £mEloyment and Output. 
Share Capital Prooortional Proportional 
Countries of Mt'OOO Allocation or Allocation of 
Origin Total Value % Labour force % Output M£'OOO % 
Malta (Total) 1,0:36 47.9 999 34.9 11,964 38.2 
Malta (state) 50 2.3 166 5.8 1,000 3.2 
Malta (Private) 986 45.6 833 29.1 10,964 35.0 
Great Britain 708 32.8 1,747 61.0 17,912 57.1 
Netherlands 330 15.3 60 2.1 500 1.6 
Switzerland 42 1.9 14 0.5 170 0.5 
Denmark 38 1.7 12 0.4 155 0.5 
Australia 1 0.1 11 0.4 494 1.6 
Austria 7 0.3 23 0.8 160 0.5 
TOTAL 2.162 100.0 2.866 100.0 31,355 100.0 
seems to overstate the control by Maltese interests of this sample of 
firms. Thus, Maltese interests account ror almost 50% or share capital, 
but only 34.9% of employment and 38.2% or gross output. Indeed, the 
small scale nature of much or the Maltese owned enterprise is confirmed 
by Table 12.16, which shows that the average workforce for Maltese private 
rirms is a meagre 31 persons - small compared with the 705 of the MNC 
subsidiaries in the sample sector. Nevertheless, Maltese ownership and 
control in the miscellaneous sector seems to be much more substantial 
than is the case in the 2 sectors diacussed previously. Exactly the 
same applies to 8ritish interests, which when combined with the Maltese 
allocations, account for a very large proportion of total share capital, 
employment and production. This pattern is probably similar to that 
prevalent in the entire manufacturing sector during the 1960s~and early 
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1970s, although early British interests were then possibly even more 
dominant. 
Time of arrival data (see figure 12.11) reveal a rather more diverse 
pattern than was the case in the textiles and metals sample sectors. 
Compared with the usual tendencies, the 2 British MNC subsidiaries are 
comparative latecomers, 1 arriving at the end of the PN admininstration 
in 1971, and the other taking over a dying Maltese/British joint 
venture in 1974. Interestingly, all but 4 of the 16 firms of the 
sample arrived before 1972, a fact which would seem to suggest that 
very little of the spectacular growth in Maltese manufacturing industry 
that occurred during the 1970s occurred outside the textiles and metals 
sectors. Most of the early arrivals were privately owned Maltese firms, 
including 1 which was established as early as 1B74. There seems to have 
been no discernible order to the arrival of Joint ventures, which 
arrived between 1948 and 1972. It is, however, significant that 6 out 
of the 7 Joint ventures have shared British and Maltese interests. It 
is also important to note that only 1 chemicals sector venture arrived 
after 1971, and that this particular enterprise was not dependent upon 
energy intensive activity. 
Many of the miscellaneous firms were not located on the Government 
industrial estates1• This was confirmed by the data collected concerning 
Government incentives (see Table 12.19). This reveals that only 10 out 
of the 16 firms were housed in Government factories, and that only 8 
1. In the early days of industrialisation, it is likely that the 
Governments' desire for overseas enterprise prompted them to ignore 
the indigenous sector, and to fail to provide premises on the 
estates for local firms. In addition, some local firms were formed 
before the industrial estates. 
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Figure 12.11 Year of Arrival" Ownership Data For The 
Miscellaneous Sample 
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Table 12.19 Miscellaneous Sector Sample - The Numbers of firms 
Receiving Government Incentives 
Incentives Number of firms 
factory Provision 10 
Cheap Rent 8 
Import Duty Concessions 10 
Grants 3 
Loans 2 
10 Year Tax Holiday 7 
Reinvestment Tax Allowance 2 
of these claimed that they benefitted from cheap rents. Similarly, only 
10 benefitted from import duty concessions, a fact ~hich indicates that 
several of the firms in the sample ~ere neither aided firms, nor 
registered exporters. The comparatively large number of recipients of 
tax holidays is a reflection of the large proportion of the sample that 
arrived before 1972. 
The employment structure of the Miscellaneous sample is radically 
different to the textiles and metals samples, indicating the lesser 
extent to which multinational capital has penetrated the sector. figure 
12.12 shows that 10 out of the 16 firms employed less than 100 persons, 
and that 6 of these employed less than 50. In addition, there were 
unusually few ventures employing workforces of between 100 and 400 (only 
3), whilst very large companies employed work forces of over 400. The 
latter group raised the average workforce for the sector to an 
unrepresentative 179. Two of the 3 firms were large British MNC subsid-
iaries, and the third a Maltese dominated beverage manufacturer with 
strong British interests. It is significant that all 5 private Maltese 
ventures employed less than 50. It is also significant that 6 out of 
the 7 chemicals sector ventures also employed less than 100 personnel. 
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Figure 12.12 Miscellaneous Sample Firms by Size of labour 
Force & Ownership 
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Figure 12.13 Miscellaneous Sample Firms by Sex Ratio of 
labour Force & Ownership 
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Sex ratio statistics for the various manufacturers in the sample also 
vary considerably from those of the metals and textiles sample. figure 
12.13 shows that 11 out of the 16 firms had workforces that were over 
50% male. Although there is no indication from figure 12.13 as to which 
particular industries are more male intensive, it seems safe to assume 
that the promotion of industries in this broad sector, instead of 
textiles and metals, is more likely to alleviate male unemployment. 
The proportion of the Miscellaneous sample's workforce that was male 
was an encouraging 65.6%, as compared with 22.1% and 48.9% of the 
textiles and metals sector samples respectively. 
Also of potential encouragement to the authorities was the tendency of 
the miscellaneous firms to pay higher weekly wages. Indeed, 8 out of 
the 16 paid a weekly wage of above ~£32.00 (see figure 12.14). In 
contrast to the other sectors of the sample, there is a strong 
relationship between the ownership of the various ventures and their 
wage rates. figure 12.14 shows conclusively that the smaller private 
Maltese ventures tend to pay their personnel very much less than the 
joint ventures, the British MNCs, and even the Maltese State owned 
enterprise. The average weekly wage of the miscellaneous sample is 
~£33.7B, a level considerably above the average M£26.0S and M£29.01 paid 
in the textiles and metals sector samples. Another interesting point is 
that no firms in the Miscellaneous category paid their workers the 
minimum wage. It is possible, therefore, that in this case, the 
presence of MNCs has led to a certain degree of competition for skilled 
male labour, which has in turn raised wage rates. 
The peak employment statistics for the miscellaneous firms reveal very 
little, and are consequently not worth ~ecounting in detail. It Is, 
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Figure 12.15 Per Cent Output Exported by Miscellaneous 
SamPle Firms 
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however, possibly significant that 4 out of the 8 firms that had passed 
a period of peak employment were Maltese private firms, 2 of which 
complained bitterly about the effects of cheap imports. The 1 British 
MNC subsidiary experiencing difficulties was being adversely affected 
by the high prices of energy and chemicals on which it depended, as well 
as its collapsing British markets. As a result of the difficulties 
being experienced in the U.K. by its British parent company, this firm 
was forced to resort to marketing its own product outside Great Britain. 
In general, the direction of the Miscellaneous exports was much more 
varied than was the case for the other sectors. This in turn has 
resulted in far less dependence upon E.E.C. markets. Four firms dealt 
predominantly with libyan customers, whilst 2 others exported all their 
produce to Middle Eastern customers. One particular food manufacturer 
specialised in the production of 'liquid dessert and instant foods' that 
could be eaten in some parts of the Middle East during Ramadan. Only 
2 firms exported all their produce to a single customer, one being a 
British MNC subsidiary supplying its parent company in Great Britain, 
and the other a Dutch independent manufacturer supplying a pharma-
ceuticals trader in the Netherlands. 
It seems that not only are the export destinetions of the Plscellaneous 
.ector sample more varied, but also that the linkages with the local 
economy are more substantial. Figure 12.15 .hows that 9 out of the 16 
firms questioned exported under 30% of their total output in 1979. Only 
3 firms, 2 of them the British MNCs, exported mora than 90% of their 
output. However, it seems to be the smaller companies that display 
low levels of exports, and usually the Maltese private~y owned ventures. 
Thus, rather than being indicativa of greater internal linkage, this 
distribution is possibly more a measure of the inability of many Maltese 
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ventures to establish their own external linkages and markets. Neverthe-
less, some industries, such as food and beverages, must be near their 
markets, and are therefore bound to be locally oriented. 
On balance, the data specifically on linkages is more encouraginQ. 
Although 13 out of the 16 respondents denied using locally produced 
materials and services in their production processes, half (8) of the 
sample claimed that they contributed directly to other manufacturer's 
production processes. Of the most significant itams mentioned were 
packaging materials, furniture, paint and rubber seals, all of which 
were manufactured by various firms in the sample. or the few items 
produced in Malta and used by the firms in the sample, bottlinQ access-
ories and furniture were the most important. Thus, although the 
linkages were more substantial than in the textiles and metals sectors, 
they were not well developed. 
Unfortunately, few generalisations can be made in the Miscellaneous 
sample concerning either equipment or training, Qiven the variety of the 
firms involved in the survey. However, the fact that most ara predomin-
antly concerned with the local markets has confined their access to new 
machinery, technology, information and markets. Similarly, training 
programmes in many of these firma are not coherent. This situation is 
reflected in the number of expatridtes employed by thesa firms. Nina 
of the sample employed no expatriates at all, the remaining 7 employing 
between 1 and 3. There was, however, 1 exception to this pattern. This 
was one of the 2 British MNC subsidiaries, which required as many as 9 
expatriates because of the extremely complex nature of the printinQ 
processes involved. As this company employed 550 highly paid personnel 
(by Maltese standards), the Maltese autborities were prepared to issue 
9 work permits without argument. 
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12.9 Respondents' Perceptions of Malta as an Industrial Location 
This section refers to data collected in the questionnaire in answer to 
the last questio~ which asked for comments on the respondent's views of 
Malta as an industrial location. The most common responses by far were 
those concerned with labour. Over half those questioned mentioned cheap 
labour as a major incentive, although a number of comments were made to 
the effect that recent wages rises imposed by the Government were 
eroding this particular advantage. Many also commented on the high 
quality of Maltese labour. This was usually explained in terms of 
adequate education, and a commitment to work. However, others were not 
so impressed, and a number of venomous complaints were received 
concerning the poor record of absenteeism amongst female workers in 
particular. 
One of the most encouraging comments received concerned industrial 
relations, which were in every case described as good. This may be 
explained by the negotiating abilities of the major Union, the General 
Workers Union (GWU), the fact that many Maltese workers realised the 
precariousness of their jobs, and the unending pressure put on the 
GWU by the MLP Governments in recent years. It seems, however, that 
some of the industrial harmony of which the Maltese were 80 proud in 
1980 has since disappeared amid continuous political chaos since 
December 1981. 
Several firms complained that there was a severe lack of suitably 
trained and educated management personnel in Malta. This, they claimed, 
has led to a need for expatriate personnal in their management structures. 
The Maltese Government, however, is not sympathetic to requests for 
expatriate work permits, a stance which has caused ill will in the past. 
Many firms also complain about the petty bureaucracy of Government 
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departments, which seem to specialise in withdrawing import licences. 
One of the managing director's office was covered with import licence 
request forms impeccably stamped with enormous 'Rejected' stamps in 
red ink. His attempts at placing his usual orders for acrylic yarn with 
french and then Israeli producers had been blocked by the Government 
for political reasons. He claimed that he was being forced out of 
business. 
Several of the respondents commented about what they described as 
Malta's political .. stability. This, and the various Government 
incentives provided since 1959,were said to complement cheap labour 
as Malta's great advantages and attractions for industrialists. Sadly, 
although this may have been the case in 1980, political instability 
has persisted since the general elections of 1981. furthermore, the 
stable currency described by a number of producers as an advantage 
has received increasing criticism in recent years, particularly from 
Japanese producers, who clearly have their own ideas as to how a 
currency should be manipulated. 
The Japanese, nevertheless, were quick to appreciate the Maltese 
location's advantages as far as E.E.C. tariffs were concerned. Malta's 
associate E.E.C. membership had definitely allowed them easy access 
to European Economic Community countries. They did, however, express 
disappointment at the limited nature of the internal market in Malta. 
Meanwhile, one British manufacturer stated pleasure at the flexible 
nature of his Maltese workforce, which was probably a result of Malta's 
'industrial youth'. Thus, typically British problems such as job 
demarcation were never a problem. In contrast, another British 
manufacturer complained that the Maltese did not have sufficient 
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industrial psychology behind their work, a problem he too attributed 
to Malta's industrial youth. 
Of the endowed advantages, location was mentioned most frequently. 
More often than not, it was mentioned favourably, particularly with 
reference to climate and associated advantages, such as low heating 
costs. There were, neverthless, many complaints about the cost and 
reliability of shipping. The fact that Malta depends on multi-
destination cargo vessels causes problems as they are usually totally 
dependent upon the unreliable Italian ports. The latter are very 
frequently strike-bound, in addition to which Maltese cargos are often 
pilfered. This results in the need for many firms to hold very large 
stocks of materials to ensure uninterrupted production. Unfortunately, 
these problems have not been solved by the creation of the State 
shipping line, 'Sea Malta', which has continued to operate at a 
substantial loss. Consequently, the Maltese Government is placing great 
faith in the completion of a container based transhipment port in the 
southern harbour of Marsaxlokk, which it is hoped will not only reduce 
dependence upon the Italian ports, but may also take much of their 
business. 
Two of the more interesting complaints concerned the Government built 
factories themselves. In one, the dust emanating from the Globigerina 
Limestone masonry caused severe problems in the manufacture of micro-
circuitry. This revelation was made late on in the survey, and it was 
too late to enquire elsewhere in other electronics factories. The 
other case illustrates the potentially rediculous nature of the 
Government's more petty bureaucracy. One particular firm wished to 
retain one of its expatriate work permits, but was refused permission 
as a 'punishment' for not building a water saving cistern beneath its 
factory, as the law has dictated in Malta for many decades. The 
management found it difficult to sympathise with this decision as it 
was the Government that had originally built the factory. 
In conclusion, perhaps the most important factor mentioned by the 
respondents was that of language. This originally acted as an 
attraction for British firms interested in overseas production locations, 
and has since encouraged West German enterprise as well, largely because 
of the widespread knowledge of English in West Germany. It was even 
noticable that in ~a number of cases, West German companies had employed 
British expatriate personnel. 
Generally speaking, the responses to the question on Malta as an 
industrial location were positive and optimistic. Sadly, given the 
recent unpleasant political events, it is likely that, if the question 
were repeated in 1983, the majority of responses would be much more 
negative. 
12.10 Conclusions 
The questionnaire survey has helped to show the enormous extent to 
which Maltese manufacturing industry is dominated by overseas enterprise. 
In the case of the dominant textiles .ector, 10 out of the 25 firms in 
the sample were MNC subsidiaries. In turn, the textiles sector itself 
has been shown to be dominated by clothing firms. MNC clothing firms 
may therefore be seen as forming a substantial part of the Maltese 
economy, a position which is enhanced by the fact that such enterprises 
display much the greatest employment and output levels of the manuf-
acturing sector. 
The extent of foreign ownership in the textiles sector indicates that 
the control of a large proportion of Maltese manufacturing capacity is 
in foreign hands, and that the operations of the sector are thus likely 
to be directed in the interests of overseas corporations, as opposed 
to Malta herself. The loss of Maltese control occurred during both 
the PN and the MLP phases of government, when industrial incentives were 
used to encourage overseas firms to locate in Malta. However, although 
some of the incentives were important, cheap, plentiful and high quality 
labour was perceived by most respondents as being the most important 
reason for choosing a Maltese location. 
Several phases of overseas involvement may be identified. In the 
early days of independence of the mid 1960s, few overseas investors chose 
Malta as a location for offshore industries. Thera then occurred in 
the late 1960s an influx of British capital, a fact that is well 
illustrated by the comparatively early arrival dates of many British 
firms in the survey. In the 1970s, other (.E.t. countries, especially 
West Germany, contributed more fully to Maltese industry, whilst British 
interests declined in importance. Simuhaneously, other sources of 
investment such as Libya, and Just as important, the Maltese Stata, 
began to make an impact upon the manufacturing sector. 
The extent of foreign dominance is well illustrsted by the ownership 
statistics for the textiles sector. In this cass, strong American 
investments were detected, in addition to which West Germany, Great 
Britain and Sweden displayed substantial involvement. The most 
important feature of the ownership tables was the fact that Maltese 
share holding statistics seriously overestimated Maltese control of 
output and employment in the sector. This is important as the Maltese 
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authorities continue to choose accumulated share capital statistics to 
measure the degree of foreign ownership and control of manufacturing. 
Perhaps the most important feature of the textiles sector was the fact 
that it appeared to be almost entirely export oriented. In 16 out of 
the 25 firms that responded to the questionnaire, over 90% of output was 
exported. Simultaneously, the same firms claimed that they neither 
received nor provided materials from or for other producers operating 
in Malta. MNC textiles sector enterprise therefore acts as an isolated 
export oriented enclave within the Maltese economy. More alarming 
still is the complete absence of autonomous marketing within the 
textiles sector. Most export trade is concentrated not only within 
single countries, but also with single customers. Such customers are 
often the subsidiaries' parent companies, but are also often independent 
organisations that subcontract their production requi~ements. This 
explains the extremely disturbing tendency for even the Maltese owned 
ventures to concentrate on performing subcontracting work for overseas 
companies. This type of arrangement induces the most serious vulner-
ability of all. 
So far, attempts at improving the local linkages within the textiles 
sector have failed, the state inspired spinning and weaving project 
meeting early difficulties. It is extremely unfortunate that the other 
dynamic area of " Maltese manufacturing industry, the metals sector, is 
in a similar position to that of the textiles sector. Metals are also 
dominated in some measure by MNC subsidiaries, and have also 1n turn 
been dominated by the arrival of electronics firms in the last 15 years. 
Ironically, it seems that technological i~stability within the 
electronics sub-sector render such industries more volatile than textiles 
sector activity. This point is well illustrated by the closure of 
the British owned Plessey subsidiary at San Gwann in Malta during 
early 1981. 
Ownership data for the metals sector reveal a similar pattern to those 
of the textiles sector in the survey. Once again, early arrivals in 
Malta were mostly British, but during the 1970s, West German and other 
E.E.C. interests have grown, whilst British interests have, in relative 
terms at least, declined. Also of great importance were Japanese 
(electronics) ventures that located with the speCifiC intention of 
exploiting E.E.C. markets. Share ownership figures again overestimated 
the Maltese control of employment and production in the sector. In 
reality. West German interests dominated the sample, with Japanese 
interests also assuming a strong position. 
As was the case with the textiles sector, most of the firms (12 out of 
15) exported over 90% of their output. Most of the exports found their 
way to E.E.C. destinations, although single customer concentrations were 
not quite so severe. Nevertheless, the severe lack of linkages within 
the internal economy remained extremely disturbing. Given the more 
complex industrial processes involved, the metals activities were more 
prone than textiles to the breakdown of production into staged, isolated 
and widely distributed production units. This is well illustrated by 
the tendency of most of the firms operating in Malta to concentrate on 
the part assembly of sub-units of equipment from ready made components. 
The Maltese experience has shown that subsidiary companies dependent 
upon this type of activity are most prone to technological obsolescence, 
a short lifespan, and early closure by parent organisations. 
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The Miscellaneous sector of the questionnaire sample survey shows a 
more encouraging internal structure. In this case, there were only 
2 MNC subsidiary plants, although their enormity in comparison with the 
other firms in the sample affected the ownership data. Thus, although 
Maltese share ownership figures were prominent, the 2 MNCs ensured that 
British interests were once again dominant, if understated. Meanwhile, 
much encouragement was to be found from the fact that the ~iscellaneous 
activities paid higher wages than the sectors already covered, and 
that they also tended to be much more male intensive. 
The Miscellaneous activities also displayed far more substantial linkages 
with .the local economy. Nine out of the 16 firms of the sample exported 
less than 30% of their output1• furthermore, of the production that was 
exported, far less was confined to single customers within the E.E.C. 
The more diversified markets included North African and Middle Eastern 
customers. This, and the characteristics stated earlier indicate that 
if an economic diversification policy concentrated on selectively 
expanding the Miscellaneous sector, then improvements in wages, export 
diversification, the provision of more jobs for males, and much improved 
local linkages, would possibly ensue. It is, however, no coincidence 
that ~iscellaneous activities have been most difficult to encourage, and 
that the textiles and electronics manufacturers have~tablished themselves 
so easily. It must not be forgotten that, although a severely distorted 
and unstable industrial structure has resulted from overseas domination 
of ~altese industrialisation, without such overseas involvement, very 
little industrialisation of any kind could have occurred. 
-
1. This was at least partly a result of the fact that a larger proportion 
of the firms in this section of the sample were unaided. 
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Meanwhile, the extent of MNC control over Maltese manufacturing industry, 
and its export based orientation, has further exacerbated the internal 
linkage problem. Malta therefore does not have an industrial base as 
such. Instead, she has a collection of industrial units which are linked 
only to external organisations and markets. In the few instances where 
internal linkages exist, the producers involved tend to be small, 
Maltese owned enterprises. In such cases, the confinement to locally 
based activity is possibly more due to the inability of the Maltese 
entrepreneur to establish export markets than his wish to exploit internal 
markets. 
There therefore exists within Maltese manufacturing a dual structure. 
The modern half of the sector, dominated as it is by MNC subsidiaries, 
is externally oriented, and is poorly integrated with the host economy 
in which it is located. The traditional half of the sector consists of 
small scale activity that 1s confined to exploiting local markets. The 
2 external and internal structures rarely interact, although they operate 
side by side within the same territory. Such dual structures are often 
seen as an undesirable consequence of dependence. However, the 2 
sectors are not entirely incompatible, despite their lack of complement-
arity. 
Dependence in the manufacturing sector may also be seen as emanating 
strongly from the ownership structure of the sector which, as has been 
observed, is dominated by British and West German MNCs. A large propor-
tion of manufacturing employment and production is therefore overseas 
controlled. The overseas control has helped to generate concentrations 
of employment, output and markets in the textiles and electronics 
activities in particular. Dependence upon such concentrations is deeply 
undesirable because of the potential vulnerability that they induce in 
the face of fluctuations in the world markets. 
On a positive note, there are advantages associated with the maintenance 
of a dual structure in manufacturing. In particular, it must be 
recognised that there are both potential positive and negative multiplier 
effects associated with industrial activity. Thus, the lack of internal 
linkages in Malta has caused disappointment because of the loss of much 
desired positive multiplier effects. However, it must be recognised 
that in the difficult recessionary period in Malta that has occurred 
since the 1980 survey, the lack of internal linkages has prevented 
numerous factory closures from inflicting far more serious damage upon 
the Maltese economy as a whole. Consequently, the type of 'dominoe 
effect'associated with the collapse of the car manufacturing industry 
in the West MidlarnEof England has not occurred in Malta. 
Oespite this encouraging observation, it must be said that the distorted 
dual structure of Maltese manufacturing,industry has inevitably resulted 
in continued economic instability within the Maltese economy as a whole. 
Inevitably, this has led to great faith being placed in the fortunes 
of Malta's tourist industry, the progress of which 1s discussed 1n the 
next chapter (Chapter Thirteen). 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: TOURISM IN MALTA 
13.1 Introduction 
The distorted structure and potential instability of the manufacturing 
sector of the Maltese economy has encouraged many to place their faith in 
the development of tourism. Tourism seems to be one of the few activities 
to which the Islands are genuinely suited. The hot, dry climate 
(especially in the summer months) is ideally suited to the demands and 
tastes of the Northern European tourist markets. rurthermore, the large 
numbers of premises vacated by the British and NATO armed forces between 
1957 and 1979 have often proved to be easily convertible to provide 
tourist services and accommodation (see Plates 13.1 and 13.2). There 1s 
also no doubt that one of the more fortunate effects of the long period 
of British military dominance was the d~ortion of the economy in favour 
of the provision of services to 'guest populations'. During the last 
2 decades, it seems that it has not been difficult for the Maltese to 
adjust their services towards the demands of the tourist markets. 
Since 1966, tourism in Malta has blossomed, and during the mid-1970s, 
it expanded faster than any of its competitors in the Mediterranean 
Basin (see rigure 13.1). Annual tourist arrivals in Malta increased 
from 170,853 in 1970 to 728,732 during 1980, an extraordinary increase 
of 327% (Central Bank of Malta 1981). The sudden and apparently 
successful evolution of Malta's tourist status is well lllustrated by 
the fact that in 1981, Malta was the sixth most popular overseas holiday 
destination of British holiday-makers (The Times 24/8/1981). However, 
the very fact that British tourists in particular are flowing to Malta 
in such large numbers is one of the many problems currently facing the 
Maltese tourist authorities. Indeed, such is the scale of British 
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PLATE 13.1 II Fortiza, 51i8ma, Malta . Thi s coastal fort, built during 
the rule of the Knights of St. John, illustrates the way in 
which old military installations can be conv erted for us e 
in the tourist sector. It is now a tastefully converted 
public bar and pizzeria. 
PLATE 13.2 Tower Road, Sliema, Malta . Many of these buildings , which 
can be found on t he waterfront at Sliema, were British 
officers' quarte r s during the period of Briti s h colonial 
rule . Some have since bee n s ucces s fully converted to hote ls , 
or self-catering accommodation , thereby au gmenting the 
ca paci ty of the Maltese tourist sector . 
involvement in the Maltese tourist sector that it is now more than 
apparent that the Maltese have merely transformed their economy from 
one dedicated to the service of British military installations and 
personnel to an economy heavily dependent upon the British tourist 
markets. 
There is little doubt that such severe dependence upon the one market 
enhances the Maltese tourist industry's vulnerability to damaging 
fluctuations in fortune, and raises questions as to the wisdom behind 
such tourist-oriented development. The threat of wild fluctuations in 
annual tourist arrivals, the control of tourist enterprises by overseas 
tour operators, the rigid seasonality of tourist activity, and the vuln-
erability of the industry to international financial and political 
pressures, are all associated with the heavy dependence of a tourist 
industry upon one market source. In addition, political instability 
within Malta herself Jeopardises still further the long term stability 
of the industry. 
rurther examination of the tourist industry reveals that the development 
of tourism is not always as fruitful as economists such as Metwally 
(1977) have suggested. ror example, heavy overseas investment in 
tourist accommodation, travel and administration not only signifies a 
lack of indigenous control over the tourist sector, but also indicates 
that a large portion of profits emanating from Maltese tourism are being 
repatriated to foreign investors. In addition, new investment in tourist 
accommodation now favours non-hotel accommodation, reducing the employ-
ment benefits normally associated with such developments. Meanwhile, 
tourist expenditure, much encouraged as it is, not only tends to have 
an extremely high import content, but also tends to fuel domestic 
inflation. finally, in conjunction with the hidden economic penalties 
of tourist development are numerous social and cultural inrluences 
which, whilst not being by any means wholly detrimental, have neverthe-
less had profound effects upon ~altese society. 
This chapter attempts to analyse the development of the ~altese tourist 
industry since independence, and tries to draw parallels with concurrent 
developments in the manufacturing sector. In particular, characteristics 
of both sectors, such as their fragility, their market concentration, 
and the strong influence of multinational capital penetration, deserve 
attention. furthermore, it is significant that both sectors have since 
1981 suffered reversals in fortune. In the case or tourism, it is there-
fore possible to assess some ideas concerning cycles of tourist devel-
opment which help to explain the current downward trends in ~alta. 
13.2 A Brief History of ~altese Tourism 
In view or the excellent climate and accessibility or the ~altese 
Islands, the first development plan proceeded to describe tourism as, 
•••• an indispensible part of the general plan for the diversification of 
the economy' (Office of the Prime Minister 1959, p.37). Oespite the 
verbal emphasis on tourism within the Plan, financial emphasis was far 
from generous as only 1.1% of the total capital programme was directed 
towards tourism development. ~oreover, although a mid-plan revision 
substantially increased this allocation, only one fifth of the available 
funds were consumed, and only 3% of the budgeted assistance to hotels was 
utilised (Central Bank of Malta 1980). The second development plan 
placed great emphasis on the need for hotel accommodation (see Plate 13.3). 
Consequently, the capital allocation to tourism was increased to 10% of 
the entire programme, of which 60% was absorbed by hotel development 
(Office of the Prime Minister 1964). An attraction policy similar to 
3~ 
PLATE 13 . 3 A New Hote l Und e r 
Co ns tructi on in 51iema , Mal t a . 
~a l tese hotel ca pacity was 
s till expanding in 1982 , 
despite seri ous sho r tfalls 
expe rienced in the num be r s o f 
annual to uri st a rriva l s sinc e 
198 0 . 
PLATE 13 . 4 A Tourist Complex a t Melli eha Bay , Ma lta . Some tourist 
developments in Ma lta are renowned for poor pl a nning , a nd 
their failure to blend into the existing l a nd s cap es . Thi s 
pa rticula r tourist complex i s a case i n po int . 
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that operated in the manufacturing sector was implemented. Overseas 
investors were attracted through the provision of 10 year tax holidays, 
grants and soft loans, and duty free imports of vital materials and 
hotel fixtures and equipment. 
In contrast to the experiences of the first Plan, 88% of the second 
Plan's grant allocation to tourism was consumed as Maltese tourism began 
to gather momentum. Hotel employment increased from 766 in 1964 to 2,778 
in 1969 (Central Bank of Malta 1980 ), whilst direct and indirect 
employment in tourism was estimated to have risen from 7,350 to 9,810 in 
the same period (Office of the Prime Minister 1970). The 65 new hotels 
to begin operations, of which 17 were grant aided, provided a further 
5,202 beds, an increase of 22L~ (Central Bank of Malta 1980 ), and it 
was estimated that tourist foreign excharige earnings as a proportion of 
gross invisible exports swelled from 5.7% in 1964 to 22.9~ in 1969. 
The Maltese Government was generally pleased with the performance of the 
second development plan, and therefore announced in the third development 
plan (1969-74) that, 'It will be Government policy to continue nursing 
the tourist sector broadly along the lines already established'(Office 
of the Prime Minister 1970, p.S7). The P'lan proceeded to state that, 
'The large multiplier effect of tourism continues to make this sector a 
rewarding avenue for investment and a main element 1n the Government's 
policy of development through diversification' (Office of the Prime 
Minister 1970, p.89). However, in response to a definite over-capacity 
in hotels, hotels assistance was cut. Most significant was that, for 
the first time, the heavy dependence on the British markets was recogn-
ised as a major problem. Already, British tourists were accounting for 
between 65% and 75% of total tourist arrivals (see rigure 13.2). The 
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intention was, therefore, to continue to enhance the flow of tourists 
from Great Britain, but to encourage far more vigourously the flows 
of visitors from other countries. 
The third development plan was aborted 2 years before its expiry date 
by the new MLP Government under the leadership of Mr. Mintoff, elected 
in 1971. Adopting a broader concept of development in the fourth devel-
opment plan (1973-80) (Boissevain 1977a), the MLP administration placed 
greater emphasis on diversification of markets away from British tourists. 
Simultaneously, the PN's incentive schemes were abolished for both 
practical and ideological reasons. Attempts were also made to spread 
the tourist season into the less popular months, thereby reducing the 
seasonality problem. 
As a result of the new policies, most funds (90%) provided by the Plan 
were directed into advertising and promotion campaigns, which were 
concentrated to a far greater extent in Western European and Northern 
European countries (except Great Britain), and which attempted to 
encourage off-peak holidays (Office of the Prime Minister 1973). There 
were also attempts to encourage business from the more affluent, less 
voluminous tourist markets, particularly in West GermanY1. Despite 
these heavily publicised efforts, tourist arrivals had risen still fur-
ther to 728,732 in 1980, an astonishing 76.5% of which were British 
(see figures 13.2 and 13.3). Since 1980, declines in tourist arrivals 
have been recorded. In 1981, a small decline of 3.2% was registered 
(Central Bank of Malta 1982), and in the first 4 months of 1982, tourist 
arrivals were down 24% on the previous year's figures. As will be 
shown shortly, these declines are entirely attributable to negative 
1. It was felt that the propogation of' less voluminous, high spending 
tourist markets was preferable to the attraction of larger numbers 
of low spending tourists. 
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1978 1980 ~rs 
fluctuations in the British tourist markets. 
13.3 Phases of Tourist Industry Development 
figure 13.3 shows the enormous extent to which the Maltese tourist 
industry has grown since 1960, especially during the mid and late 19706. 
The years between 1960 and 1980 have been divided in the diagram into 
4 different phases which will shortly be compared with models of tourist 
development proposed by Butler (1980) and Keller (1983). During Phase 1, 
which includes the years immediately before and after independence, 
little development occurred. Although the annual increase in tourist 
arrivals averaged 27% in this period, this growth was from a very low 
base indeed. Capital investment in tourism was extremely low, and 
infrastructure and accommodation remained scarce, unorganised and 
fragmented. 
In Phase 2 (1966-69), there was a marked acceleration in the growth of 
Maltese tourism, amounting to an average annual increase in tourist 
arrivals of 40%. Almost all European sources increased their particip-
ation in Maltese tourism, but the British market share was ultimately 
responsible for the bulk of the increases (see figures 13.2 and 13.3). 
The third phase of development (1970-72) was characterised by severe 
shortfalls in the tourist inflow, once again, entirely attributable to 
fluctuations in the British markets. In ~hase 4 (1973-80), there occurred 
an extraordinary advance of tourism, predictably fuelled by a sudden 
surge of British tourists. By 1980, the annual intake of tourists was 
in excess of twice the population of the Maltese Archipelago. Since 
1980, there has been what appears to be a sharp decline, the dimensions 
of which are not yet fully known outside Maltese Government circles. 
385 
The Maltese experience seems to fit quite neatly into the 3 phases 
of tourism on which Butler (1980) based his analyses1• These involve 
a sequence of phases of 'discovery', 'local response and initiative', 
and 'institutionalised institutionalisation'. Butler proceeded to 
develop his own sequence of phases based on the growth of the volume of 
tourism through time (see Figure 13.4). The first phase of 'exploration' 
involves small numbers of tourists who are provided with few specialist 
facilities, and who are therefore not segregated from the local populace. 
Their presence has little influence upon the human environment. This 
stage conforms with the experiences of Malta between 1960 and 1965 
(Phase 1). 
Butler's (19BO) second, third and fourth stages of 'involvement', 
'development' and 'consolidation' occurred in Malta between 1965 and 
1980. Defining the individual stages during this period in Malta is 
not easy, and is not necessary. However, the occurrences within these 
phases are very significant. Butler identifies the stage of , involvement , 
as being one in which local interests and authorities begin to lose 
control of the tourist industry to external interests and institutions. 
In the Maltese case, this is demonstrated by the effects of the PN's 
policy of encouraging (with the assistance of financial incentives) 
overseas investors to build hotels and other tourist facilities 1n Malta. 
By applying Butler's model , it can be seen that during the 'development' 
stage, local involvement and control began to decline rapidly in Malta 
as locally provided facilities were eliminated by larger scale, more 
elaborate facilities provided by multinational organisations. The 
tourists became 'institutionalised', arriving in increasing numbers, and 
1. Butler states that he based these ideas on Norhona, R. (1976). 
'Review of the Sociological Literature on Tourism.' New York: World 
Bank. 
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taking advantage of package deals. With the onset of mass tourism, the 
natural and cultural features which originally encouraged the tourism 
were increasingly dwarfed or destroyed by the new institutionalised 
facilities, which themselves became the major tourist attractions to 
many visitors. 
By the'consolidation' stage, efforts are usually being made to eradicate 
the very serious problems of seasonality and market concentration. There 
are also often serious problems as the tourists become increasingly 
segregated from the indigenous populace, which is often displaced in 
favour of the all important tourist. The friction that often develops 
between the tourists and the indigenous population is often serious, 
and in the long term, damaging to the tourist industry. 
rortunately, the Maltese experience does not seem to have been as 
negative as has been the case in"for example, the Caribbean, where the 
hostility of local people towards the tourists has severely damaged the 
industry. However, the influx of overseas capital into Malta, during 
the 1960s especially, caused very serious social problems. In particu-
lar, the property boom induced by British property speculators excluded 
most Maltese from buying their own property (see Chapter Seven). Oespite 
this, the segregation problems experienced elsewhere were not encountered 
in Malta, although most tourist activity is concentrated in the northern 
half of the main island. This was in part due to the fact that most 
Maltese speak English,'and that most tourists are British. Also, the 
cultural compatibility of the tourist and native groups is important. 
Almost 200 years of servicing the British military facilities has clearly 
had effects that have, on balance, positively influenced the attitude of 
the Maltese to the predominantly British visitors. Consequently, Malta 
herself remains a tourist attraction as much as the new tourist facilities 
~8 
provided by the MNCs. 
Keller (1983) states that it is during the period of dynamic growth 
(Butler's Involvement, Development and Consolidation stages) that the 
tourist sectors of the peripheral countries are taken over by the 
developed metropolitan centres. In the Maltese case, this occurred 
between 1966 and 1980. During this period, hotels were built with the 
assistance of overseas investors. This has resulted in extensive 
overseas ownership and control of Maltese hotel capacity (see Table 13.2). 
In addition, the airlines and package tour operators tended also to be 
predominantly foreign (British) owned, the consequences of which will 
be discussed shortly. Keller (1983) has produced his own model of the 
stages of tourism (see figure 13.5) which seems to fit the Maltese case 
very well. According to his scheme, Malta's tourist industry has, for a 
number of years, been under international control. He goes on to support 
Butler's (1980) view that such external control tends to detract heavily 
from the benefits of tourist activity in the periphery. Once again, this 
conclusion would seem to apply in the Maltese case, and will be examined 
more closely later in this chapter. 
Returning to Butler's (1980) stages of development, following 'develop-
ment' and 'consolidation', there occurs a stage of 'stagnation' in the 
development process, after which 'decline' becomes a likely possibility. 
Decline occurs when the tourist centre is no longer able to compete with 
newer and more dynamic tourist attractions elsewhere. Tourists therefore 
become fewer, and stay for shorter periods. Butler also states that a 
change of image and attractions, or the exploitation of new untapped 
natural attractions,may induce a rejuvenation instead of decline. The 
important point here is that, because th~ tourist industry is by this stage 
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beyond the control of indigenous businesses and the national authorities, 
it is often only the controlling overseas enterprises that are in a 
position to invest in the required rejuvenation. In many cases, it is 
far easier, and far more lucrative, to transfer their business to newer 
and more attractive venues. Thus, multinational companies operating 
within the tourist industries operate in a fashion similar to their 
counterparts in manufacturing industry. In both cases, activity can be 
transferred to more prof.itable areas, much to the detriment of the 
original locations. Recovery from reversals experienced in tourist 
activity is therefore likely to be extremely difficult unless some degree 
of indigenous control is rapidly re-established. 
This situation can, unfortunately, be applied to Malta. Statistics for 
the first 4 months of 19821 show that tourist arrivals had fallen by 
almost one quarter. This represents an enormous decline by any standards, 
and was caused primarily by the withdrawal of a number of tour operators 
from Maltese operations. The Maltese authorities, already concerned at 
the effects of the recession upon the tourist industry, were powerless 
to prevent this sudden contraction in business. Attempts are being made 
by the State to recover some of the lost markets, but a lack of control, 
especially in the field of marketing. remains the major obstacle preventing 
a reversal of the decline. At the heart of the problem is the fact that 
the overseas control has led to the complete dominance or one tourist 
market - Great Britain. The effects of this dominance will be examined 
in the next section. 
1. Although this period represents only a small part of 1982, reports 
from Malta (particularly in Maltese newspapers) indicate that the 
initiallosses'were consistent with those of the rest of the year. 
If any recovery was achieved, it was" done so with the assistance of 
cut price holidays,-which inevitably have further reduced the benefits 
accruing from tourism in Malta. 
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13.4 The Problem of Dependence on the British Market 
The strong dependence of the Maltese tourist industry upon the British 
tourist market means that apparently minor political and economic 
decisions made in Great Britain may have major repercussions in Malta. 
Thus, the decision by the British Government in 1966 to place aLSO 
restriction on Sterling taken outside the Sterling Area was a boost to 
Malta's economy because of Malta's inclusion within the Sterling Area. 
This measure was partly responsible for the substantial growth in 
tourist arrivals that occurred between 1966 and 1969 (see figure 13.3). 
However, perhaps more significant was the British Government's decision 
4 years later to raise the limit to L300, a move which allowed British 
tourists to travel elsewhere, and which simul taneously helped to reduce 
the number of tourist visitors to Malta from Great Britain in the 12 
months between January 1970 and 1971 by nearly 10% (Central Bank 'or Malta 
1980 ). 
The dominance of Maltese tourism by British tourists has also become a 
political problem. As is well illustrated by the decisions concerning 
sterling restrictions, a hostile British Government could quite easily 
impose specific restrictions upon British tourists with the intention 
of persuading a Maltese Government to alter policy. Given Malta's gao-
strategic value, this could be crucial should the Maltese wish, for 
example, to adopt a less pro-Western attitude. Thus, as a result or the 
close links that continue to perpetuate the SUbstantial dependence of 
Malta upon Great Britain, it is likely that any 'de-linking' strategy 
attempted by Malta may be greeted with suitable hostile and persuasive 
counter-measures. 
This type of situation appears to have occurred in some measure during 
the early 1970s when Malta's new Prime Minister, Mr. Mintorf, was engaged 
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in aggressive negotiations over the rent and continuation of the British 
and NATO bases on the Islands. Destructive publicity in Great Britain, 
and corresponding losses of confidence of tour operators in Malta 
resulted in a fall in tourist arrivals between 1971 and 1972 of 16%, and 
a drop of the British tourists' share of total tourist arrivals to a 
trough of 50% (see Figures 13.2 and 13.3). 
Perhaps more disturbing than deliberate interference are the seemingly 
uncontrollable fluctuations in economic fortune that influence the 
British economy, which during the late 1970s and early 1980s has been 
afflicted by a severe and continually worsening recession. The dangerous 
potential of the dependence of Maltese tourism on Great Britain was well 
illustrated by the collapse of 2 major tour operators in the early 1970s, 
the consequences of which added to the problems afflicting the Maltese 
tourist industry at that time. It was during this pariod that the 
decision was made to end the Malta Pound's parity with Sterling, a move 
which prevented the Maltese economy from being adversely affected by 
huge variations in the international value of Sterling. The value of 
the Malta Pound is now determined by the Central Bank of Malta using a 
mystery 'basket' of foreign currencies. 
In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the number of British visitors 
to Malta rose so sharply during the 1970s, especially in view of the 
recession conditions afflicting the British markets. When the first 
signs of decline appeared in 1981, they came as no surprise. However, 
a drop of one quarter in the first 4 months of 1982 was extremely 
alarming, and showed that it was possible for tourism to contract as fast 
as it had grown. On top of the recessionary conditions (which have proved 
to be most damaging to the mass tourist ·classes on which much of the 
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Maltese tourist industry depends), strong competition from other 
Mediterranean resort countries (such as Greece), and an apparently 
over-valued Malta Pound, are the most common explanations for the 
current crisis. Also of importance is the damage done to the valuable 
regular returnee tourist market by the chronic summer water shortages 
which were worse than ever during 1981. In this context, it could be 
said that, to some extent, the over-development of Maltese tourism has 
led to the destruction of the Islands' major attractions. 
Solving the water problem is relatively simple compared with eradicating 
British market dominance. Indeed, the construction of a reverse osmosis 
desalination plant has already alleviated the water crisis to a consider-
able degree. In comparison, the continuous attempts during the last 15 
years to diversify the tourist markets have failed miserably. The 
Central Bank of Malta (1980 , p.26) explains that, ' ••• the diversifica-
tion programme is often frustrated in the brisk years by the aggressive-
ness displayed by British tour operators in securing allocations of beds, 
and by their strong bargaining position vis a vis hoteliers and owners 
of holiday premises.' Thus, in the years of most vigo rously attempted 
diversification, the British share of tourist arrivals soared from 61% in 
1971 to 76.5% in 1980 (see rigure 13.2). In the same period, Italy, the 
second largest tourist market, retained her second position, but exper-
ienced a slump from 10% to a meagre 3.7~ of total tourist intake. 
Meanwhile, West Germany, one of the priority target areas of the divers-
ification publicity programme, never accounted for more than 6.3~ of 
tourist arrivals, providing only 2.6% of tourists in 1980. 
The destructive potential of the British market dominance is perhaps 
best illustrated by tourist arrival statistics for each of the first 4 
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months of 1982 (see Table 13.1). These show that there was a decline 
of 24.1% in total tourist arrivals on the first 4 months of 1981. 
further examination of the statistics reveals that the decline in 
British tourists represented no less than 96.8% of the total decline in 
tourist arrivals. Moreover, in 2 of the 4 months under scrutiny, the 
British decline was larger than the total decline in tourist arrivals, 
Table 13.1 Tourist Arrival Data for January - April 1982 
Total Tourist Arrivals 
Total Decline ~ 
Months Arrivals on 1981 Decline 
January 20,257 -6,757 -25.0 
february 22,670 -10,256 -31.1 
March 38,151 -8,256 -18.0 
April 42,200 -13,847 -24.7 
Total 123,278 -39,217 -24.1 
British Arrivals 
Decline 
on 1981 
-7,505 
-10,008 
-8,777 
-11,666 
-37,956 
,. 
j 
Decline 
-:39.:3 
-43.9 
-27.4 
-31.7 
-34.1 
U.K. Decline 
as % of Total 
Decline 
111.1 
97.6 
105.0 
84.0 
96.8 
-. 
indicating that decline in the British market more than cancelled out the 
encouraging advances of other markets. It seems that the British market 
declined by over one third during this period. If sustained during the 
remainder of 1982, this decline must have severely damaged the Maltese 
economy as a whole. 
On top of the problem of falling tourist numbers is one of declining 
benefits from tourist activity. This will be discussed 1n the next 
section of this chapter. 
13.5 The Economic Value of Tourism 
In supporting a new tourist sector, successive Maltese Governments have 
generally assumed that widespread benefits will ensue, far outweighing 
the economic, social and cultural costs incurred. Of the benefits of 
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tourism, new employment is seen as one of the most important. for 
example, employment in hotels alone has risen from 438 in 1960 to 5,159 
in 1980 (see figure 13.6). However, the hotels sector in particular 
performed disappointingly after impressive employment growth in the 
late 1960s. Part of the problem was identified as that of the seasonal 
nature of the trade, which resulted in the reluctance of hotels and 
other tourist businesses to take on extra permanent staff. 
Much of the seasonality problem emanated from the traditional rigid 
preference of the dominant British tourist markets for the hot summer 
months. The problem has been alleviated slightly by the introduction of 
cheap off-peak holidays which have appealed to the recession afflicted 
British tourists. More important has been the Maltese Government's 
introduction of laws determining minimum staff levels in hotels. Under 
the new legislation, high class hotels are obliged to maintain staff/bed 
ratios that are substantially greater than is the case in the less 
exotic hotel categories. The new laws have greatly improved the hotel 
employment levels since 1975 (see figure 13.6). This type of legislation 
illustrates well the potential of carefully conceived Government inter-
vention. 
Hotels are not the only source of new employment within the tourist 
sector. Examples of new jobs emerging from tourist related services 
include those in catering establishments, which rose by 59% between 
January 1978 and September 1980 (Office of the Prime Minister 1980), 
reaching a total of 1,583. In addition, there has been less detectable, 
but nevertheless important employment growth in activities less formally 
linked to tourism, including the distributive trades, and food and 
beverage industries. There have also been very positive effects upon 
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local arts and crafts, especially good examples including lacemaking, 
weaving and pottery industries. Thus, at least some of Metwally's (1977a) 
desirable multiplier effects have materialised. 
The fact that tourists accounted for 17.3% of total consumer expenditure 
in Malta in 1974 (Central Office of Statistics 1974), and as much as 
30.7% in 1980 (Central Office of Statistics 1980) (see rigure 13.7), 
implies that the growth of tourist activity must have had considerable 
employment and income multiplier effects in recent years, and is perhaps 
a useful measure of the growing importance of the tourist sector in the 
Maltese economy (Metwally 197~. However, it is estimated that the 
import content in tourist expenditure now amounts to well over SO%, the 
local content of tourist revenue in 1976, for example, only accounting 
for 44% of tourist expenditure (Grech 1978). The Central Bank of Malta 
estimates, therefore, that the net economic contribution of tourism to 
the GOP is only likely to be approximately 10%1. 
A large proportion of tourist expenditure is inevitably on accommodation. 
Significantly, British tourists in particular enjoy the financial 
savings associated with self-catering accommodation, a fact that is 
especially relevant in view of the continued decline in living standards 
in Great Britain. By 1978, World Tourism Statistics revealed that, of 
the total tourist arrivals in Malta, only 54% stayed 1n hotels, and that 
of the British tourist arrivals of that year, only 49% opted for hotel 
accommodation (World Tourism Organisation 1978). The fact that so 
1. The vague nature of these statistics illustrates a further problem of 
tour-1st activity. Measuring the progress of tourism is extremely 
difficult as its numerous activities and manifestations fall into differ-
ent economic sectors, and are often inseparable from aggregate statistics. 
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many visitors now spurn hotel accommodation in favour of flats and 
villas in order to save money is an increasingly disturbing phenomenon 
which suggests that as Maltese tourism has expanded, so its income and 
employment multiplier effects have been eroded. turthermore, according 
to statistics published by the Mid Med Bank (1980b),in 1978, non-hotel 
accommodation accounted for 66.9~ of tourist accommodation capacity. 
The ownership of tourist accommodation also determines to a great 
extent the local benefits accruing from tourist activity. If accomm-
odation is foreign owned, a large proportion of the profits generated is 
likely to be repatriated to overseas investors. As has already been 
discussed, the development phases of Maltese tourism involved substantial 
MNC capital penetration which has affected the hotels sector. 
Unfortunately, determining the exact proportions of overseas investment 
in the various categories of Maltese hotels is rendered extremely 
difficult because of the variety of company names under which the hotels 
operate, and t~eir complex intertwined networks of co-ownership. 
Nevertheless, with the aid of material kindly provided through the 
University of Malta, it was possible to trace the names of the hotel 
companies, and then .to provide some idea of the extent to which foreign 
ownership persisted in Maltese hotels in 1977 (see Table 13.2)1. 
Ofgreatest interest in Table 13.2 1s the De Luxe Class, whose hotels 
are apparently over 80% foreign owned. These are the largest hotels 
in the Islands, and by virtue of their quality and status, are the 'most 
expensive. Unfortunately, in many instances, determining the nationality 
of individual companies was extremely difficult as they were literally 
1. Ownership figures were gained with the kind assistance of the personnel 
of the Department of Trade, Lascaris, who kindly provided access to 
the necessary company files. 
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multinational. for this reason, ownership has been classified as 
'Maltese' or 'Foreign'. However, it is surprising that many of the 
foreign owned hotels were not British. Thus, in addition to numerous 
British owned hotel enterprises, there seemed to be an extremely strong 
American and Libyan presence. Fortunately, the much more modest 
Table 13.2 
Hotel No. of Ave. No. ! of Total % Forei~n 
Category Hotels of Beds Beddage Owned 
De Luxe 6 327 21 83 
Ia 4 270 12 40 
Ib 5 181 10 2 
IIa 15 156 25 44 
Db 23 82 20 25 
III 19 47 10 9* 
IV 8 32 2 19~ 
.......... 
40 Total 
* In Classes III and IV, sole proprietors and family owned enterprises 
were assumed, for statistical purposes, to be entirely Maltese 
owned. 
(N.B. Although total ownership data gained from the Department of 
Trade was for 1980, no hotels registered since 1977 have been 
included in the statistics.) 
foreign interests detected in other hotel categories is encouraging, 
indicating that the Maltese still control a sizeable proportion of their 
less salubrious hotel capacity. 
It is, unfortunately, impossible to determine the degree to which 
overseas interests have penetrated the self-catering (non-hotel) sector 
of tourist accommodation, especially in view of the even more diverse 
and fragmented nature of this sector. However, although the partic-
ularly strong British interests in Maltese property (which developed 
during the property boom of the late 1960s) have subsided considerably, 
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it is likely that there remains a significant British interest in the 
non-hotels sector of Maltese tourist accommodation. Nevertheless, the 
recent conversion of British and NATO barracks (and other buildings -
see Plate 13.2) into self-catering accommodation by the Government 
indicates that there must be an increasing State interest in this type 
of accommodation. 
Whilst much of the tourist expenditure in Malta is likely to be on 
accommodation, payment for most holidays is usually on a package basis, 
and includes, amongst other items, the cost of travel to and from Malta 
(usually by air). Hence, the major participants in package holiday 
trade include travel agents, package tour operators, and airlines, as 
well as the hoteliers and other owners of local holiday premises and 
businesses. In general, it is the package tour operators who have 
ultimate control over the tourist markets, and as Keller (1983) and 
Butler (1980) would agree, it is apparently British tour operators 
whose aggressiveness have ensured that three quarters of annual tourist 
arrivals in Malta in the past have been British. 
The Maltese authorities' lack of control of marketing in the tourist 
sector seems to be far worse than is the case even in the manufacturing 
sector, and has been recognised by the Maltese Governments of recent 
years as a serious problem. One of the means adopted to gain further 
control of, and benefit from, the tourist markets has been the creation 
of the state airline, Air Malta, which was formed with the assistance 
of Pakistan International Airlines in April 1974. The new airline has 
since taken a considerable share of scheduled and charter flights (mostly 
relinquished by British Airways), and has established new routes to 
other countries with whom intensified economic and tourist links are 
seen to be desirable. Air Malta has also taken majority shareholdings 
in several package tour companies in a positive attempt to participate 
more effectively in the tourist markets (Office of the Prime Minister 
1980). 
There are, meanwhile, encouraging signs that the private sector may be 
fostering the roots of successful future package tour operations, in 
some cases, with the assistance of State agencies. If this proves to 
be the case, then the stabilisation of Maltese tourism may be possible. 
However, all the indications are that such developments are both too 
late and too insubstantial to avert the savage decline now afflicting 
Maltese tourism. 
13.6 Non-Economic Issues 
There are signs that the development of tourism in Malta has served to 
enhance spatial inequalities, although the segregation of tourists away 
from the local population has not occurred (see figure 13.e). figure 
13.8 shows that nearly all the major hotels of Malta are located in the 
northern half of the main island. The same distribution applies to the 
location of restaurants, nighUiubs and discoteques, and much of the non-
hotel accommodation. It seems, therefore, that the beneficial multiplier 
effects of tourism are to some extent confined to limited areas of Malta. 
The less wealthy, predominantly Labour voting southern portion of Malta 
has few tourist facilities, and in contrast, contains most of the manu-
facturing centres. Consequently, the full cultural force of tourism is 
not experienced in the South, which similarly benefits little from 
enhanced local services. 
A commonly sited consequence of the rapid development of tourism in many 
resort countries has been a corresponding deterioration in the physical 
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environment. This is not only demonstrated by the increasing strain 
on existing infrastructure in Malta (such as water and electricity 
supplies), but is also illustrated by the unsympathetic and uncontrolled 
construction of tourist facilities throughout the Maltese Islands. 
Jones (1972) identified this problem as becoming a potentially very 
serious threat to the Maltese landscape. He did not see 
the major hotel sites as being the only major threat (see Plate 13.4). 
He observed that it is also (and mostly) the numerous space-consuming villasand 
apartment blocks, which are being built in increasingly prominent placas 
(especially in the rnrth of Malta), that seem to cause serious problems. 
The destruction of traditional lifestyles and values by the development 
of tourism is inevitable. In resort countries such as Malta, tourism 
encourages the accelerated acceptance of alien metropolitan values and 
tastes, a process that has been referred to as 'cocacolonisation' 
(Levitt 1970). The Maltese have had to tolerate the invasion of obscure 
foods, such as the 'cornish pastie', and worse, have witnessed the 
arrival of chains of 'Wimpey Bars'. Keller (1983, citing Doxey 1976 and 
Cohen 1972) extends his temporal analysis to show that with increasing 
unsympathetic overseas control, the growth of tourism is increasingly 
resented by the indigenous population (see figure 13.9). This does not 
seem to have happened in Malta. Instead, little segregation has occurred, 
and the Maltese seem to have eagerly adopted many of the tastes of the 
visiting tourists, including cornish pasties. 
The general change that has resulted is nowhere more apparent than in 
external attire, and clothing is now much more colourful, brief and 
provocative, much to the disapproval of the older generations. family 
conflict has increased as new values have infiltrated to widen the 
Explorer Drifter Ind ividual tJass Tourist Organ!Sed Mass Toorist 
Non-Irstitutioralised Institutionalised Cohen(1m)-
I Euphoria Apathy Anno)'Cnce Antagonism J L. __ --------------------- Doxey('S76) 
__ ----------------- Time,! Growth of Tourism )It 
Figure13.9 To'urism Development Models 
Source: Keller(1983) 
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generation gap, and traditional Catholic standards of behaviour have 
gradually been eroded. It must be remembered that tourists come to 
Malta for leisure, pleasure and relaxation purposes, imposing a 
perpetual holiday atmosphere upon the Maltese community. Such is the 
effect of the new tourist activity that ' ••• undoubtedly, the Maltese 
themselves do not realise how fundamentally their way of life has 
altered in the last decade' (Busuttil 1971a,p27). 
One of the major hazards of tourist activity is that it can lead to 
the commercialisation of social relations and cultural manifestations 
(Boissevain 1977b). In Malta, the glorious village feasts (fests) ara 
now frequente~ by thousands of tourists, but surprisingly, the villages 
generally seem to enjoy the presence of the foreigners, and have even in 
some cases changed the traditional dates of the festivals in order that 
they may coincide with more popular tourist months. In contrast to the 
experiences of other resort countries, it seems that in Malta, tourism 
is helping to create a new feeling of individuality, especially in the 
rural communities. Very positive effects upon arts and crafts in 
particular have enabled the Maltese to discover their own cultural 
heritage. Tourism has therefore given the Maltese pride and identity 
always previously denied by colonial military status (Busuttil 1971e). 
The ease with which Maltese society has coped with tourism until now 
suggests that tourism itself has not, and will not become 8 source of 
internal political instability. However, recent events within Malta 
suggest that political instability (produced by the anomolous general 
election results of December 1981) is becoming an increasingly serious 
threat to the stability and prosperity of tourism. This is ironic as it 
was, to some extent, political instability in the 1970s in competing 
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Mediterranean resort countries which allowed Malta to develop her own 
tourist industry so dramatically (see figure 13.1). The Iberian 
peninsula , for example, suffered severely, first as a result of the 
coup in Portugal in 1974, and then the death during the following year 
of General franco in neighbouring Spain. In Portugal, subsequent 
uncertainty and instability helped to reduce tourist arrivals from 
7,893,400 in 1974 to only 887,700 in 1975 (United Nations 1980/81). 
other Mediterranean resorts such as Greece have suffered similarly, 
and the arrival on Cyprus in 1974 of several thousand armed Turkish 
personnel seemed to discourage other visitors for several years1 • 
Cyprus, Spain, Portugal and Greece 1n particular have all recovered 
much of their markets, and in some cases, have improved upon their 
earlier positions. Unfortunately, in the case of Malta, political 
squabbles and accompanying violent incidents may quite easily induce 
a deterioration in the tourist sector similar in gravity to those 
experienced by Malta's Mediterranean competitors. for this reason, it 
is essential that the highly unsatisfactory constitution inherited at 
independence in 1964 is amended so as to prevent B repetition of the 
disastrous 1981 general elections. 
13.7 Conclusions 
Recent Maltese Governments have stated that it is their intention to 
dominate tourism rather than be dominated by it. However, the continuing 
dominance of the British tourist markets render control over this major 
source of national income difficult, if not impossible. The situation is 
rendered more unsatisfactory by the fact that foreign interests allow 
1. In 1973, tourist arrivals in Cyprus amounted to 264,100. After the 
invasion, in 1975 they had fallen to 47,100. 
many of the benefits accruing from tourist activity to be exported, in 
addition to which tourist spending tends to have a high import content. 
Bearing this in mind, it seems that one of the most important lessons 
to have emerged from the Maltese experience is that State intervention 
and involvement is vital to the future health and stability of the 
tourist industry, especially in small countries. To date, this has 
involved the creation of the State airline, and other State owned 
businesses, and has also led to the establishment of vital monitoring 
agencies. Obviously, the State believes that if it can emulate some of 
the achievements of the State dominated 'seacraft sector' (see Chapter 
Eleven), then some degree of stability should prevail within Maltese 
tourist activity. 
Many Maltese, however, claim that the type of State management experienced 
recently has been far from satisfactory. They point to the disastrous 
and often embarassing inadequacy of water supplies in the summer of 1981, 
and the complete failure of market diversification programmes. further-
more, it is suggested that the Government, whilst emphasising the 
desperate need for market diversification, has in fact deliberately 
fostered and further encouraged flows of British tourists in the interests 
of short term economic and financial gains. As evidence of the failure 
of Government policy, critics point to the disastrous beginning to 1982 
when tourist arrivals sagged badly. More alarming still is the fact that 
the apparent demise of the tourist industry has come at a bad time as 
there have been simulatneous setbacks in manufacturing industry. 
Clearly, Maltese tourism and manufacturing industry are both afflicted 
by the same problem - control by external organisations and institutions. 
Consequently, neither of the 2 most impo~tant sectors in Malta's economy 
is in a position in which it can control or even influence the markets 
on which it depends. 80th sectors are therefore not functioning in 
the interests of the Maltese economy, but are in contrast merely 
contributing to the budgets of multinational enterprise. Of the 2 
sectors, tourism is perhaps the more desirable because of its superior 
linkages with the local economy, and its more tangible multiplier 
effects (e.g. within the construction sector). Malta is undoubtedly 
suited to tourist activity, and is particularly suited to the tastes 
and requirements of British tourists. The problem of British 
dominance is not that the tourists are British, but is the fact that 
the marketing organisations which govern the destinations of tourists 
are British. If the future Maltese Governmen~can emulate the impressive 
international marketing achievements of the seacraft sector, then a more 
stable Maltese tourist industry may emerge. The chances are that,under 
such circumstances, most 0' the tourists would still be British, but 
that the tour operators and air charters bringing them to Malta, and the 
accommodation in which they stay, would be Maltese owned and controlled. 
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CONCLUSIONS TO SECTION THREE 
The diverse selection of chapters in this section have all shown that 
there are severe dependent structures prevalent within the Maltese 
economy. 80th in the manufacturing and tourist industries, dependency 
links have been identified as sources of potentially dangerous structural 
weakness within Malta's economy. The inclusion of the tourist sector 
within the analysis has proved to be especially valuable as the 
dependence with which it has been afflicted appears to be most serious. 
In both sectors, however, the irony is that little development could 
have occurred without extensive overseas involvement, and that it is 
precisely this multinational involvement that has caused the structural 
weaknesses identified in these chapters. It seems logical to conclude, 
therefore, that any further line of enquiry should concentrate on 
qu&.tioning whether overseas involvement has been sufficiently controlled 
and manipulated, rather than whether it should have occurred in the 
first place. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
CONCLUSIONS 
A number of important conclusions can be extracted from this study, and 
may be divided into 2 broad groups. The first set of conclusions relate 
to dependency theory itself, and to the lessons learned from the Maltese 
case concerning the application of the theory. The second, more 
voluminous set of conclusions relate to Malta itself, and are concerned 
with the relevance of dependence to the Maltese development experience. 
Conclusions Concerning Dependency Theory 
1. This study has shown that, although dependency theory is not 
necessarily a completely coherent or unified body of theory in its own 
right, it can at least be used to devise a framework of analysis for 
empirical studies. In the case of Malta, it has been possible in 
particular to examine and evaluate the role of the MNC in the development 
process. This study has therefore assumed dependent development to be 
possible, and has therefore concentrated on examining the quality of the 
development achieved by successive Maltese Governments. It seems that 
such en approach to dependence is likely to be more revealing than one 
~hich, at the outset, denies the possibility of dependent development. 
2. The presence within an economy of structural concentrations in 
production, overseas ownership, export markets and employment may be seen 
as a major structural weakness that is likely, in the long term, to induce 
damaging dependence and severe instability. The most obvious manifest-
ation of the concentration problem is that of sectoral concentration. 
The Maltese case has shown that an idea of the degree of concentration 
within an economy can be gained by establishing the proportion of GOP 
which is accounted for by a group of related products or services. Equally 
important in the Maltese case, especially as MNCs are heavily involved, is 
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the extent to which economic activity is owned and controlled by overseas 
interests. This is especially significant as it is clear that the 
interests of multinational investors do not necessarily coincide with 
those of the host countries within which they establish their subsidiary 
activities. 
3. It is clear from the Maltese experience that marketing constitutes 
one of the most serious problems facing many LDCs. There is inevitably 
a strong relationship between patterns of overseas ownership and control 
within the Maltese economy, and the extent and direction of Maltese 
export trade. Consequently, many of the worrying concentrations of overseas 
ownership correspond exactly with similar concentrations in export links. 
This type of situation persists in many other LDCs, and is therefore worthy 
of further study. Of particular interest is the inability of many 
countries to establish their own marketing links abroad, and also the 
extent to which total trade, when aggregated on a national basis, tends to 
be heavily concentrated with one country - often the ex-colonial power. 
Such a situation may render the weaker LDC vulnerable to political pressure 
exerted by the government of a dominant trading partner, or may also have 
repurcussions should the economy of the dominant trading partner encounter 
severe reversals in fortune. 
4. As a result of the above, strong concentrations in the structure of 
employment ensue on a sectoral basis. This can be a serious problem for 
governments whose economies may become dependent upon concentrations in 
unstable activities; thus, a concentration of output and export trade in, 
for example, a volatile manufacturing activity, can lead to severe 
fluctuations in levels of employment, and accompanying social problems. 
Such difficulties may be exacerbated if overseas controlled enterprises 
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act entirely in their own interests, thereby ignoring the social costs 
incurred by their decisions. 
5. Assuming the Maltese experience to be applicable to many LOCs 
(especially small countries), it seems that the indiscriminate attraction 
of MNC subsdiaries by LOCs seeking externally induced economic development 
can be a major cause of the structural concentrations and dependence 
currently prevalent within many economies. This is ironic as it is 
usually the perceived need for economic diversification which prompts 
governments to embark upon such development strategies. Unfortunately, 
it seems that MNC manufacturing subsidiaries fail to generate secondary 
activity during their residence in LOCs. In contrast, their heavily 
staged activities encourage linkages almost exclusively with their parent 
companies. The complete lack of internal linkages (apart from labour) 
with the often more traditional host economy indicates the existence of 
a 'dual economy' in many LOCs - a major symptom of dependence. The much 
desired income and employment multiplier effects of MNC activity are 
therefore often not as great as is hoped, although the direct provision 
of employment by the MNCs is usually greatly appreciated. 
6. Dependency theory may therefore be employed directly to examine and 
assess the importance of structural concentrations in an economy, and 
the degree of integration (as indicated by the presence of local linkages) 
within the same economy. Further important considerations emanating from 
the dependency literature include the influence of MNC induced development 
upon a nation's balance of payments, its socio-economic structure, and, 
more specifically, its income distribution. Of equal significance are 
assessments of the importance of transfer pricing activities by MNCs, and 
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the potency of government when faced with the often persuasive bargaining 
strength of the MNCs. 
7. Of the many facets of dependence applicable in empirical studies, 
cultural dependence is perhaps the most difficult to pursue. This is 
attributable to the largely abstract and subjective nature of cultural 
dependence. Measurement is therefore difficult, but the case of Malta 
demonstrates that external cultural influences can be important. MNCs 
are undoubtedly responsible for a substantial proportion of imported 
alien culture in Malta, especially through their activities in the 
tourist sector. However, the strength of surviving colonial structures, 
and the prolonged post-independence presence of the British fortress, 
render an assessment of the role of MNCs in the enhancement of Maltese 
cultural dependence difficult. Similar problems are .likely to apply in 
the study of other countries. 
8. One of the problems of the dependency literature has been its 
inability to provide solutions to the problems induced by dependence. 
Most contributions imply that dependence is a 'bad thing', and that it 
should be eliminated. The advantage of empirical studies of dependence 
is that they emphasise the fact that dependence need not necessarily be 
a wholly undesirable condition, and that no prescriptive measures are 
likely to be able to eliminate dependence completely, especially in small 
countries such as Malta. 
9. The case of Malta has shown that it is essential to consider the 
basic geographical characteristics of countries when examining dependency 
structures and designing a suitable economic strategy. factors such as 
natural resource endowment, situation and geostrategic value are extremely 
important. However, size has proved to be one of the most important 
factors governing Malta's dependence, as well as her means of coping with 
that dependence. For small countries such as Malta, dependence is 
unavoidable. Smallness results in deficiencies in physical and human 
resources, an inability to achieve scale economies, and a corresponding 
pattern of concentrations in production. In many cases (excluding some 
of the more successful small NICs such as Singapore), it also helps to 
ensure a profoundly weak trading position in which the small country 
remains a price-taker, and is never able to influence the markets on 
which it depends. Eradicating dependence in small countries is impossible, 
as is well illustrated by the often dangerous consequences of vigorous 
delinking strategies elsewhere in the world (e.g. ~amaica). Alternative 
strategies are necessary, which in effect involve the diversification 
and manipulation of dependency links, and simultaneous reductions in the 
dangerous structural concentrations which frequently develop in small 
less developed economies. Dependency theory may therefore be used 
prescriptively to help countries cope with, and even exploit their 
dependence. 
10. In small countries especially, it is clear that, despite the 
inevitable development of dependent structures, the attraction of MNCs 
is vital if major industrial and service development is to be successfully 
established. The experiences of Malta have shown that in many small 
countries, most crucial factors of production (including capital, 
technology, raw materials and entrepreneurial impetus) are absent, and 
must therefore be imported. Equally important is the inadequacy of the 
internal markets of small countries, which hinders the creation of import 
substitution industries, and encourages dependence upon external markets 
for businesses seeking economies of scale. In this context, it seems 
that market acquisition is itself a serious problem facing most LDCs, 
and once again, that MNCs often provide the best means of obtaining market 
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outlets, both for industrial goods and international services (sUCh as 
tourism). 
Given that the attraction of MNC subsidiaries is unavoidable, it is 
essential that a complementary and beneficial blend of MNC activities 
is encouraged. Thus it is important that the MNC attraction is selective, 
and that the development of dangerous dependent structures is avoided 
through the prevention of undesirable concentrations in overseas 
ownership, export markets, production and employment. It seems that 
under these circumstances, strong state intervention is necessary if the 
desired indigenous control over the development process is to be retained. 
11. Dependency theory may therefore be employed as a means of planning 
and assessing a country's development programme. In this case, it has 
been used to assess Malta's development strategies, particularly with 
respect to the role of MNCs. The section that follows contains conclusions 
concerning Malta's development experiences, and the role of MNCs in 
Maltese development. 
Conclusions Concerning Maltese Development 
1. Malta is an extremely small country with an extremely small economy. 
Whilst it is perhaps reasonable to expect larger countries,with more 
substantial human and physical resources at their disposal,to attempt a 
more autonomous development strategy, Malta has, since independence, been 
heavily and unavoidably dependent upon external sources for capital 
investment, technology, entrepreneurial impetus and markets. Thus, 
although many dependency theorists assume that the elimination of 
dependency links is a vital component of any development strategy, the 
Maltese case illustrates that elimination is often impossible, and that 
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some countries are forced to tolerate conditions of extreme dependence. 
Despite this apparent handicap, Malta appears to have attained many of 
its development goals (both in economic and social terms), and to have 
achieved the 'dependent development' that so much of dependency theory 
claims to be impossible. However, the extreme nature of Malta's 
dependence has without doubt devalued much of the development aChieved 
since 1964. Consequently, in this study, it has been possible to use 
dependency theory to assess the value of Maltese post-independence 
development - an approach that differs radically from most uses of 
dependency theory, which prefer to concentrate on the impossibility of 
dependent development. 
2. Malta has emerged from almost 2 decades of independence with a 
severely distorted economic structure. The current pattern of economic 
activity in the Islands is directly attributable to the policies of 
successive Governments of both Parties, which, despite displaying widely 
differing labels, have involved the concerted attraction of overseas-
owned and overseas-controlled export-oriented manufacturing industry, 
and the development of an overseas-controlled tourist industry. 
3. 80th Nationalist Party and Malta Labour Party Governments have 
achieved their broad aims of enlarging the Maltese manufacturing sector, 
but have in the process surrendered the initiative to MNCs, which in turn 
has encouraged the development of undesirable concentrations within the 
manufacturing sector. 
One of the most obvious concentrations has occurred in manufacturing 
output, of which 36% was accounted for by' the textiles sector by 1980. 
The only other manufacturing sector to show significant growth has been 
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metals, much of this advance being in electronics industries. 80th the 
textiles sector and electronics based activities have been shown to be 
volatile, fluctuating industries, a fact which indicates that excess 
·dependence upon them is highly undesirable. 
4. The labour intensive nature of the textiles and electronics activities 
has resulted in a corresponding concentration in the employment structure 
of Maltese manufacturing. The creation of employment has been a major 
priority of all post-independence Maltese Governments. However, the 
concentration of the new employment in such unstable industries gives 
cause for great concern. furthermore, the fact that the new industries 
have in most cases opted to employ young, semi-skilled and female labour 
instead of the experienced, redundant male workers for whom the Government 
industrial attraction policy was devised, has been disappointing. 
5. Although it must be accepted that indigenous factors were unable to 
generate the desired new manufacturing indus~ry alone, by attracting 
overseas MNC subsidiaries, successive Maltese Governments ~ lost much 
of their influence and control over the new manufacturing sector. 
Ownership data for manufacturing industry has revealed that, especially 
in the leading sectors, 8ritish, American, and latterly, West German 
interests dominate. In most cases, it is also apparent that official 
Government statistics underestimate the direct control that overseas 
interests have over Maltese industrial output and employment. Unfort-
unately, it is difficult to ensure that the perceived interests of the 
nation coincide with those of the MNCs operating in Malta. This is 
particularly worrying given the already volatile nature of the industries 
involved. 
6. Perhaps the most disturbing concentration to have developed within 
the structure of the manufacturing sector is that of overseas markets, 
the current distorted pattern of trade clearly resulting primarily from 
the domination of overseas interests in Maltese manufacturing activity. 
By 1980, 82% of exports found their way to E.E.C. markets. Much of the 
trade occurred between MNC parents and their subsidiaries. Most alarming 
was the fact that, in the comparatively few cases were Maltese companies 
exported their produce, they too depended almost entirely upon MNCs for 
their marketing activities. furthermore, as a result of the distorted 
pattern of output within Maltese manufacturing, Maltese exports remain 
confined to a restricted range of mostly textile goods. Consequently, 
a complete lack of Maltese control in the marketing sphere, the strong 
dominance of E.E.C. market destinations, and the very limited range of 
products exported by the Maltese economy constitutes a highly unsatis-
factory and dependent situation. 
7. There is no doubt that tourism represents a welcome addition to the 
Maltese economy, and that it constitutes a vital component in the post-
independence diversification programme. It is, nevertheless, disappoint-
ing that tourism displays serious structural concentrations similar to 
those of the manufacturing sector. Indeed, as far as markets are 
concerned, tourism is in a very much more serious situation than manuf-
acturing activity. Tourism is a highly sensitive activity, the potential 
for wild market fluctuations,in general, remaining much greater than is 
the case for other activities. Moreover, in the Maltese case, by 1980, 
over three quarters of all tourist arrivals originated in Great Britain 
(over 90% originating from the E.E.C. as a whole). The current 
dependence afflicting Maltese tourism may be attributed to the control of 
Maltese tourist activity by overseas tour operators, the bulk of which 
are British. 
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B. As is the case in most economies attempting overseas induced economic 
development, it is hoped that the introduction of MNC subsidiary activity 
will help create a well integrated economy. The key to such an 
achievement is seen as the development of local linkages that bind the 
new activities to ~e domestic sector of the economy. This rarely occurs 
in LDCs, and the overseas industries tend to remain largely separate 
from the local economy. This situation has occurred in Malta, where a 
type of dual economy now exists. Malta's new industries are spatially 
segregated from most indigenous activity, operate on a different scale to 
most local industry, export almost all their output, and usually do no 
business with local companies. They therefore induce little extra 
activity on their arrival, and consequently fail to realise the desired 
employment and income multiplier effects expected in the official Maltese 
policy documents. On a positive note, however, the extreme lack or 
linkages has its advantages as, in the current world recessionary 
conditions, the closure of a Maltese ractory is unlikely to have serious 
negative multiplier effects. Significantly, the only dynamic areas of 
the Maltese economy to show substantial internal linkages are the 
dockyards, and the unstable tourist industry. 
9. To many dependency theorists, the structural concentrations evident 
within the Maltese economy, and the corresponding absence of internal 
linkage~would indicate the existence of damaging dependent structures. 
However, some of the other common ingredients of a classically dependent 
economy are absent in the Maltese case. for example, there is no 
evidence that the arrival of MNC subsidiary plants has displaced 
indigenous activity. Indeed, although a dual economy may be said to 
exist in ~alta, thSfU J~ no slgn that the modern, overseas controlled 
sector of manufacturing industry is incompatible with the indigenous 
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sector. This may be explained in some measure by the fact that nearly 
au the MNC subsidiaries are export-oriented, and that they do not compete 
with indigenous enterprise for the domestic market. 
MNCsare usually attracted to LDC economies in the hope that they will 
be able to attract valuable foreign exchange to such countries. For a 
variety of reasons, dependency theorists maintain that in the long term, 
MNCs encourage the reverse situation, inducing a loss to the domestic 
economy of foreign exchange earnings. tortunately, in the Maltese case, 
this does not seem to have occurred to excess, and the Maltese balance 
of payments has consequently remained in surplus in most years since 
the late 1960s. This is impressive, particularly in view of the fact 
that the close relationship between MNC parents and their subsidiaries 
has inevitably permitted transfer pricing activities. 
Dependency theorists may also be surprised to observe that in Malta, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the new MNC activities have 
encouraged the development of new class groupings. furthermore, there 
is little evidence to suggest that they have worsened the income 
distribution in the Islands. In contrast, it seems that in the last 
decade especially, firm interventionist Government policy has ensured 
that incomes have converged, an achievement which has substantially 
assisted the poorer classes. 
Although it seems that the power of the Maltese Governments may have 
been sufficient to eliminate some of the less desirable consequences of 
MNC activities in Malta, there is little evidence to suggest that their 
bargaining power over MNCs is strong. As 1s the case in other LDCs, the 
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Government in Malta is generally unable to impose terms on overseas 
investors, and equally important, is rarely able to prevent the arbitrary 
closure of Maltese plants by disinterested MNC parent organisations. 
10. Of all the manifestations of dependence, cultural dependence is 
probably the most difficult to assess. Malta clearly regards itself as 
part of Europe, as is illustrated by many Maltese citizens' apparent 
dislike of north African (particularly libyan) visitors. There is 
little doubt that Maltese cultural dependence upon Europe (particularly 
Great Britain), has been reinforced by her prolonged colonial experience, 
and the continuation of the British fortress in Malta long after 
independence in 1964. In addition, the strong influence of the British 
dominated tourist industry should not be underestimated. There remains 
in Malta, therefore, a positive prejudice in favour of British goods 
especially. Thus, despite increasingly severe import restrictions, many 
Maltese consumers still prefer British goods (particularly food and 
confectionary goods), and many Maltese entrepreneurs still prefer 
Bitish capital equipment (if they can obtain it). 
11. Countering dependence in the Maltese Islands has been complicated 
by the extremely small size of the Maltese economy. As has already been 
observed, the capacity for indigenous economic development has never seemed 
great, and the decision to depend upon multinational enterprise as the 
major force in the develop~ent programme appears to have been unavoidable. 
It can only be concluded that successive Maltese Governments have never 
been in a position in which the elimination of dependence has been possible. 
The only option has consequently been one of attempting to manipulate and 
diversify dependency links, and in some cases, to sever some of the more 
undesirable links. Such a,policy would be expected to involve the 
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adoption of a controlled delinking strategy, and the diversification 
of the economy, thereby reducing,where possible, the more serious 
structural concentrations in the economy. It seems that recent MLP 
Governments in particular have adopted this type of development strategy, 
although their success has clearly been limited, particularly with 
respect to economic diversification, and the reductions of the now 
enormous structural concentrations in the economy. 
12. To many British observers, especially those who are unaware of the 
strong links which continue to bind the Maltese economy to the British 
economy (particularly in the tourist industry), Malta has in the last 
decade adopted a vigorous delinking strategy. Manifestations of this 
strategy include the official break with Sterling, and the aggressive 
way in which Malta greeted negotiations concerning the continuation of 
the British fortress in 1972. It is strange that the majority of the 
British public still incorrectly believes that the Maltese expelled the 
British and NATO forces from the Islands in 1979. This was not the 
case, and it is amilarly not the case that the Maltese people have 
adopted an anti-British attitude. If a genuinely anti-British attitude 
were to develop in Malta, it would seriously damage both the tourist 
and manufacturing sectors of the economy. 
13. The loss of the British fortress has, however, been signiricant in 
the diplomatic sphere. Malta now has an entirely rejuvenated attitude 
to international politics, and is a fully-fledged non-aligned state. 
Increased 'cooperation' between Malta and the Easte~8loc countries, and 
most important, the Arab world, has helped diversify Malta's sources of 
aid, although it has as yet done only a little to broaden Malta's trade 
links. Malta therefore no longer perce~ves its importance in the 
Mediterranean in terms of geostrategic value, but prefers to think of 
itslef in peaceful terms as a 'Euro-Arab Bridge'. This explains a recent 
Government decision to make the teaching of Arabic compulsory in Maltese 
schools. It is possible that such decisions may go some way towards 
diluting the dominant British culture which continues to influence the 
Islands. 
14. Recent Maltese Governments have undoubtedly made great progress in 
the social sphere. Through the application of strongly interventionist 
social policy, MLP Governments since 1971 have reduced income inequalities, 
reduced unemployment by creating the Labour Corps, and countered severe 
housing shortages by implementing a major housebuilding programme. Their 
activities have therefore benefitted the most disadvantaged groups of the 
Maltese population. Simultaneously, as a result of a series of 
unpleasant clashes, the MLP Governments have further reduced the power 
of the Church in Maltese politics. It is unfortunate that such successes 
have not been repeated effectively in the economic sphere. However, 
the internal political instability that has occurred within Malta during 
the last 11 years indicates that a similar approach to the economy could 
have done more harm than good. 
15. Since the peak of 1980, it seems that Malta has begun to pay the 
penalty for permitting the uncontrolled development of dependent and 
highly concentrated structures within her economy. The latest figures 
to be published by the Central Bank of Malta (1983) show that during 
1982, unemployment jumped from 5.3% to 8.5% - the highest rate on record 
since 1960. This increase constitutes a rise in the number of Maltese 
unemployed of 82.3% in 12 months. Simultaneously, the disturbing downward 
trend in tourist arrivals in the first 4 months of 1982 (see Chapter 
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Thirteen) worsened in the next 3 months up to the beginning of August, 
indicating a fall of almost one third. The British shortfall continued 
to account focover 90% of the total decline in tourist arrivals. 
The latest figures from the Central Bank indicate that Malta is facing 
a very severe crisis. Increases in unemployment, and decreases in 
tourist arrivals show at least that the tourist sector is in difficulties. 
However, unofficial reports indicate that much of the new unemployment 
has been caused by difficulties in the manufacturing sector. The only 
bright light amidst the gloom is provided by the State-owned and cont-
rolled dockyards, which still appear to be working at full capacity, 
and to have overcome mounting recessionary pressures. 
16. finally, the Maltese Islands at independence in 1964, and the Maltese 
Islands of the early 1980s, were both faced with serious crises. Malta 
in 1964 was faced with the task of trying to shake off its colonial 
dependence, and reduce its dependence upon the dying fortress sector. 
Help in the diversification process was comparatively plentiful, and was 
provided by the British Government. In the 1980s, Malta is once again 
trying to diversify her economy, this time away from an unhealthy 
dependence upon tourism, textile manufacturing activities, and the 
multinational companies that control these vital sectors of the economy. 
Although the dependence of the 2 periods is markedly different in 
character, the problems of economic diversification remain similar. 
Nevertheless, in the 1980s, Malta cannot rely upon substantial British 
aid, and is also forced to contend with hostile world markets which were 
rather friendlier in the 1960s. Consequently, despite substantially 
increased living standards, the dependency. structures of contemporary 
Malta are rather more debilitating than those which faced the Maltese 
Government at independence in 1964. 
APPENDIX 
DEPARTMENT Or GEOGRAPHY 
UNIVERSITY Of GLASGOW 
GLASGOW G12 8QQ 
SCOTLAND 
INDUSTRIAL SURVEY Of THE MALTESE ISLANDS 
DISCLAIMER 
The information obtained in the following 
questionnaire is NOT for publication. It 
is not to be used~r commercial or polit-
ical purposes, and is entirely academic in 
nature, contributing substantially towards 
a crucial part of the enquirer's doctorate 
research. All the information gained will 
be treated with the utmost confidentiality. 
SECTION ONE: GENERAL INfORMATION 
1. What is the Maltese registered name of your firm? Please state the 
firm's address:-
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
••• • • •• • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • •• • •• • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • •• 
• • •• • •• • • • •• •• • • • ••• •• •• • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • •• • • •• • •• • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
2. Are you a subsidiary company or a branch of any other firm? 
YES NO 
If YES, please give the name, address and nationality of your parent 
company:- .' 
Name: •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • 
Address: •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Nationality: ••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
1 
3. What are your main products? •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
••• • • • •• • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • 
4. In what year did your company begin production in Malta? •••••••• 
SECTION TWO: GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES 
1. Have you ever received Maltese Government assistance? YES NO 
If YES, please tick any of the list of incentives below that you 
received :-
Interest free, or low interest loans 
Grants 
10 year tax holiday 
Import duty concessions 
SECTION THREE: EMPLOYMENT 
ractory Provision 
Cheap factory rent 
Reinvestment tax allowance 
Other forms of aid? Please 
describe:-
•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
1. How many persons do you employ? Totall ••••••• Malst ••••••••••• 
remale I 
••••••••• 
2. What is the largest number of persons that you havs ever employed, 
and IIIhen? 
Maximum Number of Employees: •••••••••• Year: • ••••••••••• 
3. What is your standard operative's lIIeekly wage? Ml •••••••••••••••• 
4. How many expatriate persons do you employ? •••••••••••••••••••••• 
SECTION tOUR: PRODUCTION AND TRADE 
1. What was the total valu8_ of output of your plant during 1979? 
M£ ••••••••••••••••••••• 
2. What proportion of your output lIIas exported in 19791 •••••••••••• % 
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3. If you do export, please list the countries to which you exported 
in 1979, and the approximate proportions of your exports that went 
to each country:-
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ........ % 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••• • ••••• •• % 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••• • ••••• •• % 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••• • ••••• •• % 
SECT! ON FI V(: LOCAL LI NKAGES 
1. 00 you obtain inputs to your production processes from any other 
manufacturers operating in Malta? 
YES NO 
If YES, please state a) The various inputs ••••••••••••••••••••• 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
b) The companies which provide them ••••••• 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
c) Their value in 1979 
•••••••••••••••••••• 
•• • • •• • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• • •• • • • 
2. 00 you provide inputs from your production inMalta for any other 
manufacturers operating in the Maltese Islands? 
YES NO 
If YES, please state a) The various inputs •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
b) The companies with which you provide the 
inputs 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
c) Their value in 1979 ••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
429 
3 
1 • 
SECTI ON SI X: EQUIPMENT 
Do you employ second-hand machinery? YES NO 
If YES, what proportion (by value) of all your machinery is 
second hand? . . . 
• •• • • •• • • • • • • •• • % 
2. from which different countries does your equipment originate, and 
in what proportion? 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
SECTI ON SEVEN: TRAINING 
1. Does your firm have a training policy for:-
a) Shop floor personnel YES NO 
b) Management Personnel YES NO 
If YES, please elaborate •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
SEeTI ON EI GHT: OWNERSHIP 
1. What is the total value of your paid up share capital? i'lL • ••••• 
2. Who, and what nationality are the major share holders? 
Share Holder Nationali ty Value 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••• • •••••••••••••••• I'I£' •••••• •••••• %: 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••• • •••••••••••••••• i'lL • ••••• . ..... " 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••• • •••••••••••••••• I'I£' • ••••• . ..... % 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••• • •••••••••••••••• M£. • ••••• • ••• •• % 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••• • •••••••••••••••• I'I£' • ••••• . ..... % 
• •••••••••••••••••••••••••• • •••••• ! ••••••••• ML • ••••• • ••••• % 
4 
SECTION NINE: GENERAL COMMENT 
1. What, in your opinion, are the advantages and disadvantages or 
Malta as an industrial location? 
2. 00 you have any further comments to make about Malta? 
5 
~---------
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